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Oh Barbie, Not Again! Mattel’s View of Women and Science

Apparently, Barbie again thinks that women are limited when it comes to science. Mattel seems to be trying to get on board with with STEM and women. They commissioned a book Barbie: I Can Be A Computer Engineer. Unfortunately, according to The Sydney Morning Herald, the book has Barbie as only able to design and not code, and she seems not to have a sense of computer security. The online outrage has prompted a recall of the book. The writer claims that Mattel required Barbie to be “more polite.” Mattel has claimed the book, which came out in 2010, does not reflect current Barbie views. Nonetheless, The Herald points out that The book came out last year and there is evidence that the book was commissioned in 2011. Furthermore, the real point is that Mattel should be able to do better here. As the Herald points out that other offerings such as Rosie Revere Engineer and the Hello Ruby project manage to show females doing well with technology and gaining skills such as coding. So will Mattel and Barbie ever catch up to more modern ideas? After all, critical views of Barbie and Mattel’s views on women in math and science have been going on since at least the late 1990s.

Maybe the Internets and buying power will force a shift. As I argue in Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine, people should take on Mattel and Barbie with online protests, boycotts, reworking of the brand image (which apparently happened with a remix app that lets “people [] make their own wry comments by rewriting the book”), and more. That might signal competitors that a market exists while also telling Mattel that they are losing the next generation of consumers. Plus The Herald notes that Barbie sales are down. That may present and opportunity for this sort of action to have force. As STEM grows in attention, and moms start to buy more toys that foster new views of femininity, maybe other toy and doll makers will take off and challenge Barbie. Given Mattel’s power, it may alter course and swamp those new entrants, or it may buy them. A more likely outcome is that a few new offerings emerge, but Barbie stays the course. Still, if some criticism spurs even niche options, today’s world of Internet sales and bespoke toys can support that niche until it maybe becomes more.

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I Am Thankful for Antitrust? Yep.

So you are settling in thinking about food, those who have it, those who don’t, and of course a distraction, antitrust, pops into your head. OK that is unlikely unless you are a nerdy professor, which I am. In all seriousness, I am thankful that friends and colleagues indulge my ideas as I develop them, and that they read work other than what I read. It allows me to pose odd questions, hear what I may be missing, share views that my friends may not have seen, and all are better for it.

The specific, recent example happens to be in antitrust. I was catching up with Spencer Waller and mentioned that I had dusted off early Bork. The man writes quite well. Whether one agrees or disagrees with him, his style and clarity is to be admired. That also poses a danger that Peter Swire alluded to and Spencer helped me overcome. Bork, of course, has critics and some of that criticism is about substance. That is some argue Bork was inaccurate about history and more. So if one wishes to cite Bork, it helps to know where that may lead. Thankfully, Spencer pointed me to an excellent symposium on Bork.

So I am also grateful to the Antitrust Law Journal and Barak Orbach, George Priest, Danny Sokol, and Adam J. Di Vincenzo for organizing and editing the Symposium on Robert Bork and Antitrust Policy. (Volume 79, Issue 3). The range of views and explanations are exceptional. Each essay explores specific ideas or contentions. The authors I have read so far provide a view of Bork and antitrust in general that educates and excites. I look forward to reading the rest.

European Parliament Resolution on Google

The European Parliament voted 384 – 174 today in favor of a “resolution on Supporting Consumer Rights in the Digital Single Market.” The text of the resolution:

Stresses that all internet traffic should be treated equally, without discrimination, restriction or interference, independently of its sender, receiver, type, content, device, service or application;

Notes that the online search market is of particular importance in ensuring competitive conditions within the Digital Single Market, given the potential development of search engines into gatekeepers and their possibility of commercialising secondary exploitation of obtained information; therefore calls on the Commission to enforce EU competition rules decisively, based on input from all relevant stakeholders and taking into account the entire structure of the Digital Single Market in order to ensure remedies that truly benefit consumers, internet users and online businesses; furthermore calls on the Commission to consider proposals with the aim of unbundling search engines from other commercial services as one potential long-term solution to achieve the previously mentioned aims;

Stresses that when using search engines, the search process and results should be unbiased in order to keep internet search non-discriminatory, to ensure more competition and choice for users and consumers and to maintain the diversity of sources of information; therefore notes that indexation, evaluation, presentation and ranking by search engines must be unbiased and transparent, while for interlinked services, search engines must guarantee full transparency when showing search results; calls on Commission to prevent any abuse in the marketing of interlinked services by operators of search engines;

Some in the US tech press has played this up as an incipient effort to “break up” Google, with predictable derision at “technopanic.” (Few tend to reflect on whether the 173 former firms listed here really need to be part of one big company.) But the resolution’s linking of net and search neutrality suggests other regulatory approaches (prefigured in my 2008 paper Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines). I’ve developed these ideas over the years, and I hope my recently released book‘s chapters on search and digital regulation will be of some use to policymakers. Without some regulatory oversight and supervision, our black box society will only get more opaque.

Image Group Legal Academia 07
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Legal Academia LinkedIn Group

I created a new LinkedIn group called Legal Academia for legal academics to share useful links, posts, scholarship, events, etc. Shameless-self promotion is welcomed — as long as what you promote is good.

Who Can Join?

Anyone can join — non-academics can join too if you want to follow along.

How Do You Join?

Go to the group’s page: Legal Academia . Just click the join button at the top of the page.

Who Can Post?

The forum will be moderated so that all posts will be by legal academics about their work, blog posts, conferences, and scholarship.  Administrators can post about law school events or notable happenings or issues.

What Topics Can You Post On?

Posts are not restricted to those about legal academia.   This forum might hopefully grow into a hub of information about notable activity in the blogosphere, scholarship, and elsewhere.  Please don’t promote every single blog post you write, but if you have written something noteworthy, please share it.   Please feel free to share the work of others too.

Why Join?

Academics have not embraced LinkedIn as much as they have Twitter, but there are some really great things about LinkedIn’s platform.  It is a way to get work noticed and read by practitioners.  Posts, although short, are not subject to Twitter’s Draconian character limit.  There’s a lot less noise on LinkedIn, so the forum can be a more focused place for promoting and discussing scholarship and information relevant to the academy.

In your settings, you can have a daily digest or weekly digest of the postings to the group emailed to you — or nothing at all.

So please join the Legal Academia LinkedIn group.  And please post, as the group won’t succeed if I’m the lone one posting.   Please don’t be bashful about pointing out new things that you’ve written.  That’s what this forum is for — to help everyone publicize and get more people reading and engaging with scholarship and academic discussion.  Thanks!

Posner
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The Maverick – A Biographical Sketch of Judge Richard Posner: Part II, The Will to Greatness

This is the second installment of a biographical profile of Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. The first installment can be found here. Beginning next week, a five-part Q & A series along with an interview with the author of a forthcoming Posner biography will be posted.

Note: Some of the links used below will open only in Firefox or Chrome but not in Safari. // Revised: 11-26-14 (10:50 pm)

The Friendly Connection

“Friendly and Posner have been cited by name by the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Courts of Appeals, and the U.S. Districts Courts more often by far than any other circuit court judges.”  — William Domnarski (2011)

While much is known about Judge Posner’s high regard for Justice Holmes, much less attention has been devoted to his great respect for Judge Henry Friendly (1903-1983). For Posner, Friendly’s “photographic memory combined with his analytical power, energy, speed, and work ethic” produced “the most powerful legal reasoner in American legal history.” Or as Posner put it in a 1986 tribute: Judge Friendly’s “opinions have exhibited greater staying power than that of any of his contemporaries on the federal courts of appeal.” (99 Harv. L. Rev. 1724)

Between 1982 and 1986, the two jurists shared some 15,000 words in correspondence to one another (their letters have been preserved in the Harvard Law Library). Early on, in a May 12, 1982 letter to Posner, the 78-year-old Friendly praised the 43-year-old jurist: “I could not have dreamed of finding so perceptive a reader as you.” As Mr. Domnarski has aptly noted, “[s]oon Posner was comfortable enough to reveal some uncertainty in his work and ask for criticism that might help him. ‘On a more serious, even dismal, note,’ he writes, ‘I am enclosing a recent opinion I did on primary jurisdiction. I hope I got it right, but I felt a little unsure of the boundary between exhaustion and primary jurisdiction; and I would as always appreciate any comments, however critical, if you have time to read it. Pay no attention to it if I’m trespassing too much on your time.’”

A few years later, Judge Friendly was even more impressed with both the volume and quality of Posner’s judicial opinions.

Judge Friendly on Posner’s Judicial Opinions

“Every one is a masterpiece of analysis, scholarship, and style,” he declared in a September 19, 1984 letter. “About a year ago I said you were already the best judge in the country; having uttered that superlative, I am baffled on how to better it. If I could think of a way, I would use it.”

They wrote back and forth on topics ranging from railroad law to diversity jurisdiction and beyond. “Friendly and Posner were apparently so drawn to each other’s work,” says Domnarski, “that they wanted to see the other in action by having Posner come to Friendly’s Second Circuit and sit by designation. Posner had at first wanted Friendly to come to the Seventh Circuit to sit to take advantage of the rule allowing senior circuit judges such as Friendly to sit by designation in other circuits upon request and approval by the visited circuit’s chief judge.” Unfortunately, it never happened, though Posner did manage an occasional visit with Friendly whenever he came to New York and had the time.

Around Christmas of 1984, Judge Friendly inquired about Posner’s possible “elevation” to the Supreme Court. Even back then, Posner thought it doubtful. As he expressed it in a December 26, 1984 letter: “I have become an object of mysterious fascination to a segment of the press, which is doing a pretty good job of portraying me as a weirdo on the basis of some of my pre-judicial academic writing (misrepresented) and a handful of my opinions (misunderstood). Of course there is precious little I can do about any of this, but I am consoled by the thought that eventually the press will lose interest in me and move on to intrinsically livelier topics.”

Screen Shot 2014-11-21 at 9.33.44 AMAssuredly, Henry Friendly knew well what it meant to be a great judge but nonetheless passed up for a seat on the High Court. In a January 10, 1985 letter, he tried to console Posner: “These things are annoying but all this will pass. Unhappily this may not be without injury to your immediate prospects for elevation but I gather that you did not think these were very high in any event. You are wise to have acquired immunity for Supreme Court fever – a disease that has ruined many a judge.”

By 1986 it was over; Henry Friendly – old, depressed, and lonely – took his life. It was a great loss to the legal world. Worse still, his brand of judging was vanishing into the vapor of a past-tense world. Law, Posner wrote that same year, “is becoming increasingly politicized, bureaucratized, and specialized, and rising workloads are depriving more and more judges of time for reflection, discussion, and outside reading. These trends, which are unlikely to be reversed soon, bode ill for the continuation of our tradition of great judges. We may not see the likes of Henry Friendly again. The fullness of time may reveal that his passing marked the end of the classic period of American law.” (99 Harv. L. Rev. 1724,1725).

Friendly & Posner – their names sit well together. In some respects it is unsurprising that the two should have bonded as they did. They shared a common commitment to solving the riddles of the law in ways that lesser judges never do. Given their cerebral firepower and will to make the law more beholding to pragmatic reasoning, they stood almost alone in the camps of jurists.  Because of that, they also shared a common identity as the most highly regarded jurists of their time, though neither ever elevated to the Supreme Court.

As it turned out, Henry Friendly’s reputation struggled to survive the ravages of time (see, for example, Adrian Vermeule’s review of the David Dorsen’s biography of Friendly). Even so, traces of the Friendly legacy find new and invigorated meaning in the person and writings of Richard Posner, buttressed of course by the latter’s unique judicial temperament, stylistic writings skills, and economic modes of analysis.

Beyond their respective biographies (existing and forthcoming), someday someone will write a book of a collection of profiles of the great federal judges who influenced the law but never sat on the High Court (a book similar to G. Edward White’s The American Judicial Tradition). When that book is done, profiles of Henry Friendly and Richard Posner are certain to be included, if only because they helped to shape the law in ways that most Supreme Court Justices never have. And yet, when he was nominated, relatively little attention was paid to Richard Posner; it was as if all that he had already written were typed in invisible ink. He was just another nominee . . . or so it seemed to the Senate when it confirmed him.

Richard Posner’s Confirmation Hearing

Posner’s confirmation hearing took place on a Friday afternoon, in a joint session with four other nominees, and with only Chairman Strom Thurmond and the conservative Howell Heflin of Alabama in attendance. Posner’s part of the hearing took but a few minutes, and he was quickly confirmed without debate.  — Herman Schwartz, Packing the Courts (1988)

Judging Risks: Global Warming, Terrorism, & Abortion Protestors

UnknownHe crosses the street with Darwinian caution. While he may not be entirely risk averse, he is surely risk attentive . . . even though a side of him greatly admires Holmesian heroism of the kind the captain so valiantly displayed in the Civil War. In this general regard and others, one can turn to Posner’s book Catastrophe: Risk and Response (2004) to get an up close sense of his views on cost-benefit analysis.

Global Warming: Mindful of such matters, a decade ago Posner expressed serious concerns about global warming. In Catastrophe, he stressed that “a wait-and-see policy would be perilous.” Though he would surely shun an environmentalist name tag (too herd mentality like), the libertarian jurist cautioned: “Eventually, and perhaps sooner than later, the atmospheric concentrations may reach a level that triggers abrupt, catastrophic global warming – the kind that ended the Younger Dyras. No one knows what that trigger point is or when it will be reached (if ever), but it will be reached sooner if we do nothing, starting now, to reduce emissions.”

In reflecting on the respective environmental and economic factors, Posner was sensitive to the well-being of future generations:

Posner the “Environmentalist” 

Although there is a strong case for taking measures against global warming now rather than waiting decades to do so, the question remains what measures to take – how much cost to incur – and the answer depends in part on the weight to be given to the welfare of future generations, since it is most likely that the costs of global warming will be borne primarily by them.”

In that regard, he made a strong case for being “more future-regarding.” To put it another way, the law may belong to the living, but its impact will be on those yet to be born, to whom a duty is surely owed.

Terrorism: Lest Judge Posner be mistaken for a pie-in-the-sky liberal, his ideas on terrorism and civil liberties might readily prompt those of that ilk to pause before applauding him. Here again, his views on risk management are articulated in Catastrophe, and also in his Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency (2006).

Posner has little patience for civil libertarians who hold that courts should actively police the constitutional boundaries between national security and civil liberties. “The strategy of civil libertarians,” he wrote in Catastrophe, “is to oppose the slightest curtailment of civil liberties. Their strategy may serve their fund-raising and other organizational goals, but it is questionable from an overall social welfare standpoint.” (See “Geoffrey Stone Debates Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties,” ACSblog, October 3, 2005, and “Legality and National Security,” Judge Posner’s remarks to ABA Standing Committee, May 9, 2006)

In United States v. Daoud (2014), a case involving a convicted American terrorist who attempted a “violent jihad” by way of bombing a building, Posner put his academic views to legal use. In Daoud the court denied the defendant access to secret warrant applications that allowed FBI surveillance of him. “The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,” wrote Posner, “is an attempt to strike a balance between the interest in full openness of legal proceedings and the interest in national security, which requires a degree of secrecy concerning the government’s efforts to protect the nation.” And then with characteristic bluntness he added: “Terrorism is not a chimera.” (The court later elaborated on its reasoning in a heavily redacted classified opinion.)

Posner Hypotheticals

Were it known that a terrorist was driving toward Chicago with a bomb, would you think it an improper restriction of civil liberties to stop and search all cars approaching Chicago, even though there would be no probable cause to suspect any given driver of carrying a bomb? Or suppose a kidnapper has buried his victim alive and refuses to tell the police where. A policeman punches him in the face to make him talk. Would you think the policeman had acted improperly?  (Source here.)

In a nutshell, Posner’s view is this: “Most judges know little about national security; the danger of catastrophic terrorism is real; and a constitutional decision forbidding a counterterrorist measure is almost impossible to change. It is better to leave these matters to be sorted out by the executive and legislative branches of government, where the relevant expertise resides.” Whether that is entirely so is, to be sure, open to debate as Jeffrey Rosen pointed out in his 2004 review of Catastrophe.

On a related front, there is also the question of the Wikileaks and Edward Snowden and their respective revelations of government excesses taken in the name of national security. Here again, Posner is not without an answer; he has his own take on whistleblowers and classified information. In November of 2011, while speaking at the Chicago Humanities Festival, Judge Posner told the audience: “I don’t think disclosure of classified information has ever been significantly harmful to American foreign policy and national security objectives. And indeed in many cases has helped them. On the other hand, I don’t think the efforts of the government to stifle revelation of classified material is consequential.”

Abortion Protestors: Harms, however, do not have to be catastrophic for Judge Posner to believe they may trump some claim of constitutional liberty. Take, for example, his criticism of the unanimous judgment in the recent Supreme Court buffer zone abortion clinic case. “Lecturing strangers on a sidewalk is not a means by which information and opinion are disseminated in our society,” he wrote in Slate. “Strangers don’t meet on the sidewalk to discuss ‘the issues of the day.’ (Has Chief Justice John Roberts, the author of the opinion, ever done such a thing?).”

Unwilling to leave it there, Posner cut to the realist quick: “The assertion that abortion protesters ‘wish to converse’ with women outside an abortion clinic is naive. They wish to prevent the women from entering the clinic, whether by showing them gruesome photos of aborted fetuses or calling down the wrath of God on them. This is harassment of people who are in a very uncomfortable position; the last thing a woman about to have an abortion needs is to be screamed at by the godly.”

Oh, how he abhors the sanctimonious! — be they conservative moralists or Ivy League ones.

Academic moralists pick from an à la carte menu the moral principles that coincide with the preferences of their social set. They have the intellectual agility to weave an inconsistent heap of policies into a superficially coherent unity and the psychological agility to honor their chosen principles only to the extent compatible with their personal happiness and professional advancement.Richard Posner, October 1997 (Harvard Law School).

The Art of Critical Thinking Read More

Yawning is a political strategy?
Yawning is a political strategy?
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(Il)liberalism’s Paralysis

At Vox, Ezra Klein claims that the White House believes the bully pulpit drives illiberal dissensus on most matters of public concern.

“The problem is the White House no longer believes Obama can bridge [racial] divides. They believe — with good reason — that he widens them. They learned this early in his presidency, when Obama said that the police had “acted stupidly” when they arrested Harvard University professor Skip Gates on the porch of his own home. The backlash was fierce. To defuse it, Obama ended up inviting both Gates and his arresting officer for a “beer summit” at the White House . . .

Moreover, Obama’s presidency has seen a potent merging of the racial and political divides. It’s always been true that views on racial issues drive views on American politics. But as political scientist Michael Tesler has documented, during Obama’s presidency, views on American politics have begun driving views on racially charged issues.

This all speaks to a point that the White House never forgets: President Obama’s speeches polarize in a way candidate Obama’s didn’t. Obama’s supporters often want to see their president “leading,” but the White House knows that when Obama leads, his critics becomeeven less likely to follow. The evidence political scientists have gathered documenting this dynamic is overwhelming, and Frances Lee lays it out well here…”

Klein (channelling the White House) and others seems to suggest that this illiberal bully pulpit effect is a feature of the modern presidency.  I take it this argument comes in parts: (1) twitter & 24-hour news cycle require comments on every issue lest president be seen as passive and consequently weak; (2) modern media fragment the bully pulpit’s message and make it more likely for any speech to take on purely political valence; so therefore (3) presidential speeches will, through naive realism, harden battle lines and make it more difficult for non-political institutions to come to solutions.  Therefore, says the hyper-sophisticated Klein and other savvy consumers of our political science and psychology literatures, Presidential pablum is the future. While the White House may use rhetorical nudges on the margin, any attempt to move the needle on matters of public note is basically self-defeating.

This all strikes me as too clever by half. It takes the wrong lesson from problem of cognitive illiberalism (as popularized by the the Cultural Cognition Project’s blog).  It’s not that we are doomed to process information through cultural lenses, and that we inevitably view political leaders from opposite parties as our antagonists.  Rather, the way that messages are framedwhether threatening to identity or not - matters a great deal.  Or to put it differently, cultural dissensus isn’t inevitable. Look at nanotech and GM foods: notwithstanding all the preconditions for cultural warfare, the western front remains silent.

My intuition is that the President’s rhetorical boomerang effect doesn’t so much result from a structural feature of the modern Presidency as a bug. That bug flows from some set of small tics related to how the President speaks to audiences – how he (and his speechwriters) can’t manage to make it seem like his gestures toward opposing views are anything other than convenient.  (This is an empirical intuition and I’m more than open to the possibility that the “bug” also/instead turns on the President’s race.)

Worse, casting about for structural explanations is self-defeating & weak.  The Administration’s repeated public signaling that they know that the Presidency can’t move the needle creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop.  The more that the President says publicly that he lacks power to influence the world (because of SCIENCE!), the less power he actually has. It would be better to talk less about talking less.

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Law’s Influence Protecting Wealth Growth

Thomas Piketty in Capital in his path breaking book, Capital the Twenty-First Century, by citing to a vast array of data demonstrates that over the long haul capital grows more rapidly than income or the economy generally – his formula is r>g. Starting from that premise, Shi-Ling Hsu in The Rise and Rise on the One Percent: Getting to Thomas Piketty’s Wealth Dystopia, shows the role law plays in distributing wealth. For Hsu, “Piketty [is] missing a huge piece of the puzzle: the role of law in distributing wealth.” The essence of Hsu’s article is that he shows how, in making and administering law, our legal system has failed to focus on the impact law has on levels of economic inequality. Instead, all too often, the focus of the law and the law making is exclusively on the effect on the private interests that would be directly affected by the legal issue presented. He then demonstrates how, absent a specific and systemic focus on economic inequality, law allows, and frequently promotes, the growth of economic inequality.

Hsu starts with the low hanging fruit of the Great Recession. Preceding it was broad financial deregulation that allowed the huge economic bubble to grow and then, of course, burst when it was no longer sustainable. That deregulation provided the financial industry to gain tremendous short term gain without risk ultimately to itself but that laid to waste the economy of the U.S. and much of the world triggering the Great Recession. In one long paragraph, Hsu summarizes a broad array of corporate and finance laws that were enacted in a very short time to set the stage for the crash. He says there is a now a consensus that “the crisis would not have occurred but for some misguided or feckless legal policy. The financial crisis was, at least in the United States, clearly a product of lawmaking. Lax regulation (or probably more accurately, encouraged) excessive risk taking.” In sum, “a large number of finance professionals took unwise risks that were made possible by one or more legal moves toward deregulation.”

Looking back, these laws were disasters just waiting to happen. We can now ask, what were law makers thinking when they deregulated the financial industry? But at the time of their enactment, there appeared to be close to consensus that these changes would allow economic growth to blossom with minimum risk because the invisible hand of the market would restrain undue risk: The risks would be “rational” because capitalism is all about the allocation of private risk. The Great Recession demonstrated beyond peradventure that the “rational actors,” shielded from the downside of the risks they take, will exercise little or no limit to the risks they will take because that maximizes their upside. That is, of course, how bubbles form, grow and then collapse. For the law to allow this to happen is completely irrational social policy. Even assuming that the risks remain private it is simply wrongheaded to shield actors from the downside consequences of the systemic risk they create while allowing them to capture the upside. Despite the disaster of the Great Recession, the Chicago School macroeconomic paradigm continues to prevail so at best reforms have been muted, if not stifled. For example, banks can still securitize and therefore off load the downside risk that mortgages they issue will not be paid. Piketty with the help of subsequent developments of his work, such as Hsu’s, may help overcome the shortsightedness of prevailing microeconomic economic ideology that has done away with macroeconomic analysis of the economy writ large.

As described by Hsu, the externalities generated by the extreme levels of risky behavior allowed and encouraged by macroeconomic theory were imposed on the American people generally, not on those who created the risk. “In 2008 and 2009, nearly nine million Americans lost jobs. . . . Between 2007 and 2010, nine million Americans slipped into poverty. Even those in the lower ninety-nine percent keeping their jobs, their contractions were more severe than it was for the one percent. For them, housing equity accounts for a much larger fraction of household wealth, and the slow rebound in housing prices has dampened their recovery.” Those externalities included much of the business world beyond the financial sector. When the bubble finally burst, businesses outside the financial sector suffered because the credit necessary to run their operations dried up. To save the financial system, the government, and therefore the American people, assumed the private downside risk from those who created it without imposing any costs on its perpetrators. So, the wealthy suffered less than the people generally and they quickly bounced back from any losses they suffered by snaring almost all the economic since the Great Recession ended. “[F]rom 2009 to 2012, an astonishing ninety-five percent [of total income gains] accrued to the top one percent of earners.”

Hsu identifies the underlying fault with how laws are structured, analyzed and operate: The legislatures do not focus on the broader externalities when considering new laws or amendments to existing laws. “[T]he focus of finance and corporations law is to regulate relations among private parties – investors, directors, managers, and perhaps, under the guise of bankruptcy law, creditors. Securities laws are concerned with protecting the integrity of the market. . . .[T]here is little sense in the law that the finance industry and corporations impose externalities upon a broader society, despite their capacity to redirect the flow of trillions of dollars. . . . [L]awmaking and legal scholarship in the area of finance and corporations law seem to be based predominantly on the notion that the only truly interested parties are private ones.”

A shortcoming of Piketty’s is that he limits his description of capital to things – cash, stock, real and personal property. While it has those physical aspects, capital really is power – social, economic and political power. In terms of law, organized private interests push for and get the legislation they seek. Citing Mancur Olson’s The Rise and Decline of Nations, Hsu describes how, “Over time, special interest groups form, they secure enough above-normal wealth, and what is left over is below-normal wealth for everybody else. Once special interests groups gain a foothold, their influence over policy grows, and their gains at the expense of society cumulate.” Organized wealth gets a seat at the policy-making table but also, in part because of the influence of money in politics, influences who the policy makers are at that table and that determines how policy comes to be defined.

Having laid out why law helps capital by protecting it and helping it to grow using the example of corporate and financial law, Hsu then goes on to describe several areas of law beyond corporate and financial law that promote capital growth.. Some examples that Hsu pick are surprising. For example, Hsu demonstrates how adding “grandparenting” exceptions when new legal regulations are enacted protects and enhances the capital of the “grandparents.” Antitrust law, one might think, should work against the protection and expansion of incumbent wealth. But Piketty demonstrates how the legal interpretation of antitrust law has come to have the opposite effect. To prove a violation, there must be a demonstration of a negative effect on consumers. So, if consumers are not directly hurt by the challenged activity of the defendants, then the regulated parties are protected from liability even if their activity exacerbates inequality by protecting the growth of private wealth. Another example is electric utility regulation. As the law has evolved, it has come to focus on protecting the return on private capital rather than the need to provide electric services for the entire community. Guaranteeing a return on invested capital, allows it to grow unimpeded. Hus also describes some areas of law where wealth obviously is protected and enabled to grow unimpeded. The specialized tax treatment of the oil and gas industry is a good example of that.

Obviously, Hsu cannot in a single paper describe how law generally tilts to favor capital. What he does give us is a way to analyze law by demonstrating the effect – positive, negative, or neutral – law has on economic inequality. Piketty proposed new, macroeconomic approaches to be developed in a revived data-driven study of political economy. Hus takes us a step further by showing that, in the study of law an important but generally missing element, is the need to study the impact law has on economic inequality.

Posner
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The Maverick – A Biographical Sketch of Judge Richard Posner: Part I

auth

Below is the first installment in a multi-part series of posts on Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. The first two installments consist of an unconventional biographical profile of the Judge. These posts will be followed by a series of posts consisting of the Judge’s candid and often unexpected responses to numerous questions I posed to him along with those of 24 noted legal figures. In the process, Judge Posner bursts into the breach with frankness about his views on privacy, the exclusionary rule, NYT v. Sullivan, intellectual property rights, law and economics, constitutional interpretation, legal education and scholarship, and the politicization of the judiciary. With Posnerian resolve, he also speaks of his own life, his onetime thoughts on being a Supreme Court Justice, his cherished feline, and even his favorite rock stars. Given all that, we selected “Posner on Posner” as the title for this series.

Note: Some links will open only in Firefox or Chrome but not in Safari. 

______________________________________

A man[’s] . . . thinking should be

cosmopolitan and detached. He should

be able to criticize what he reveres and loves.

                                                – Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., February 4, 1901

He is like no other. Cool, calm, and calculating (in a methodical sense, that is). To watch him, one might think him shy, if only because of the way he averts his blue eyes when speaking. His complexion is fair (sun sensitive), which makes for a striking contrast to the dark suits he often dons. His appearance is ordinary, highlighted only by a blue Oxford linen shirt and wide-framed rectangular glasses. He speaks in a measured manner and while his voice can be monotonic, his oral style can fluctuate from serious to humorous. At times, his expression is flat, though once and a while a chuckle erupts, prompted by some folly he underscores or some hypocrisy he exposes while discussing this or that point or person. His public conversations with others can seem singular; they smack of a man thinking aloud.

Candor is his calling card, print is his preferred medium, and the moves of the mind are his raison d’être. One is reminded, in a fleeting philosophical sense, of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The “atypical . . . manner and character” of both men only adds to the resemblance. That said, there is one big difference: He is no parlor philosopher; he is a man who lives to transform ideas into action.

To some, he is an irritating gadfly. To others, he is a cold-blooded pragmatist. To many, he is an enemy of liberalism, while to many others he is a foe of conservatism. To more sensitive types, his economics-grounded “thinking is inevitably without compassion and often cruel.” To more cerebral types he is “our most prominent rationalist.” To those whose world is divided along uncompromising ideological lines, his views on the Second Amendment are horrendous and tyrannical, even if he is quite libertarian when it comes to legalizing marijuana, “cocaine, heroin, methamphetamime, LSD, and the rest of the illegal drugs.” To still others, he is a mental maverick gunning for any kind of specious arguments (especially self-righteous ones) that pass for gospel. And to yet others, he is the only one who dares to describe law as it is here on mortal earth rather than how it might be in some utopian salon. In that realist respect, there is even a Machiavellian streak in him.

He is, to be sure, an acquired taste. Even to those who know him, there is a distant quality about his personality. Perhaps because of that, those who know him appreciate his wit and playfulness all the more. Not one to hand out a diplomatic compliment, merit is the measure that rules his life.

Past as Prelude

Richard A. Posner, Harvard Law Review photo

Richard A. Posner, Harvard Law Review photo

He is Richard Posner. At 75, the New York City born jurist shows no signs of slowing down. If anything, his cerebral game is as good or better than it was in 1959 when he graduated summa cum laude from Yale College at age 20 (he was an English major with an avid interest in Yeats) or when he graduated first in his class from Harvard Law School in 1962 (he was President of the Harvard Law Review). 

His credentials as a young man all signaled future greatness – law clerk to Justice William J. Brennan (1962-63 Term), assistant to Commissioner Philip Elman of the Federal Trade Commission (1963-65), and assistant to Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall (1965-67). In that capacity and others, he wrote some 40 briefs and argued ten cases before the Supreme Court. The cases he argued were:

  1. Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission (1966) (audio here)
  2. Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. (1966) (audio here)
  3. United States v. Von’s Grocery Co. (1966) (audio here)
  4. First National Bank v. Walker Bank (1966) (audio here)
  5. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Norfolk & W.R. Co. (1966) (audio here)
  6. Honda v. Clark (1967)(audio here)
  7. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. (1967)
  8. Will v. United States (1967)
  9. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n. (1968)
  10. National Broiler Marketing Association v. United States (1978) (Frank H. Easterbrook was on the brief for the government on the other side)

Posner also served as general counsel on President Johnson’s Task Force on Communications Policy (1967-68). Soon enough the legal academy beckoned him, first as an associate law professor at Stanford (1968-1969) and later as a professor at the University of Chicago Law School (1969-1981). It was during that time that at age 34 he published his momentous work, Economic Analysis of the Law (1973) (now in its 9th edition).

judge_posner

The virtual Posner

As if all of that were not enough, “Posner augmented his professional life . . . found[ing] Lexecon Inc., a [profitable] consulting firm that tried to put into practice [his law and economic] theories. A large portion of Lexecon’s early business, when he was still a partner, was advising companies as to whether their competitive practices would run afoul of antitrust laws.” In late October of 1981, after his time in the legal academy, Posner then pursued a judicial path as a Ronald Reagan appointee to the Seventh Circuit. In the process, he traded wealth for fame – not what one typically expects from a unapologetic cost-benefit capitalist.

One more thing: In 2006 the ever-colorful Judge stared as an avatar in Second Life, an online virtual community.

The Brennan Clerkship

I was a little disappointed in the Supreme Court. I had a

more elevated opinion of it as a law student than it merited.

                                                                            Richard Posner

To return to his clerkship with Justice Brennan: It came to him via Paul Freund (1908-1992), the famed Harvard professor of constitutional law. In those days it was customary for certain law professors to select law clerks for some of the Justices, this even without a prior clerkship. Young Posner (age 23) was one of Freund’s two picks.

Once he arrived in Washington, D.C., Posner went to work on a variety of jobs for Justice Brennan. It has been reported that during that time he “wrote up an opinion arguing the reverse of Brennan’s [initial sense of the] decision.” Things worked out, nonetheless, and the clerk’s opinion proved “so compelling that Brennan and the Court changed their minds and adopted it.” That unanimous opinion, replete with 83 footnotes, was Sanders v. United States (1963), a habeas corpus case.

Posner also had a hand in writing another habeas case, Fay v. Noia (1963). And then there was NAACP v. Button (1963), a First Amendment civil rights case he authored. For Harry Kalven (1914-1974), the renowned First Amendment scholar, the Button opinion was an important one. “The Court,” he wrote in The Negro and the First Amendment (1965), “offers a generous view of the range of First Amendment protection, a view which seems to me to be indisputably correct although the Court had never previously been given an appropriate occasion for announcing it.” Kalven found it “exciting” that the opinion appeared to break “new ground.”

In a 2013 interview Posner reminisced about his clerkship at the Court: “The most significant experience of my clerkship was happening to work on a case assigned to Justice Brennan, an antitrust case called United States v. Philadelphia National Bank (1963) [the vote was 5-1-2 with Justice White not participating and Justice Harlan dissenting]. And working on that greatly stimulated my interest in antitrust law, and my time in Washington after the clerkship – I was there for another five years – I was mostly concerned with antitrust issues. So that was, I’d say, the most significant experience I had at the Supreme Court.”

Four Brennan-Posner opinions – there is a certain irony here, namely, that these opinions were written by a law clerk who when he became a judge refused to permit his own law clerks to write his judicial opinions. Then again, as Judge Posner once quipped, “Life is full of surprises . . . .”

judgeposner_2010Mind Games — A Multidimensional Man

Richard Posner is a man of the mind. He welcomes the challenges of complexity; he takes pride in showing the hollowness of legal abstractions; and he loves to simplify the complex without leaving it senseless. Speaking in a soft but nonetheless deliberate tone, he delights in exposing babble masquerading as legal argument, and can be rather relentless when counsel persists in being evasive (see, e.g., here).

In a legal world divided, on the one hand, by jurists who demand the rigidities of rules in matters of interpretation, and jurists who, on the other hand, insist on the flexibility of standards, Posner readily sidesteps ideological boundaries. As he sees it, such disputes are better understood as psychological in character than logical in nature. He prefers a more pragmatic contextual approach. To draw upon his own words in MindGames Inc. v. Western Publishing Co. (2000): “some activities are better governed by rules, others by standards.” Thus, in MindGames the Court declined to be bound by a 1924 rule regarding new businesses and lost profits.

Another Posnerian trait: He is not oblivious to the obvious, even when others are. And he does not hesitate to speak sternly when the circumstances warrant it, as in a class actions case (Eubank v. Saltzman) involving a lawyer who took far too many liberties. There, Posner used the opportunity of the controversy to demonstrate the factual oddities and ethical problems with the case, this while offering several learned yet pragmatic observations about this body of the law and its efficient operation. He did much the same in another class action case (Redman v. Radio Shack Corporation) in which he was quite critical of a settlement that offered Radio Shack customers about $830,000 worth of coupons while offering the lawyers who negotiated it $1 million. He was equally outspoken in a recent copyright case (Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd.). And his edgy wit and probing reasoning were much apparent in a pair of recent same-sex marriage cases (Baskin v. Bogan and Wolf v. Walker) in which he was particularly hard on the counsel for the state during oral arguments in those cases.

Color him with many stripes. Posner relishes the study of economics; he savors the lure of literature; he delights in clearing the air polluted by scandalous politics; he enjoys applying his free-market thinking to explain the various economic crises of our time; he relishes the chance to confront head on those issues that bedevil cultural critics; and he loves his life in the law (be it jurisprudence, antitrust, intellectual property, regulatory law, patent law, labor law, criminal law, or constitutional law). In a world increasingly bereft of public intellectuals, he rises from the lifeless ashes like a modern-day Phoenix. True to that cerebral calling, Posner has personal opinions, often controversial, on everything from sexual behavior to judicial behavior and beyond to subjects as diverse as terrorism, global warming, aging, moral and literary theory, and even the risks of catastrophic harm due to an asteroid colliding with the earth.

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The President’s Executive Order on Immigration

I want to discuss the way in which critics of the President’s Executive Order are making their case, as I think at least one of the arguments raises a genuine dilemma that I keep coming back to in my recent research. Here are some ways of thinking about why what the President did is wrong (if you believe that):

1.  He does not have the statutory authority to issue the order.

Presumably, a slew of lawsuits will be filed on this question.  I have no idea what the answer is, but that will get sorted out by the courts.

2.  He does have the legal authority to act, but doing so is a political mistake.

Maybe, but that will also be proven with time.  If a Republican wins the White House in 2016 (0r in some future election assuming that no new statute is passed), then the order could be reversed.

3.  He does have the legal authority to act, but he should not use that authority because the only legitimate way to do what he did is through legislation.

This is an argument that folks like David Brooks seem to be making, and I find this much more interesting.  Why should this only be done through legislation?  Because executive action in this respect is unprecedented?  Because major policy changes should always be done via statute?

The reason I ask is that I do think that there are “legal but unconstitutional” actions, and I’ve talked about them in prior posts.  (A simple example is when presidential electors in a state decide to vote for someone other than the person who won that state.  They can do that, but the voters would throw a fit.)  I think that this situation arises, though, only when there is extensive precedent against exercising a legal power (basically, a sort of desuetude) or there is a powerful norm that makes the legal action suspect.

Is there a norm that says presidents should not undertake “major” changes via executive orders that are lawful?  I’m not sure.  President Truman’s Executive Order desegregating the armed forces was a very big deal, but that was not done via statute.  Affirmative action at the federal level is, to a large extent, based only on executive orders.  There may be more examples.  Do they cover the immigration case?

 

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The Grand Jury in Ferguson

Up until now, I have not had anything to say about the events in Ferguson. I’m not an expert on policing or racial profiling, and sometimes you have to know your limitations. But I am fascinated by the deliberations of the grand jury, which are a throwback to another time.

The most common phrase that goes with “grand jury” nowadays is “ham sandwich.”  Not so here.  Ordinary citizens are carefully considering whether an indictment or “true bill” should issue in a controversial case.  This is what the Framers had in mind when they wrote the grand jury into the Fifth Amendment, and they were drawing on a rich colonial and British tradition of grand juries shielding people from wrongful accusations or expressing the community’s view on a criminal prosecution.

The trouble now is that this only works when the case reaches an astronomical level of visibility.  In ordinary cases, an information is at least as good, if not better, at serving the functions of a grand jury (especially when combined with some form of prosecutorial accountability.)  This may explain even ardent supporters of incorporation seem uninterested in reversing Hurtado and making the grand jury requirement applicable to the states.