Mark Weiner, author of The Rule of the Clan, Wins Grawemeyer Award

I am thrilled to share that Mark Weiner has won the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order for the ideas in his book, The Rule of Clan. As some of you know, Concurring Opinions hosted a symposium on Mark Weiner’s book, The Rule of the Clan. It was a heady exchange and much fun too. Mark is a dear friend and colleague. To see his work recognized in this way is most gratifying. The history of the award is rather interesting too. H. Charles Grawemeyer trained as a chemical engineer, had success as an industrialist, and endowed the award “to honor powerful ideas in five fields in performing arts, the humanities, and the social sciences.Winners in the World Order category include Mikhail Gorbachev, Samuel Huntington, John Braithwaite and Peter Drahos, and Erica Chenoweth among many others. So again, congratulations to Mark who is continuing his slacker ways with new work while at the University of Salzburg, Austria, this spring as a Fulbright Scholar. I expect another great set of ideas and work is in Mark’s and our future.


The Creativity Cliff: Another Reason Extended Copyright Terms Are Not About Authors

Quality of life and creative capacity at the end of life are other reasons to doubt that long copyright terms are important for authors. Ezekiel Emanuel’s “Why I Hope To Die at 75” caused a stir for his views on graceful death and quality of life. Part of his argument is that creativity, on average, diminishes late in life. Those who pursue prolonging life as if they are “immortals” “operate on the assumption that they will be … outliers” such as one of Emanuel’s colleagues who still publishes papers that change policy at 90. “But the fact is that by 75, creativity, originality, and productivity are pretty much gone for the vast, vast majority of us.” (Emanuel picks 75 because that is his trigger age for not fighting death). The article has a graph that indicates truly creative, novel ideas and work decline after the early to mid 60s for most people. Emanuel is quick to point out that there are many other ways to be productive and contribute to society after creativity slows down or goes away. Nonetheless, if he is correct that “This age-creativity relationship is a statistical association, the product of averages; … [and] The age-creativity curve—especially the decline—endures across cultures and throughout history, suggesting some deep underlying biological determinism probably related to brain plasticity”, it suggests that there is what I would call a creativity cliff.

If the creativity cliff is real, it suggests that giving more incentives to create late in life is unwise. As I argue in The Life and Death of Copyright, the idea that authors need copyright after death to provide for heirs is absurd and unsupported. When I presented the paper, many asked but what if I am old and want to leave something to my children, isn’t copyright an incentive? It may be an incentive, but it is not sound, in part because of the creativity cliff. In general, as Hal Varian has noted, very few works ever generate a steady income stream. That is true regardless of when one creates. Copyrighted works are part of winner-take-all markets and “Such markets end up fostering over-entry into the field because too many people believe they will be the one to sit at the top of the market when only a few or arguably one can do so.” As Emanuel points out, many of us hope to be outliers and “immortals” who have excellent quality of life and tremendous creativity late in life, but by definition that can’t be true. Thus those who say they need copyright as an incentive to write as they see death approaching labor under the illusion that they are the outliers. I laud the effort and probably will write until I die, but that is not a sound basis for policy.


Sex (and Money) in the City

Thanks to Solangel, Dan, and the rest of the folks at Concurring Opinions for inviting me to be a guest blogger this month!

A few weeks ago, an Oklahoma judge was tasked with dividing Harold and Sue Ann Hamm’s $2Billion marital estate. And the judge’s only guidance was to divide it in any way that was, in his mind, “fair,” “just,” and “reasonable.”  Billion dollar divorces like this one highlight long-known problems with divorce law. Namely, that courts have wide and almost unreviewable discretion over many aspects of a divorcing couples’ lives.  When I ask students in my family law class how they would divide a particular marital estate, I generally get a lot of variation.  Many people choose 50%-50%, a substantial number choose 66%-34% or 75%-25%, but there are always a lot of students who choose more extreme divisions, like 90%-10%.  This highlights the lottery-like aspect of many family law issues.

But what can be done? I want to float a controversial idea, and then very briefly explain why it deserves serious attention.

Here’s the idea: Let local governments (like city councils) weigh in on how local judges should exercise their discretion.

The rest is below the fold…

Read More


Data, A/B Testing, and Sales

A company called Adore Me that was founded in 2010 now has sales ($5.6 million) to rival La Perla has done well in part because they use data and A/B testing. Rather than rely on the intuition of photographers and designers, the company takes versions of an offering and shows them to consumers to see what works. Here are the surprising claims. Blonds don’t sell well. A picture of a model with her hand on her hip will sell less than if she places her hand on her head. According to Fast Company:

Through its research, Adore Me has found that the right model matters even more than price. If customers see a lacy pushup on a model they like, they’ll buy it. Put the same thing on a model they don’t, and even a $10 price cut won’t compel them. Pose matters as well: the same product shot on the same model in a different posture can nudge sales a few percentage points in either direction. Another test found that a popular model can sell a more expensive version of the same garment.

Adore Me also has a plus sized model (although I am sure that others can tell me best whether the company’s definition of size 12 and above is a good one) and presumably will see whether folks may buy more lingerie from someone with a body other than a Barbie-esque one. Of course they may find that the image machine controls how we shop, but I am curious to see whwther they will find ways to challenge and tweak what resonates with consumers. Now that may be unlikely as the author of the article, Rebecca Greenfield, wrote “Scrolling through the site, the models could all be related—long legs, olive skin, dark hair, insanely hot.” Yet when it came to race, the article suggests that pose, styling, and the emotional connection with the photo mattered more than race for selling a given item.

As with all data, the practice raises some difficult questions. Seeing how people behave can help sell. Assuming that one’s offering does not influence how people behave is a mistake. The ethics of what one does with data about buying habits and current preferences is a topic for another post and many papers are being written on the topic. For now, be aware of the practices. For Facebook thought it was cool to run thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of tests on users. As Ian Ayres noted, people can use Google Ads to see what titles work best for a book. So maybe we care more about emotional manipulation than the variation in ad content. Maybe we care more about whether we see ads for the same item and same price as others than whether that ad is highlighted in red, blue, or green. Maybe we should know that poses and lighting can influence our desires and buying habits. Although business experiments are not new, how they are done and for what purpose forces us to re-examine practices. Along the way, we will re-visit markets versus manipulation versus power versus nudging versus culture versus shaping as we better see what is happening and then ask why and whether about those outcomes.


Will The Nobel Committee Follow Oscar and Restrict Selling Medals?

Apparently Watson, of DNA discovery fame, is selling his Nobel Medal. Christie’s estimates the price at $2.2 million. I will go into the reasons for the sale below. But first, I wonder whether the Nobel Committee will put in a restriction on selling the medals. The Oscar folks, (aka the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences) placed a restriction on awards granted after 1950: the recipient or heirs had to offer it the the Academy for $1 before selling to anyone else. Unrestricted Oscars have been sold for $510,000 (1993, Vivien Leigh’s Oscar for “Gone with the Wind”) and $1,540,000 (1999 David O. Selznick’s Oscar for “Gone with the Wind”) among other prices. Whether the Nobel folks see the award as their key asset (as AMPAS does) or they have other objections to its sale will determine what they do.

For those wondering why sell the medal, Watson made some comments about race in 2007. According to Irish Central, in an interview with the Financial Times, Watson said he was “‘inherently gloomy about the prospect of Africa’ because ‘all our social policies are based on the fact that their intelligence is the same as ours – whereas all the testing says not really.'” That statement resulted in boards and other groups choosing not to work with him. In short, he needs the money.

Given that Watson has said he will give some of the money to science charities, I wonder whether he might set up fund in honor of Rosalind Franklin, the woman who took the picture that allowed the structure of DNA to be seen and died four years before the Nobel for DNA’s discovery was made. (The Nobel prize is awarded only when one is alive). Nonetheless, her credit has been lost. Then again if Ms. Franklin were alive, she might not be happy to have a fund created in her name by someone who has Watson’s current reputation, let alone the DNA discovery problem.

Correction: Earlier version mistakenly listed Crick as the Nobel medal seller.


The Man Behind the Robes — A Q&A with Richard Posner

I myself am a counterrevolutionary. I am not eager to be sent to the countryside to do farm work while wearing a dunce cap. (2009)

I’m much less reactionary than I used to be. (2014)   – Richard Posner

This is the third in a series of posts on Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. The first installment can be found here, and the second one here. (My interest in Judge Posner goes back almost a quarter century. See Ronald Collins & David O’Brien, “Gauging Reputations, National Law Journal, pp. 13-14, April 1, 1991 (commenting on Posner’s Cardozo book).)  

The measure of a man is gauged in different ways. For some, it moves along a spectrum of social approval. For others, it is personal perfection. For a few, it is mastery — that ability to excel in one’s life calling. And then there are those who take public service seriously. For yet others, it is legacy – that long story after the life story. In that journey, whatever one’s direction and destination, a few are bold into the fray, others calculating into the conflict, and still others are quiet into the clash. How we measure them depends on where we stand, how we judge the end game, and just how impartial we are. Then again, how we judge someone may reveal more about us than the person being judged. Bear all that in mind as you read the words of the man — an atypical  man — who is the focus of this and the other interviews.  

Richard Posner

Allen Richard Posner (see below)

How, then, to measure Richard Posner? It is not an easy task; he is complex. Because of that it is easy to misjudge him. Up close, Posner is unusual. For one thing, his candor can be unnerving. Thus, his personality in one-on-one situations can be odd, unless one is attuned to him, which requires being on his psychological wavelength. For another thing, he is somewhat unconstrained by many social mores. He is, for better or worse, a take-me-as-I-am sort of individual. But give him distance from the province of personality (conventionally defined), and he works well in the world of rules and reasons. That is his domain. In that realm, he appreciates informed judgment and delights in being daring. True to his cerebral bent, he loves to be rational (tag it Aristotelian eros), even if it leaves him the odd man out. In that sense, there is something peculiarly fascinating about him – that rara avis who seizes our attention even when we tend to turn away.    

What follows are the first in a series of questions I posed to the Judge about his life and life views. (Note: Some links will open in Firefox or Chrome but not in Safari.)


Question:    Were you born Richard Allen Posner, or was Allen your first name? [Hat tip to Professor Peter Irons.]

Posner:       That’s true [about being named Allen]. But my parents always called me ‘Dick.'” [RC: The Judge has his law clerks address him as his parents did.]

Question:   You were exceptionally revealing in the New Yorker profile that Larissa MacFarquhar did back in 2001 – the story in which, among other things, you described yourself as “an imperfectly house-broken pet.” You also compared yourself to your late Dinah, “playfulbut with a streak of cruelty.” (Dinah has since died.) Two questions:

  1. Why? What prompted such unconventional candor?
  2. Do you have any regrets?


  1. Larissa was very skillful at extracting unguarded comments from me. She is an excellent reporter. [RC: In a 2003 interview with Howard Bashman, Judge Posner said: “MacFarquhar. . . exaggerated my role in the law and economics movement, but that’s fine!”]
  2. No.

Question:      In what respects are you most like and unlike your parents?

Posner:         I share my mother’s love of literature, and my parents’ lack of religiosity (I believe the word “God” was never mentioned in our home). My father [Max] was introverted, like me. I didn’t share my parents’ politics, which were extremely left-wing. It’s unrealistic to think me much like my parents, as they were born in 1900 and 1901 respectively, into central European families with no money who immigrated shortly afterward to the United States. There is no comparison to my situation at and after birth, by which time (1939) my parents were prosperous, educated, and completely assimilated Americans.

Cleanth Brooks

Cleanth Brooks

Question:    You were an English major at Yale College and did your senior thesis under Cleanth Brooks (the famed figure of literary criticism). Your thesis was on William Butler Yeats’s late poetry. Why English, why Yeats? And tell us a little bit more about you senior thesis – its title and scope.

Posner:   My mother [Blanche] was a high school English teacher and started me off on literature when I was an infant — she read Homer and Shakespeare to me from a very early age. I majored in English at Yale because I was already steeped in literature and Yale had the best English department in the country. I discovered Yeats’ poetry and loved it and still do. I don’t recall the title of my senior thesis. I do recall the principal theme, which was that his poetry was “reflexive,” in the sense that much of it, I thought, despite its ostensible subject matter, was about poetry itself, which after all he new best.

Question:   What was your draft status? How did you navigate the whole military service matter?

Posner:    Deferment was automatic in my day (before the Vietnam War heated up) while one was a student. My first job after graduating from law school was as a law clerk at the Supreme Court. Justice Brennan, my boss, wrote a letter to my draft board before I started the clerkship asking it to defer me for the clerkship, which it did (it didn’t have to). During my clerkship year my wife had our first baby, and at the time (1963) that was an automatic deferment. I never heard further from anyone about the draft.

Alex Bickel

Alex Bickel

Question:    When you were the president of the Harvard Law Review (vol. 75, 1961-62), several prominent persons (e.g., Alexander Bickel, Felix Frankfurter, and Henry Friendly) published on your watch. Do you have any memorable stories you might share with us?

Posner:      Bickel was not a Harvard Law School professor (Yale instead), and I broke with tradition in asking him to write the Foreword to the Supreme Court section in the first issue.

I also got into some trouble with the faculty over publishing a very critical review by Frederick Bernays Wiener of an excellent revision [of Wigmore’s evidence treatise] by John T. McNaughton, one of the law school’s professors (later a key aide to Robert McNamara in the Vietnam War).

Question:       Were there any professors you had at Harvard who stood out in your mind? If so, who were they and why do you remember them?

Posner:         There were a number of excellent professors: in no particular order they were Paul Bator, John Mansfield, Abraham Kaplan, Derek Bok, Donald Turner, Walter Bart Leach, and (probably the best) John Dawson. I may have forgotten some others who were good. Turner’s field was antitrust, and he had a Ph.D. in economics from Harvard. We were friendly. To some extent, he sparked my interest in economic analysis of law.

Question:       How did Paul Freund come to select you for a clerkship with Brennan?

Posner:        He was an informal adviser to the law review so I got to know him pretty well, though I never had him in class. I was the president of the law review and the highest-ranking student by grades, so I was a natural pick for a Supreme Court clerkship. I didn’t apply—he just picked me. I actually wasn’t particularly interested in clerking.

Question:       You worked with Thurgood Marshall while he was Solicitor General. What was your opinion of Mr. Marshall back then?

Posner on Thurgood Marshall

He was a good boss in the sense that he backed the staff, which of course was all I cared about, but had rather little interest in the job. It was just a stepping-stone job. He had been a great trial lawyer, and I don’t think appellate law interested him particularly. Before becoming SG he was on the Second Circuit briefly, and after he was S.G. he, of course, was on the Supreme Court. I don’t think any of those jobs drew on his strengths, which as I say was as a trial lawyer.

 Question:      While in the S.G.’s Office you argued nine cases before the Supreme Court. Do any of those case stand out in your mind? Are you especially proud of your performance in any of them?

Posner:          I remember the antitrust cases, like Von’s and Schwinn, but I don’t really remember my briefs or oral arguments in them.

Question:     You were general counsel on President Johnson’s Task Force on Communications Policy. How did that come about and what sort of things did you do in that capacity?

Posner:       I probably was asked by the staff director, Alan Novak, but I don’t actually remember. My title of “general counsel” had no meaning. The task force had a small staff. I learned a lot of economics from our economist staff member, Leland Johnson, a very smart economist from RAND. I did most of the writing for the report. The report was influential in the deregulation movement, and also led to my being asked to do a good deal of consulting in telecommunication policy during my time as an academic.

Question:     What is your sense of the 60s counter-culture? Read More


Introducing Guest Blogger Sean Williams

shw395-mediumI am delighted to welcome Professor Sean Williams, from the University of Texas School of Law, who will be joining us for a guest visit this month. Professor Williams writes in the areas of tort theory, family law, and behavioral law and economics.  He has examined the role of happiness research in tort awards, the implications of individual justice accounts of tort law for damages in wrongful death suits, and the empirical and philosophical justifications for allocating more safety resources to children compared to adults.  He has also examined bargaining dynamics between spouses in post-nuptial negotiations, the resilience of overly optimistic beliefs in marriage, consumer contracts, and employment relationships, and the broad legal implications of ambiguity aversion.

Prof. Williams graduated with High Honors from the University of Chicago Law School.  Before his appointment at the University of Texas School of Law, he was a Climenko Fellow and Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School. Prior to his legal career, he analyzed large national datasets to uncover trends in teen pregnancy and risky adolescent behaviors more generally.

His recent publications include:

Probability Errors: Over-Optimism, Ambiguity Aversion, and the Certainty Effect, in The Oxford Handbook on Behavioral Economics and the Law (2014).

Statistical Children, 30 Yale J. Reg. 63 (2013).

Lost Life and Life Projects, 87 Indiana L. J. 1745 (2012).

Self-Altering Injury, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 535 (2011).

Sticky Expectations: Responses to Persistent Over-Optimism in Marriage, Employment Contracts, and Credit Card Use, 84 Notre Dame L. Rev. 733 (2009).

Postnuptial Agreements, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 827 (2007).

You can find his ssrn page here.


Pew’s “Web IQ” Test Is Flawed

Pew Research does good work, but of late the surveys and claims give a “factoid” feeling. The latest report “What Internet Users Know about Technology and the Web” asks some rather silly questions. Why knowing the character limit on Twitter (140), which university was the first on Facebook (Harvard), or the year that the iPhone came out (2007) is indicative of useful knowledge is unclear. To me these points of trivia may matter as one tries to write about technology history and maybe policy. But the idea of Web IQ is murky. Heck, many of the questions are about the Internet, not the Web. Identifying the faces of tech leaders such as Gates or Sandberg is a curious feat but is this quiz in fact a game of tech Jeopardy!? (Yes, few knew Ms. Sandberg, but that is a different issue than Web IQ for me). The questions about tech policy seem to reveal more about problem areas. Guess what, net neutrality and privacy fared poorly. Knowing how wikis work might enable folks to think about the authority of content. Despite the irony of the quiz name, knowing the difference between the Web and the Internet also helps sort issues about many evolving technologies. Yet the overall thrust of the report reminds me of political, navel gazing junkies who, like Trekkers, thrill to their did you know who did what on some exact, obscure date knowledge and then act as if those who don’t know the answer somehow are stupid or “don’t get it.”

Raw knowledge and history are great and fun, but unless you can tie them together they are quite dead. Maybe if Pew had just called it a general tech knowledge test, it would have made more sense, but then maybe no one would read the report. Ah there it is. Pew’s IQ may be rather high after all.


The Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment

One of the issues that I’m going to explore in my next book (an announcement about that should be coming soon) is the debate between those who think that the Bill of Rights consists of the first ten amendments and those who think that text includes only the first eight amendments.  People rarely explain why they give the definition that they do, so we need to fill in that gap with some speculation.  Part of the answer for the “eight amendments” crowd must be that they did not care for states’-rights or thought that that the Bill of Rights addressed only individual rights.  (Adios, Tenth Amendment.)   Since the first references to the Bill of Rights as “just eight amendments” came during Reconstruction, any antipathy towards the Tenth Amendment is understandable.

A more interesting question is what the “eight amendments” interpretation of the Bill of Rights says about the Ninth Amendment.  If you think that the Ninth Amendment protects unenumerated individual rights (or at least says that they are not precluded) then there is every reason to include that as part of the Bill of Rights.  Nevertheless, I can find only one case that defines the first NINE amendments as the Bill of Rights, even though that reading makes sense.  Those who excluded the Ninth must have either thought that this provision did nothing important or did not protect individual rights.  How common was this view?  Not uncommon, though I’ll note that John Bingham was in the “first ten amendments” camp.  Since the 1970s, though, the “first eight amendments” view had faded away.  Could this be because unwritten rights and states-rights have gained traction since then?


Presidential Censure

In the wake of the President’s executive order on immigration, at least one Republican member of Congress has called for a Censure Resolution declaring the President’s conduct either unlawful or wrong.  (I’m not sure which.)  The precedent for this during Andrew Jackson’s presidency, which I talked about in my first book, is very problematic given that only the Senate censured the President, Jackson protested that the resolution was unconstitutional, and the resolution was later repealed by the Senate.

Here’s a broader question.  Is there any limit on Congress’s power to pass a joint resolution that does not create binding law?  In other words, can Congress pass any resolution that just gives its opinion?  Suppose they want to say that the police officer in Ferguson should have been indicted?  Or that Bill Cosby is a rapist?  Or that Putin is not the legitimate president of Russia?  One thought is that resolutions like these are purely symbolic, and so there are no constitutional limits.  But you could say that these statements might matter (for instance, in a civil suit brought against a named person, or in some diplomatic negotiation).  If that is true, though, how does one articulate the limits on Congress’s expressive rights?  Does the President need to denounce one that goes too far?  Should courts not allow such statements to go before a jury?