Site Meter


P
0

FTC v. Wyndham

The case has been quite long in the making. The opinion has been eagerly anticipated in privacy and data security circles. Fifteen years of regulatory actions have been hanging in the balance. We have waited and waited for the decision, and it has finally arrived.

The case is FTC v. Wyndham, and it is round one to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

Some Quick Background

For the past 15 years, the FTC has been one of the leading regulators of data security. It has brought actions against companies that fail to provide common security safeguards on personal data. The FTC has claimed that inadequate data security violates the FTC Act which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” In many cases, the FTC has alleged that inadequate data security is deceptive because it contradicts promises made in privacy policies that companies will protect people’s data with “good,” “adequate,” or “reasonable” security measures. And in a number of cases, the FTC has charged that inadequate data security is unfair because it creates actual or likely unavoidable harm to consumers which isn’t outweighed by other benefits.

For more background about the FTC’s privacy and data security enforcement, please see my article with Professor Woodrow Hartzog: The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2014). The article has just come out in print, and the final published version can be downloaded for free here.

Thus far, when faced with an FTC data security complaint, companies have settled. But finally one company, Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, challenged the FTC. A duel has been waging in court. The battle has been one of gigantic proportions because so much is at stake: Wyndham has raised fundamental challenges the FTC’s power to regulate data security under the FTC Act.

The Court’s Opinion and Some Thoughts

1. The FTC’s Unfairness Authority

Wyndham argued that because Congress enacted several data security laws to regulate specific industries (FCRA, GLBA, HIPAA, COPPA) that Congress did not intend for the FTC to be able to regulate data security more generally under FTC Act unfairness. The court rejected this argument, holding that “subsequent data-security legislation seems to complement—not preclude—the FTC’s authority.”

This holding seems quite reasonable, as the FTC Act was a very broad grant of authority to the FTC to regulate for consumer protection for most industries.

Read More

3

Corporate Leadership and Politics

Recently there was a brouhaha over the hiring (and then firing) of Brendan Eich, the CEO of Mozilla.  In 2008, Eich gave a personal contribution to the campaign for Proposition 8, the California constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage.  Same-sex marriage supporters responded to Eich’s hiring with criticism and threats of a boycott before the company essentially rescinded the offer.

While you can look at this case as an example of free speech or intolerance (or both–there is plenty of intolerant free speech), I want to suggest that this sort of thing is an unintended consequence of Citizens United.  In a world where corporations can give large sums to political campaigns, the political views of a company’s CEO are highly relevant.  Suppose the new head of Microsoft was a fervent supporter of [some cause or candidate] and decided to back [some cause or candidate] with $1 billion from the company’s cash hoard.  People on the other side of that issue would have every reason to organize against that person as the CEO.  Now it is unlikely that a publicly-traded company would pick a political activist as its leader, and the Board of Directors (not to mention shareholders) would probably take a dim view of such large political contributions. But I can understand where the concern would come from.

I am not saying that this is why Eich was raked over the coals.  In his case, people were attacking him for his past behavior, not for what he might do in the future.  But they could have been worried about the future.

 

 

0

Fifth Annual Constitutional Law Colloquium

Loyola University Chicago School of Law will host a Constitutional Law Colloquium on Friday, November 7 and Saturday, November 8, 2014.

This will be the fifth annual Loyola constitutional law colloquium.  Organizers hope to attract constitutional law scholars at all stages of their professional careers to discuss current projects, doctrinal developments in constitutional law, and future goals. The conference will bring together scholars to discuss their works-in-progress concerning constitutional issues, such as, but not limited to Free Speech, Substantive Due Process, Equal Protection, Suffrage Rights and Campaign Finance, Process Oriented Constitutionalism, Constitutional Interpretation, Constitutional Theory, National Security and Constitutional Rights, Due Process Underpinnings of Criminal Procedure, Judicial Review, Executive Privilege, Suspect Classification, Free Exercise and Establishment of Religion, and Federalism. As in years past, there will be many opportunities for the vetting of ideas and for informed critiques. Submissions will be liberally considered, but participation is by invitation only. Presentations will be grouped by subject matter.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Dean and Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of California-Irvine School of Law, will be the keynote speaker.

Titles and abstracts of papers should be submitted electronically to constitutionlaw@luc.edu no later than June 15, 2014.

The Law Center is located on Loyola’s Water Tower campus, near Michigan Avenue’s Magnificent Mile, Lake Michigan, Millennium Park, the Chicago Art Institute, and Chicago Symphony Center.

Participants’ home institutions are expected to pay for their own travel expenses. Loyola will provide facilities, meals, and support.

There are numerous reasonably priced hotels within walking distance of the Loyola School of Law and Chicago’s Magnificent Mile.

Conference Organizers:

Professor Barry Sullivan, Cooney & Conway Chair in Advocacy, bsullivan7@luc.edu
Professor Alexander Tsesis, atsesis@luc.edu
Professor Michael Zimmer, mzimme4@luc.edu

Program Administrator:
Heather Figus, ConstitutionLaw@law.edu

 

0

Making Changes to Fundamental Law

Thanks to Deven, Gerard, and everyone else at Concurring Opinions for the warm welcome.  I plan to blog a bit about the new book, America’s Forgotten Constitutions, as well as some matters related to ongoing research.

A few words about the conception of the book.  It combines American history and legal theory in a way that I hope tells us some new things about events and ideas that have already received some scholarly attention.  It also analyzes some events in constitutionally significant terms when they previously have not received such treatment (e.g., the world federalist movement, the recent drafting of an Aryan constitution).  In doing so, the book seeks to shed light on certain recurring theoretical questions about our constitutional process, writ large.  The primary organizing themes are the dual meta-principles of written constitutionalism and popular sovereignty, combined by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution and unleashed on the population.  I’m interested in how average people adapt these basic principles to forge new relationships and communities, develop novel procedures for authorizing a constitution, and defend extra-legal tactics.

The book’s ambition is to go beyond current treatments of “popular constitutionalism”–so we can have an honest discussion about the energizing and dangerous aspects of our political tradition.  I pick eight examples where Americans wrote constitutions at various important moments in time, in order to explore these questions.  The colorful cast of characters consists of squatters, native Americans, slaveholders, abolitionists, socialists, world federalists, black nationalists, and white separatists.  I explore how the functions of writing and notions of sovereignty mutate after the Founding period.

Allow me to begin by suggesting that these constitution-writing episodes push us to reevaluate what we think we know about the procedure for making constitutional law.  Just to get the ball rolling, much of the literature identifies the following ways of altering fundamental law (let’s note but for now bracket the crucial lurking question of the relative legitimacy of each approach):

1.  Making foundational law during a true revolutionary moment, marked by political breakdown or some other break in historical time, when procedural questions are up for grabs along with substantive commitments.

2.  Formally amending a constitutional text (in the U.S. Constitution, according to the process outlined in Article V) without rejecting the continuing legitimacy of the legal order created.

3.  Creatively using conventional national institutions (say, by one party winning successive elections, enacting transformative laws, making key judicial appointments, winning landmark decisions through litigation).  Again, this is done without rejecting the authority of the overarching legal order.

4.  Gaining control of key bureaucracies (White House, OLC, DOD) or forging government-private relationships (such as Federalist Society-DOJ-Judiciary).  These social networks may not be lasting, but the goal is to achieve major shifts in substantive law rather than to overthrow an entire system.

5.  Creating a social movement that signals popular discontent, shapes public debate, forces national institutions to rethink governing commitments.

What are the protagonists in my stories doing?  For the most part, options # 2, # 3, and # 4 elude their grasp.  Typically, they compose a small group holding marginalized ideas, so it is not realistic to dominate any particular political party, win successive elections, or gain ideological control of key institutions.  Even where, as with the Confederates, they enjoyed a degree of access to formal power at the national level, they have given up on the possibility of making fundamental law within the conventional rules.  Option # 5 is possible for a few of my groups, but in the main they find themselves on the outliers of oppositional movements and trends.  In fact, the act of writing a constitution signals their differences with other dissenters in terms of state-building goals and tactics, not to mention the depths of their despondency that legal change through conventional means is possible.

None of my popular legal theorists believes that anything in the 1787 Constitution or our political tradition requires preapproval to write a new constitution; it merely dictates how rewrites of the existing one must be accomplished.  The right to write is inherent and fundamental.  They also agree that the people have the power to alter the basis and terms of political community.  Where they tend to differ is over tactics and procedures.

For some–let’s call them the classical revolutionaries–they believe themselves to be engaged in process # 1.  They confidently point to ample evidence of political breakdown, and argue that they are justified in authoring a new governing document and coming up with completely new protocols for deliberation and ratification.  This best captures the slaveholding statesmen who formed the Confederate States of America, though their theory of consent is vigorously disputed by Lincoln and other defenders of the 1787 Constitution.

At first blush, the classical situation also seemingly captures John Brown’s proposal for a new republican form of government and the Republic of New Afrika’s constitution created by the followers of Malcolm X after his assassination.  In both cases, people’s conventions determined that the original Constitution did not bind them, either because it was irreparably broken due to slavery and racial subjugation, or because the Framers never gained the rightful consent of the governed (i.e., slaves and former slaves).

Here’s where it gets complicated.  Most people don’t agree the country faces a true revolutionary moment.  Each dissident group gains supporters, but never enough regular folks to threaten the national legal order as a social movement, or enough elites to control any formal levers of power.  Each struggles with the question of violence as a tool for constitutional change, ultimately concluding that under extreme circumstances targeted violence is justified by the political tradition.  Force, they believe, can be constitutionally used to liberate slaves or defend against private and public acts of violence, inequality, and degradation.  Each group has national aspirations: in the case of John Brown, he hopes his constitutional vision will supplant the tottering slave-holding vision propped up by the High Court; for Imari and Gaidi Obadele, the goal is to convince the U.S. to give up the former slaveholding states so a black republic can be established.

As they await better conditions for revolutionary consolidation, created by themselves or others, they decide to start living out their constitutional principles.  In other words, their constitutions are not simply pieces of paper to be discussed one day if enough people are intrigued.  This shift toward social implementation is somewhat seamless for their respective communities because they espouse a strong dose of what I call “ethical sovereignty”–the notion that true legal authority derives from shared moral beliefs.  They begin to sustain law-based communities despite lacking control of territory and not completing the tasks of authorizing and implementing their constitutions.  In fact, while they see themselves as pursuing strategy # 1, I think both groups at some point transition into a different strategy of constitutional change: modeling an alternative community.  The Republic of New Afrika lasts longer than John Brown’s group, mostly because Brown decided to force the action at Harpers Ferry, and his execution decimates that nascent law-based community.  But New Afrikans are also better at it in that they reach more deeply into the recruitable population.

Once we see that dissenters can use imperfectly authorized constitutions to model alternative communities (let’s now call it strategy # 6), we start to notice other things.  Modeling derives from the same basic principles of popular sovereignty and written constitutionalism.  Modeling can stand alone or supplement any of the other strategies for constitutional change.  Innovative use of state and local laws (not simply national laws and institutions) can facilitate the formation of alternative constitution-based communities (more on this in a future post).  Suddenly, we start to notice a lot more groups of people writing constitutions, for all sorts of reasons and to varying degrees of success.

 

1

There & Back Again: John Rizzo & Yuri Nosenko

John Rizzo gave thirty-four years of service as an attorney for the Central Intelligence Agency, serving with distinction under eleven directors and rising to acting general counsel.  Yuri Nosenko, who died in 2008, was a lieutenant colonel in the KGB, a Soviet defector, and suspected double agent.

RizzoNosenkoWhat do they have in common?  A late night, one-on-one, vodka-soaked discussion of Nosenko’s three years of unremitting torture by Rizzo’s employer. The torture produced nothing, neither confirmation that Nosenko was a Soviet mole nor confidence that he was not.  In his new memoir, Company Man, Rizzo asserts that this meeting left an indelible impression on him as a young lawyer. But just how did he put that experience to use when he evaluated the legality of the “Enhanced Interrogation Program” that landed on his desk in the CIA General Counsel’s office after 9/11?

His answer is not found in his memoir.  But he did give an answer last week, when I asked him this question at an outstanding symposium on the future of national security law held at Pepperdine Law School.  The conference was organized by Professor Greg McNeal ably assisted by 3L Shelby Doyle and her team of student editors at the Pepperdine Law Review.

Comrade Nosenko’s story, and Mr. Rizzo’s answer, follow after the break. Read More

0

FAN 10.1 (First Amendment News) The 2014 Jefferson Muzzles are Here! — 2015 Candidates in Wings

Since 1992, the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free Expression has celebrated the birth and ideals of its namesake by calling attention to those who in the past year forgot or disregarded Mr. Jefferson’s admonition that freedom of speech “cannot be limited without being lost.”

Announced on or near April 13—the anniversary of the birth of Thomas Jefferson—the Jefferson Muzzles are awarded as a means to draw national attention to abridgments of free speech and press and, at the same time, foster an appreciation for those tenets of the First Amendment.TJCenter-copy

As the Center sees it, because the importance and value of free expression extend far beyond the First Amendment’s limit on government censorship, acts of private censorship are not spared consideration for the dubious honor of receiving a Muzzle.

So, Ladies and Gentlemen, by way of the Thomas Jefferson Center, I present you the

2014 Jefferson Muzzles

Re: 2013 Muzzles, go here

On a related point, see David Berstein’s “Brandeis University’s Double Standard on Honorary Degrees,” Volokh Conspiracy, April 9, 2014.

If Josh Wheeler and the folks at the Jefferson Center are considering candidates for the 2015 Muzzles, check out John L. Smith’s column entitled “Government in full force to corral cattle, First Amendment,” Las Vegas Review-Journal, April 7, 2014. As Smith  put it:

Perhaps I’ve led a sheltered life, but . . . I had never set foot in a First Amendment Area. On Saturday, the lot was otherwise empty. There were no fiery voices of libertarian protest, no throng of angry Nevada ranchers with rifles in their pickups, not even a gaggle of curious tourists or a covey of head-scratching reporters. Of course, the fact the free-speech pen was located several miles from Bundy’s ranch and even farther from the federal government’s corral of “trespass cattle,” the lack of attendance was understandable. (By Monday, the voices of peaceful protest would increase considerably a few miles up the road near the banks of the Virgin River.)

Adds Smith: “A sign marks a ‘First Amendment area’ to designate where protesters can protest near Bunkerville.” See lonely “First Amendment Area” below in pic. Turns out that sometime later a protester ventured out with an American flag and placard that read: “The First Amendment is not an area.”

web1_bundy_040114JL_09_4Last FAN.10 Column: (“Justice Stevens’ Proposal to Amend the 1st Amendment”) go here

Next Scheduled FAN Column: April 16th

stairway-to-heaven-1319562-m
9

Fan.10 (First Amendment News) — Justice Stevens’ Proposal to Amend the 1st Amendment

justice-stevensWhile the Justices busily prepared their respective opinions in the McCutcheon campaign finance case, one of their Brethren was preparing to release a book that calls on Americans to reverse some of his former colleagues’ constitutional handiwork. The forthcoming book is Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the Constitution (Little, Brown & Co., pp. 170). The author is Justice John Paul Stevens.

This short book is offered up against the backdrop of Justice Stevens’ co-authored opinion in McConnell v. FEC (2003), his dissents in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC (1996), Randall v. Sorrell (2006),  Davis v. Federal Election Commission (2008), and Citizens United v. FEC (2010), his criticism of that case in his Five Chiefs: A Supreme Court Memoir (2011), and in his various criticisms of the Court’s campaign finance jurisprudence in his print and TV interviews along with his public addresses. Moreover, it is highly likely that Justice Stevens is just as critical of the Court’s recent 5-4 decision in McCutcheon v. FEC. In short, John Paul Stevens is a man on a constitutional mission.

Quite apart from Citizens United, Justice Stevens has long had serious reservations about vindicating First Amendment claims in most campaign finance cases. Coming onto the Court shortly after Buckley v. Valeo (1976), he witnessed firsthand what Justice William Brennan and his colleagues had wrought in sustaining several of the First Amendment claims urged by  Senator James L. Buckley, presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy, and the ACLU. It left him, he recalled in Five Chiefs, with an “extreme distaste” for that precedent. That distaste, he added, “never abated, and I have felt ever since that the Court would have been best served by inserting itself into campaign finance debates with less frequency.”

Given that, he thinks it is time to resort to Article V for a constitutional remedy. Admittedly, it is (and should be) difficult to amend the Constitution. From 1789 to April 2014, some 11,539 amendments have been proposed, but only twenty-six have been ratified. But that fact has not deterred the retired Justice from Hyde Park, Chicago. Here, then, is the text of the 43 words Justice Stevens would add to the Constitution in order to amend the First Amendment.

Neither the First Amendment nor any other provision of this Constitution shall be construed to prohibit the Congress or any state from imposing reasonable limits on the amount of money that candidates for public office, or their supporters, may spend in election campaigns.

(Though the publication date is not until April 22, the text of the above language, which has been confirmed to be the final text, has heretofore appeared here and here and here.)

Reactions from Select 1st Amendment Scholars & Lawyers

Professor Martin Redish, a noted First Amendment scholar who teaches at Justice Stevens’ alma mater, takes exception to this proposed constitutional amendment: “As much as I respect Justice Stevens, I believe that his proposed amendment is sorely misguided.”

  1. “Its inescapable impact would be to reduce dramatically the flow of information and opinion to the voters about political campaigns, thereby substantially undermining core goals of the First Amendment and its role as a facilitator of democracy. The simple fact is that speech costs money, and by limiting the amount of money that candidates and supporters can spend the provision would necessarily limit the flow of often valuable expression which could help the voters perform their governing function in the voting booth.”
  2.  “Moreover, Justice Stevens’ proposal would have the inescapable effect of locking in non-monetary inequalities—for example, incumbency, political connections or fame— perversely, in the name of equality. These are inequalities that have traditionally been diluted by opponents’ use of money to equalize the voters’ awareness of the candidates.”
  3.  “Finally, the provision would create an interpretive nightmare. How much money is “reasonable”? Would it differ from state to state? From campaign to campaign? And who gets to decide? Would courts invoke strict scrutiny or rational basis review of the legislature’s judgment? To give the authority of determining how much is “reasonable” to a state legislature invites the fox to watch the hen house: legislators who will stand for reelection will naturally attempt to shape the limits in a way that facilitates their continued victory. Also on an interpretive level, enormous uncertainty would be created by the task of determining who is a “supporter” of a candidate. And even if courts were somehow able to establish coherent interpretive standards for that word, is it appropriate for the Constitution to engage in what amounts to viewpoint-based discrimination by giving preferences to those who are neutral over those who have chosen to support a particular candidate?”

“In sum, Justice Stevens’ proposal would bring about all of these nightmares—political, social, and interpretive. We would be left with a doctrinal morass and a substantial disruption of the flow of information and opinion fundamental to the operation of the democratic process. To be sure, there are problems with our current campaign system, but as Madison warned in Federalist No. 10, sometimes the cure is worse than the disease.”Unknown

Professor Steven Shiffrin, another noted First Amendment scholar, takes a different view: “The proposal of Justice Stevens directly speaks to the major evil confronting our elections and our democracy. Nonetheless, I worry that conservatives on the Court, as they have in the past, will make a distinction between commentary on issues and election commentary allowing the former, but not the latter. They have previously ruled that commentary was about issues rather than candidates even when the purpose and effect of the commentary was to influence the outcome of an election. This loophole could seriously undermine the purpose of the proposed amendment.”

Such comments notwithstanding, Justice Stevens is “confident that the soundness” of his proposal “will become more and more evident, and that ultimately [it] will be adopted.” The purpose of his forthcoming book, he tells us, “is to expedite that process and to avoid future crises before they occur.”

Not surprisingly, Robert Corn-Revere, a noted First Amendment lawyer, was also skeptical of the Justice’s amendment idea: “The idea of proposing an amendment to reverse Supreme Court decisions one doesn’t like is not new – witness the myriad amendments that purported to ‘fix’ the First Amendment in the wake of the flag burning cases Texas v. Johnson and U.S. v. Eichmann.  But such a thing is rare when it comes from a retired Supreme Court justice, and even more surprising is the degree of latitude the proposed language would give government to restrict our most basic rights. I would have hoped Justice Stevens’ long experience with Fourth Amendment jurisprudence would have suggested the danger of giving the courts power to decide which abridgements are ‘reasonable.’”

Two Opposing Views

John Nichols & Robert McChesney, Dollarocracy (2013): “Every major reform period in American history…has been accompanied by numerous amendments to the Constitution, amendments that were deemed unthinkable until almost the moment they were passed. If the problems faced at this point in the American journey are going to be solved, history suggests constitutional amendments will be a significant part of the process”

– Laura W. Murphy, director, ACLU Washington Legislative Office (June 2012): “If there is one thing we absolutely should not be doing, it’s tinkering with our founding document to prevent groups like the ACLU (or even billionaires like Sheldon Adelson) from speaking freely about the central issues in our democracy. Doing so will fatally undermine the First Amendment, diminish the deterrent factor of a durable Constitution and give comfort to those who would use the amendment process to limit basic civil liberties and rights. It will literally ‘break’ the Constitution.”

Other Proposed Amendments to the First Amendment re Campaign Finance Issues

Read More

1

Welcome Back, Professor Robert Tsai

rtsaiIt is with great pleasure that I re-introduce Professor Robert Tsai. Robert has blogged with us before, and we are lucky to have him back to blog about his work, ideas, and I hope his new book America’s Forgotten Constitutions: Defiant Visions of Power and Community. I met Robert when we are at Yale Law School together. He was sharp and engaged then and has not slowed down since. He has held two clerkships — Hugh H. Bownes, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and Denny Chin, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. He has litigated constitutional issues before federal and state courts. As a professor his papers have twice been selected for the Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum: once in constitutional theory and once in constitutional history. Professor Tsai began his academic career at the University of Oregon and then joined the law faculty of American University in 2008 and was promoted to full professor the following year. Welcome back, Robert.

1

Woodrow Wilson and Justice McReynolds

98px-President_Woodrow_Wilson_portrait_December_2_1912I’m starting to go through Justice McReynolds’ papers, and one thing that I would like to figure out is how he got on the Court.

The most common story of McReynolds’ appointment goes like this.  He was a jerk as Attorney General, so when a Supreme Court vacancy opened up Woodrow Wilson took that opportunity to get rid of him.  This does not strike me as a plausible explanation.  Even if you took Supreme Court appointments lightly, which I don’t think Wilson did, I doubt that you would hand this plum to someone you could not stand.  What are the other possibilities?

1.  McReynolds, as I mentioned in a prior post, had a fine reputation as a trust buster in 1914.  This may have convinced Wilson that he was a progressive (or progressive enough).  I’m less clear on whether McReynolds was a good Attorney General–I still need to work through that.

2. The vacancy to which McReynolds was appointed was a southern seat (Horace Lurton, a Kentuckian, died).  As a result, the fact that McReynolds was from Tennessee gave him a leg up.

3.  Wilson’s wife died a few weeks before McReynolds was nominated.  Some suggest that (in his grief) Wilson simply was not thinking clearly about the nomination or any public matter at that time.

Anyway, I’m curious to see what the press had to say about the McReynolds nomination.