Tagged: jurisprudence

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FAN 41 (First Amendment News) Three Harvard Law Review essays discuss Justice Breyer’s free speech jurisprudence

  • Judge Breyer has a unique zig-zag style. Ralph Nader (confirmation hearing statement, July 15, 1994)
  • I do not rest my conclusion upon a strict categorical analysis. – Justice Stephen Breyer (concurring in United States v. Alvarez, June 28, 2012)
  • The single most important area of Breyer’s work on the Court has been his opinions on the First Amendment, in which he has developed a unique and pathbreaking approach to issues of freedom of speech. — Paul Gewirtz (Yale Law Journal, 2006)
Justice Stephen Breyer

On the one hand . . . but then on the other

When it comes to free speech, he is darling of the Liberal Left . . . or some on the Left, or of some on the Left in the legal academy, or of those on the Left who abhor rulings such as Citizens United v. FEC (2010) and McCutcheon v. FEC (2014). To others, he is the Justice who got the First Amendment right (albeit in dissent) in cases such as Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010) and Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006). Many of those same defenders shy away from their praise when it comes to opinions such as the one Justice Breyer authored in Randall v. Sorrell (2006).

In his pragmatist approach, one will readily discern the vernacular of ad hoc balancing, of  “competing constitutional concerns” or “First Amendment interests . . . on both sides of the legal equation.” Mindful of such concerns, he asks: Are the “restrictions on speech disproportionate when measured against their speech-related benefits”? And why? What is the purpose of such balancing? He responds: to “facilitate a conversation among ordinary citizens that will encourage their informed participation.” To that end, government may limit speech in the supposed service of “preserving a democratic order” or for the purpose of promoting and protecting  “collective speech.” In this way an others, and dating back to his 1997 concurrence in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC II, Stephen Breyer has set out to rewrite First Amendment jurisprudence.

In light of his two decades of service on the Supreme Court, I thought I would offer some background information on how the Justice has decided First Amendment free expression cases (29 are listed below), his thoughts on free speech generally, and how scholars and lawyers have viewed his jurisprudence in this area. A sketch of all of that is set out below by way of select references to various sources.

HLR Essays in Honor of Justice Breyer 

The November issue of the Harvard Law Review has a collection of essays in honor of Justice Stephen Breyer’s twenty years of service on  the United States Supreme Court. The following three essays concern the Justice’s free speech jurisprudence:

Let me pose a hypothetical

Let me pose a hypothetical: “Candidate Smith — we can only give him $2,600 — has a lot of supporters.”

Active Liberty: Justice Breyer on Free Speech

In his 2005 book, Active Liberty: Interpreting our Democratic Constitution, Justice Breyer devoted a chapter (pp. 39-55) to the question of free speech.

Roberts Court Era: Justice Breyer’s Majority or Plurality Opinions in Free Expression Cases

In what follows, S indicates that a majority of the Court sustained the First Amendment claimed whereas D means that it was denied.

Separate Opinions: Below is a list of separate opinions authored by Justice Breyer in free expression cases decided during the Roberts Court era:

a pensive moment

the pensive pragmatist

Justice Breyer’s Pre-Roberts Court Opinions: Selected Cases 

First Circuit Free Expression Opinions Read More

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FAN 40 (First Amendment News) Steve Shiffrin & Bob Corn-Revere debate “What’s Wrong with the First Amendment?”

Bob Corn-Revere & Steve Shiffrin (with Joel Gora in background)

Bob Corn-Revere & Steve Shiffrin (with Joel Gora in background)

For those who savor good give-and-take talk about the First Amendment, last Wednesday evening was a memorable one as Professor Steven Shiffrin debated Robert Corn-Revere with Ashly Messenger moderating. The topic: “What’s Wrong with the First Amendment?” Why that title? Because that’s the working title of Professor Shiffrin’s next book.

The New York city event was the third in a series of First Amendment salons held at the offices of the law firm of Levine, Sullivan, Koch & Schulz. The program was introduced by Lee Levine, who announced that this was the first salon done in conjunction with the Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression at Yale Law School. The event was video cast live to the firm’s office in Washington, D.C. and to the Abrams Institute in New Haven.

Among others, those attending the event included: Floyd Abrams, Sandra Baron, John Berger, Joan Bertin, Vince Blasi, Kali Borkoski, Karen Gantz, Joel Gora, Laura Handman, David Horowitz, Maureen Johnston, Adam Liptak, Greg Lukianoff, Tony Mauro, Wes Macleaod-Ball, David Savage, David Schulz, Paul Smith, and James Swanson.

The exchange was robust as the Cornell professor took articulate and passionate exception to several of the Roberts Court’s First Amendment rulings, including United States v. Stevens, Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, and United States v. Alvarez – all cases in which Corn-Revere had an amicus’ hand in defending the free speech claims. No potted plant, the First Amendment lawyer fired back with facts, figures, and history as the two men debated the pros and cons of balancing vs strict scrutiny approaches to free speech decision-making. The animated discussion was always friendly and at times even funny as the two traded witty retorts.

The dialogue was enriched as Vince Blasi, Katherine Bolger, Joan Bertin, Paul Smith, James Swanson, and Floyd Abrams, among others, weighed in. As the discussion developed one could almost see minds bouncing back-and-forth as Ms. Messenger pressed the two seasoned First Amendment experts. The evening ended on a high note as Shiffrin and Corn-Revere laughed and shook hands. (Re earlier salons, see here and here.)

Coming soon: book by Seana Shiffrin 

UnknownThe Shiffrin name has long been a familiar one in First Amendment circles — a name that has both invited and provoked thought. Now comes another Shiffrin, UCLA philosophy and law Professor Seana Shiffrin, who is a scholar in her own right — someone quite attune to jurisprudential nuance.

If the case of United States v. Alvarez (2012) — the Stolen Valor case — caught your attention, and if you were intrigued by Chief Judge Alex Kozinki’s separate opinion in the case when it was before the Ninth Circuit, then Speech Matters: On Lying, Morality, and the Law (Princeton University Press, Dec. 21, 2014) by Seana Shiffrin is a book for you. And it is more, philosophically much more.

Here is the publisher’s description of the forthcoming book: “To understand one another as individuals and to fulfill the moral duties that require such understanding, we must communicate with each other. We must also maintain protected channels that render reliable communication possible, a demand that, Seana Shiffrin argues, yields a prohibition against lying and requires protection for free speech. This book makes a distinctive philosophical argument for the wrong of the lie and provides an original account of its difference from the wrong of deception.”

“Drawing on legal as well as philosophical arguments, the book defends a series of notable claims — that you may not lie about everything to the “murderer at the door,” that you have reasons to keep promises offered under duress, that lies are not protected by free speech, that police subvert their mission when they lie to suspects, and that scholars undermine their goals when they lie to research subjects.”

“Many philosophers start to craft moral exceptions to demands for sincerity and fidelity when they confront wrongdoers, the pressures of non-ideal circumstances, or the achievement of morally substantial ends. But Shiffrin consistently resists this sort of exceptionalism, arguing that maintaining a strong basis for trust and reliable communication through practices of sincerity, fidelity, and respecting free speech is an essential aspect of ensuring the conditions for moral progress, including our rehabilitation of and moral reconciliation with wrongdoers.”

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Lies and the Murderer Next Door 5

Chapter 2: Duress and Moral Progress 47

Chapter 3: A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech 79

Chapter 4: Lying and Freedom of Speech 116

Chapter 5: Accommodation, Equality, and the Liar 157

Chapter 6: Sincerity and Institutional Values 182

I plan to say more about this book in the coming year. Stay tuned.

UnknownNew book by Danish editor of newspaper that published cartoons of Mohammad

The author: Fleming Rose 

The book: The Tyranny of Silence (Cato Institute, Nov. 14, 2014)

Description: “When the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten (Viby, Denmark) published the cartoons of the prophet Mohammed nine years ago, Denmark found itself at the center of a global battle about the freedom of speech. The paper’s culture editor, Flemming Rose, defended the decision to print the 12 drawings, and he quickly came to play a central part in the debate about the limitations to freedom of speech in the 21st century. Since then, Rose has visited universities and think tanks and participated in conferences and debates around the globe in order to discuss tolerance and freedom. In The Tyranny of Silence, Flemming Rose writes about the people and experiences that have influenced the way he views the world and his understanding of the crisis, including meetings with dissidents from the former Soviet Union and ex-Muslims living in Europe. He provides a personal account of an event that has shaped the debate about what it means to be a citizen in a democracy and how to coexist in a world that is increasingly multicultural, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic.”

See Fleming Rose here re his recent appearance on The Last Word with Lawrence O’Donnell.  

1-A groups urge school district to select books “solely on sound educational grounds” Read More

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CJ Katzmann weighs in with new book on statutory interpretation

cover-197x300While there seems to be no end to books, articles, essays, blog posts and symposia on constitutional interpretation, relatively little attention is paid to the all-too-important issue of statutory interpretation. Well, that is changing with the advent of a new book by the Chief Judge of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. The work is aptly titled Judging Statutes (Oxford University Press) and its author is Robert Katzmann. It is already drawing impressive attention as evidenced by the following:

Among other scholarly venues, there have already been programs on the book at the following places:

Of course, Judge Katzmann does not, by any measure, occupy this field alone. His chief scholarly rivals are Justice Antonin Scalia and Mr.  Bryan A. Garner, who two years ago published the much-noticed Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. To be sure, the Chief Judge has a different interpretive take, though he approaches his subject with diplomacy, nuance, and a comprehensive knowledge of how the federal legislative process works. (Another leading book in this area is Legislation and Statutory Interpretation by William Eskridge, Philip Fricky and Elizabeth Garrett.)

Federal appeals judge Robert Katzmann’s new book [is attracting impressive attention]. Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor were in the front row of the audience on Tuesday at a Georgetown University Law Center event marking the Sept. 11 publication of Katzmann’s book Judging Statutes. . .  . The Justices’ presence signaled that, as Georgetown Law dean William Treanor put it, Katzmann’s book is ‘already having incredible influence, even as it is just being published.'” -- Tony Mauro

 In case you missed it, check out my Q & A interview with Chief Judge Katzmann over at SCOTUSblog.

(Full disclosure: I have known Robert Katzmann for many years.)

→ Coming soon: POSNER ON POSNER (a five-part Q & A series prefaced by an unconventional two-part biographical essay). 

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This is Water

It is both an honor and a great pleasure to participate in this discussion of Robin West’s brilliant book, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE. There are so many ideas to laud in this work, many of which have been ably raised by other commentators within this conversation. But reflecting upon this work, I have been particularly struck (as I first was as a student) by Robin’s extraordinary capacity to illuminate aspects of our legal landscape that, while foundational and ubiquitous, remain invisible. Robin’s chalk-outline of a missing progressive normative jurisprudence calls to mind a parable told by the too-soon departed David Foster Wallace. In a commencement address at Kenyon College, Wallace told the story of two young fish out for a swim who happen upon an older fish. The older fish says: “Good morning boys. How’s the water?” After the older fish passes by them, one of the young fish turns to the other and says: “What the hell is water?”

In NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE, Robin offers us an opportunity to rethink the “water” of our analytic practices. Most significantly, she presents the possibility of a jurisprudence in which normative argument constitutes the “water” of our analytical practice. Normative argument, she argues, should occupy a central rather than marginalized role in our jurisprudence. Moreover, she observes that progressives’ absence from the normative table has relegated our jurisprudential conversations to an unduly narrow and adjudicatorally-obsessed preoccupation with explicating the law that we already have. This positivist analytic jurisprudence (or, in Robin’s helpful Benthamite parlance, “expository” jurisprudence) has consciously and perhaps even aggressively eschewed normative argument to the peril of the project of legal reform and the promotion of social justice. Robin’s point is not that the project of exposition should be set aside in favor of a project of developing normative/critical (or, again in Robin’s Bethamite vocabulary, “censorial”) jurisprudence, but rather that room should be made in the center stage of our jurisprudential tradition for normative/critical/censorial jurisprudence.

Yet within Robin’s rendering lies room for the hypothesis that the agnosticism that we take as a matter of course to be a basic precept of analytic jurisprudence is itself a tacit manifestation of a conception (or, more accurately, varying conceptions) of the good. Robin’s argument raises potential doubts about the capacity of our conventional analytic jurisprudence to maintain agnosticism about conceptions of the good. In this rendering, competing conceptions of the good are the “water” that our various jurisprudential projects are already immersed in. While we may have become acculturated to understanding and explaining the law in a way that is formally divorced from conceptions of the good (e.g. whether wise or not, our tort law is committed to a principle of corrective justice), is it nonetheless possible that we have, all the while, been swimming in it?

Of course this is not Robin’s principal point. Whether or not our existing analytic jurisprudence is capable of the moral agnosticism it formally espouses, Robin would have us draw our foundational moral conceptions (whatever their source or origin) out into the light where they could serve more prospective and ambitious (rather than merely descriptive and thereby modestly – in the service of continuity to past practice – prescriptive) ends. Nonetheless, the question of whether our analytic jurisprudential practices necessarily depend upon a conception (or conceptions) of the good seems to me to be an important one in light of Robin’s thesis. Not only does the question seem to be intimately tied to her overall picture of progressives’ commitment to neutrality that figures centrally in her argument, but if this hypothesis bears out, it strikes me that it has potential to significantly undermine potential pragmatic objections to Robin’s thesis. It is, therefore, a question that I think merits some attention. Read More

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Justice, Law, and Fellowship: From Coordination to Collaboration

“True peace is not the absence of tension: it is the presence of justice and brotherhood.” — Martin Luther King, Jr. (1955, 1958, 1961)

At the Martin Luther King Jr. Memorial, Washington DC

Dr. King spoke these words or similar ones on a number of occasions, usually when explaining the relationship between love, law, and civil disobedience. I invoke them here because of their affinity with the idea that law that successfully promotes the common good will not yield simply the absence of anarchy but the presence of fellowship.

In the first major chapter of Normative Jurisprudence, “Revitalizing Natural Law”, Robin West argues for “a reengagement of liberal and progressive lawyers with … the ethical inquiry into the nature of the common good furthered by just law.” This is a terrific project. But it is a more complicated project than either a casual reader or a sophisticated scholar might notice. There are at least two major kinds of complexity involved. One, to which West devotes some attention in the chapter, involves how to specify human good, common or individual. The other, which receives less attention, at least at this phase of the book, involves figuring out what is distinctively legal about a project to promote the common good. In this post, a bit about this second area of complexity. This is not to say that West herself does not appreciate the complexity of and need for sorting out the role of law in a quest for the common good.

West persuasively explains that just because the project of promoting the common good might also be a political one or an overall ethical one, that does not mean it is not also a legal one, a distinctively legal one, or one in which law plays a distinctive role. Throughout “Revitalizing Natural Law”, West emphasizes that achieving the common good, understood as arising from the demands of individual good, necessitates coordinated social action, of the sort law is uniquely positioned to bring about.

Individuals going it alone will not get very far in achieving their own good, notes West. A group of uncoordinated individuals who realize this problem need state-sponsored coordination, in the form of law, to ensure that each of them do better, which means that all of them will do better. Fair enough, as far as it goes. But there is a lot more to coordination, and to coordination implemented by law, than meets the eye.

“Coordination” can be understand more or less thickly. A law dictating whether to drive on the left or the right coordinates thinly. It solves a problem whose solution does not impact the good in question: keeping traffic flowing. The content of the law does not matter, what matters is having one. The activities and instrumentalities involved are understood, practically speaking, largely similarly by all the participants.

Most of the time, though, there is a thicker connection between laws governing collective action or social activity and the content of the laws themselves. Laws against polluting the environment presuppose or stipulate agreement on foundational matters, including what constitutes pollution and how to demarcate the polluters from the environment. Laws regulating research on human subjects presuppose or stipulate agreement on what is research, who is human, and what it means to be a subject of another’s study.

To approach jurisprudence as West urges means noticing and taking quite seriously the role law and legal institutions – all of them, not just legislatures, but courts and agencies and review boards and prosecutors and juries and so on – play in coordinating both the understanding and the lived actuality of the activities and instruments law references. The good is rich stuff, and to get us to it, law must make it possible for us to proceed from strategic interaction in a coordinated setting (e.g. driving on the highway) to substantive cooperation (e.g. creating a functional and legitimate banking system). That sort of cooperation rests on shared background understandings of matters basic, diverse, and particularistic. To enable such cooperation law must not only invite and permit, but also foster, collaboration on a worldview sufficiently shared so that law has a shared meaning for law makers, law appliers, law enforcers, and law abiders (not that these four actors are always distinct and separate).

The flight from ethical normativity that West identifies in Normative Jurisprudence is part of a larger flight from normativity in general – including the normativity of meaning. How much agreement on meaning do we need in order to achieve just law that furthers the common good? What sort of legal actors and institutions do we need to get that agreement? In future posts during this celebration of Normative Jurisprudence, I will continue to examine these questions. I take inquiry into them to be part of the project West urges. I also expect that there will be sharp disagreement among liberal and progressive scholars about how much shared meaning we need and what we are willing to do get it.