Tagged: First Amendment

21

Photographic License to Discriminate?

The loosening of restrictions on same-sex marriage over the last decade has been accompanied by the refusal of persons opposed to such unions to participate in them in any way. Naturally, the law requires no one to show up and cheer at a same-sex wedding or commitment ceremony, but what if a county clerk did not want to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples or a health care worker refused to perform the necessary blood tests? Obviously, some objections to marriage will intrude on a couple’s ability to marry more than others.

800px-Photographer

The key to understanding which objections are legal and which are not does not only lie in guarantees of religious freedom. Everyone is free to harbor religious or philosophical opposition to same-gender couples and to shout that message from the rooftops, as long as they do not create a nuisance in doing so. It is in jurisdictions that have enacted prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations where those who peddle their wares in the public marketplace are not allowed to reject customers for being gay. In such jurisdictions, religious opponents to same-sex unions have every right to voice their objections in church and to teach their children that it is wrong to be gay. If these opponents open up shop in the local marketplace, however, they are required to leave their biases at home.

New Mexico has such a law. Elaine Huguenin is a talented photographer who makes a good living recording important moments in the lives of the people of Albuquerque. In 2006 she decided to refuse the request of a lesbian couple that she be the photographer at their commitment ceremony. When sued, Huguenin, obviously aware that her religious freedom argument would have no traction under decades-old Supreme Court precedent, came up with the novel argument that if she were required to photograph the ceremony, she would be forced to celebrate it and to express that she is accepting of same-sex marriage. This is a story that Huguenin did not want to tell.

Huguenin’s argument sounds as if it was lifted from the Supreme Court’s Boy Scouts of America v. Dale decision. But since her “expressive policy” is merely to make money with her camera, she gave the argument a twist. She insisted that artists, since they create protected speech, must be free to choose what customers they will serve and will not.

While I have no reason to doubt that Huguenin is an artist of the highest caliber with a special flair for photographic storytelling, I fail to see how her status elevates her above someone who merely hires herself out to record an event. I am certain there have been many occasions when the contract between Huguenin and her customers has constrained her to adhere to provisions about how and when, to what degree and in what format they want their stories told. But the question here is not whether Huguenin can refuse to sign a contract whose provisions offend her artistic sensibilities. The question is whether she can refuse her services because the customers are gay. In Huguenin’s case, at least, an argument for carving out an exception in the law for artists is not likely to carry the day.

Furthermore, the law in this case simply does not force Huguenin to make art in a way not of her choosing or to utter a statement that is against her religion. First, it is a given that Huguenin will tell the story of an event in her own way. She is, after all, the one behind the camera. Second, as someone hired to take pictures at the event, she participates primarily as an observer who has some interaction with the major players when she stages certain photographs. More important than the fact that she is not truly there to celebrate is the fact that her hired presence in no way implies an expression that she believes in the goodness of the proceedings.

If Huguenin wants to turn a profit in the economic environment the State of New Mexico provides her, the citizens of that state have declared that there are certain business decisions she may not make. The good news for those who want to discriminate nonetheless is that relatively few jurisdictions in this country have public accommodations laws that forbid sexual orientation discrimination. Right next door to New Mexico, Arizona has such laws only at the local level in Tucson and Phoenix. There is also a paucity of public accommodations protections in neighboring Texas and Oklahoma. It should thus be relatively easy for Huguenin to find her way to a place where she is truly free to marry her business practices with her religious convictions.

20

Citizens United, Graffiti, and the Web

We need more outlets to challenge the way things run. Challenging corporations is difficult, necessary, and proper. Someone in San Diego tried to do that. He is losing his case. It turns out that if you scribble anti-bank messages, you could face 13 years in jail. The medium: washable children’s chalk, not spray paint, on the sidewalk in front of banks. The bank: Bank of America. Now, you might think the First Amendment would be an issue here; it’s not. According the news report, “a judge had opted to prevent the defendant’s attorney from ‘mentioning the First Amendment, free speech, free expression, public forum, expressive conduct, or political speech during the trial,’ and the defendant must now stand trial on 13 counts of vandalism.” The defendant was saying other banks were better banks. Bank of America did not like it, claimed it cost $6,000 to clean up the chalk, and apparently used its influence to have the city gang unit investigate and hand the case to the attorney’s office. Given that this defendant may not be allowed to engage in this speech, because of anti-graffiti and, my bet, property laws, all that may be left is the Web. I think offline mediums matter and should be protected. The Web is an alternative, not a substitute. But even on the Web a protester will have problems.

As I argue in Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine, corporate power to speak has gone up. Corporate power to limit speech has not. A corporate public figure doctrine would allow someone to use a corporation’s logo and name to challenge to corporation on public issues. A corporation’s word mark is its given name; its logo, its face. Just as we would not limit the ability to question and identify human public figures for speech, we should not do so for corporate public figures. A foundational commitment of free speech law, perhaps the foundational commitment, is that public figures don’t and can’t own their reputations. Yet, through trademark and commercial speech doctrines corporations have powerful control over their reputations. If corporations are people for free speech purposes, as a constitutional matter, their control over their reputations can be no greater than the control other public figures have. Corporations cannot have it both ways. Corporations want and receive many of the legal rights natural persons receive. They should be subject to the same limits as other powerful, public figures.

HT: Fred von Lohmann for noting the story on Facebook.

PS. I am not saying corporations should be challenged, because they are corporations. That is silly. In that sense, I would challenge those who challenge, but that’s me.

15

Stanford Law Review Online: Privilege and the Belfast Project

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Will Havemann entitled Privilege and the Belfast Project. Havemann argues that a recent First Circuit opinion goes too far and threatens the idea of academic privilege:

In 2001, two Irish scholars living in the United States set out to compile the recollections of men and women involved in the decades-long conflict in Northern Ireland. The result was the Belfast Project, an oral history project housed at Boston College that collected interviews from many who were personally involved in the violent Northern Irish “Troubles.” To induce participants to document their memories for posterity, Belfast Project historians promised all those interviewed that the contents of their testimonials would remain confidential until they died. More than a decade later, this promise of confidentiality is at the heart of a legal dispute implicating the United States’ bilateral legal assistance treaty with the United Kingdom, the so-called academic’s privilege, and the First Amendment.

He concludes:

Given the confusion sown by Branzburg’s fractured opinion, the First Circuit’s hardnosed decision is unsurprising. But by disavowing the balancing approach recommended in Justice Powell’s concurring Branzburg opinion, and by overlooking the considerable interests supporting the Belfast Project’s confidentiality guarantee, the First Circuit erred both as a matter of precedent and of policy. At least one Supreme Court Justice has signaled a willingness to correct the mischief done by the First Circuit, and to clarify an area of First Amendment law where the Court’s guidance is sorely needed. The rest of the Court should take note.

Read the full article, Privilege and the Belfast Project at the Stanford Law Review Online.

3

Stanford Law Review Online: Software Speech

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Andrew Tutt entitled Software Speech. Tutt argues that current approaches to determining when software or speech generated by software can be protected by the First Amendment are incorrect:

When is software speech for purposes of the First Amendment? This issue has taken on new life amid recent accusations that Google used its search rankings to harm its competitors. This spring, Eugene Volokh coauthored a white paper explaining why Google’s search results are fully protected speech that lies beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. The paper sparked a firestorm of controversy, and in a matter of weeks, dozens of scholars, lawyers, and technologists had joined the debate. The most interesting aspect of the positions on both sides—whether contending that Google search results are or are not speech—is how both get First Amendment doctrine only half right.

He concludes:

By stopping short of calling software “speech,” entirely and unequivocally, the Court would acknowledge the many ways in which software is still an evolving cultural phenomenon unlike others that have come before it. In discarding tests for whether software is speech on the basis of its literal resemblance either to storytelling (Brown) or information dissemination (Sorrell), the Court would strike a careful balance between the legitimate need to regulate software, on the one hand, and the need to protect ideas and viewpoints from manipulation and suppression, on the other.

Read the full article, Software Speech at the Stanford Law Review Online.

0

Stanford Law Review Online: Dahlia v. Rodriguez

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Kendall Turner entitled Dahlia v. Rodriguez: A Chance to Overrule Dangerous Precedent. Turner argues that the Ninth Circuit has an opportunity to make an important change to the rules governing the application of First Amendment protections to the speech of public employees:

In December 2007, Angelo Dahlia, a detective for the City of Burbank, California, allegedly witnessed his fellow police officers using unlawful interrogation tactics. According to Dahlia, these officers beat multiple suspects, squeezed the throat of one suspect, and placed a gun directly under that suspect’s eye. The Burbank Chief of Police seemed to encourage this behavior: after learning that certain suspects were not yet under arrest, he allegedly urged his employees to “beat another [suspect] until they are all in custody.”

After some delay, Dahlia reported his colleagues’ conduct to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Four days later, Burbank’s Chief of Police placed Dahlia on administrative leave. Dahlia subsequently filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Chief and other members of the Burbank Police Department, alleging that his placement on administrative leave was unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

She concludes:

Dahlia offers the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to overturn Huppert and articulate a narrow understanding of Garcetti. This narrow understanding accords with the reality of public employees’ duties—for the duties they are actually expected to perform may differ significantly from the responsibilities listed in their job descriptions. A narrow reading of Garcetti is also essential to ensuring adequate protection of free speech: The answer to the question of when the First Amendment protects a public employee’s statements made pursuant to his official duties may not be “always,” but it cannot be “never.”

Read the full article, Dahlia v. Rodriguez: A Chance to Overrule Dangerous Precedent at the Stanford Law Review Online.

3

Hearing on National Security Leaks

On Wednesday morning the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and National Security held a hearing on the recent national security leaks.  I have just finished watching a video of the hearing so you won’t have to (you can thank me later).  Experts testifying included President George W. Bush’s homeland security advisor Kenneth Wainstein, American University Professor Stephen Vladeck, George Mason Professor Nathan Sales, and US Army (Ret.) Colonel Kenneth Allard.

As the witnesses pointed out, this is the third time in a year and a half that Congress has called for testimony on national security leaks.  The sheer frequency of the hearings indicates that Congress should really try to figure out how to reform the Espionage Act, but I am not going to be holding my breath waiting for this to happen.  Today’s hearing raised some interesting questions but unfortunately provided little guidance on how Congress might revise the Espionage Act.

Not surprisingly, Republican members of the Subcommittee largely used this hearing as an opportunity to rail against the lack of a special prosecutor to investigate the most recent national security leaks, while Democrats spent their time pointing out the most recent leaks were nothing new because leaks have been going on since the founding of this country.

The most interesting part of the hearing from my perspective was the Republicans’ attacks on the media for publishing national security secrets.  As I had mentioned in one of my first posts, almost all of the hostile reaction to the most recent round of high-profile leaks was initially directed at the leakers themselves and not the media entities that published those leaks.  Well, no more.  Rep. Lamar Smith of Texas began the attacks on the media at the outset of the hearing when he said that newspapers publish national security secrets not because they are committed to transparency but rather because they want to increase circulation.  Colonel Allard happily jumped on the media-bashing bandwagon, stating that the N.Y. Times “abuses its position” and that David Sanger’s reporting was “the equivalent of having a KGB operation running against the White House.”  (Colonel Allard also had one of the best quotes from the hearing: “In wartime, I am as opposed to the free flow of information as I am to the free flow of sewage.”  Yikes!)

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0

Washington Law Review, Issue 87:2 (June 2012)

Volume 87  | June 2012 | Issue 2

June 2012 Symposium: The First Amendment in the Modern Age

Foreword:

The Guardians of Knowledge in the Modern State: Post’s Republic and the First Amendment

 

Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover

Essays:

The First Amendment, the Courts, and “Picking Winners”

 

Judge Thomas L. Ambro & Paul J. Safier

Public Discourse, Expert Knowledge, and the Press

 

Joseph Blocher

The First Amendment’s Epistemological Problem

 

Paul Horwitz

A View from the First Amendment Trenches: Washington State’s New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy

 

Bruce E.H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran

Democratic Competence, Constitutional Disorder, and the Freedom of the Press

 

Stephen I. Vladeck

Reply:

Understanding the First Amendment

 

Robert C. Post

Bibliography:

Robert C. Post, Selected Bibliography of First Amendment Scholarship

 

Washington Law Review

Comments:

Defining “Breach of The Peace” in Self-Help Repossessions

 

Ryan McRobert

Addressing the Costs and Comity Concerns of International E-Discovery

 

John T. Yip

2

Initial Thoughts on the Stolen Valor case

Although most people are focusing on Chief Justice Roberts’ vote to uphold the healthcare law, it turns out the Chief also voted with the “liberals” today to strike down the Stolen Valor Act as violating the First Amendment.  This is an important First Amendment opinion with lots of points for discussion.

The Stolen Valor Act makes it a misdemeanor to “falsely represent oneself as a recipient of military honors.  The final vote from the Court was 6-3, but the six votes were spread between Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion (joined by the Chief and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor) and Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion joined somewhat surprisingly by Justice Kagan (more on that in a minute). The dissent was written by Justice Alito, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas.

I will just note a few things that captured my attention after a first read:

Reliance on the marketplace of ideas: Although Justice Kennedy spends a lot of time in his plurality opinion discussing how the current statute does not require prosecutors to demonstrate any material harm resulting from the false speech, he also notably places a lot of confidence in the marketplace of ideas to discredit false statements.  In particular, he relies heavily on the ability of counterspeech to flush out the truth.  In this case, Kennedy writes, the Government could easily post online a database listing those who have received military honors.  Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion also discussed the importance of the marketplace of ideas and encouraged the Government to embrace “information-disseminating devices” to correct the truth.

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5

Leakers and the First Amendment

There has always been an active debate about whether the First Amendment affords government outsiders (like the media) any protection when they disseminate classified national security information without authorization.  As I mentioned in my blog post last week, however, critics of the most recent round of high-profile leaks have targeted their attacks almost exclusively on the leakers themselves and not on the news outlets that published the leaks.  So the question is, do leakers have any First Amendment right to disclose national security information to government outsiders without authorization?

At the outset, let me just say leakers have a variety of statutory arguments they might make if prosecuted under the Espionage Act and related statutes.   Charlie Savage recently outlined a few of these arguments here.  In addition, one of the obstacles the government might face is that in order to prove that the disclosure was harmful to national security, they might have to reveal even more national security secrets (often called “graymail”).  This is one reason why the Drake prosecution fell apart.

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4

(Don’t) Blame the Messenger: What to Do about National Security Leaks

Many thanks to Danielle Citron for inviting me to serve as a guest blogger.  Lately I have been following the discussion about the most recent series of national security leaks, including those that detailed the White House’s terrorist “kill lists,” the foiling of a terrorist plot by a double agent in Yemen, and cyberattacks against Iran.  Outrage about leaks is hardly new.  Neither are leaks.  (See my prior article detailing the long history of leaks in this country.)  What is new is that the outrage this time around seems to be directed at the leakers and not at the media outlets that published the leaked information.

Back in December 2005, when the New York Times published its story about the NSA’s warrantless wiretapping program, the paper and its reporters were condemned just as vigorously as the leakers themselves.  It is interesting to think about why the politicians and commentators have held their fire against the media after this latest round of leaks (at least so far).  Perhaps critics’ suspicions that these leaks were politically motivated during an election year to make President Obama look like a strong leader has made them forget to take their usual shots at the “liberal media” that disseminated them to the public.  But given that leaks often appear politically motivated, this answer is not all that satisfying.

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