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Tagged: First Amendment

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FAN.6 (First Amendment News) — Cellphone Privacy & the First Amendment

employee_Corn-RevereRobThere has been quite a bit of news lately, along with general commentary on this blog, about the legality of police searches of the contents of an arrestee’s cell phone. The issue raised in United States v. Wurie, which the Court has agreed to review, is whether the Fourth Amendment permits the police, without obtaining a warrant, to review the call log of a cellphone found on a person who has been lawfully arrested. (The Court has also agreed to hear a companion case out of California: Riley v. California.) But there is more here than meets the constitutional eye, or so maintains Robert Corn-Revere, a noted First Amendment lawyer who is a partner at the Washington, D.C. office of Davis Wright Tremaine. Yesterday, he filed an amicus brief on behalf of the National Press Photographers Association and thirteen media organizations in support of the Petitioner in the Wurie case. What is interesting about this brief is the First Amendment argument Mr. Corn-Revere offers up to buttress the Fourth Amendment claim at stake in these cases.

Here is the media interest in all of this: “Of particular concern to Amici, media outlets increasingly rely on issuing reporters smart phones to take photographs and to record other story elements. Cell phone cameras are capable of taking high quality photographs and audio-visual recordings. And, because smart phones can connect to the Internet, it is easy for journalists to upload photo, video, audio, or text files to the Internet to file reports.” So opens this amicus brief.

Here is the problem for the media: “These new technologies have greatly expanded the ability to gather and report news, but the same capabilities that make them a boon to journalists create a grave threat if they are subject to unrestricted warrantless searches incident to arrest. Unfortunately, the threat is not just hypothetical, and the enhanced newsgathering capacity may have made reporters more frequent targets of police action. There has been an epidemic of arrests for nothing more than the journalistic enterprise of photographing public events. Frequently, such arrests are made on generalized charges of ‘disorderly conduct’ or ‘disturbing the peace,’ and often charges are dismissed without further action. But such circumstances could be used, and in some cases have been used, as a predicate to search or seize photographic equipment.”

Here is the First Amendment take on this: “It is essential that the Fourth Amendment be scrupulously applied in cases that involve sophisticated communications technologies because of the inherent intrusion of warrantless searches on . . . other fundamental rights,” including First Amendment rights. This interconnectivity of rights, Corn-Revere argues, has both historical roots and contemporary significance in our cellular world.  Or as he puts it: “These interconnected rights have long been ‘part of the intellectual matrix within which our own constitutional fabric was shaped,’ . . . and [any] failure to protect them in light of changing technology would risk converting constitutional principles into ‘impotent and lifeless formulas’ whereby ‘[r]ights declared in words might be lost in reality.’ Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).”

Oral argument in the two cases is set for April 29th. Read More

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Fan.5 (First Amendment News) Is sharing a hyperlink protected expression?

I had hoped to post a piece today on Justice John Paul Stevens and his forthcoming book, Six Amendments: How and Why We Should Change the Constitution (Little, Brown & Co., pp. 170, to be released on April 22). However, since it was impossible to confirm the advanced-copy wording of his proposed amendment to the First Amendment until the final printed version is released, I opted to wait until next month to post the piece and the commentaries accompanying it.

That said, here are some news items that might be of interest to you.

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Is Sharing a Hyperlink Protected Expression? The lawyer for Barrett Brown thinks so and has argued as much in his motion to dismiss criminal charges against his client for sharing a publicly available hyperlink. The matter is pending in a federal district court in Texas. The hyperlink in question was transmitted in a chat-room and pointed to data that was obtained during the hacking of Stratfor Global Intelligence, this in purported violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028. The motion to dismiss was filed by University of Texas clinical law instructor Ahmed Ghappour and the Law School’s Civil Rights Clinic. Though he argues that the pertinent statutory provisions are inapplicable to his client (thus triggering the doctrine of constitutional avoidance), Professor Ghappour maintains that if they are, the First Amendment nonetheless protects his client. Here is how he put it in his March 3, 2014 motion:

First, the allegations in this case are encompassed by the Supreme Court’s holding in Bartnicki v. Vopper, in that Mr. Brown’s publication of truthful information (by republishing a hyperlink) obtained in a lawful manner cannot be punished absent a showing of a heightened state interest. Second, Mr. Brown was engaged in pure political speech in republishing the hyperlink. Because §1028 as applied imposes a complete prohibition on such speech, and does so based on the speech’s content, Count 1 (and Counts 3-12) must be dismissed absent a showing of a compelling state interest and least restrictive means. Finally, as applied to Mr. Brown, §1028 also fails the O’Brien test for intermediate scrutiny because it is not at parity with any substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent regulation.” (Update: Government Dismisses Bulk of Indictment Against Barrett Brown — hat tip to Ruthann Robson.)

Advertising Pot & the First Amendment: Though it is now legal to enjoy pot in Colorado, the Colorado Department of Revenue, Marijuana Enforcement Division, has promulgated certain rules limiting the advertising of the product. For example, there is this rule:

A Retail Marijuana Establishment shall not utilize television Advertising unless the Retail Marijuana Establishment has reliable evidence that no more than 30 percent of the audience for the program on which the Advertising is to air is reasonably expected to be under the age of 21.

Similar rules exist for radio, print media, and the Internet. Another rule provides: “A Retail Marijuana Establishment shall not engage in Advertising that specifically targets Persons located outside the state of Colorado.” As for outdoor advertising, there is this rule:

Except as otherwise  provided in this rule, it shall be unlawful for any Retail Marijuana Establishment to engage in Advertising that is visible to members of the public from any street, sidewalk, park or other public place, including Advertising utilizing any of the following media: any  billboard or other outdoor general Advertising device; any sign mounted on a vehicle, any hand-held or other portable sign; or any handbill, leaflet or flier directly handed to any person in a public  place, left upon a motor vehicle, or posted upon any public or  private property without the consent of the property owner.

High Times magazine and Westword (an alternative weekly newspaper) have challenged the rules in a suit brought in a federal district court in Colorado. U.S. District Judge Marcia Krieger has been assigned to the case. The plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief. They argue that such restrictions violate the First Amendment as interpreted by Central Hudson and 44 Liquormart.  David A. Lane of Killmer, Lane, & Newman is representing the two publications. When Jacob Sullum, writing for Forbes, asked UCLA Law Professor Eugene Volokh for his take on the matter, here is how Volokh replied: “I don’t see how marijuana sales are lawful, given the federal prohibition, so I think advertising marijuana is not protected under commercial speech doctrine,” Volokh said. “I realize that here the commercial speech restriction is imposed by the state, and the sales restriction is imposed by the federal government, but I don’t think that would change the First Amendment analysis.” That said, in a Reason magazine piece Mr. Sullum urged that such challenges be brought in state court instead of federal court, and under Article II, section 10 of the Colorado Constitution.

Monitoring Newsrooms? FCC Declines. Late last month the Federal Communications Commission issued a statement that it was nixing a proposal that involved sending government researchers into newsrooms to conduct survey questions related to how news organizations chose which stories to run. In its statement, the FCC noted: “To be clear, media owners and journalists will no longer be asked to participate in the Columbia, S.C. pilot study. The pilot will not be undertaken until a new study design is final. Any subsequent market studies conducted by the FCC, if determined necessary, will not seek participation from or include questions for media owners, news directors or reporters.” The proposal came under attack in a February 10, 2014 Wall St. Journal op.-ed by FCC Commissioner Ajit Pai.  Jay Sekulow, chief counsel of the American Center for Law and Justice, and his group also weighed in by way of a campaign to express public opposition to the proposed study. “This is significant victory for the First Amendment and the freedom of the press,” said Sekulow.  “By shutting down this proposal,” he added, “the FCC took the only action it could. We will now remain vigilant to ensure that the FCC follows through on its pledge to refrain from putting monitors in America’s newsrooms.”

University Settles in Dispute with Pro-Life Student Group: When Oklahoma State University officials barred Cowboys for Life from displaying certain photos near the University’s Student Union building, the Cowboys bucked. The photos they wanted to display depicted aborted fetuses. They were, however, given an alternative: relocate at a less populated site and display a warning. They declined.  The Alliance Defending Freedom came to their First Amendment defense and sued the University. The group’s lawyer, Travis Barham, maintained that “OSU needs to learn that it does not have free reign to censor its students. It can’t exile displays to remote areas of campus, or restrict students from distributing literature just because the hyper-sensitive feelings of a university administrator got ruffled.” Though not admitting guilt, the University agreed to pay $25,000 in legal fees and to amend its student conduct code.

Upcoming Conference on Sullivan:  On April 23, 2014, the University of Minnesota School of Journalism and Mass Communications will host a conference entitled “How Far from Near? 50 Years of New York Times v. Sullivan in Minnesota and Beyond: A Symposium Honoring the Legacy of Silha Professor Emeritus Donald M. Gillmor.”  Robert D. Sack, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, will give the keynote address entitled “Thirteen Ways of Looking at New York TImes v. Sullivan.” Twelve participants will discuss the Sullivan case and its legacy. The titles of the panels are:

  • Academic panel: “Beyond First Amendment Exceptionalism: The Multiple Legacies of Near and Sullivan”
  • Practitioners panel: “Time After Times: Defamation Law (and Privacy, Too) in Minnesota”

(Hat tip to Professor Kyu Ho Youm)

Next Scheduled FAN Column: Wednesday, March 12th.

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FAC.1 (First Amendment Conversations) — Larry Tribe on Free Expression

photoOccasionally, I will post blog conservations (or Q & As) with various First Amendment persona – lawyers, litigants, journalists, scholars, or perhaps even a judge or two. My first such exchange is with the Carl M. Loeb University Professor at Harvard and author of numerous scholarly works, most notably his widely cited American Constitutional Law treatise. He has been awarded eleven honorary degrees, including most recently a D. Litt. from Columbia University in 2013. He is, of course, Professor Laurence Tribe. His views on freedom of speech have been an important part of his legal scholarship. More than three decades ago, he sketched out a “metatheory of free speech” in an essay in Constitutional Government in America (R. Collins, ed., 1980). Beyond scholarship, Professor Tribe has an impressive record as a Supreme Court litigator who has argued some 34 cases before the Justices between 1981 and 2005. Seven of those cases involved First Amendment free expression issues.

  • Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness (1980) (audio)
  • Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia (1981) (audio)
  • Sable Communications v. FCC (1989) (audio)
  • Rust v. Sullivan (1990) (audio)
  • U.S. v. United Foods (2001) (audio)
  • Nike v. Kasky (2002) (audio)
  • Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Association (2005) (audio)

Tribe even won a First Amendment case in the Supreme Court without having to argue it. The case is Boston v. Anderson (1978) (see also here and here), a summary per curiam disposition (over the written dissent of Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Stewart and then-Justice Rehnquist). The Court held that a state court may not prohibit municipal spending on speech regarding a referendum issue then pending before the people in a statewide election.

Larry, welcome to the Concurring Opinions blog and thank you for agreeing to share your thoughts with our FAC readers.    

Question: Which Supreme Court Justice do you think has had the greatest impact on the law of free expression under the First Amendment? And why? 

Answer: Rather than naming just one, I’d point to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis for their extraordinarily influential separate opinions in Abrams in 1919 (Holmes’ greatest dissent) and in Whitney in 1927 (Brandeis’ greatest concurrence).

Question: Some noted First Amendment scholars such as Professors Steven Shiffrin and the late C. Edwin Baker, and also Dean Robert Post, have been rather critical of extending First Amendment protection to corporate commercial expression. Do you share that skepticism?

Answer: Although I do think the Court went rather far in Sorrell v. IMS (2011) three years ago, and found myself in considerable sympathy with Justice Breyer’s dissent (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Kagan), I continue to agree with Virginia Board of Pharmacy (1976) and with Discovery Network (1993) and disagree strongly with Florida Bar v. Went For It (1995), where I thought Kennedy’s dissent for himself and Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg was spot on. I just cannot bring myself to view either professional or corporate commercial expression as categorically beyond the reach of First Amendment protection. That’s why I took the position I did in Nike v. Kasky (2003) and was pleased to see that Justices Breyer, O’Connor, and Kennedy agreed.

Question: Insofar as the First Amendment is concerned, do you think that since corporations (for-profit ones) are entitled to free expression rights, they are likewise entitled to have free exercise rights? Or are the two conceptually different for constitutional purposes? What do you think?  

Answer: That’s too complex an issue for me to answer as briefly as you’d need in this context. To the extent that all First Amendment rights are interrelated and focus principally on the systemic dangers of entrusting certain matters to government control, I’m opposed to organizing one’s analysis around which entities are or are not “entitled to have” particular First Amendment rights. That’s an aspect of Citizens United (2010) with which I don’t take issue – even though the Court appears to be curiously agnostic on that score, as exemplified by its unexplained summary affirmance in 2012 of a district court ruling in Bluman v. FEC (2011) barring the participation of foreigners from campaign speech!

That said, it seems to me that it makes much more sense to maintain that the Free Speech Clause protects “speech” regardless of who or what happens to be its source than it would to say that the Free Exercise Clause protects “religion” regardless of who or what is engaged in its exercise. With respect to claims involving the free exercise of religion, I think there is considerably more room to pay attention to the nature of whoever is doing the “exercising.” For an illuminating thought experiment, I would suggest that, if a cute but distinctly alien extraterrestrial – let’s call it “ET” – were to land in Lafayette Park and were to broadcast condemnations of Obamacare, the fact that such a creature is not itself entitled to the protection of the Free Speech Clause would not undermine an interested listener’s First Amendment objection to an Executive Order silencing the exterrestrial (or to an Act of Congress shutting it up were it to switch to praising the ACA!). Yet I wouldn’t expect anyone to take seriously a claim made on the extraterrestrial’s behalf by the ACLU defending, either under the Free Exercise Clause or under RFRA, the right of ET to smoke grass as part of a sincere religious ritual in front of the White House – particularly if, as some argue is the case in Hobby Lobby, the religious freedom ET wished to exercise could be shown to injure third parties or even compromise their exercise of their constitutional rights.

I don’t believe, however, that the for-profit or not-for-profit character of the entity in question should be decisive, although some Justices will probably find that a tempting line to draw in otherwise difficult and close cases.

Finally, I believe that decisions like Hosanna-Tabor (2012) and those barring civil courts from injecting themselves into disputes over religious doctrine and/or the internal organization of religious bodies should not turn on the corporate or non-corporate character of the institutions in question.

Question: As of this date, the Roberts Court has rendered 30 First Amendment free expression opinions. For First Amendment purposes, what is your sense of the Court? What are its strengths and/or shortcomings as you see them?

Answer: That question is even less compatible with a short response than the previous one, and I’d rather let the fourth chapter of my forthcoming book (co-authored with a superb recent student of mine, Joshua Matz), Uncertain Justice: The Roberts Court and the Constitution (Henry Holt, June, 3, 2014), speak for itself on that issue. The chapter, which expresses both my sense and Joshua’s of the free speech jurisprudence of the Roberts Court, is entitled “Freedom of Speech: Sex, Lies, and Video Games.”

Question: As you know, this term the Court heard yet another campaign finance case, McCutcheon v. FEC. I gather you favor a constitutional amendment to curb what you see as the Court’s constitutional excesses in this area. Can you say a few words about why you think it would be wise to amend the First Amendment? 

Answer: Actually, although I did assist my former student Adam Schiff (D. Cal.) in drafting a proposed constitutional amendment that I thought would be better than the alternatives floating around at the time, and although at one point I thought some such amendment would be wise to consider seriously, I haven’t joined forces with those who currently urge vigorous pursuit of the amendment path, which I think probably represents a political dead end. I think that there’s both more promise and less danger in pushing for greater transparency and disclosure of the sort the Court held permissible in Citizens United, for reforms in the laws determining how and when corporations can spend their shareholders’ money on speech, and for possible ways to get around the Court’s post-Citizens United decision striking down the calibrated public finance mechanism at issue in Arizona v. Bennett (2011).

Thanks Larry, I hope we can continue this conversation again sometime. 

I hope so, Ron. I’ve enjoyed this opportunity to address your excellent questions.

The next FAN (First Amendment News) column (to be posted this Wednesday) will be devoted to Justice Stevens’ proposal to amend the First Amendment, replete with comments from noted First Amendment scholars and lawyers.

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FAN.4 (First Amendment News)

In this issue of FAN I flag some forthcoming books that should be of interest to First Amendment enthusiasts.  I hope to say more about some of these works when they are published. Before proceeding to the forthcoming books, I want to to share a video link to Justice John Paul Stevens’ February 7, 2014 speech to the ABA Forum on Communications Law (hat tip to Steven Zansberg). I also want to to highlight a just-released book.

Former Stanford University President and former dean of the University of Chicago Law School Gerhard Casper has published a book entitled The Winds of Freedom: Addressing Challenges to the University (Yale University Press, 248 pp.). Chapter 4 of that book (pp. 64-83) is titled “Corry v. Stanford University: The Issue of Free Expression.” The Cory case involved a challenge to Stanford’s speech code. Anyone familiar with Professor Casper’s impressive scholarship will want to examine this book. (On a related front, this April Yale University press will release the paperback version of Dean Robert Post’s Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State.)

Now, onto the forthcoming books and a few related matters:

  1. Stanley Fish is Coming!: Following the general Casper-Post theme, Stanley Fish offers his own unique perspective in Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to Revolution — The Rice University Campbell Lectures (192 pp, Univ. of Chicago Press, Oct. 2014). Here is a description of the book: “Providing a blueprint for the study of academic freedom, Fish breaks down the schools of thought on the subject, which range from the idea that academic freedom is justified by the common good or by academic exceptionalism, to its potential for critique or indeed revolution. Fish himself belongs to what he calls the ‘It’s Just a Job’ school: while academics need the latitude—call it freedom if you like—necessary to perform their professional activities, they are not free in any special sense to do anything but their jobs.  Academic freedom, Fish argues, should be justified only by the specific educational good that academics offer. Defending the university “in all its glorious narrowness” as a place of disinterested inquiry, Fish offers a bracing corrective to academic orthodoxy.”
  2. Press Freedom & Press Performance: University of Texas Journalism Professor Regina Lawrence has revised the late Timothy E. Cook’s edited work entitled Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in Action (Louisiana State University Press, 2nd ed., June 2014). Contributors include: Charles Clark, Jack Weiss, Frederick Schauer, Michael Schudson, Ralph Izard, W. Lance Bennett, Craig Freeman, Diana Owen, Emily Erickson, Timothy Cook, and the new editor.
  3. U.S. v. Stevens — the book: In Animal Cruelty and Freedom of Speech: When Worlds Collide (Purdue University Press, pp. 260, May 2014) Wake Forest Law Professor Abigail Perdue and Dr. Randall Lockwood (senior vice president for Forensic Sciences & Anti-Cruelty Projects of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) offer a detailed case study of the Stevens case. The authors provide a survey of important issues facing society in the area of animal welfare. “The Stevens case included various ‘hot topic’ elements connected to the role of government as arbiter of public morality, including judicial attitudes to sexual deviance and dogfighting. Because it is one of only two animal rights cases that the US Supreme Court has handled, and the only case discussing the competing interests of free speech and animal cruelty, it will be an important topic for discussion in constitutional and animal law courses for decades to come.”
  4. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale – the book: The next addition to the University Press of Kansas’ impressive Landmark Law Cases and American Society series is Judging the Boy Scouts of America: Gay Rights, Freedom of Association, and the Dale Case (272 pp., May 2014). In this forthcoming book, Willamette University Professor Richard J. Ellis “tells the fascinating story of the Dale case, placing it in the context of legal principles and precedents, Scouts policies, gay rights, and the “culture wars” in American politics.”
  5. The State of Funeral-Picketing Laws – The folks over at the First Amendment Center have just released a special report entitled the “Constitutionality of State Funeral-Picketing Laws Since Snyder v. Phelps.” The report was prepared for the Newseum Institute’s First Amendment Center by a team of law students from the Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America and examines the legal and legislative responses, as of January 1, 2014, to Snyder v. Phelps.
  6. In light of the recent passing of Professor George Anastaplo, I thought I would alert readers to some of his works on free speech, which include: Reflections on Freedom of Speech and the First Amendment (2007); The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary (1995, pp. 47-58); and The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment (1971 & 2005). Finally, for an audio file of Professor Anastaplo’s arguments before the Supreme Court in In re Anastaplo, go here.
  7. Last Issue of FAN: If you missed it, go here.
  8. Next Scheduled Issue of FAN: Wednesday, March 5th.
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FAN.2 (First Amendment News)

Thanks to everyone who sent along information for this and future FAN columns. For those who missed the first column, go here. One of the aims of FAN is to help build bridges between scholars and litigators, liberals and conservatives (and libertarians, too!), and between journalists and all others interested in the First Amendment and freedom of expression. To that end, here is more free speech news:

  • Speech — Justice Stevens & The First Amendment: In a February 7, 2014 speech to the ABA Forum on Communications Law (as of yet unpublished), retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens said some interesting things about the free expression law of the First Amendment. Here are a few samples:

– Re the Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) product disparagement case, though Justice Stevens ultimately wrote the majority opinion in the 6-3 case, when the cert. petition was first considered at Conference Stevens and most of his colleagues voted to deny review. Justice Byron White, however, relisted the case in order to write a dissent from the denial of cert. Ultimately, however, White persuaded his colleagues to hear the case and the rest is, as they say, history.

– Similarly, the Justices originally planned to deny review in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton (1989), a defamation case. Here, too, Justice White drafted a dissent from the denial of cert., which prompted three other Justices (Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall) to “vote to grant.” When the dialogic dust settled (and there is more to the Stevens’ story), the Court was unanimous and Stevens wrote the opinion. [For more on this case and the Bose one and related stories, see Lee Levine & Steve Wermiel’s The Progeny (2014).)]

– Justice Stevens disapproved of the Court’s judgment in United States v. Alvarez (the 2012 stolen valor case). “I agree,” said Stevens (a WW II Bronze Star veteran), “with the reasoning and conclusion of Justice Alito’s dissent.” Nonetheless, Stevens found  the first sentence of that dissent to be “inaccurate.” According to Stevens, and contra Alito, “the Court did not hold that ‘every American has a constitutional right to claim to have received that singular award.’” All the Court did was strike down as overbroad a particular federal statute; it thus did not condone all such false and deceptive speech.

– During the ABA Q & A period, Justice Stevens was asked if he thought it was necessary to have a constitutional amendment to overrule the 2010 Citizens United case. He replied: “Well, either a constitutional amendment or one more vote.”

Though Justice Stevens’ remarks have yet to be posted or published, you can look for them in the days ahead on the ABA Forum website here.  (Hat tip to Lee Levine and Steven Zansberg.)

  • Are Animal Rights Activists Terrorists? Have you ever heard of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act? Section 43(a) of the Act makes it a crime for anyone who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes to be used the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, for the purpose of causing physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise; and intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of, any property (including animals or records) used by the animal enterprise, and thereby causes economic damage exceeding $10,000 to that enterprise, or conspires to do so; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” The Center for Constitutional Rights maintains that AETA violates the First Amendment by criminalizing protected speech and expressive activities such as protests, boycotts, picketing and whistleblowing (see here). The district court dismissed the case on standing grounds, though that ruling has been appealed to the First Circuit (see here).
  • Free Press-Fair Trial: Seems that a Marin County public defender objects to the Marin Independent Journal taking photos of his client (an accused serial bank robber) at an arraignment in the Superior Court. According to a MIJ news report, “after the courtroom hearing, MIJ photographer Frankie Frost snapped photos of [the defendant] on public property outside the Hall of Justice as sheriff’s deputies escorted him in a wheelchair back to the jail. Those photos, which we shared with the Associated Press, have been published in the MIJ’s print editions and website.” The public defender balked and filed an 11-page memorandum seeking to enjoin the paper from publishing the photos again. When MIJ objected, Judge James Chou denied its request without prejudice (see here).
  • Upcoming Event: On Friday, February 21, 2014 (12:00-1:00 pm), the Heritage Foundation will host a program titled “Taxing the First Amendment: Using the IRS to Censor Speech?” The participants include Cleta Mitchell (partner, Foley & Lardner), Bradley A. Smith (chairman, Center for Competitive Politics), Eliana Johnson (reporter, National Review), and Kimberley Strassel (editorial board, Wall Street Journal).
  • Next FAN: Wednesday, February 19.
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FAN.1 (First Amendment News)

From time to time, I will post some First Amendment news items that might otherwise escape the attention of free expression enthusiasts.  It may be about a controversy or brief or new book or article or conference or what have you.  If you wish to send along your own newsworthy item for consideration, drop my an e-mail.  With that, here is my first dollop of news:

  • On February 15th the Harvard Law Review will host a conference on “Freedom of the Press” in celebration of the 50th anniversary of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.  Participants include: Mark Tushnet (Harvard), Stuart Benjamin (Duke), Sonja R. West (U. Ga.), RonNell Andersen Jones (BYU), David Anderson (U. TX), Marvin Ammori (New America Foundation), Marjorie Heins (Free Expression Policy Project), Jonathan Zittrain (Harvard), Rebecca Tushnet (Georgetown), Caroline Corbin (U. Miami), Jack Balkin (Yale), Yochai Benkler (Harvard), and Dawn Nunziato (GWU).
  • Speaking of NYT v. Sullivan, Lee Levine (a noted First Amendment media lawyer) and Steve Wermiel (a professor at American University Law School) have just published The Progeny: Justice William Brennan’s Fight to Save New York Times v. Sullivan (American Bar Association, 2014). Check out my SCOTUSblog interview with the authors.
  • Recently, the Minnesota Law Review published a thought-proving article titled “Speech Engines” by James Grimmelmann (U. MD Law).  It is one of the best pieces of scholarship I have seen concerning the regulatory debates over just how the law – of copyright, trademark, defamation, privacy and of the First Amendment – should treat Google’s search engines.
  • Gabriel Schoenfeld, writing in the Weekly Standard, just reviewed Floyd Abrams’ latest book, Friend of the Court: On the Front Lines with the First Amendment (Yale University Press, 2013).  (For Mr. Abrams’ views on McCullen v. Coakley (the Mass. abortion-protest case now before the Court), see  Jonathan H. Adler’s post over at the Volokh Conspiracy.)
  • This June Yale Law School Dean Robert Post will release his latest book, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 234 pp., $25.00).  The book is an outgrowth of Post’s 2013 Tanner Lectures at Harvard.  Here is a little excerpt from the publisher’s blurb: “Defenders of the First Amendment greeted the ruling with enthusiasm, while advocates of electoral reform recoiled in disbelief. Robert Post offers a new constitutional theory that seeks to reconcile these sharply divided camps.” Post’s text is followed by commentaries by Pamela S. Karlan, Lawrence Lessig, Frank I. Michelman, and Nadia Urbinati.
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Photographic License to Discriminate?

The loosening of restrictions on same-sex marriage over the last decade has been accompanied by the refusal of persons opposed to such unions to participate in them in any way. Naturally, the law requires no one to show up and cheer at a same-sex wedding or commitment ceremony, but what if a county clerk did not want to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples or a health care worker refused to perform the necessary blood tests? Obviously, some objections to marriage will intrude on a couple’s ability to marry more than others.

800px-Photographer

The key to understanding which objections are legal and which are not does not only lie in guarantees of religious freedom. Everyone is free to harbor religious or philosophical opposition to same-gender couples and to shout that message from the rooftops, as long as they do not create a nuisance in doing so. It is in jurisdictions that have enacted prohibitions on sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations where those who peddle their wares in the public marketplace are not allowed to reject customers for being gay. In such jurisdictions, religious opponents to same-sex unions have every right to voice their objections in church and to teach their children that it is wrong to be gay. If these opponents open up shop in the local marketplace, however, they are required to leave their biases at home.

New Mexico has such a law. Elaine Huguenin is a talented photographer who makes a good living recording important moments in the lives of the people of Albuquerque. In 2006 she decided to refuse the request of a lesbian couple that she be the photographer at their commitment ceremony. When sued, Huguenin, obviously aware that her religious freedom argument would have no traction under decades-old Supreme Court precedent, came up with the novel argument that if she were required to photograph the ceremony, she would be forced to celebrate it and to express that she is accepting of same-sex marriage. This is a story that Huguenin did not want to tell.

Huguenin’s argument sounds as if it was lifted from the Supreme Court’s Boy Scouts of America v. Dale decision. But since her “expressive policy” is merely to make money with her camera, she gave the argument a twist. She insisted that artists, since they create protected speech, must be free to choose what customers they will serve and will not.

While I have no reason to doubt that Huguenin is an artist of the highest caliber with a special flair for photographic storytelling, I fail to see how her status elevates her above someone who merely hires herself out to record an event. I am certain there have been many occasions when the contract between Huguenin and her customers has constrained her to adhere to provisions about how and when, to what degree and in what format they want their stories told. But the question here is not whether Huguenin can refuse to sign a contract whose provisions offend her artistic sensibilities. The question is whether she can refuse her services because the customers are gay. In Huguenin’s case, at least, an argument for carving out an exception in the law for artists is not likely to carry the day.

Furthermore, the law in this case simply does not force Huguenin to make art in a way not of her choosing or to utter a statement that is against her religion. First, it is a given that Huguenin will tell the story of an event in her own way. She is, after all, the one behind the camera. Second, as someone hired to take pictures at the event, she participates primarily as an observer who has some interaction with the major players when she stages certain photographs. More important than the fact that she is not truly there to celebrate is the fact that her hired presence in no way implies an expression that she believes in the goodness of the proceedings.

If Huguenin wants to turn a profit in the economic environment the State of New Mexico provides her, the citizens of that state have declared that there are certain business decisions she may not make. The good news for those who want to discriminate nonetheless is that relatively few jurisdictions in this country have public accommodations laws that forbid sexual orientation discrimination. Right next door to New Mexico, Arizona has such laws only at the local level in Tucson and Phoenix. There is also a paucity of public accommodations protections in neighboring Texas and Oklahoma. It should thus be relatively easy for Huguenin to find her way to a place where she is truly free to marry her business practices with her religious convictions.

20

Citizens United, Graffiti, and the Web

We need more outlets to challenge the way things run. Challenging corporations is difficult, necessary, and proper. Someone in San Diego tried to do that. He is losing his case. It turns out that if you scribble anti-bank messages, you could face 13 years in jail. The medium: washable children’s chalk, not spray paint, on the sidewalk in front of banks. The bank: Bank of America. Now, you might think the First Amendment would be an issue here; it’s not. According the news report, “a judge had opted to prevent the defendant’s attorney from ‘mentioning the First Amendment, free speech, free expression, public forum, expressive conduct, or political speech during the trial,’ and the defendant must now stand trial on 13 counts of vandalism.” The defendant was saying other banks were better banks. Bank of America did not like it, claimed it cost $6,000 to clean up the chalk, and apparently used its influence to have the city gang unit investigate and hand the case to the attorney’s office. Given that this defendant may not be allowed to engage in this speech, because of anti-graffiti and, my bet, property laws, all that may be left is the Web. I think offline mediums matter and should be protected. The Web is an alternative, not a substitute. But even on the Web a protester will have problems.

As I argue in Speech, Citizenry, and the Market: A Corporate Public Figure Doctrine, corporate power to speak has gone up. Corporate power to limit speech has not. A corporate public figure doctrine would allow someone to use a corporation’s logo and name to challenge to corporation on public issues. A corporation’s word mark is its given name; its logo, its face. Just as we would not limit the ability to question and identify human public figures for speech, we should not do so for corporate public figures. A foundational commitment of free speech law, perhaps the foundational commitment, is that public figures don’t and can’t own their reputations. Yet, through trademark and commercial speech doctrines corporations have powerful control over their reputations. If corporations are people for free speech purposes, as a constitutional matter, their control over their reputations can be no greater than the control other public figures have. Corporations cannot have it both ways. Corporations want and receive many of the legal rights natural persons receive. They should be subject to the same limits as other powerful, public figures.

HT: Fred von Lohmann for noting the story on Facebook.

PS. I am not saying corporations should be challenged, because they are corporations. That is silly. In that sense, I would challenge those who challenge, but that’s me.

15

Stanford Law Review Online: Privilege and the Belfast Project

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Will Havemann entitled Privilege and the Belfast Project. Havemann argues that a recent First Circuit opinion goes too far and threatens the idea of academic privilege:

In 2001, two Irish scholars living in the United States set out to compile the recollections of men and women involved in the decades-long conflict in Northern Ireland. The result was the Belfast Project, an oral history project housed at Boston College that collected interviews from many who were personally involved in the violent Northern Irish “Troubles.” To induce participants to document their memories for posterity, Belfast Project historians promised all those interviewed that the contents of their testimonials would remain confidential until they died. More than a decade later, this promise of confidentiality is at the heart of a legal dispute implicating the United States’ bilateral legal assistance treaty with the United Kingdom, the so-called academic’s privilege, and the First Amendment.

He concludes:

Given the confusion sown by Branzburg’s fractured opinion, the First Circuit’s hardnosed decision is unsurprising. But by disavowing the balancing approach recommended in Justice Powell’s concurring Branzburg opinion, and by overlooking the considerable interests supporting the Belfast Project’s confidentiality guarantee, the First Circuit erred both as a matter of precedent and of policy. At least one Supreme Court Justice has signaled a willingness to correct the mischief done by the First Circuit, and to clarify an area of First Amendment law where the Court’s guidance is sorely needed. The rest of the Court should take note.

Read the full article, Privilege and the Belfast Project at the Stanford Law Review Online.

3

Stanford Law Review Online: Software Speech

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Andrew Tutt entitled Software Speech. Tutt argues that current approaches to determining when software or speech generated by software can be protected by the First Amendment are incorrect:

When is software speech for purposes of the First Amendment? This issue has taken on new life amid recent accusations that Google used its search rankings to harm its competitors. This spring, Eugene Volokh coauthored a white paper explaining why Google’s search results are fully protected speech that lies beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. The paper sparked a firestorm of controversy, and in a matter of weeks, dozens of scholars, lawyers, and technologists had joined the debate. The most interesting aspect of the positions on both sides—whether contending that Google search results are or are not speech—is how both get First Amendment doctrine only half right.

He concludes:

By stopping short of calling software “speech,” entirely and unequivocally, the Court would acknowledge the many ways in which software is still an evolving cultural phenomenon unlike others that have come before it. In discarding tests for whether software is speech on the basis of its literal resemblance either to storytelling (Brown) or information dissemination (Sorrell), the Court would strike a careful balance between the legitimate need to regulate software, on the one hand, and the need to protect ideas and viewpoints from manipulation and suppression, on the other.

Read the full article, Software Speech at the Stanford Law Review Online.