Tagged: First Amendment

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FAN 19 (First Amendment News) Law Prof. Contests Ban on Note-Taking in Courtroom

This first part of this column is about bans on note-taking in courtrooms, federal and state. To illustrate this point, I want to say a few things about a law professor and the recent hell he went through in his attempt to takes notes in a public courtroom in Cook County, Illinois. Before I get to his story, which is an incredible one, permit me to set the stage with a few bits of history.
* * * * 
There was a time, in my adult lifetime, when spectators in the Supreme Court were barred from taking notes. Yes, note-taking was not permitted unless one was a member of the press corps. One had to sit and listen in silence. In an August 18, 1997 Washington Post op-ed, Professor David M. O’Brien and I put it this way:

“It is an unwritten rule but a rule nonetheless. No ordinary citizen can take notes in the courtroom of the U.S. Supreme Court, unless granted special prior approval by the officer of the Public Information Office. . . . (For an unknown period before 1988, not even members of the Court’s bar could lift a pen.) . . . . No one really really knows when the rule, which is of contemporary vintage, began. Insofar as there is any reason for the rule, it is to protect the ‘decorum factor.’ Violate the rule and the marshals whisk you away.”

“No one, including the ever-attentive press corps, fusses over the rule, one of the few of its kind enforced in any federal or state court in this land. . . . Back in 1988, however, Justice Harry Blackmun complained about the rule in a memo to his colleagues: ‘I wonder if we go too far in our request for decorum.’ Noting came of the complaint.”

We concluded our op-ed this way: “Imagine courtroom audiences . . . taking notes about what they hear and see, as if the Court were a civic classroom. Imagine citizens exercising their First Amendment rights to further their knowledge of [the Supreme Court] and their Constitution. What is amazing is that such things can only be imagined — for now.”

Ban Silently Lifted 

And then the world changed in November 2002. As Tony Mauro reported in a May 5, 2003 article for Legal Times: The rule’s “demise came without fanfare and without public notice, but Court public information officer Kathy Arberg confirmed last week that sometime last November the policy against note-taking was ‘no longer enforced’ by Court Police officers.” And then this: “One of the weblogs that handicaps Court cases, [SCOTUSblog], first noted the change on April 25th after blogger Ted Metzler attended the arguments in Nike v. Kasky. As he and other spectators went through security, Metzler recalls, ‘The officer told us we could bring in a notebook and pen and we all looked at each other.’ Metzler is currently a law clerk at D.C.’s Goldstein & Howe . . . .”

Professor Samuel V. Jones

Professor Samuel V. Jones

12 Years Later — Enter Professor Jones (the would-be notetaker)

He doesn’t fit the typical profile of a rabble-rouser. He is a former Marine Sargent, a former U.S. judge advocate, and before that senior counsel in the Commercial Law group at AT&T Corp and later as corporate counsel for Labor and Employment for Blockbuster, Inc. He is also a former Special Advisor to the Chair of the Illinois Judicial Council. And now he is a professor at the John Marshall Law School.

He is Samuel V. Jones. This former Marine is not a man to sit on his rights, especially his First Amendment rights. And so when the deputies in a circuit court ordered his to forsake those rights, he refused.

It all happened on May 8th during the course of bail hearings in a Cook County court presided over by Circuit Judge Laura Sullivan. Apparently, the atmosphere was tense as deputies patrolled the courtroom. At one point, according to Professor Jones, a “deputy approached and impolitely inquired, ‘Are you an attorney’? I identified myself as a professor of law doing research. She responded, ‘There is no note-taking in here.’ I wondered if the deputy knew that ‘the right of the press to access court proceedings is derivative of the public’s right,’ and journalists held no greater right than I did. I informed her that the office of the chief judge had advised me that note-taking is permitted. I asked if I had violated any laws or was disruptive. ‘No,’ she replied, and walked away.”

But that was hardly the end of the matter. Shortly thereafter, two different deputies ordered the professor out of the courtroom and confiscated his notes. “One deputy approached Judge Sullivan,” recalls Professor Jones, “and the proceedings immediately stopped. I was ordered to sit on a bench, told not to move or write, and was surrounded by several deputies.”

Judge Laura Sullivan

Judge Laura Sullivan

Here is how it ended: “After roughly 30 minutes, they released me with my notes. As I left, a group of African-Americans approached, wanting to shake hands. A lady enlightened me, ‘We saw what they did to you and figured you must be important.’ ‘Why,’ I asked. She explained, ‘Because they let you go.'”

Turns out that this is a old story in Cook County courts. According to recent a Chicago Tribune editorial, “in 2004, a different Cook County judge threw a different law professor out of her courtroom for taking notes. [Now retired] Judge Gloria Coco  forbade . . . writing in her courtroom . . . . That time, it ended up in federal court. A judge said the First Amendment protects public access to the courts so that citizens can observe and critique their government, and note-taking helps ensure an informed discussion.” (Here is the case: Goldschmidt v. Coco (2006).)

Thanks to Professor Jones, the problem may now have been solved for good insofar as Chief Judge Timothy Evans has since signed an “administrative order spelling out that note-taking is permitted in court.”

→ For an earlier discussion of the same problem, see Eugene Volokh, “Ban on Note-Taking by Spectators in Court,” Volokh Conspiracy, May 24, 2013

→ The American Judicature Society has conducted a federal court and 50-state court survey of “Note-Taking Laws,” this in connection with juror note-taking.

Third Circuit to Hear Challenge to Delaware’s Voter Guide Rules Read More

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 5

Volume 61, Issue 5 (June 2014)
Articles

Opinions First—Argument Afterwards Daniel J. Bussel 1194
How the California Supreme Court Actually Works: A Reply to Professor Bussel Goodwin Liu 1246
The Best of All Possible Worlds? A Rejoinder to Justice Liu Daniel J. Bussel 1270
Deprivative Recognition Erez Aloni 1276
Immigration Detention as Punishment César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández 1346
Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education Erika K. Wilson 1416
The Dark Side of the First Amendment Steven H. Shiffrin 1480

 

Comments

Misdiagnosing the Impact of Neuroimages in the Courtroom So Yeon Choe 1502
Under the (Territorial) Sea: Reforming U.S. Mining Law for Earth’s Final Frontier James D. Friedland 1548

 

 

 

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FAN 17 (First Amendment News) — New Bio Reveals How Scalia Helped to Save a PBS Station

A soon to be released 650-page biography of Antonin Scalia reveals some interesting tidbits about the Justice and his career as it relates to free speech. The book is titled Scalia: A Court of One (Simon & Schuster, June 10, 2014). Bruce Allen Murphy, the Fred Morgan Kirby Professor of Civil Rights at Lafayette College, is the author of this heavily-researched and well-documented new biography. Professor Murphy’s previous judicial biographies include The Brandeis/Frankfurter Connection: The Secret Political Activities of Two Supreme Court Justices (1982), Fortas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice (1988), and Wild Bill: The Legend and Life of William O. Douglas (2003).

Bruce Allen Murphy

Bruce Allen Murphy

Tellingly, the yet-to-be-distributed book has already been praised and criticized. That said, Murphy’s biography affords a new opportunity to revisit the history of Justice Scalia’s interaction with the First Amendment, both before and during his career on the Court. Readers of this column will recall Scalia’s recent call for law schools to place more emphasis on teaching the First Amendment. Recall, too, the Justice’s repeated criticism of the holding in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.

Turning back the biographical clock, and as Professor Murphy recounts it, in January of 1971 Antonin Scalia (he was 35) went to work as general counsel for the Office of Telecommunications Policy. During Scalia’s tenure there President Nixon “became convinced that the national news and public affairs division of the Public Broadcasting Service . . ., which depended on government funding, was an ‘enemy’ group staffed by relentless liberal journalists. Nixon decided to try to take control of this agency, or, if he could not, to destroy it by cutting off its funding.”

Sometime later, word reportedly came down from the Nixon White House to “get a particular PBS station off the air.” According to an OTP official then working there, “Nino said, ‘hell, write back a memo that says it’s illegal.’ While Scalia acknowledged that [the purported illegality] was not true, he added, ‘Hell, they don’t know that.'” Subsequently, the OTP official “told a reporter that he did precisely what Scalia recommended and the White House soon dropped the issue.”

To be sure, there is more to this story, but I refer readers to the Murphy’s biography to learn how the matter ultimately played out, politics and all.

Before leaving the Murphy biography, readers might be interested to know that he devotes a chapter (#8) to the originalist debate over the meaning of the First Amendment as interpreted by then Circuit Judges Robert Bork and Antonin Scalia in the case of Ollman v. Evans (1984).

More on Justice Scalia

Speaking of Justice Scalia and free speech, the following is a list of his First Amendment free expression majority opinions authored during his tenure on the Roberts Court. Notice the vote margin when he is assigned to write for the Court.

→ Aside: Coming in 2015: A play titled “The Originalist

Federal Court Affirms Right to Videorecord Police 

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FAN 16.3 (First Amendment News) — Unanimous Judgments: The Roberts Court’s Record in First Amendment Free Expression Cases

Earlier today the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Wood v.Moss.  The vote was 9-0 and the opinion was authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.  In part, the Court held that

Government officials may not exclude from public places persons engaged in peaceful expressive activity solely because the gov- ernment actor fears, dislikes, or disagrees with the views expressed. See, e.g., Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley . . . . The fundamental right to speak, however, does not leave people at liberty to publicize their views “ ‘whenever and however and wherever they please.’ ” United States v. Grace . . . In deciding whether the protesters have alleged violation of a clearly established First Amendment right, this Court assumes without deciding that Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, . . . , which involved alleged Fourth Amendment violations, extends to First Amendment claims . . . .

Accordingly, the Court ruled that the Secret Service agents were entitled to immunity; the Ninth Circuit was reversed. (See Professor Ruthann Robson’s comments on the case here.)

Beyond the qualified immunity point of this opinion, what is interesting is that in Wood the Court denied a First Amendment claim by a unanimous vote. When it comes to free expression First Amendment cases, the Roberts has consistently been unanimous in cases in which the claim was denied. In other words, the only time the judgment is unanimous in such cases is when a free speech claim is rejected. Wood is but the latest case in this string of First Amendment opinions.

Unanimous Judgments Denying First Amendment Expression Claim

  1. Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights (2006) [vote: 8-0] [3rd Cir., reversed & remanded]
  2. Davenport v. Washington Educ. Association (2007) [vote: 9-0] [Wash. S. Ct., vacated & remanded]
  3. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres (2008) [vote: 9-0] [2nd Cir., reversed]
  4. Pleasant Grove City, UT, et al v. Summum (2009) [vote: 9-0] [10th Cir., reversed]
  5. Locke v. Karass (2009) [vote: 9-0] [First Cir., affirmed]
  6. Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz v. United States (2010) [vote: 9-0] [8th Cir., affirmed in part, reversed in part & remanded]
  7. Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan (2011) [vote: 9-0] [Nevada S. Ct., reversed & remanded]
  8. Reichle v. Howards (2012) [vote: 8-0] [10th Cir., reversed & remanded]
  9. Wood v.Moss (2014) [vote: 9-0] [9th Cir., reversed]

Conclusion

Of the Roberts Court’s 32 free expression First Amendment opinions, 28% were decided by a unanimous vote and against the free expression claim being asserted.

See also: FAN 11.3: The Roberts Court on Free Speech, & Snapshots of 2013-2014 Term

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FAN 16.1 (First Amendment News) — RNC Lawsuit Challenges Soft Money Restrictions in McCain-Feingold

Press Release (complaint available here)

Today, the Republican National Committee (RNC) and the Republican Party of Louisiana (LAGOP) filed suit in federal court challenging federal soft-money restrictions in the McCain-Feingold campaign finance law that prevent political parties from having their own independent-expenditure accounts and that prevent state and local political parties from using soft money — i.e., state-regulated money — for voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities.
        The Federal Election Commission (FEC) has recognized that political committees may have independent-expenditure accounts, which may receive unlimited contributions for making independent expenditures about federal candidates, and may also have a separate account to make contributions to candidates. Contribution accounts are subject to a “base contribution limit,” usually $5,000 annually, restricting how much an individual may contribute to them.
        However, the FEC prohibits political parties from having independent-expenditure accounts, which means that the RNC’s independent expenditures must be funded by contributions limited to $32,400 a year.
        In the lawsuit, Republican National Committee v. FEC, the RNC and Chairman Reince Priebus want to establish an RNC independent-expenditure account and to solicit unlimited contributions to it. However, political parties are currently prohibited from having independent-expenditure accounts and national political party officers are limited in how much they may solicit for an independent-expenditure account — only up to the base contribution limits — even though base limits on contributions to independent-expenditure accounts are unconstitutional.
        The Republican Party of Louisiana, and its Chairman Roger Villere, also are suing in order to establish and to solicit unlimited contributions to the LAGOP’s own independent-expenditure account.
        In addition, the LAGOP has joined with two Louisiana local political parties, Jefferson Parish Republican Parish Executive Committee and Orleans Parish Republican Executive Committee, to seek to do independent “federal election activities” with Louisiana state-regulated money (often called “soft money”),  instead of so-called “federal funds” (often called “hard money”). Federal election activity includes voter-identification, voter-registration near federal elections, and get-out-the-vote activities, as well as any public communications that merely mention a federal candidate. State and local parties must currently use federal funds even for independent federal election activity. Federal funds are subject to burdensome regulations that prevent many state and local political parties from engaging in federal election activity.
        The controlling legal principle undergirding all the suit’s claims is that the Supreme Court has held in Citizens United v. FEC and McCutcheon v. FEC, that “independent expenditures . . . do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption.” As a result, it is unconstitutional to impose contribution limits on independent expenditure activities – which has given rise to independent-expenditure accounts. The same reasoning applies to political parties’ independent campaign activities.
        In the alternative, the Plaintiffs ask the court to declare all soft money provisions of McCain-Feingold to be unconstitutional on their face, reversing McConnell v. FEC, since there is no evidence of quid-pro-quo corruption where a political party sought to corrupt their own candidates. McCutcheon v. FEC recently decided that only quid-pro-quo corruption can justify contribution limits and McConnell upheld the soft money bans despite no evidence of quid-pro-quo corruption, so McConnell was wrongly decided.
        James Bopp, Jr., lead attorney for Plaintiffs comments:
After Citizens United, there is no justification for restricting funds that political parties receive for independent campaign activity. In an era when independent-expenditure accounts can solicit unlimited contributions and spend enormous amounts to influence political races, political parties are constitutionally entitled to compete equally with them with their own independent campaign activity. Political parties are an important part of our political system and success in this case will help empower them again.

May 23, 2014
Contact: James Bopp  (see link above) 

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FAN 15.2 (First Amendment News) — Justice Scalia on the First Amendment & Legal Education

In a recent speech entitled “Reflections on the Future of the Legal Academy,” Justice Antonin Scalia had a few things to say about legal education and the First Amendment. The remarks were made on May 11, 2014 at the William & Mary Law School, this by way of a commencement address. The relevant passage is:

In more than a few law schools, including some of the most prestigious (the University of Chicago, for example), it is possible to graduate without ever having studied the recent First Amendment. Can someone really call himself an American lawyer who has that gap in his compendious knowledge of the law? And can a society that depends so much upon lawyers for shaping public perceptions and preserving American traditions regarding the freedom of speech and religion, afford so ignorant a bar?

[Hat tip to William Baude]

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FAC 4 (First Amendment Conversations) – Steve Shiffrin, the Dissenter at the First Amendment Table

My [next] book calls upon you and others to recognize that your religion – your speech worship – does a lot of damage, and you might do well to contemplate the possibility that the lack of free speech idolatry in other Western countries might be leading to more sensible conclusions (except when it comes to dissent where they are somewhat worse than we are).

Steven H. Shiffrin is the Charles Frank Reavis Sr., Professor of Law at Cornell Law School. He is the author of several books including: The Religious Left and Church-State Relations (Princeton University Press, 2009), Dissent, Injustice, and the Meanings of America (Princeton University Press, 1999), and The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance (Harvard Press, 1990). He is the coauthor of Constitutional Law (11th ed., 2011) and The First Amendment (5th ed., 2011), both of which are widely used casebooks in the field. He is also a regular contributor to the “Religious Left Law” blog (and is active on Twitter and Facebook). From time to time, he files amicus briefs in First Amendment cases such as the recent Elane Photography case, which the Supreme Court declined to review. And he is a frequent speaker on the First Amendment lecture circuit.

In 2007, the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review dedicated an entire issue to honor Steve. In that symposium, the late C. Edwin Baker (a noted First Amendment scholar in his own right) labeled Steve as “one of the country’s three or four top First Amendment scholars.” He went on to add: “I consider Steve the best in terms of possibly the most important criterion: being right about what really matters. On that ground, his achievement is truly worthy of honor.”

Steve Shiffrin

Steve Shiffrin

Steve is also a dear and longtime  friend. That friendship dates back to our days in law school when Steve first introduced me to the works of Harry Kalven, the preeminent  free speech scholar of his time. Speaking of law school, Steve’s student law review Note was cited approvingly by Justice Brennan in Fisher v. United States (1976). It was but one of several early signs of the high caliber of his scholarship. After law school he served as a law clerk to Judge Warren Ferguson on the United States District Court, Los Angeles (1975-76). 

Steve, welcome to the Concurring Opinions blog and thank you for agreeing to share your thoughts with our FAC readers. I’d like to ask you some tough and some easy questions, all in the spirit of robust discussion between friends.  

Question: When I think of your work — beyond its rigorous analytical contours, that is — I always think of the dissenter, that lone wolf who howls at the moon for reasons unknown to or unpopular with the rest of us. Why this fascination with rogues or “moral lepers” as you tag them?

Answer: I have argued that the protection of dissent should occupy a special place in the First Amendment primarily, but not exclusively, because it is crucial to the combatting of injustice. I would think this even if I did not admire dissenters. But I do hold a special admiration for those who swim against the current and challenge existing customs, habits, institutions, and authorities. I do not think of dissenters as moral lepers (though some of them are). And I do not think dissent should always be protected. But I do think the practice of dissent should be regarded as especially valuable.

Question: What is your sense of Edward Snowden? Do you consider him a dissenter, of sorts? And do you believe that the First Amendment should protect him if he were to be prosecuted for leaking classified documents?

Answer: The First Amendment should often protect those who blow the whistle on government misconduct even if documents relating to that misconduct are classified. Much of the conduct disclosed by Snowden was rightly disclosed. I am not sure if all of it was. I find it disturbing that the government welcomed the debate instigated by Snowden even though it attempted to prevent the debate from occurring and that it seeks to prosecute Snowden for creating it. In particular, the desire to prosecute Snowden is disturbing when you recognize that government for decades has selectively revealed classified information in pursuit of official or partisan ends.

Question: In your Dissent book, you wrote: “if content neutrality is the First Amendment emperor, the emperor has no clothes.” Given the centrality of that doctrine in our current First Amendment decisional law, that seems to be a striking (and that is the word) assessment. Can you elaborate a bit on your thoughts concerning this?

Answer: The First Amendment prevents content discrimination except when it doesn’t. Many exceptions to First Amendment protection depend upon content, e.g., some forms of defamation, sexual speech, advocacy of illegal action. The Court has no principled justification for using strict scrutiny regarding some forms of content discrimination and less scrutiny for others. A theory of content neutrality does nothing to explain its selective use.

The Values of Free Speech vs the Value of Democracy

Question: In 1990 you wrote: “there is something quite odd about suppressing speech in the name of democracy.” Forgive me, but in today’s vernacular that could almost be the mantra of, say, the libertarian Cato Institute or of Shaun McCutcheon, the petitioner in McCutcheon v. FEC. What is your response to that?

Answer: A rhetorical joust in one context does not work in another. A politically centered theory of the First Amendment rooted in democratic theory leads to the conclusion that much non-political speech is not protected because it is only marginally related, if at all, to the democratic dialogue. Contributing to democratic dialogue should not be a necessary condition for First Amendment protection. Suppressing literature, music or art or private non-political speech in the name of democratic theory is entirely unpersuasive. At the same time, the values of free speech can be outweighed by the value of democracy. The Court’s insensitivity to this and its legalization of forms of bribery in Buckley, Citizens United, and McCutcheon is an embarrassment to the country and a scandal.

Question: As you know, the ACLU argued for the First Amendment claims sustained in Buckley v. Valeo (1976), the case in which Senator James Buckley and former Senator Eugene McCarthy challenged certain provisions of the 1974 Amendment to the Federal Election Campaign Act. Do you think that the ACLU and the majority got in right in Buckley?

Answer: No. The Court left human beings free to spend unlimited sums of money with the intent and effect of advancing or opposing political candidates and by implication it left corporations free to do the same so long as they did not use explicit language of endorsement or opposition to a particular candidate. Democracy is not consistent with the kind of preferential access and influence that the wealthy buy by spending large sums of money in this way. The victory for free speech is a significant democratic loss.

Question: Would it be fair to say, at least generally speaking, that your view of free expression under the First Amendment turns on power and those who possess it versus those who do not? What prompts this question is a passage in your Romance book wherein you wrote: “From the romantic perspective, the regulation of the wealthy, the powerful, and the large corporate conglomerate does not ordinarily inspire concern  [about whether such individuals or groups] are in danger of being stifled or that individual self-expression is at risk” By contrast, you add, the “Schencks, the Carlins, [and] the O’Briens” do need such protection. Hence, “from the romantic perspective, it is clear: the powerful rarely need protection; dissenters often do.” Putting aside for the moment the fact that the late comedian George Carlin was a man of means, does your view of free speech look at wealth and power as important factors in deciding whether to protect speech? Read More

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FAN 13.3 (First Amendment News) New Study Reveals Politics of Justices’ Protection of Free Speech

Over at the New York Times Adam Liptak has just posted a news item entitled “In Justices’ Votes, Free Speech Often Means ‘Speech I Agree With.” Liptak’s story is based on a new empirical study entitled “Do Justices Defend the Speech They Hate? In-Group Bias, Opportunism, and the First Amendment.” The study was done by Professors Lee Epstein, Christopher M. Parker, & Jeffrey A. Segal.  Here is the abstract:

In contrast to the traditional political science view, which holds that justices on the left are more supportive of free speech claims than justices on the right, and in contrast to a newer view among legal academics that justices on the right are more supportive of free speech claims than justices on the left, we use in-group bias theory to argue that Supreme Court justices are opportunistic supporters of free speech. That is, liberal (conservative) justices are supportive of free speech when the speaker is liberal (conservative).

A two-level hierarchical model of 4,519 votes in 516 cases confirms the in-group bias hypothesis. Although liberal justices are (overall) more supportive of free speech claims than conservative justices, the votes of both liberal and conservative justices tend to reflect their preferences toward the speakers’ ideological grouping, and not solely an underlying taste for (or against) the First Amendment.

Below is a revealing chart summary of the study (sans the notes to the asterisks). Given the importance of this study, I plan to post more on this work after I have had more time to review it.  Meanwhile, here is a link with additional information concerning the study.  Screen Shot 2014-05-05 at 3.25.12 PM

 

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FAN 13.2 (First Amendment News) — Indiana High Court Affirms Right to Criticize Judge

The CaseBrewington v. Indiana (No 15S01-1405-CR-309, May 1, 2014)

The Vote: Unanimous

The AuthorJustice Loretta H. Rush

The LawyerJames Bopp, Jr. (for Defendant)

Facts: (as stated in Court opinion)

In his blog posts, Defendant’s criticisms of the Judge were rather generalized—contending that the Judge “has abused my children” or otherwise done “mean things to my children and my family,” was guilty of “criminal conduct,” or was simply “crooked,” or “a nasty evil man.” But he also posted a copy of his August 24, 2009 “Motion to Grant Relief from Judgment and Order” online  in which he alleged that the Judge:

Justice Loretta Rush

Justice Loretta Rush

  • “has a substantial conflict of interest as[ he] was aware that Dr. Connor was not licensed to practice psychology by the State of Indiana when [he] had appointed Dr. Connor to perform psycho- logical services for an Indiana Court,”
  • “conducted himself in a willful, malicious, and premeditated manner in punishing the Respondent for attempting to protect the parties’ minor children, the Counties of Ripley and Dearborn, and the States of Indiana and Kentucky from the actions of Dr. Edward J. Connor by terminating the Respondent’s parental rights,”
  • “robbed [Defendant’s] parenting rights as revenge for fighting injustice,”
  • “caused irreparable damage to the Respondent’s children in the Court mandated child abuse [sic]” by “illegally eliminating their father from their lives out of the Court’s self-interest,” and
  •  used “child abducting tactics” by issuing the divorce decree.

In the motion, Defendant also threatened to “fil[e] criminal complaints with the Sheriff’s department and Prosecutor’s office for child abuse,” and to contact government officials, local churches and schools, social service agencies, and community organizations “in an attempt to contact other victims and to help bring public awareness to the atrocities that take place in the Ripley and Dearborn County Courts.” And he concluded the motion by seeking relief “due to fraud” by the Judge, the Doctor, and opposing parties and counsel—and echoing his previous efforts seeking Judge Taul’s recusal, he further demanded “the immediate resignation of Judge James D. Humphrey from the bench for the horrendous crimes committed against the Respondent and his children.”

Judgment

The First Amendment “is . . . certainly broad enough to protect Defendant’s ill-informed—but by all indications, sincere—beliefs that the Judge’s child-custody ruling constituted “child abuse” or “child abducting,” and that the ruling was based on improper motives. The Court of Appeals erred in relying on Defendant’s overheated rhetoric about “child abuse,” or the falsity of that characterization, to affirm his conviction for intimidating a judge. Even if Defendant’s “child abuse” and other statements about the Judge could be understood as assertions of fact, not hyperbole, they are protected by the First Amendment because there is no proof of actual malice.”

While his criticism of the judge was protected, the Court concluded that other statements made by the Defendant constituted “true threats” and were thus unprotected under the First Amendment. Said the Court:

It is every American’s constitutional right to criticize, even ridicule, judges and other parti- cipants in the judicial system—and those targets must bear that burden as the price of free public discourse. But that right does not permit threats against the safety and security of any American, even public officials, regardless of whether those threats are accompanied by some protected criti- cism. Defendant’s true threats against the Judge and the Doctor therefore find no refuge in free speech protections. To the contrary, they undermine the core values of judicial neutrality and truthful witness testimony on which every aggrieved citizen depends.

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FAN 12.3 (First Amendment News) Floyd Abrams Institute Sponsors Upcoming Conference

The Floyd Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression is sponsoring an upcoming First Amendment conference at Yale Law School. This will be the the second Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, which is hosted by the Information Society Project (ISP) at the Law School. The event is scheduled for May 3-4, 2014.abrams-logo

“The conference brings scholars together to discuss their works-in-progress concerning freedom of speech, expression, press, association, petition, assembly, and related issues of knowledge and information policy. The conference offers participants an opportunity to receive substantive feedback through group discussion. Each accepted paper will be assigned a discussant, who will lead discussion and provide feedback to the author. Participants will be expected to read papers in advance, and to attend the entire conference.”

The array of topics for the conference includes:

  • Constitution Betrayed: Free Expression, the Cold War, and the End of Democracy
  • First Amendment Challenges to Economic Regulation in the Jehovah’s Witness Cases       
  • Free Speech Constitutionalism (see also here)
  • National Security Letters and the First Amendment, Brief of Amici Curiae Floyd Abrams Institute and First Amendment Scholars, In re Nat’l Sec. Letter (9th Cir. filed Mar. 31, 2014) (Brief currently under seal)
  • Old School/New School Speech Regulation (see also here)
  • Product Redesign as Commercial Expression: Antitrust Treatment of Speech and Innovation
  • Revenge Porn (see also here)
  • The Freedom not to Think
  • Unreasonable Access: Disguised Issue Advocacy and the Role of Broadcasters in Shaping Public Discourse
  • When Government Lies: The Constitutional Implications of the Government’s Deliberate Falsehoods
  • Why Data Privacy Law is (Mostly) Constitutional (see also here)

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    ISP Logo

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