posted by Suzanne Kim
The New York state court system this week unveiled its Human Trafficking Intervention Initiative to expand a network of pilot courts specially aimed at linking prostitution defendants with a range of social services, and offering the potential for non-criminal dispositions or reduced charges for these defendants. The program represents an important step toward addressing the exploitation of women, men, and children through sex trafficking. The recognition of coercion in the sex trade and of the coexistence of prostitution with needs for housing, healthcare, immigration assistance, job training, and drug treatment echo reforms in the domestic violence context to create more integrated judicial approaches to addressing the needs of victims.
These reform efforts raise the question of how much attention should be paid to the market supporters of the sex trade. Law enforcement has tended to focus on sellers of sex, rather than its purchasers, although every state in the U.S. but Nevada criminalizes both the sale and the purchase of sex. Our American approach, however, is not self-evident. Sweden criminalizes patronage but not prostitution, akin to many European countries. The NY reforms suggest further thinking about allocation of criminal responsibility.
September 29, 2013 at 10:21 am Tags: Criminal Law, discrimination, human trafficking, legal reform, prostitution, sexuality Posted in: Culture, Politics, Privacy, Uncategorized Print This Post 2 Comments
posted by Stanford Law Review
The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Andrew Kloster entitled The Violence Against Women Act and Double Jeopardy in Higher Education. Mr. Kloster argues that proposed changes to the Violence Against Women Act have potentially serious implications for persons accused committing sexual assault in university proceedings:
The reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), set to expire this year, has elicited predictable partisan rancor. While there is little chance of the reauthorization being enacted by Congress so close to an election, the Senate draft includes a provision that raises interesting issues for the rights of students involved in sexual assault disciplinary proceedings on campus. The Senate version of VAWA could arguably condition a university’s receipt of federal funds on a requirement that the university always provide an appeal right for both accuser and accused. Setting aside the massive rise in federal micromanagement of college disciplinary proceedings, the proposed language in VAWA raises serious, unsettled issues of the application of double jeopardy principles in the higher education context.
Whatever the legal basis, it is clear that both Congress and the Department of Education ought to take seriously the risk that mandating that all universities receiving federal funds afford a dual appeal right in college disciplinary proceedings violates fundamental notions of fairness and legal norms prohibiting double jeopardy. College disciplinary hearings are serious matters that retain very few specific procedural safeguards for accused students, and permitting “do-overs” (let alone mandating them) does incredible damage to the fundamental rights of students.
Read the full article, The Violence Against Women Act and Double Jeopardy in Higher Education at the Stanford Law Review Online.
October 10, 2012 at 10:30 am Tags: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Education, feminism Posted in: Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Education, Feminism and Gender, Law Rev (Stanford) Print This Post One Comment
posted by Stanford Law Review
The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Nicolas L. Martinez entitled Pulling the Plug on the Virtual Jury. Martinez takes issue with Judge William Young’s proposal that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed be tried via videoconference from Guantanamo Bay by a jury sitting in New York:
Most people probably figured that the debate over where to try alleged 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (“KSM”) had ended. Indeed, it has been well over a year since Congress forced Attorney General Eric Holder to reluctantly announce that KSM’s prosecution would be referred to the Department of Defense for trial before a Guantanamo military commission. But a provocative proposal put forth recently by Judge William G. Young of the District of Massachusetts has revitalized one of the most contentious legal debates of the post-9/11 era. In a nutshell, Judge Young proposes that an Article III court try KSM at Guantanamo, but with one major twist: the jury would remain in New York City.
Perhaps unwilling to refight the battles of two years ago, Congress has shown no inclination to retreat from its apparent view that KSM may only be tried by a military commission at Guantanamo. As a result, following through on Judge Young’s plan, which could be viewed as an attempt to circumvent the will of Congress, might lead some legislators to harden their stance on civilian trials for alleged terrorists and propose even more disagreeable legislation to that end. This is not to say that creative solutions aimed at fortifying the rule of law in a post-9/11 world should be held hostage to the proclivities of intransigent voting blocs in Congress. Quite the opposite, in fact. But the likely political ramifications of Judge Young’s proposal cannot be ignored, especially in an election year when few members of Congress may be willing to spend their political capital defending the need to hold KSM’s trial in federal court.
Even though Judge Young’s provocative suggestion should not be adopted in its current form, he has moved the conversation in the right direction. Continuing to think imaginatively about ways to preserve our rule of law tradition from external threats is immensely important, particularly in the context of national security crises. For it is when the rule of law can be so easily discarded that it must be most doggedly defended.
September 13, 2012 at 10:00 am Tags: Civil Rights, Courts, criminal justice, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, guantanamo bay, military commissions, security, War on Terror Posted in: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Courts, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Current Events, Law Rev (Stanford), Military Law, Politics Print This Post No Comments
posted by Stanford Law Review
The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Jane Yakowitz Bambauer entitled How the War on Drugs Distorts Privacy Law. Professor Yakowitz analyzes the opportunity the Supreme Court has to rewrite certain privacy standards in Florida v. Jardines:
The U.S. Supreme Court will soon determine whether a trained narcotics dog’s sniff at the front door of a home constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. The case, Florida v. Jardines, has privacy scholars abuzz because it presents two possible shifts in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. First, the Court might expand the physical spaces rationale from Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in United States v. Jones. A favorable outcome for Mr. Jardines could reinforce that the home is a formidable privacy fortress, protecting all information from government detection unless that information is visible to the human eye.
Alternatively, and more sensibly, the Court may choose to revisit its previous dog sniff cases, United States v. Place and Illinois v. Caballes. This precedent has shielded dog sniffs from constitutional scrutiny by finding that sniffs of luggage and a car, respectively, did not constitute searches. Their logic is straightforward: since a sniff “discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item,” a search incident to a dog’s alert cannot offend reasonable expectations of privacy. Of course, the logical flaw is equally obvious: police dogs often alert when drugs are not present, resulting in unnecessary suspicionless searches.
Jardines offers the Court an opportunity to carefully assess a mode of policing that subjects all constituents to the burdens of investigation and punishment, not just the “suspicious.” Today, drug-sniffing dogs are unique law enforcement tools that can be used without either individualized suspicion or a “special needs” checkpoint. Given their haphazard deployment and erratic performance, police dogs deserve the skepticism many scholars and courts have expressed. But the wrong reasoning in Jardines could fix indefinitely an assumption that police technologies and civil liberties are always at odds. This would be unfortunate. New technologies have the potential to be what dogs never were—accurate and fair. Explosive detecting systems may eventually meet the standards for this test, and DNA-matching and pattern-based data mining offer more than mere hypothetical promise. Responsible use of these emerging techniques requires more transparency and even application than police departments are accustomed to, but decrease in law enforcement discretion is its own achievement. With luck, the Court will find a search in Jardines while avoiding a rule that reflexively hampers the use of new technologies.
May 9, 2012 at 7:30 am Tags: Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, drug policy, law enforcement, Privacy, technology Posted in: Civil Rights, Criminal Law, Criminal Procedure, Law Rev (Stanford), Privacy, Privacy (Law Enforcement), Technology Print This Post No Comments
Bright Ideas: Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins and Ethan J. Leib on Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties
posted by Deven Desai
Today’s Bright Idea comes from Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, and Ethan J. Leib. Dan is the D’Alemberte Professor of Law at Florida State University College of Law and of course blogs at Prawfs. Jennifer is an associate professor of law at Wake Forest University School of Law. Ethan is an associate professor of law at U.C. Hastings College of Law. All three have impressive track records as scholars with articles appearing in the Yale Law Journal, Northwestern University Law Review, Iowa Law Review, Emory Law Journal, and many other excellent publications among them. With such an impressive group behind Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties, I am quite pleased to present Dan Markel, Jennifer M. Collins, and Ethan J. Leib as they share the shape of their ambitious book. In addition, the essay explains how the project began and evolved. Both parts offer insights well worth the read.
First, we want to thank Deven and the Co-Op crew for the chance to share some thoughts about our book and the story behind its writing. Privilege or Punish: Criminal Justice and the Challenge of Family Ties is a book that tries to answer two basic but under-appreciated questions. First, how does the American criminal justice system (writ large) address a defendant’s family status? And, second, how should a defendant’s family status be recognized, if at all, in a criminal justice system situated within a liberal democracy committed to egalitarian principles of non-discrimination?
The Shape of the Book
The descriptive part of the project originally began as a chance to ruminate upon contemporary “Antigone” situations where one’s loyalties to the state stand in tension with one’s loyalties to family members. Think of David Kaczynski, the Unabomber’s brother, or Bernie Madoff’s sons—they all called in the authorities to arrest their family member. But we soon realized the Antigone problem was only one of many sites where the state’s criminal apparatus and family intersected.
Consequently, we sought to survey the various spaces within the criminal justice system in which defendants are either benefited or burdened by virtue of their family status, ties, and/or responsibilities. To give you a sense of the panoply of benefits and burdens, consider just a few: most states give spouses a right to refuse to testify against their spouse in a criminal proceeding and some even permit a spouse to block the testimony of a spouse who is willing to testify; almost twenty states give exemptions or substantial punishment discounts to those harboring a fugitive when that fugitive was a close family member; many states permit or require sentencing discounts to offenders who are parents with care-giving obligations; most states impose duties to rescue, supervise and support children and the breach of those duties renders one eligible for criminal sanction; most states have bigamy and incest laws that render conduct “criminal” that would not otherwise be unlawful but for the family status of the defendant. These are just some of the various “family ties benefits” and “family ties burdens” in our criminal justice system.
Naturally, we weren’t satisfied with merely cataloguing these benefits and burdens. We also wondered how policymakers and courts *should* view these laws. And so we established a framework of analysis for these benefits and burdens, one that was inspired by, but not identical to, the framework used to scrutinize suspect classifications in constitutional law. To sum up our various conclusions crudely, we basically claim that the state should exercise substantial caution and indeed skepticism to most attempts to distribute these benefits or burdens based on one’s family status. This is a controversial stance, but we concluded that in many circumstances there are simply too many costs to the criminal justice system when it gives special treatment based on one’s family ties or responsibilities.
Moreover, even when the criminal justice system does not suffer in terms of its ability to reduce crime and to impose accurate and adequate punishment, the signals of such family ties burdens and benefits are often expressively denigrating the lives of those who don’t live by the rules of a heterosexist and often repro-normative conception of family life. Our view is that a criminal justice system in a liberal democracy has to be especially careful about sending these messages of denigration and inequality through its most awesome instruments of power, coercion, and condemnation.
By offering both our descriptive and normative claims, we hope to be doing something different and important. Although in recent years scholars have been successful in analyzing the indirect effects of certain criminal justice policies and practices on the family, few have recognized the variety of laws (whether statutory or common law-based) expressly drawn to privilege or disadvantage persons based on family status alone. It is critically necessary to pause and think through how and why our laws intentionally target one’s family status and how the underlying goals of such a choice might better be served in some cases. This book begins that vitally important conversation with an array of innovative policy recommendations that we hope will be of interest to anyone seeking the improvement of our criminal justice system.
Below the fold, we talk a little about how the evolution of our book from idea to reality.