Tagged: Constitutional Law

stairway-to-heaven-1319562-m
0

FAN.4 (First Amendment News)

In this issue of FAN I flag some forthcoming books that should be of interest to First Amendment enthusiasts.  I hope to say more about some of these works when they are published. Before proceeding to the forthcoming books, I want to to share a video link to Justice John Paul Stevens’ February 7, 2014 speech to the ABA Forum on Communications Law (hat tip to Steven Zansberg). I also want to to highlight a just-released book.

Former Stanford University President and former dean of the University of Chicago Law School Gerhard Casper has published a book entitled The Winds of Freedom: Addressing Challenges to the University (Yale University Press, 248 pp.). Chapter 4 of that book (pp. 64-83) is titled “Corry v. Stanford University: The Issue of Free Expression.” The Cory case involved a challenge to Stanford’s speech code. Anyone familiar with Professor Casper’s impressive scholarship will want to examine this book. (On a related front, this April Yale University press will release the paperback version of Dean Robert Post’s Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State.)

Now, onto the forthcoming books and a few related matters:

  1. Stanley Fish is Coming!: Following the general Casper-Post theme, Stanley Fish offers his own unique perspective in Versions of Academic Freedom: From Professionalism to Revolution — The Rice University Campbell Lectures (192 pp, Univ. of Chicago Press, Oct. 2014). Here is a description of the book: “Providing a blueprint for the study of academic freedom, Fish breaks down the schools of thought on the subject, which range from the idea that academic freedom is justified by the common good or by academic exceptionalism, to its potential for critique or indeed revolution. Fish himself belongs to what he calls the ‘It’s Just a Job’ school: while academics need the latitude—call it freedom if you like—necessary to perform their professional activities, they are not free in any special sense to do anything but their jobs.  Academic freedom, Fish argues, should be justified only by the specific educational good that academics offer. Defending the university “in all its glorious narrowness” as a place of disinterested inquiry, Fish offers a bracing corrective to academic orthodoxy.”
  2. Press Freedom & Press Performance: University of Texas Journalism Professor Regina Lawrence has revised the late Timothy E. Cook’s edited work entitled Freeing the Presses: The First Amendment in Action (Louisiana State University Press, 2nd ed., June 2014). Contributors include: Charles Clark, Jack Weiss, Frederick Schauer, Michael Schudson, Ralph Izard, W. Lance Bennett, Craig Freeman, Diana Owen, Emily Erickson, Timothy Cook, and the new editor.
  3. U.S. v. Stevens — the book: In Animal Cruelty and Freedom of Speech: When Worlds Collide (Purdue University Press, pp. 260, May 2014) Wake Forest Law Professor Abigail Perdue and Dr. Randall Lockwood (senior vice president for Forensic Sciences & Anti-Cruelty Projects of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) offer a detailed case study of the Stevens case. The authors provide a survey of important issues facing society in the area of animal welfare. “The Stevens case included various ‘hot topic’ elements connected to the role of government as arbiter of public morality, including judicial attitudes to sexual deviance and dogfighting. Because it is one of only two animal rights cases that the US Supreme Court has handled, and the only case discussing the competing interests of free speech and animal cruelty, it will be an important topic for discussion in constitutional and animal law courses for decades to come.”
  4. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale – the book: The next addition to the University Press of Kansas’ impressive Landmark Law Cases and American Society series is Judging the Boy Scouts of America: Gay Rights, Freedom of Association, and the Dale Case (272 pp., May 2014). In this forthcoming book, Willamette University Professor Richard J. Ellis “tells the fascinating story of the Dale case, placing it in the context of legal principles and precedents, Scouts policies, gay rights, and the “culture wars” in American politics.”
  5. The State of Funeral-Picketing Laws — The folks over at the First Amendment Center have just released a special report entitled the “Constitutionality of State Funeral-Picketing Laws Since Snyder v. Phelps.” The report was prepared for the Newseum Institute’s First Amendment Center by a team of law students from the Columbus School of Law at The Catholic University of America and examines the legal and legislative responses, as of January 1, 2014, to Snyder v. Phelps.
  6. In light of the recent passing of Professor George Anastaplo, I thought I would alert readers to some of his works on free speech, which include: Reflections on Freedom of Speech and the First Amendment (2007); The Amendments to the Constitution: A Commentary (1995, pp. 47-58); and The Constitutionalist: Notes on the First Amendment (1971 & 2005). Finally, for an audio file of Professor Anastaplo’s arguments before the Supreme Court in In re Anastaplo, go here.
  7. Last Issue of FAN: If you missed it, go here.
  8. Next Scheduled Issue of FAN: Wednesday, March 5th.
stairway-to-heaven-1319562-m
0

FAN.2 (First Amendment News)

Thanks to everyone who sent along information for this and future FAN columns. For those who missed the first column, go here. One of the aims of FAN is to help build bridges between scholars and litigators, liberals and conservatives (and libertarians, too!), and between journalists and all others interested in the First Amendment and freedom of expression. To that end, here is more free speech news:

  • Speech — Justice Stevens & The First Amendment: In a February 7, 2014 speech to the ABA Forum on Communications Law (as of yet unpublished), retired Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens said some interesting things about the free expression law of the First Amendment. Here are a few samples:

— Re the Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc. (1984) product disparagement case, though Justice Stevens ultimately wrote the majority opinion in the 6-3 case, when the cert. petition was first considered at Conference Stevens and most of his colleagues voted to deny review. Justice Byron White, however, relisted the case in order to write a dissent from the denial of cert. Ultimately, however, White persuaded his colleagues to hear the case and the rest is, as they say, history.

— Similarly, the Justices originally planned to deny review in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton (1989), a defamation case. Here, too, Justice White drafted a dissent from the denial of cert., which prompted three other Justices (Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall) to “vote to grant.” When the dialogic dust settled (and there is more to the Stevens’ story), the Court was unanimous and Stevens wrote the opinion. [For more on this case and the Bose one and related stories, see Lee Levine & Steve Wermiel’s The Progeny (2014).)]

— Justice Stevens disapproved of the Court’s judgment in United States v. Alvarez (the 2012 stolen valor case). “I agree,” said Stevens (a WW II Bronze Star veteran), “with the reasoning and conclusion of Justice Alito’s dissent.” Nonetheless, Stevens found  the first sentence of that dissent to be “inaccurate.” According to Stevens, and contra Alito, “the Court did not hold that ‘every American has a constitutional right to claim to have received that singular award.’” All the Court did was strike down as overbroad a particular federal statute; it thus did not condone all such false and deceptive speech.

— During the ABA Q & A period, Justice Stevens was asked if he thought it was necessary to have a constitutional amendment to overrule the 2010 Citizens United case. He replied: “Well, either a constitutional amendment or one more vote.”

Though Justice Stevens’ remarks have yet to be posted or published, you can look for them in the days ahead on the ABA Forum website here.  (Hat tip to Lee Levine and Steven Zansberg.)

  • Are Animal Rights Activists Terrorists? Have you ever heard of the Animal Enterprise Protection Act? Section 43(a) of the Act makes it a crime for anyone who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes to be used the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, for the purpose of causing physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise; and intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning of an animal enterprise by intentionally stealing, damaging, or causing the loss of, any property (including animals or records) used by the animal enterprise, and thereby causes economic damage exceeding $10,000 to that enterprise, or conspires to do so; shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.” The Center for Constitutional Rights maintains that AETA violates the First Amendment by criminalizing protected speech and expressive activities such as protests, boycotts, picketing and whistleblowing (see here). The district court dismissed the case on standing grounds, though that ruling has been appealed to the First Circuit (see here).
  • Free Press-Fair Trial: Seems that a Marin County public defender objects to the Marin Independent Journal taking photos of his client (an accused serial bank robber) at an arraignment in the Superior Court. According to a MIJ news report, “after the courtroom hearing, MIJ photographer Frankie Frost snapped photos of [the defendant] on public property outside the Hall of Justice as sheriff’s deputies escorted him in a wheelchair back to the jail. Those photos, which we shared with the Associated Press, have been published in the MIJ’s print editions and website.” The public defender balked and filed an 11-page memorandum seeking to enjoin the paper from publishing the photos again. When MIJ objected, Judge James Chou denied its request without prejudice (see here).
  • Upcoming Event: On Friday, February 21, 2014 (12:00-1:00 pm), the Heritage Foundation will host a program titled “Taxing the First Amendment: Using the IRS to Censor Speech?” The participants include Cleta Mitchell (partner, Foley & Lardner), Bradley A. Smith (chairman, Center for Competitive Politics), Eliana Johnson (reporter, National Review), and Kimberley Strassel (editorial board, Wall Street Journal).
  • Next FAN: Wednesday, February 19.
0

UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 1

Volume 61, Issue 1 (December 2013)
Articles

Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler 2
Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt 66

 

Comments

“Let’s Have a Look, Shall We?” A Model for Evaluating Suspicionless Border Searches of Portable Electronic Devices Sid Nadkarni 148
An Article III Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: A Critical Race Perspective on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Standing Jurisprudence Raj Shah 198

 

 

 

1

Bright Ideas: Mark Weiner on his new book Rule of the Clan

Sometimes fortune smiles upon you. I met Mark Weiner when we started law school. My life and my work is much better for it. Mark is a scholar and more. He obtained his B.A. in American Studies from Stanford, his J.D. from Yale, and his PhD in American Studies from Yale.

His most recent project is his excellent book, The Rule of the Clan. Ambassadors, professors from all around the world, members of the 9/11 commission, and publishers have embraced the book. Mark argues, and I think rather well, that the state has a quite important role to play, and we ignore that to our peril. Publishers Weekly has said:

A nuanced view of clan-based societies … Weiner’s argument is a full-throated defense of the modern centralized state, which he sees as necessary to protect human rights: “In the face of well-intended but misguided criticism that the state is inimical to freedom, we must choose whether to maintain the state as our most basic political institution or to let it degrade.” An entertaining mix of anecdote and ethnography.

The New York Journal of Books has called the book “accessible, mesmerizing, and compelling.”

I wanted to get into how Mark came up with the project, why it matters, and, for the writers out there, the process of writing about such a complex subject but in a way that is accessible to a general audience. So I asked Mark whether we could do a Bright Ideas interview. He graciously agreed.

Mark, the book is great. I want to jump in and ask, What do you mean by “clan”?

Thanks, Deven. In my book, I consider clans both in their traditional form, as a subset of tribes, but also as a synecdoche for a pattern by which humans structure their social and legal lives: “the rule of the clan.” Clans are a natural form of social and legal organization. They certainly are more explicable in human terms than the modern liberal state and the liberal rule of law. Because of the natural fact of blood relationships, people tend to organize their communities on the basis of extended kinship in the absence of strong alternatives.

So why clans now?

Two reasons. First, the United States is involved militarily in parts of the world in which traditional tribal and clan relationships are critical, and if we don’t understand how those relationships work, including in legal terms, we have a major problem.

Let me give you an example from Guantanamo. In the book, I tell a story of a college friend who was in charge of the team there interrogating detainees from Saudi Arabia. (I should note that my friend finds torture morally repugnant and against the national interest, as do I, and that she has advocated for this view in meaningful ways.) Over the course of her work, my friend realized that because of the first-name/last-name structure of the detainee tracking system, basic information about detainee tribal affiliations hadn’t been gathered or had been lost. This meant, among other things, that we couldn’t fully appreciate the reason why some of these men had taken up arms against us in the first place—for instance, because the United States had become embroiled in their centuries-long, domestic tribal war with the House of Saud.

Our ignorance about these issues is what I call the contemporary “Fulda Gap.” Our lack of knowledge about more traditional societies hinders our ability to understand the motivations of those who oppose us and leaves us vulnerable—and, even more important, it diminishes our ability to cooperate with our friends and to assist liberal legal reformers abroad in ways that are both effective and ethical.

The second reason to study clans, and ultimately for me even more important than the first reason, has to do with our own political discourse here at home. You could say that I became interested in clans because of widespread ideological attacks against the state within liberal societies—that is, attacks on government. By this I mean not simply efforts to reduce the size of government or to make it more efficient. Instead, I mean broadside criticisms of the state itself, or efforts to starve government and render it anemic.

I think you are saying there is something about clans that helps us organize and understand our world. What is it?

It’s often said that individual freedom exists most powerfully in the absence of government. But I believe that studying the rule of the clan shows us that the reverse is true. Liberal personal freedom is inconceivable without the existence of a robust state dedicated to vindicating the public interest. That’s because the liberal state, at least in theory, treats persons as individuals rather than as members of ineluctable status or clan groups. So studying clans can help us imagine what our social and legal life would become if we allow the state to deteriorate through a lack of political will.

By the way, the idea that the state is somehow inimical to freedom—that we gain individual freedom outside the state, rather than through it—is hardly limited to the United States. It was a core component of Qaddafi’s revolutionary vision of Libya. Or consider Gandhi, who advocated for a largely stateless society for postcolonial India. Fortunately for India, his vision wasn’t realized. Instead, we owe the prospects for further liberal development there to the constitution drafted by B. R. Ambedkar.

Hold on. From Indian independence to Libyan revolution seems a long jump. Can you help me connect the dots?

Read More

1

The Stanford Law Review Online: Defending DOMA in Court

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Matthew I. Hall entitled How Congress Could Defend DOMA in Court (and Why the BLAG Cannot). Professor Hall argues that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group lacks standing to defend DOMA:

In one of the most closely watched litigation matters in recent years, the Supreme Court will soon consider Edith Windsor’s challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The Court surprised many observers by granting certiorari, not only on the merits of Windsor’s equal protection and due process claims, but also on the question whether the defendants—the United States and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (the BLAG)—have Article III standing to defend DOMA. The United States has agreed with plaintiffs that DOMA is unconstitutional, prompting the BLAG to intervene for the purpose of defending DOMA’s constitutionality. No lower court has yet addressed whether the BLAG has standing, so the Supreme Court will have the first crack at the issue. But it turns out that the answer is straightforward: Under settled precedent, the BLAG lacks authority to represent either the United States or Congress, and having claimed no interest of its own, it therefore lacks Article III standing.

He concludes:

Congress could solve these problems by statute or resolution, but until it does so the BLAG is a mere bystander, with no stake in defending DOMA. This lack of standing may play a decisive role in the Windsor litigation. Both the BLAG and the executive branch defendants appealed the District Court’s judgment to the Second Circuit, and petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. If the BLAG lacks standing, however, then it had no authority to appeal or to seek Supreme Court review, and the Court’s jurisdiction must turn on whether the United States, which has agreed with the plaintiff that DOMA is unconstitutional, has standing to proceed with the case. Interestingly, the BLAG itself has argued that no such standing exists—a controversial position that is beyond the scope of this short piece. But if the BLAG is correct, then there is no case or controversy before the Court, and the Court will have to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The widespread expectation that Windsor will be a significant decision appears to be well-founded. But it remains to be seen whether its significance will lie in the area of individual rights or in the areas of federal court jurisdiction and the separation of powers.

Read the full article, How Congress Could Defend DOMA in Court (and Why the BLAG Cannot) at the Stanford Law Review Online.

15

Stanford Law Review Online: Privilege and the Belfast Project

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Will Havemann entitled Privilege and the Belfast Project. Havemann argues that a recent First Circuit opinion goes too far and threatens the idea of academic privilege:

In 2001, two Irish scholars living in the United States set out to compile the recollections of men and women involved in the decades-long conflict in Northern Ireland. The result was the Belfast Project, an oral history project housed at Boston College that collected interviews from many who were personally involved in the violent Northern Irish “Troubles.” To induce participants to document their memories for posterity, Belfast Project historians promised all those interviewed that the contents of their testimonials would remain confidential until they died. More than a decade later, this promise of confidentiality is at the heart of a legal dispute implicating the United States’ bilateral legal assistance treaty with the United Kingdom, the so-called academic’s privilege, and the First Amendment.

He concludes:

Given the confusion sown by Branzburg’s fractured opinion, the First Circuit’s hardnosed decision is unsurprising. But by disavowing the balancing approach recommended in Justice Powell’s concurring Branzburg opinion, and by overlooking the considerable interests supporting the Belfast Project’s confidentiality guarantee, the First Circuit erred both as a matter of precedent and of policy. At least one Supreme Court Justice has signaled a willingness to correct the mischief done by the First Circuit, and to clarify an area of First Amendment law where the Court’s guidance is sorely needed. The rest of the Court should take note.

Read the full article, Privilege and the Belfast Project at the Stanford Law Review Online.

3

Stanford Law Review Online: Software Speech

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Andrew Tutt entitled Software Speech. Tutt argues that current approaches to determining when software or speech generated by software can be protected by the First Amendment are incorrect:

When is software speech for purposes of the First Amendment? This issue has taken on new life amid recent accusations that Google used its search rankings to harm its competitors. This spring, Eugene Volokh coauthored a white paper explaining why Google’s search results are fully protected speech that lies beyond the reach of the antitrust laws. The paper sparked a firestorm of controversy, and in a matter of weeks, dozens of scholars, lawyers, and technologists had joined the debate. The most interesting aspect of the positions on both sides—whether contending that Google search results are or are not speech—is how both get First Amendment doctrine only half right.

He concludes:

By stopping short of calling software “speech,” entirely and unequivocally, the Court would acknowledge the many ways in which software is still an evolving cultural phenomenon unlike others that have come before it. In discarding tests for whether software is speech on the basis of its literal resemblance either to storytelling (Brown) or information dissemination (Sorrell), the Court would strike a careful balance between the legitimate need to regulate software, on the one hand, and the need to protect ideas and viewpoints from manipulation and suppression, on the other.

Read the full article, Software Speech at the Stanford Law Review Online.

0

Stanford Law Review Online: The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Fatma Marouf entitled The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters. Professor Marouf writes that recent efforts by several states to purge noncitizens from their voter rolls may prevent many more citizens than noncitizens from voting:

Over the past year, states have shown increasing angst about noncitizens registering to vote. Three states—Tennessee, Kansas, and Alabama—have passed new laws requiring documentary proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register. Arizona was the first state to pass such a requirement, but the Ninth Circuit struck it down in April 2012, finding it incompatible with the National Voter Registration Act. Two other states—Florida and Colorado—have waged aggressive campaigns in recent months to purge noncitizens from voter registration lists. These efforts to weed out noncitizen voters follow on the heels of legislation targeting undocumented immigrants in a number of states. Yet citizens may be more harmed by the new laws than noncitizens, especially since the number of noncitizens registering to vote has turned out to be quite small. Wrongfully targeting naturalized or minority citizens in the search for noncitizens could also have negative ramifications for society as a whole, reinforcing unconscious bias about who is a “real” American and creating subclasses of citizens who must overcome additional hurdles to exercise the right to vote.

She concludes:

Some of the laws require voters to show government-issued photo IDs, which 11% of U.S. citizens do not have. Some have placed new burdens on voter registration drives, through which African-American and Hispanic voters are twice as likely to register as Whites. Others restrict early voting, specifically eliminating Sunday voting, which African-Americans and Hispanics also utilize more often than Whites. In two states, new laws rolled back reforms that had restored voting rights to citizens with felony convictions, who are disproportionately African-American. Each of these laws is a stepping-stone on the path to subsidiary citizenship. Rather than creating new obstacles to democratic participation, we should focus our energy on ensuring that all eligible citizens are able to exercise the fundamental right to vote.

Read the full article, The Hunt for Noncitizen Voters at the Stanford Law Review Online.

0

Stanford Law Review Online: Dahlia v. Rodriguez

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a Note by Kendall Turner entitled Dahlia v. Rodriguez: A Chance to Overrule Dangerous Precedent. Turner argues that the Ninth Circuit has an opportunity to make an important change to the rules governing the application of First Amendment protections to the speech of public employees:

In December 2007, Angelo Dahlia, a detective for the City of Burbank, California, allegedly witnessed his fellow police officers using unlawful interrogation tactics. According to Dahlia, these officers beat multiple suspects, squeezed the throat of one suspect, and placed a gun directly under that suspect’s eye. The Burbank Chief of Police seemed to encourage this behavior: after learning that certain suspects were not yet under arrest, he allegedly urged his employees to “beat another [suspect] until they are all in custody.”

After some delay, Dahlia reported his colleagues’ conduct to the Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department. Four days later, Burbank’s Chief of Police placed Dahlia on administrative leave. Dahlia subsequently filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against the Chief and other members of the Burbank Police Department, alleging that his placement on administrative leave was unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights.

She concludes:

Dahlia offers the Ninth Circuit an opportunity to overturn Huppert and articulate a narrow understanding of Garcetti. This narrow understanding accords with the reality of public employees’ duties—for the duties they are actually expected to perform may differ significantly from the responsibilities listed in their job descriptions. A narrow reading of Garcetti is also essential to ensuring adequate protection of free speech: The answer to the question of when the First Amendment protects a public employee’s statements made pursuant to his official duties may not be “always,” but it cannot be “never.”

Read the full article, Dahlia v. Rodriguez: A Chance to Overrule Dangerous Precedent at the Stanford Law Review Online.

1

Stanford Law Review Online: The Violence Against Women Act and Double Jeopardy in Higher Education

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Andrew Kloster entitled The Violence Against Women Act and Double Jeopardy in Higher Education. Mr. Kloster argues that proposed changes to the Violence Against Women Act have potentially serious implications for persons accused committing sexual assault in university proceedings:

The reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), set to expire this year, has elicited predictable partisan rancor. While there is little chance of the reauthorization being enacted by Congress so close to an election, the Senate draft includes a provision that raises interesting issues for the rights of students involved in sexual assault disciplinary proceedings on campus. The Senate version of VAWA could arguably condition a university’s receipt of federal funds on a requirement that the university always provide an appeal right for both accuser and accused. Setting aside the massive rise in federal micromanagement of college disciplinary proceedings, the proposed language in VAWA raises serious, unsettled issues of the application of double jeopardy principles in the higher education context.

He concludes:

Whatever the legal basis, it is clear that both Congress and the Department of Education ought to take seriously the risk that mandating that all universities receiving federal funds afford a dual appeal right in college disciplinary proceedings violates fundamental notions of fairness and legal norms prohibiting double jeopardy. College disciplinary hearings are serious matters that retain very few specific procedural safeguards for accused students, and permitting “do-overs” (let alone mandating them) does incredible damage to the fundamental rights of students.

Read the full article, The Violence Against Women Act and Double Jeopardy in Higher Education at the Stanford Law Review Online.