Category: Tort Law

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Facebook and the Appropriation of Name or Likeness Tort

facebook.jpgA few days ago, I posted about Facebook’s new Social Ads and I argued that they might give rise to an action under the appropriation of name or likeness tort. The most common formulation of the appropriation tort is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652C: “One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy.”

A related tort, a spin-off of appropriation, is the “right of publicity” which as defined by the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Unfair Competition § 46: “One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purpose of trade is subject to liability for [monetary and injunctive] relief.”

These two torts have sometimes been confused with each other, but the basic difference is that appropriation protects one’s dignitary interests in not desiring to have one’s identity exploited and used for another’s benefit whereas the right of publicity protects a person’s property interest in the commercial value of her identity.

Both torts are potentially applicable to Facebook’s Social Ads.

Over at Digital Daily, John Paczkowski discusses my post and adds:

Now Facebook claims no personally identifiable information is shared with an advertiser in creating a Social Ad. “Facebook has always empowered users to make choices about sharing their data, and with Facebook Ads we are extending that to marketing messages that appear on the site,” the company explains. “Facebook users will only see Social Ads to the extent their friends are sharing information with them.” That’s certainly a thoughtful assurance. But it doesn’t exactly address the issue of Facebook appropriating user identities for its own benefit.

At the NYT”s Bits, Saul Hansell discusses the response of Chris Kelly, the chief privacy officer of Facebook:

Mr. Kelly said the advertisements are simply a “representation” of the action users have taken: choosing to link themselves to a product. He added that in many states, consenting to something online is now seen as the equivalent of written consent.

And he argued that it would be difficult for someone used in one of these ads to object because that person had already chosen to publicly identify themselves with the brand doing the advertising.

“We are fairly confident that our operation is well presented to users and that they can make their own choices about whether they want to affiliate with brands that put up Facebook pages,” Mr. Kelly said.

I don’t agree with Kelly’s take on the law. Suppose Michael Jordan says on national TV that he likes Wheaties. Does this allow Wheaties to use his image on its cereal box or in a commercial? The answer is no. The fact that Jordan says he likes Wheaties can be used in a news story; it can be used in a biography of Jordan. But it cannot be used in a commercial advertisement. Comment (c) to the Restatement’s section on appropriation states that “the defendant must have appropriated for his own use or benefit the reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or other values of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” That’s exactly what’s being done with Social Ads. They are not merely reporting facts (which is ok under appropriation and publicity); instead, they are using the reputation and standing of people to promote commercial products and services.

The fact that a person publicly states that she likes a product is not equivalent to that person’s consent to be used in an advertisement. Otherwise, Coca Cola could snap a photo of a celebrity drinking a can of Coke and then use the photo in its ad campaign without paying the celebrity. That celebrity’s lawyers would be licking their chops if that were to happen.

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The New Facebook Ads — Starring You: Another Privacy Debacle?

facebook.jpgFacebook recently announced a new advertising scheme. Instead of using celebrities to hawk products, it will use . . . you! That’s right, pictures of you and your friends will appear on Facebook ads to make products more enticing to Facebook customers.

As Facebook’s website describes its new “Social Ads” program:

Facebook Social Ads allow your businesses to become part of people’s daily conversations. Ads can be displayed in the left hand Ad Space — visible to users as they browse Facebook to connect with their friends — as well as in the context of News Feed — attached to relevant social stories. The social stories, such as a friend’s becoming a fan of your Facebook Page or a friend’s taking an action on your website, make your ad more interesting and more relevant. Social Ads are placed in highly visible parts of the site without interrupting the user experience on Facebook.

Here’s the sample ad that Facebook includes on its social ad description page:

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According to the NY Times:

Facebook wants to put your face on advertisements for products that you like.

Facebook .com is a social networking site that lets people accumulate “friends” and share preferences and play games with them. Each member creates a home page where he or she can post photographs, likes and dislikes and updates about their activities.

Yesterday, in a twist on word-of-mouth marketing, Facebook began selling ads that display people’s profile photos next to commercial messages that are shown to their friends about items they purchased or registered an opinion about.

For example, going forward, a Facebook user who rents a movie on Blockbuster.com will be asked if he would like to have his movie choice broadcast out to all his friends on Facebook. And those friends would have no choice but to receive that movie message, along with an ad from Blockbuster.

At this point in reading the article, it seems as though participation in the ads (by the person being used in the ad) is fully consensual. But the article goes on to say:

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Reparations and Net Benefit

As reported in outlets like the National Law Journal, Connecticut professor Robert L. Birmingham has taken a leave of absence following a strange incident in which he apparently showed the class a racy video clip — complete with scantily clad strippers — as part of an in-class argument against reparations for slavery. Some commenters have suggested that this case raises potential questions of academic freedom. Let’s set aside those issues, to focus on the substance of Birmingham’s argument as reported in the NLJ.

The NLJ summarizes Birmingham’s argument as: “The sometimes controversial professor asked students to make a case for slavery reparations in light of the fact that much of Africa is beset by war, famine and AIDS.” Law.com later summarizes:

In an e-mail, one student in the remedies class characterized Birmingham’s classroom exercise as a “syllogistically perfect” argument that the students, try as they might, were not able to disprove in 15 minutes of discussion. The professor questioned whether reparations are logically due for American descendants of slaves, who generally enjoy a much better standard of living than modern West Africans whose ancestors were not enslaved,” the student wrote.

Of course, this basic argument isn’t limited to Birmingham, and is quite familiar to reparationists. It’s a point often raised by reparations critics like David Horowitz.

Is this really a syllogistically perfect (or otherwise convincing) argument against reparations for slavery?

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Public vs. Private: Funerals, Free Speech, and Privacy

grave2.jpgTimothy Zick recently blogged about a lawsuit by a parent of a deceased soldier against a fundamentalist religious group that protested near the funeral. The religious group has been protesting near several funerals for soldiers, and their message is particularly offensive: The group claims that the soldiers died as punishment for a society that permits homosexuality. Read Timothy’s post for more background about the case.

The verdict is now in. From the AP:

A grieving father won a nearly $11 million verdict Wednesday against a fundamentalist Kansas church that pickets military funerals out of a belief that the war in Iraq is a punishment for the nation’s tolerance of homosexuality.

Albert Snyder of York, Pa., sued the Westboro Baptist Church for unspecified damages after members demonstrated at the March 2006 funeral of his son, Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder, who was killed in Iraq.

The federal jury first awarded $2.9 million in compensatory damages. It returned in the afternoon with its decision to award $6 million in punitive damages for invasion of privacy and $2 million for causing emotional distress. . . .

Church members routinely picket funerals of military personnel killed in Iraq and Afghanistan, carrying signs such as “Thank God for dead soldiers” and “God hates fags.”

Snyder claimed the protests intruded upon what should have been a private ceremony and sullied his memory of the event.

While the amount of the verdict strikes me as far too excessive, I am pleased that the plaintiffs won (from what limited information I’ve read about the case). I would like to respond to Timothy Zick’s very thoughtful and compelling argument for why the speech of the protesters should win out over the interests of the family holding the funeral. Timothy argues:

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Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality

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Dan and I have just uploaded the final published version of our article, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality up on SSRN. The paper is in print in the latest volume of the Georgetown Law Journal and we’re both very excited it’s out. Our paper tells the story of how privacy and confidentiality law diverged in Britain and America after 1890, how they have begun to converge once again in recent years, and how the law of confidentiality holds great promise for American law as it continues to grapple with the problems of personal information. Here’s the abstract:

The familiar legend of privacy law holds that Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis invented the right to privacy in 1890, and that William Prosser aided its development by recognizing four privacy torts in 1960. In this article, Professors Richards and Solove contend that Warren, Brandeis, and Prosser did not invent privacy law, but took it down a new path. Well before 1890, a considerable body of Anglo-American law protected confidentiality, which safeguards the information people share with others. Warren, Brandeis, and later Prosser turned away from the law of confidentiality to create a new conception of privacy based on the individual’s inviolate personality. English law, however, rejected Warren and Brandeis’s conception of privacy and developed a conception of privacy as confidentiality from the same sources used by Warren and Brandeis. Today, in contrast to the individualistic conception of privacy in American law, the English law of confidence recognizes and enforces expectations of trust within relationships. Richards and Solove explore how and why privacy law developed so differently in America and England. Understanding the origins and developments of privacy law’s divergent paths reveals that each body of law’s conception of privacy has much to teach the other.

The Care/Profit Tradeoff in Nursing Homes

We’re often told that inequality helps keep the US economy efficient. Cut regulation and give high rewards to those at the top, and they’ll work hard to cut costs and compete on quality, providing better and cheaper goods and services for all. Private equity firms like Carlyle Group might be considered the apotheosis of such a market-based approach, taking over companies and forcing them to meet market imperatives.

Here’s a fascinating NYT study of their influence on the nursing home industry, which “compared investor-owned homes against national averages in multiple categories, including complaints received by regulators, health and safety violations cited by regulators, fines levied, [and] the performance of homes as reported in a national database known as the Minimum Data Set Repository.” The findings describe an extraordinary combination of business efficiency and deflection of legal responsibility:

The Times analysis shows that . . . managers at many . . . nursing homes acquired by large private investors have cut expenses and staff, sometimes below minimum legal requirements. Regulators say residents at these homes have suffered. At facilities owned by private investment firms, residents on average have fared more poorly than occupants of other homes in common problems like depression, loss of mobility and loss of ability to dress and bathe themselves, according to data collected by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The typical nursing home acquired by a large investment company before 2006 scored worse than national rates in 12 of 14 indicators that regulators use to track ailments of long-term residents.

The law plays an important role in preventing accountability here; “private investment companies have made it very difficult for plaintiffs to succeed in court and for regulators to levy chainwide fines by creating complex corporate structures that obscure who controls their nursing homes.” So perhaps the key “innovation” here was the decision to aggressively reduce care and skillfully deploy legal strategies to prevent any liability for injuries that reduced care caused. It certainly worked well for investors; “A prominent nursing home industry analyst, Steve Monroe, estimates that [one investment group’s] gains from [its sale of a nursing home chain] were more than $500 million in just four years.”

I have to confess that I’ve always wondered what business practices could “create the value” that’s resulted in such extraordinary gains at the top of the income scale. The Times has done us a great service by putting a human face on some of them. . . and on the legal strategies that make them possible.

Captured Product Safety Commission

nord.jpgAbout a year ago I heard a radio story about a new technology called SawStop, which is designed to prevent table saw injuries. Every year table saws cause “over 60,000 injuries, over 3,000 amputations, and $2 billion in injury-related costs.” SawStop petitioned the Consumer Products Safety Commission to issue new rules to encourage manufacturers to increase the safety of their saws. After years of lobbying, SawStop appeared to get the CPSC to agree…but then its chairman resigned:

[T]he CPSC staff recommended the petition be granted. On July 11, the commission voted, 2 to 1, to start the process of making a new rule, a job that can take years. [Sawstop’s founder and attorney] said they felt vindicated, although the rejoicing ended four days later when Stratton resigned from the agency. One of the remaining commissioners, Nancy A. Nord[pictured at right], wanted to defer action on the petition and instead look at voluntary efforts being made by the industry. . . . Julie Vallese , CPSC spokeswoman, said the saw-safety standard idea isn’t dead but that the agency’s “decision-making procedures” don’t allow the rulemaking to advance with what amounts to a deadlocked commission.

I was surprised by that story, but apparently gridlock and apathy are par for the course at the agency. For example, it has protected ATV manufacturers from regulation, despite the fact that in 2004 “44,000 children riding all terrain vehicles were injured . . . nearly 150 of them fatally.” Here’s one insider’s account of that decision:

[At a hearing on the matter,] John Gibson Mullan, the agency’s director of compliance and a former lawyer for the A.T.V. industry . . . [said that the] current system of warning labels and other voluntary safety standards was working, he said. “We would need to be very careful about making any changes.” Robin L. Ingle, then the agency’s hazard statistician and A.T.V. injury expert, was dumbfounded. Her months of research did not support Mr. Mullan’s analysis. Yet she would not get to offer a rebuttal. “He had hijacked the presentation,” [she said].

A bit more commentary below the fold. . . .

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Volokh on Blogs, Libel, and Insurance

Over at the VC, Eugene Volokh has a very thoughtful post about blogs, libel, and insurance. He notes: “It turns out that homeowner’s insurance policies, and possibly also some renter’s insurance policies, generally cover libel lawsuits.” The “policies generally don’t cover punitive damages, but they do cover both compensatory damages and litigation defense costs.” However, Volokh notes:

[T]hese policies generally explicitly exclude liability related to “business pursuits.” The exclusion and the definition of “business pursuits” may vary from policy to policy, so check yours (and again check both the homeowners’ insurance and your umbrella policy, if you have it). Still, I’m told that most policies just say “business pursuits,” and sometimes define them as referring to a “trade, occupation, or profession.”

If your blog is entirely noncommercial — you neither have ads nor solicit donations for a tip jar, and you don’t systematically use your blog as primarily promotion for your business — then you should be covered for libel lawsuits arising out of your blog posts, because the blogging wouldn’t be a business pursuit. (Possible exception: If your primary occupation is a professor or a journalist, then even noncommercial posting on topics related to your specialty may conceivably be seen as part of your main occupational “business pursuit”; I know of no precedents one way or the other about this.)

But if you make some money out of it, even a small amount, then in many states you probably won’t be covered.

Check out the entire post for useful advice on blogger liability issues.

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More on Identifying the TB Patient

I blogged the other day about the inappropriate disclosure of the TB patient’s identity. Over at Chronicles of Dissent, Dissent has an interesting post worth reading about the issue. He quotes Dr. Martin Cetron, Director of Division of Global Migration and Quarantine at CDC, who said: “I don’t think, publicly naming the individual, which we never do, has any advantage in [faciliating contacting individuals at risk of contracting TB from exposure to the patient], since this is not a disease that’s spread by casual interactions with the public.” Dissent writes:

Certainly by now, the patient has been portrayed in a generally unflattering light in the media — as someone who was only concerned about his own needs and desires and who gave little thought to the health of others. Less media attention has been paid to his statements that he was never ordered not to fly, that at the time he left the country, he had not been diagnosed with the dangerous treatment-resistant strain, and that after they contacted him in Europe to inform him, he felt the CDC did not move quickly enough to make arrangements for his safe travel back to the U.S. for treatment — so he made his own arrangements.

Check out the full post for more about the issue.

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Identifying the TB Patient

tb-patient2.jpgThe other day, I blogged about the TB patient who flew to Europe and back with the knowledge that he had a rare form of TB. The media had been reporting on the case for a while, and the man’s name was not identified until a day or two ago, when a number of stories began including his full name and photograph [one photo is included in this post; I have obscured his face], as well as the name and photographs of the woman he married (including photos from his wedding).

Although I find the man’s conduct to be irresponsible, I don’t think it was appropriate to identify him. I bet that revealing his name will result in threats and attempts at vigilantism, possibly putting him and his family at risk of harm. It will also severely hurt his reputation and perhaps even his career. Some might say that he deserves such consequences, but I believe that the most appropriate sanctions are legal, not extra-legal. I have blogged extensively about my thoughts about such community mob “justice” here.

Was it appropriate for the media to publish his name and photograph? The name and photograph of his wife? I am curious about how his name got leaked. If one of his physicians released it, or if a government official at the CDC or elsewhere released it, he might have a cause of action for breach of confidentiality or public disclosure of private facts.

UPDATE: Dissent (a commenter to my post) points to an AP story that provides an answer to how the man’s identity was revealed. According to the AP:

The tuberculosis patient under the first federal quarantine since 1963 is a 31-year-old personal injury attorney who practices law with his father in Atlanta, a federal law enforcement official said Thursday.

The official, who asked to remain anonymous because he was not authorized to talk about the case, identified the patient as [name]. A medical official in Atlanta also confirmed the patient’s name on condition of anonymity.

Barring facts I’m unaware of, such a disclosure by the government official seems improper and probably illegal. It might well be a violation of the TB patient’s constitutional right to information privacy. The confirmation of the patient’s identity by the medical offical in Atlanta would be a breach of confidentiality. It is surprising that these individuals disclosed the man’s name. They clearly knew better, as the federal official indicated he wasn’t supposed to speak about the case and the medical official requested anonymity. This strikes me as a willful disregard for the law, and I hope that these officials will be punished, let alone successfully sued by the TB patient.