In the fight over Proposition 8, social conservatives used arguments about religious freedom as a sword. Their most prominent arguments were spectacularly overstated. Some proponents of Prop 8 warned, for example, that recognition of gay marriage would lead to hate speech prosecutions of anti-gay pastors, and loss of tax exemption for churches that refused to host same-sex marriages. Though neither of these developments was remotely likely, some [...]]]> After approval of Proposition 8 in California last fall, who would have expected to find the movement for same-sex marriage and concern for religious freedom on common ground in the spring? As legislatures in Vermont and Connecticut have just demonstrated, however, a long-overdue reconciliation between claims of marriage equality and those of religious liberty is there for the taking.

In the fight over Proposition 8, social conservatives used arguments about religious freedom as a sword. Their most prominent arguments were spectacularly overstated. Some proponents of Prop 8 warned, for example, that recognition of gay marriage would lead to hate speech prosecutions of anti-gay pastors, and loss of tax exemption for churches that refused to host same-sex marriages. Though neither of these developments was remotely likely, some voters were apparently moved by these assertions to support Prop 8.

Very recently, however, same-sex marriage has gotten a tremendous boost. In early April, the Iowa Supreme Court and the Vermont legislature, acted in favor of same-sex marriage. On April 23, the Connecticut legislature did likewise. But Vermont and Connecticut, acting through the legislative process, took steps that are not open to courts in cases like that in Iowa. Both the Vermont and Connecticut legislatures acted to protect religious freedom as well as marriage equality. The recently enacted Vermont law recognizes the right of clergy to not preside over same-sex marriages; the right of religious organizations to refuse the use of their facilities to celebrate a same-sex marriage; and the right of fraternal benefit societies, such as the Knights of Columbus, to refuse to provide insurance benefits to same-sex partners of its members if the organization has religious scruples against doing so. The Connecticut law includes those three safeguards for religious liberty but goes farther still. It insulates religious organizations from liability for refusing to provide any goods or services when the request for such goods or services arises from a same-sex marriage – so, for example, a religiously affiliated college would not have to make its married student housing available to a married same-sex couple. And the Connecticut law exempts adoption and foster care services run by religious organizations from any obligation to serve same-sex couples, so long as these services are not government-funded. Thus, in Vermont and Connecticut, religious liberty became a shield for religious freedom against the intrusion of same-sex marriage on traditional religious values, not a sword to be used against all recognition of such marriages.

In light of the Vermont and Connecticut experience, religious conservatives and secular progressives now have the opportunity to reach political bargains with one another, where both sides agree to a regime of reciprocal accommodation and respect. And further political developments are in the works. Steve Schmidt, John McCain’s campaign strategist, is urging Republicans to stop opposing same-sex marriage. Same-sex marriage legislation is making progress in both Maine and New Hampshire; the proposals in both states, though still subject to potential gubernatorial vetoes, include religious liberty provisions.

Perhaps most prominently, Governor David Patterson has introduced a same-sex marriage bill in New York, which now offers a perfect laboratory in which to experiment. As of now, the only religious freedom recognized by Governor Patterson’s same-sex marriage proposal in New York is the right of clergy to not preside at such marriages. Those who champion the equalization of marriage in New York – where, unlike Connecticut, the courts have not ordered such a move — should be willing to agree to a set of carefully crafted guarantees, designed to ensure that equal-marriage measures do not pressure religious organizations to compromise their religious convictions about marriage and sexuality. A very strong candidate for inclusion on this list in New York would be the exemption for religious organizations engaged in adoption or foster care placement, but unwilling to make such placements with same-sex couples. Three years ago, in Massachusetts, Catholic Charities surrendered its license as an adoption agency over precisely this issue. New York (and other states, like Maine and New Jersey, also actively considering the same-sex marriage question) can be wiser than Massachusetts. Such an exemption would in no way imperil foster placements or adoption placements with same-sex couples, whose interests can be served by a wide variety of agencies, secular and religious. But the exemption may help persuade Catholics and others to accept state recognition of same-sex marriages, because state law would explicitly guarantee the freedom of each faith community to promote its own vision of marriage and family.

One sort of provision that should not be included in any such bill is the recognition of for-profit business owners, such as photographers, caterers, and others in the wedding trade, to be exempt on religious grounds from laws protecting those in same-sex marriages from discrimination. Only in the rare and special case of abortion – where some see human life at stake — does American law recognize the right of service providers, otherwise subject to non-discrimination laws, to refuse service on religious grounds. A religious exemption for business people in the marriage context – or, for that matter, a religious exemption for clerks asked to issue marriage licenses, which the New Hampshire law now contains – would represent a slap in the face to same-sex couples, and would be impossible to administer. How could decision-makers ever determine with confidence whether an individual claiming such an exemption was acting from sincere religious conscience, or visceral discomfort over proximity to a same-sex union?

Whatever concessions might be appropriately made to religious liberty, social conservatives cannot expect to get them for nothing. They should promise to support repeal of the federal “Defense of Marriage Act,” which blocks federal recognition of same-sex marriages. Moreover, conservatives should also promise to stop opposing same-sex marriage in states that choose to recognize such marriages. Neither side can be expected to act if the other does not.

In the wake of the bitterness in California, the Iowa ruling, the new laws in Connecticut and Vermont, and the proposed legislation in New Hampshire, Maine, and New York, the conflict between religious freedom and same-sex marriage is now squarely on the political table. For those who equate compromise with the fatal loss of fund-raising from those at the polar extremes, this political transaction will have no appeal. But if either side in the culture wars truly seeks all quiet on this Western front, the Vermont and Connecticut legislative precedents are very fresh, New Hampshire and Maine are in play, and New York represents a highly prominent stage on which to build further.

In a series of cases stretching from Reynolds v. United States (1878) to Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Supreme Court has ruled that when the personal imperatives of one’s religion or morality lead to actions in violation of generally applicable laws ­ laws not promulgated with the intention of affronting anyone’s conscience ­ the violations will not be allowed and will certainly not [...]]]> Over at the NYT’s Think Again blog Stanley Fish has a post on the Obama Administration’s contemplated reversal of the so-called conscience clause, which allows medical professionals to refuse to provide otherwise legal procedure when they have religious objections. Fish presents the issue as pitting the demands of a neutrally applicable law against the demands of personal conscience. He writes:

In a series of cases stretching from Reynolds v. United States (1878) to Employment Division v. Smith (1990), the Supreme Court has ruled that when the personal imperatives of one’s religion or morality lead to actions in violation of generally applicable laws ­ laws not promulgated with the intention of affronting anyone’s conscience ­ the violations will not be allowed and will certainly not be celebrated; for, says the court in Reynolds, “To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.”

Of course Fish doesn’t quite get the law right. While he is correct that generally claims that the constitution requires the exemption of religious believers from neutrally applicable laws has been a loser in court, the Justices have also been quite clear of late that despite this hostility, it is fine for law makers to create such exemptions as a matter of non-constitutional law. This is my understanding what the Bush Administration did. No matter. We don’t read Fish for the constitutional law anyway. Far more interesting is his connection of the debate to the broader issue of religion in a liberal democracy:

But should patients be asked to add to the problems they already have the problem of having to figure out (if they have the time) which providers will be willing to treat them? When a professional hangs out his shingle doesn’t he offer his services and skills to the public and not just to members of it who share his morality? Isn’t it a matter of conscience (in Hobbes’s sense) to abide by the rules that define the profession you’ve signed up for?

The force of these questions depends on assumptions the proponents of the conscience clause do not share, chiefly the assumption that obligations vary with different contexts and that one can (and should) relax the obligations of faith when one is not in church. This sequestering of religion in a private space is a cornerstone of enlightenment liberalism which only works as a political system if everyone agrees to comport himself or herself as a citizen and not as a sectarian, at least for the purposes of public transactions.

Now for the record, I support the conscience clause. Provided that there are competitive markets that can provide legal services to those that demand them, I am not particularly outraged about the claims of this or that person’s conscience. There are, it seems to me, two ways of situating my position within the liberal framework that Fish alludes to. The first is to situate the marketplace within the private sphere where Fish thinks that religion may still legitimately make its claims. The second is to suggest that while there is a kind of public citizenship of the market place, it is different than the political citizenship upon which Fish models his liberalism.

The first approach is essentially that taken by market-oriented libertarians and is likely the most common response. The second approach, however, strikes me as much more interesting. It suggests that the market ought to be understood as a kind of intermediate public space between the political agora and the privacy of the household, a public space where liberal norms are important but not all important. I suspect that even the most ardent privatizers of religion would not want to insist that all the norms of political liberalism apply to the marketplace. Consider, for example, the question of consumption. I assume that no one objects to the orthodox Jew who patronizes only kosher butcher shops, even those who would argue that it would violate the ideals of liberal citizenship for the same orthodox Jew to refuse to vote for a Christian candidate. In other words, religion may be a criterion for butcher shops in a way that it ought not to be a criterion for political candidates. This suggests, however, that the separation of church and market is not as absolute as the separation of church and state.

Notice that in order to get his argument off the ground, Fish appeals to two extra concepts to work up the outrage against the non-comforming doctors. The first is consent — they signed up for the rules of profession. Of course, the problem with this kind of consent argument is that it would justify ANY set of rules that were announced ex ante. Don’t like them, don’t sign up for that particular activity. The second is the idea of a profession, that as a doctor one has a set of special obligations. The irony here, of course, is that there is a sense in which invoking the notion of a profession runs counter to precisely the ideal of equal citizenship that Fish invokes. To be a professional is to have certain non-disclaimable duties by virtue of one’s status. Another way of putting this is that the appeal to the profession is in a sense a negation of equal citizenship. Their duties are different than ours because they are different kinds of people. I would assume, however, that Fish would not see liberalism as requiring that doctors have a different set of political rights and duties, say an obligation not to vote in elections or to refrain from political speech. In the political agora they ought to be treated just like everyone else. Here liberalism abhors the notion of status.

The real problem, of course, is that we have a set of political philosophies that center on the state. The result is that they have a hard time telling us a great deal about the market, which must always operate by analogy to something — the state or the household — about which the philosophers have thought. There are, however, more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in liberal philosophy.

I have been thinking a lot about polygamy lately. As I prepare to teach Family Law once again, I am confronted with polygamy everywhere I turn. First, the third season of Big Love, the HBO series about a Utah entrepreneur struggling to support and “satisfy” his three wives and eight children, begins next week. Second, last April, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed 468 children from their homes in a polygamous ranch. Although the Texas Supreme Court ordered the children’s return to their parents after finding no immediate danger warranting emergency removal, child protective services has continued its investigation in [...]]]> Thanks to Concurring Opinions for inviting me back to blog this month. I look forward to your comments.

I have been thinking a lot about polygamy lately. As I prepare to teach Family Law once again, I am confronted with polygamy everywhere I turn. First, the third season of Big Love, the HBO series about a Utah entrepreneur struggling to support and “satisfy” his three wives and eight children, begins next week. Second, last April, the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed 468 children from their homes in a polygamous ranch. Although the Texas Supreme Court ordered the children’s return to their parents after finding no immediate danger warranting emergency removal, child protective services has continued its investigation in a handful of cases. Third, I have been following Professor Angela Campbell’s research on the polygamous community of Bountiful in British Columbia, which has challenged some of my assumptions about polygamous wives. Finally, I recently learned that polygamy is practiced in the U.S., not only by members of a fundamentalist Mormon sect in Utah, Arizona, and Texas, but also by Black Muslims and African immigrants in New York and Philadelphia. This brings me to the question I would like to raise: What exactly is wrong with polygamy? I will discuss some frequently made arguments and look forward to reading yours.

Polygamy is illegal in all 50 states. Yet, it is estimated that 50,000 to 100,000 men, women, and children live in polygamous households in the U.S. Most polygamists do not enter into plural marriages for purely personal reasons, but rather are guided by religious beliefs. Members of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (which broke with the Mormon church in 1890 when the latter disavowed polygamy) believe that only men who have at least three wives will enter the highest level of heaven and that women can only get to heaven if their husbands take them there. The United States Supreme Court, in Reynolds v. United States , rejected claims of religious freedom under the First Amendment to practice polygamy.

Many Americans believe that polygamy is morally wrong, but this view is not universal. Polygamy is legal and widely practiced in many countries in Africa and the Middle East and Islamic law allows a man to have up to four wives so long as he treats them equally. So why are most Americans vehemently opposed to polygamy?

Some people oppose polygamy because they are concerned about the potential for sexual abuse of young girls. Admittedly, some girls entering polygamous unions are too young for marriage (or sexual relationships). Some of the girls who lived in the polygamous ranch in the Texas case discussed above had become pregnant in their early teens. The husbands are often much older, men in their 50s and 60s, or older. Undeniably, many of these “spiritual marriages” are not consensual unions, but sexual abuse (rape) of a minor.

However, polygamy and sexual abuse of young girls do not necessarily go hand in hand. Every state has laws protecting minors from sexual abuse. States can prosecute child predators while allowing consenting adults to enter into polygamous relationships without fear of criminal prosecution. For example, law enforcement agencies in Utah and Arizona have chosen to focus on crimes within polygamous communities such as child abuse and domestic violence rather than polygamy itself.

Sexual abuse is clearly a problem in at least some polygamous communities. However, some adult women freely choose plural marriage. For example, Anne Wilde, a graduate of Brigham Young University and co-author of Voices in Harmony: Contemporary Women Celebrate Plural Marriage, freely chose plural marriage for 33 years until her husband’s death. Should women like Anne Wilde be able to enter into a polygamous marriage without fear of prosecution?

This question raises a second concern. Even if some adult women freely choose plural marriage, does polygamy harm all women? Arguably, polygamy violates the principle of gender equality. Although the term “polygamy” includes marriage to more than one man, such marriages are very rare; almost all polygamous societies practice only polygyny—marriage to more than one woman. Further, most plural wives have no legal protection during or after the marriage. The reason is that most polygamist men have one legal wife and the subsequent wives are “spiritual wives” – they are not legally married. When a spiritual marriage ends before the husband’s death, a spiritual wife has no claim to spousal support or equitable distribution of marital property. Spiritual wives are also not entitled to an intestate or elective share of the husband’s estate, or any of the legal benefits of marriage, including Social Security survivor benefits. While legal recognition of polygamous marriages might remedy these inequities, under current law, polygamist men who are unjustly enriched by their wives’ contributions to the marriage have no legal duty to provide anything in return.

Opponents of plural marriage argue that exposure to polygamy is harmful to children. Texas officials believed that the “culture of polygamy” in the compound was such a threat to the children’s health that immediate removal was necessary. Although the Texas Supreme Court found no evidence to warrant removal, in 1955, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a similar raid on a polygamous community, finding that a polygamous home was an “immoral environment for the rearing of children.” However, some adults raised in polygamous households recall their childhood fondly. One woman who grew up with seven mothers and 60 siblings told the Salt Lake Tribune: “I’ve always considered that I had a fairy-tale childhood . . . I had more close friends and family than most people have acquaintances. It was warm and supportive. You knew you were loved.” Few adults recall their childhood, whether polygamous or not, quite so fondly. However, according to the ABA Journal , many of the attorneys who represented the children in the Texas case thought that the children’s mothers “seemed like great parents . . . Their children were noticeably well-behaved . . . and quite playful.” It is worth noting that the children repeatedly asked to go back home to the polygamous ranch.

We cannot assume that children reared in polygamous households are necessarily worse off than children reared in one or two parent homes. In fact, in recent years, the Utah Supreme Court seems to have changed its opinion that a polygamous home is an “immoral environment for the rearing of children,” and has held that the practice of polygamy does not make a person unfit to serve as a custodial or adoptive parent. In other words, in a custody dispute between a parent who practices polygamy and one that does not, it might be in a child’s best interest to reside with the polygamist parent.

Finally, I would like to return to the argument that polygamy is immoral. Although many Americans hold this view, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the majority’s belief that certain conduct is immoral does not mean that it “may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operations of criminal law” and Massachusetts and Connecticut allow same-sex marriage despite many individuals’ beliefs that such marriages are immoral. This brings me back to my original question: If there is no evidence that polygamy per se harms children, why shouldn’t consenting adults be allowed to enter into polygamous relationships?

This Saturday, I’m in Washington, at a conference I helped organize at American University, on Exploring the Intersections of Religion and Governance: Past, Present, and Future.

Over the course of the day yesterday, and continuing today, the discussion has explored historical and comparative perspectives on the relationship of religion and governance, the relevance of religious communities to the pursuit of social and economic development, intersections of religious belief with the regulation of both climate change and corruption, and even the religious dimensions of intellectual property law. Speakers have included Arash Abizadeh, Abduh An-Na’im, Jeremy Gunn, David Hunter, and Layli Miller-Muro. All told – in my admittedly biased assessment – a [...]]]> I write with the latest in my series: “It’s Saturday, so I must be in…”

This Saturday, I’m in Washington, at a conference I helped organize at American University, on Exploring the Intersections of Religion and Governance: Past, Present, and Future.

Over the course of the day yesterday, and continuing today, the discussion has explored historical and comparative perspectives on the relationship of religion and governance, the relevance of religious communities to the pursuit of social and economic development, intersections of religious belief with the regulation of both climate change and corruption, and even the religious dimensions of intellectual property law. Speakers have included Arash Abizadeh, Abduh An-Na’im, Jeremy Gunn, David Hunter, and Layli Miller-Muro. All told – in my admittedly biased assessment – a fasinating conference!

Anyway, for those who may be interested in questions of law and religion, the conference is being webcast, and will also be available in video format for viewing/downloading later this coming week, at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/video.cfm.

Take a close look at this sandal from John Galliano’s runway show for Christian Dior. The carved statuette that forms the heel is reportedly a Masai fertility symbol.

Even setting aside the awkward juxtaposition of a curvy, pregnant woman with teenage fashion models so thin that they may not even be capable of conceiving (a legal issue for [...]]]> Many thanks for the invitation to join you all in blogging at Concurring Opinions! During my visit I’m looking forward to writing about things that are not necessarily part of my law-and-fashion beat over at Counterfeit Chic, but to start off I can’t resist sharing an image from Paris Fashion Week that touches upon – or, rather, walks all over – both fashion and cultural property.

Take a close look at this sandal from John Galliano’s runway show for Christian Dior. The carved statuette that forms the heel is reportedly a Masai fertility symbol.

Even setting aside the awkward juxtaposition of a curvy, pregnant woman with teenage fashion models so thin that they may not even be capable of conceiving (a legal issue for another day), the colonialist image is a disturbing one. Galliano, like many other Western designers, is known to “ransack the world’s closets for inspiration,” as I put it in my first book. Many of the resulting cultural hybrids (to use Naomi Mezey’s term) are extraordinarily beautiful expressions of human creativity that few would wish out of existence, even if greater norms of attribution to source communities should be developed and encouraged. Some uses of others’ cultural products, however, are simply inappropriate. Placing an African religious symbol literally under the heels of predominantly white women on a European runway is one such offensive use. Selling those same shoes to wealthy women around the globe is another.

I’m reminded of an Australian case that I’ve written about and taught, along with Christine Haight Farley and a number of other scholars. Milpurrurru v. Indofurn Pty. Ltd., (1994) F.C.R. 240, involved a rug merchant who appropriated a series of sacred Aboriginal images for his carpets. It happened that in this case the theft was so literal that copyright law provided a remedy. But what about damages for the desecration of the sacred images that had been trodden underfoot? Or the fact that, lengthy as copyright terms are, religious beliefs are likely to outlast them? Or the potential appropriation of religious images that are not the work of a specific living artist but are instead iconic forms, repeated and passed down over time?

To be fair, maybe the admittedly brilliant Galliano or the august fashion house for which he designs consulted authorized Masai representatives and female elders, who freely and without the pressure of economic or other coercion licensed the use of the fertility figure. It could even be their gift to the reproductively challenged pale populations to their north. But I doubt it.

Perhaps the most peaceful resolution of an issue like this one is a demand for mutual inquiry and respect, rather than protective legislation. Moreover, bearing in mind the violent response to Danish editorial cartoons of Mohammed several years ago and the resulting tension between religious demands and freedom of speech, any such legislation would require extraordinarily careful drafting. But if the cultural “owners” of this fertility symbol object to its commercialization, there should be some forum for their concern.

In a nutshell, there is a lot of money sloshing around the Islamic world. 20 percent of the world’s population is Muslim and at least part of the population sits atop oil fields that churn out an enormous amount of cash every day. What is an observant Muslim, one who cares about [...]]]> Generally speaking, when Americans hear about shar’ia it conjures up images of bearded and turbaned Taliban executioners gleefully stoning women to death in an Afghan soccer stadium. It is an unfair stereotype of a great legal tradition, and it is also one that misses some of the most important issues that shar’ia raises for the modern world. As usual, if you want to find the real action follow the money.

In a nutshell, there is a lot of money sloshing around the Islamic world. 20 percent of the world’s population is Muslim and at least part of the population sits atop oil fields that churn out an enormous amount of cash every day. What is an observant Muslim, one who cares about Islamic strictures against usury to do? Islamic law forbids the taking of interest, but certain transactional structures that allow some return in exchange for tying up capital are allowed. For example, a straight out purchase-money loan with interest secured by a mortgage on a the purchased house would violate Islamic injunctions against usury. On the other hand, if the bank buys the house, leases it to the resident for a period of years, followed by the resident’s purchase of the house at the expiration of the lease for a nominal sum, it does not violate the injunction. The game in Islamic finance is to come up with ways of structuring transactions so as to generate an attractive rate of return for investors without running afoul of the strictures of shar’ia. The result has been a cottage industry of banks and lawyers experimenting with various transactional structures and then rushing to find a reputable Islamic legal scholar willing to issue a fatwah validating the deal for Muslim investors.

The Economist just put up a rather good briefing article detailing some of the growing pains that the industry is facing. At least part of this problem is legal. To give one example that interests me, UCC 9-109 states that the Article 9 governs “a transaction, regardless of form, that creates a security interest in personal property . . . by contract.” The rule is aimed at precisely the kind of sale-and-lease-back transactions that are used in Islamic finance, a transactional gimmick that has also been tried as a way of avoiding the strictures of the UCC. The result of the rule, however, is that despite their best efforts parties may be forced, legally speaking, into an interest bearing loan. There is also the simple problem of complexity and the associated transaction costs. Still, according to the Economist:

None of these tensions need derail the growth of Islamic finance just yet. There is plenty of demand, whether from oil-rich investors, the faithful Muslim minorities in Western countries or the emerging middle classes in Muslim ones. There is lots of supply, in the form of infrastructure projects that need to be financed, Western borrowers looking for capital and ambitious rulers eager to set up their own Islamic-finance hubs. The industry is innovative; new products keep expanding the range of shar’ia-compliant instruments. And as in conventional finance, the economics of the Islamic kind improve as it gains scale.

If they are right, then Islamic finance is likely to be the real face of shar’ia in the modern world. In 2007, for example, over 150 new Sukuk (essentially a form shar’ia compliant bond) funds were launched with a value of nearly $50 billion. Given the less than inspiring ethical performance of certain aspects of the American lending market of late, a dose of financial puritanism from the desert might not be such a bad thing.

(Image source: Wikipedia)

Heaven, one of the tenderest verses in the Bible has it, is where God will wipe away all tears from our faces. In her novel “Gilead,” Marilynne Robinson adds, in a line just as tender, if a little sterner, “It takes [...]]]> James Woods’ essay on the problem of evil in the New Yorker is an illuminating reflection on the question of how an omnipotent and benevolent God can permit suffering. The essay gives us a sense of how everyday legal categories of restitution and responsibility inform theology (and perhaps should humble lawyers into recognizing how much their own categories owe to religious thought). Though there’s much to commend in the essay, I found his closing assessment of Marilynne Robinson’s novel Gilead most interesting:

Heaven, one of the tenderest verses in the Bible has it, is where God will wipe away all tears from our faces. In her novel “Gilead,” Marilynne Robinson adds, in a line just as tender, if a little sterner, “It takes nothing from the loveliness of the verse to say that is exactly what will be required.” Robinson, herself a devout Protestant, means that the immense surge of human suffering in the world will need, and deserves, a great deal of heavenly love and repair; it is as close as her novel comes to righteous complaint. But one could also say, more skeptically, that Christianity needs the concept of Heaven simply to make sense of all the world’s suffering—that, theologically speaking, Heaven is “exactly what will be required.” In the end, Heaven, it seems, is the only tenable response to the problem of evil. It is where God’s mysterious plan will be revealed; it is where the poor and the downtrodden, the sick and the tortured, will be healed; it is where everything that we went through on earth will suddenly seem “worth it.”

But Heaven is also a problem for theodicists who take the freedom to choose between good and evil as paramount. For Heaven must be a place where either our freedom to sin has been abolished or we have been so transfigured that we no longer want to sin: in Heaven, our will miraculously coincides with God’s will. And here the free-will defense unravels, and is unravelled by the very idea of Heaven. If Heaven obviates the great human freedom to sin, why was it ever such a momentous ideal on earth, “worth” all that pain and suffering?

The difficulty can be recast in terms of the continuity of the self. If we will be so differently constituted in Heaven as to be strangers to sin, then no meaningful connection will exist between the person who suffers here and the exalted soul who will enjoy the great system of rewards and promises and tears wiped from faces: our faces there will not be the faces we have here. And, if there were to be real continuity between our earthly selves and our heavenly ones, then Heaven might dangerously begin to resemble earth.

I really enjoyed the novel Gilead, and if I recall it correctly, I think one passage responds to Wood’s concern. The narrator of the novel (a preacher), having heard that “95 percent of Americans believe in God” (from a 1948 Ladies Home Journal poll), looks over at his cat, stretching in the sun, and mentions offhand that the cat’s sense of the events surrounding it may be analogized to humans’ capacity to comprehend the infinite:

The oddness of the phrase “believe in God” brings to my mind that first chapter of Feuerbach, which is really about the awkwardness of language, not about religion at all. Feuerbach doesn’t imagine the possibility of an existence beyond this one, by which I mean a reality embracing this one but exceeding it, the way, for example, this world embraces and exceeds Soapy’s [the cat's] understanding of it. Soapy might be a victim of ideological conflict right along with the rest of us, if things get out of hand. She would no doubt make some feline appraisal of the situation, which would have nothing to do with the Dictatorship of the Proletariat or the Manhattan Project. The inadequacy of her concepts would have nothing to do with the reality of the situation. . . . [In a similar way,] our human circumstance creates in us a radically limited and peculiar notion of what existence is. (143)

Part of the charm of Robinson’s novel is the way in which the philosophical narrator tends to undermine himself; shortly after this passage he notes that “my interest in abstractions, which could have been forgiven first on grounds of youth and then on grounds of eccentricity, is now being forgiven on grounds of senility.”

But the point about the limits of our knowledge struck me again as I read two recent books on humanity’s response to mortality (Muriel Gillick’s The Denial of Aging and Avishai Margalit’s Ethics of Memory). Echoing Becker’s Denial of Death, Gillick discusses (and dismisses) the biotech heaven of eternal organ replacement that’s becoming an increasingly popular form of secular eschatology. Margalit combines an eclectic array of moral and aesthetic value judgments to argue for efforts to remember (and not merely transcend) the past. Both authors echo Robinson’s undertone of reconciliation with the human condition–an attitude incompatible with the table-pounding demands made by the book Wood reviews (Bart D. Ehrman’s God’s Problem: How the Bible Fails to Answer Our Most Important Question—Why We Suffer). In an eloquent bit of theodicy of his own, Robinson’s aged narrator notes:

Theologians talk about a prevenient grace that precedes grace itself and allows us to accept it. I think there must also be a prevenient courage that allows us to be brave–that is, to acknowledge that there is more beauty than our eyes can bear, that precious things have been put into our hands and to do nothing to honor them is to do great harm. . . . What have I to leave you but the ruins of old courage, and the lore of old gallantry and hope? Well, as I have said, it is all an ember now, and the good Lord will someday breathe it into flame again.

Amen.

Art Credit: Photo of Piotr Uklanski’s Untitled (Thing) (2007), from the exhibit “God and Goods: Spirituality and Mass Confusion.”

A number of American religious denominations – Quakers, Baptists, Mormons, and others – have tried with varying degrees of success to opt out of the secular legal system, resolving civil litigation between church members in church courts. Using the story of the rise and fall of the jurisdiction of Mormon courts over ordinary civil disputes, this article provides three key insights into the interaction between law and religion in nineteenth-century America. First, it dramatically illustrates the fluidity of the boundaries between law and religion early [...]]]> I have put up a couple of posts here on my on-going research on the resolution of civil disputes in ecclesiastical courts.The full version of my research is now up on SSRN for those interested. Here is the abstract:

A number of American religious denominations – Quakers, Baptists, Mormons, and others – have tried with varying degrees of success to opt out of the secular legal system, resolving civil litigation between church members in church courts. Using the story of the rise and fall of the jurisdiction of Mormon courts over ordinary civil disputes, this article provides three key insights into the interaction between law and religion in nineteenth-century America. First, it dramatically illustrates the fluidity of the boundaries between law and religion early in the century and the hardening of those boundaries by its end. The Mormon courts initially arose in a context in which the professional bar had yet to establish a monopoly over adjudication. By century’s end, however, the increasing complexity of the legal environment hardened the boundaries around the legal profession’s claimed monopoly over adjudication. Second, the decline of the Mormon courts shows how allegiance to the common-law courts became a prerequisite of assimilation into the American mainstream. While hostility to the secular courts had been a hallmark of a major stream of American Protestantism during the colonial period and the first decades of the Republic, by the end of the nineteenth century, Mormons’ rejection of those courts marked them off as dangerous outsiders. Part of the price of their acceptance into the national mainstream was the abandonment of legal distinctiveness. Finally, the story of the Mormon courts also illustrates the importance of law for the development of religious beliefs and practices. Other scholars have documented the “public law” side of this story, showing how the federal government’s effort to eradicate Mormon polygamy was central to Mormon experience in the last half of the nineteenth century and ultimately forced a revolution in Mormon beliefs and practices. The rise and fall of the Mormon court system, however, shows that private law could exercise no less of a power over the religious imagination.

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1) The Vatican’s increasing environmental awareness was manifest in the Pope’s midnight mass today, when Benedict XVI lamented “the abuse of energy and its selfish and reckless exploitation.” An eschatological awareness can help us better value a future too easily diminished by standard economic discounting methods.

2) On the [...]]]> It’s always difficult to know exactly how to observe a holiday like Christmas on a blog like this. On the one hand, norms of “public reason” tend toward the neutrality of a “happy holidays” approach. On the other hand, I do celebrate Christmas and have a sense that at least some dimensions of Christianity’s aesthetic and ethical appeal are universal. So I’ll make a brief note of three of that come to mind.

1) The Vatican’s increasing environmental awareness was manifest in the Pope’s midnight mass today, when Benedict XVI lamented “the abuse of energy and its selfish and reckless exploitation.” An eschatological awareness can help us better value a future too easily diminished by standard economic discounting methods.

2) On the aesthetic side, I would trade all the department store carols in the world for a few minutes of Bach’s Christmas Oratorio. This podcast organized by the extraordinary Christopher Lydon is a great introduction to Bach’s music.

3) Finally, the recently published papal encyclical Spes Salvi has a number of illuminating insights, particularly on the relationship between technology and values:

Science can contribute greatly to making the world and mankind more human. Yet it can also destroy mankind and the world unless it is steered by forces that lie outside it.

**

In the twentieth century, Theodor W. Adorno formulated the problem of faith in progress quite drastically: he said that progress, seen accurately, is progress from the sling to the atom bomb. Now this is certainly an aspect of progress that must not be concealed. To put it another way: the ambiguity of progress becomes evident. Without doubt, it offers new possibilities for good, but it also opens up appalling possibilities for evil—possibilities that formerly did not exist. We have all witnessed the way in which progress, in the wrong hands, can become and has indeed become a terrifying progress in evil. If technical progress is not matched by corresponding progress in man’s ethical formation, in man’s inner growth . . . then it is not progress at all, but a threat for man and for the world.

In words that call to mind Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, the Pope notes that any overarching “technical” solution to human conflict should always be suspect:

Anyone who promises the better world that is guaranteed to last for ever is making a false promise; he is overlooking human freedom. Freedom must constantly be won over for the cause of good. Free assent to the good never exists simply by itself. If there were structures which could irrevocably guarantee a determined—good—state of the world, man’s freedom would be denied, and hence they would not be good structures at all.

***

It is when we attempt to avoid suffering by withdrawing from anything that might involve hurt, when we try to spare ourselves the effort and pain of pursuing truth, love, and goodness, that we drift into a life of emptiness, in which there may be almost no pain, but the dark sensation of meaninglessness and abandonment is all the greater.

These may seem rather dark ideas for an encyclical on hope. But an idea of redemption is a common thread throughout the document; “It is not science that redeems man: man is redeemed by love.” Here is to hoping that “progress in man’s ethical formation” can begin approaching our technical prowess in 2008.

Sometimes it is hard to know exactly where one’s contribution will do the most good. Over the past three years I have found many good causes through Global Giving, a group now sponsoring a Giving Challenge. Here are some causes I found compelling enough to give to:

–Safe [...]]]> By the way, I don’t want to sound (from my last post) as if I am against all charity. I’m very concerned about the plight of those in LDC’s, and I’ve argued that charitable giving should be something of a moral requirement for many of us in the developed world. As this extraordinary program from Krista Tippett’s Speaking of Faith shows, charitable giving can help us find a true “moral balance” of sharing, saving, and spending.

Sometimes it is hard to know exactly where one’s contribution will do the most good. Over the past three years I have found many good causes through Global Giving, a group now sponsoring a Giving Challenge. Here are some causes I found compelling enough to give to:

–Safe Water and Latrines for Bangladeshi Slum

–Clean Water for DEPDC’s Underprivileged Children

–Help Feed 200 Neglected Elderly in Guatemala

I’m also happy to report that GG’s president, Mari Kuraishi, recently gave a talk at a conference devoted to figuring out the best ways of assessing the reputation and value of various online entities–including charities. As efforts like these improve, questions about the accountability of charities will become less nagging.

Grassley wanted to know how Kenneth Copeland–who as a church leader pays no taxes but is expected to plow revenue back into the public welfare–got a private plane and whether flights to Hawaii and Fiji qualified as business trips. Grassley sought credit card receipts and the numbers of the church’s offshore bank accounts.

The conflict raises some interesting theological questions–for example, what if the religious group sincerely believes that its leaders deserve extraordinary opulence? What if their high spending is not a diversion of resources, but instead is the very point of the religion? As I’m mentioned before regarding [...]]]> Recently Republican Senator Charles Grassley has begun to investigate “six televangelists who are part of an evangelical subculture known loosely as Prosperity gospel.” For example,

Grassley wanted to know how Kenneth Copeland–who as a church leader pays no taxes but is expected to plow revenue back into the public welfare–got a private plane and whether flights to Hawaii and Fiji qualified as business trips. Grassley sought credit card receipts and the numbers of the church’s offshore bank accounts.

The conflict raises some interesting theological questions–for example, what if the religious group sincerely believes that its leaders deserve extraordinary opulence? What if their high spending is not a diversion of resources, but instead is the very point of the religion? As I’m mentioned before regarding The Secret, wealth worship may be working its way into the DNA of American culture. Consider this conflict between Grassley and the Prosperity gospel crowd:

Prosperity adherents believe the right thoughts and speech, along with giving to the church, will prompt divine repayment in this life, with a return as high as $100 on each dollar handed up. On a small scale, Prosperity’s positive thinking has sometimes energized the march of the poor into the middle class, but many Christians find it theologically and ethically perverse. Prosperity dominates American religious TV, and millions of adherents send millions of dollars to preachers they have never met. For Grassley, this might be fine if the ministers put all the money back into their mission work. But his now famous question about Meyer’s $23,000 commode suggests he questions the destination of her estimated $124 million annual take.

I think the answer has to be that the Prosperity Gospel crowd is itself distorting and ignoring Christian doctrine–even if such an indictment sets up the state as a more authoritative interpreter of the Bible in this case than those it would prosecute.

One need only a passing acquaintance with the Bible to understand that egalitarianism and concern for the poor are two of its central themes. The story of the “widow’s mite” says volumes, and as Proverbs 16:8 puts it, “Better is a little with righteousness, than great revenues without right.” Matthew 19:23-24 also comments on how difficult it is for the rich to enter the Kingdom of God.

I think there is one final lesson in this controversy for those who would criticize others for holding “strange” or “exotic” religious beliefs. As inequality skyrockets, the “Prosperity Gospel” may be the most natural and obvious creed one could opt for in today’s America. But perhaps we should religious ethics in part to the extent to which they are in tension with the prevailing norms of our commercial society. As much of the collection Preach Liberty suggests, religion can provide moral balance in the present age.

Photo Credit: Micreon.

So, Lawrence O’Donnell seems to have an interesting set of beliefs about Mormons and Romney. His discussion is a little disjointed, but as far as I can tell from his interview, his Hewitt interview, and his Huffington Post column, his beliefs can basically be distilled into some major ideas. For example:

1. Early Mormon leaders said some strange things.

2. All of those strange things play an important role in Mormonism today.

3. There are no moderate Mormons. All Mormons fervently believe everything that any prior church leader has ever said, and they accord those statements a very high priority.

3a. Mitt Romney is not a moderate Mormon. (This follows naturally from [...]]]> He can’t say he wasn’t warned about the strudel, either.

So, Lawrence O’Donnell seems to have an interesting set of beliefs about Mormons and Romney. His discussion is a little disjointed, but as far as I can tell from his interview, his Hewitt interview, and his Huffington Post column, his beliefs can basically be distilled into some major ideas. For example:

1. Early Mormon leaders said some strange things.

2. All of those strange things play an important role in Mormonism today.

3. There are no moderate Mormons. All Mormons fervently believe everything that any prior church leader has ever said, and they accord those statements a very high priority.

3a. Mitt Romney is not a moderate Mormon. (This follows naturally from “there are no moderate Mormons”).

4. Therefore, Mitt Romney’s worldview is closely linked to any strange thing Brigham Young may have said 150 years ago.

5. Romney’s refusal to state this (and to discuss Mormon theology and/or history in detail) makes him a liar.

Let’s look at a few of these ideas.

First, O’Donnell points out that early church leaders said some problematic things. And of course, he’s right. For instance, Brigham Young spoke publicly on a few occasions against interracial marriage. O’Donnell cites to one of these, a sermon where Brigham Young states, “Shall I tell you the law of God in regard to the African race? If the white man who belongs to the chosen seed mixes his blood with the seed of Cain, the penalty, under the law of God, is death on the spot.” Yep, that’s a pretty awful thing to say.

Of course, it’s not really that surprising of a statement, coming from a mid-19th-century white person. Unfortunately, these kinds of views were rather mainstream at the time. Most contemporaneous whites believed that interracial marriage was wrong. Really! Quick quiz: Which 19th-century figure said this about interracial marriage?

I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black races, that I am not, nor ever have been, in favor of making voters or jurors of negroes, nor of qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry with white people; and I will say in addition to this that there is a physical difference between the white and black races which I believe will forever forbid the two races living together on terms of social and political equality. And inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain together there must be the position of superior and inferior, and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the superior position assigned to the white race.

That would be Abraham Lincoln.

Yep, it was the mid-19th Century, and most white people held ugly, racist views. Brigham Young was one of them. His 19th-century views on interracial marriage don’t stand up well today; neither do Lincoln’s, and neither do the ideas about race held by most 19th-century white elites.

So, why are we worried about what Brigham Young said in the 19th century? In linking this idea to Mitt Romney, or to Mormonism today, O’Donnell implies that these statements have some sort of salience today. That claim is just silly.

Let’s start with provenance. The Brigham Young statement cited comes from the Journal of Discourses. The JD, as historians call it, is a 26-volume collection of 1,500 transcribed sermons given by dozens of different church leaders over a 30-year period. It’s kinda like the Congressional Record. If anyone said anything, it went into the JD. This is why it’s 26 volumes and thousands of pages.

There are huge problems with any suggestion that the JD has much salience today. First, the JD is not church doctrine, and has no binding weight as church doctrine. Church members read the scriptures regularly; many don’t even know that the JD exists.

Not only is it not doctrinal — the JD is also essentially unknown to most church members. I grew up as a church member, and my parents didn’t have a copy of the JD in their home. (Why would they? 26 volumes of old talks.) I don’t have one in my home now, and I’ve got well over a hundred church books on my shelves. I do keep thinking that I should get one, but that’s because I’ve been doing some historical reading, and it’s interesting as a an old historical relic. No one, except for a real history junkie, has a copy of the JD on their shelves.

The church publishes an official manual called the Teachings of Brigham Young. This is a book-sized official church publication, on every church member’s bookcase, and it’s one that church members are instructed to teach class out of, every Sunday, for a year. This is what Mormons today actually read, study, follow, out of Brigham Young’s teachings. And the line about race isn’t part of this collection. (Check for yourself — the entire manual is available online.)

I’ve been attending church regularly for over 30 years, and I have never once heard Brigham Young’s line about interracial marriage cited in a church setting. Ever.

And I personally know church members who are in interracial marriages — and no one gets killed or cast out. One member who I personally know, a Black man in an interracial marriage, was the bishop of a ward that I attended for four years.

Present-day church leaders also give highly public sermons about the evils of racism. They make statements like, “God’s second commandment, love thy neighbor, clearly leaves no room for racism” and “I have learned to admire, respect, and love the good people from every race, culture, and nation that I have been privileged to visit. In my experience, no race or class seems superior to any other in spirituality and faithfulness.” A lengthy recent statement from church leader Gordon B. Hinckley condemned racism in no uncertain terms:

Racial strife still lifts its ugly head. I am advised that even right here among us there is some of this. I cannot understand how it can be. It seemed to me that we all rejoiced in the 1978 revelation given President Kimball. I was there in the temple at the time that that happened. There was no doubt in my mind or in the minds of my associates that what was revealed was the mind and the will of the Lord.

Now I am told that racial slurs and denigrating remarks are sometimes heard among us. I remind you that no man who makes disparaging remarks concerning those of another race can consider himself a true disciple of Christ. Nor can he consider himself to be in harmony with the teachings of the Church of Christ. How can any man holding the Melchizedek Priesthood arrogantly assume that he is eligible for the priesthood whereas another who lives a righteous life but whose skin is of a different color is ineligible?

Throughout my service as a member of the First Presidency, I have recognized and spoken a number of times on the diversity we see in our society. It is all about us, and we must make an effort to accommodate that diversity.

Let us all recognize that each of us is a son or daughter of our Father in Heaven, who loves all of His children.

Brethren, there is no basis for racial hatred among the priesthood of this Church. If any within the sound of my voice is inclined to indulge in this, then let him go before the Lord and ask for forgiveness and be no more involved in such.

So, let’s see:

Brigham Young said some problematic and racist statements. Yep. Those statements were unfortunately pretty consistent with elite white thinking at the time; those statements are essentially unknown to most Mormons today, because they’re not doctrinal and the only place anyone could find them is in a musty old collection that nobody reads; those statements set out certain rules (such as prohibiting interracial marriage) that are neither discussed, followed or enforced in the church today. Brigham Young’s statement is unfortunate; unsurprising, given the era; unread; unknown; and unenforced.

Now, this isn’t to say that there aren’t Mormons who are racist jerks. I know some of those, too. That’s unfortunate.

And, it isn’t to say that racist ideas haven’t existed in church. Clearly, racist ideas have existed at various times during church history. At times, racist views seem to have been relatively widespread in the church. (They were pretty widespread out of the church, too.) Brigham Young certainly wasn’t the last prominent church member to hold racist beliefs, and other prominent members have made racist statements over time. There have been some interesting studies, such as those by sociologist Armand Mauss, about the place of racist lore in church culture over time.

And many church members, myself included, find the prior racist statements disturbing. There have been some public repudiations of prior racist statements, which is a good development. I’m not the only church member who would be happy if there were more discussion, and further repudiation and apology for past statements. That would be great. No argument there.

Also, the work of dedicated scholars like Margaret Young, Darius Gray, Newell Bringhurst, Armand Mauss, Lester Bush, and others has been instrumental in highlighting the stories of Black Mormons, including some who are relatively unknown. Emphasizing the stories of Black Mormons is a very positive development, that helps counter past racist ideas.

And of course, there’s always room for improvement. Some members have racist ideas, and things could always be made better. The church isn’t a perfect place, as far as attitudes towards race.

But it’s silly to act as though modern church members teach Brigham Young’s racist ideas as doctrine (they don’t), or that those ideas play a significant role in everyday church membership today.

(Image source: WIkicommons).

For those following the Richard Dawkins thread from last week, why monogamously limit yourself to this year’s videos when you can also see last year’s, including Dawkins himself? See here (he spoke during session 7, but you may have to find a way to fast forward a bit).

Not that there’s anything wrong with Krakauer. Into Thin Air — Krakauer’s bestseller about the fatal Mount Everest climb — was a great read. And why wouldn’t it be? Krakauer has decades of [...]]]> Maureen Dowd wants you to know that she’s read Jon Krakauer’s book about Mormonism. She’s really proud of this tidbit, and she cites the book — a lot — in her Sunday column . By all appearances, this is the only book about Mormonism that she’s read so far. But hey, she gets her mileage out of it, quoting Krakauer extensively on topics like polygamy and underwear and Joseph Smith as a hypnotically charming salesman. That was ten dollars well spent at the airport bookstore.

Not that there’s anything wrong with Krakauer. Into Thin Air — Krakauer’s bestseller about the fatal Mount Everest climb — was a great read. And why wouldn’t it be? Krakauer has decades of experience as an outdoors writer, he’s got an undergraduate degree in environmental studies, and he’s written prior, well-received books about survival in the outdoors.

Also, he wrote one book about Mormonism, Under the Banner of Heaven — and as we now know, Maureen Dowd read that book.

Of course, a skeptic might suggest that Dowd should have considered interviewing other sources. A few of her colleagues even seem to have adopted that approach themselves. David Brooks, in his own article on the Romney speech, cites to established religious scholars like Catholic theologian Richard John Neuhaus, and (careful, he’s Mormon!) emeritus Columbia historian Richard Bushman. (Bushman is also a Bancroft prize winner, which cancels out at least 62% of his Mormonness). Meanwhile, over in the NYT Week in Review, writer Laurie Goodstein offers a nuanced and interesting article that quotes from theologian Richard Mouw, President of the (non-Mormon) Fuller Theological Seminary.

Dowd, though, sticks to her guns: She cites Krakauer, and then for confirmation, she interviews Krakauer.

Our skeptic could also argue that Dowd should have checked out a few books in addition to Krakauer’s magnum opus. For instance, the highly regarded Mormonism: The Story of a New Religious Tradition, by Indiana University historian Jan Shipps, a non-Mormon who has written about Mormon history for forty years. Or perhaps one of the biographies or studies by Richard Bushman (warning: may contain Mormon content), the Bancroft-winner whose status as a Mormon history superstar was again confirmed with his recent appointment to chair a new Mormon Studies program at (non-Mormon) Claremont Graduate University. Or maybe the short bio by (non-Mormon) star Jacksonian-era historian Robert Remini of the University of Illinois. Or even some of the Oxford-published work by (careful, he’s Mormon!) University of Richmond prof Terryl Givens. The list goes on, and on; it’s not like there is a shortage of really well-researched, well-regarded studies of Mormon history.

But then, those kinds of books — dry and boring and well-researched — are probably less likely to contain one-liners like Krakauer’s (and now, Dowd’s) “[Joseph Smith] could sell a muzzle to a dog.”

Hmm. Perhaps that’s the point?

Image source: Wikicommons.

Divorce is not just a family matter. It exacts a serious toll on the environment by boosting the energy and water consumption of those who used to live together, according to a study by two Michigan State University researchers.

The analysis found that cohabiting couples and families around the globe use resources more efficiently than households that have split up. The researchers calculated that in 2005, divorced American households used between 42 and 61 percent more resources per person than before they separated, spending 46 percent more per person on electricity and 56 percent more on water. . . .

Married households use energy and water [...]]]> There’s a really bizarre article in today’s Washington Post. Under the title, “Divorce Found to Harm the Environment,” the article states:

Divorce is not just a family matter. It exacts a serious toll on the environment by boosting the energy and water consumption of those who used to live together, according to a study by two Michigan State University researchers.

The analysis found that cohabiting couples and families around the globe use resources more efficiently than households that have split up. The researchers calculated that in 2005, divorced American households used between 42 and 61 percent more resources per person than before they separated, spending 46 percent more per person on electricity and 56 percent more on water. . . .

Married households use energy and water more efficiently than divorced ones because they share these resources — including lighting and heating — among more people, said Jianguo Liu, one of the paper’s co-authors. Moreover, the divorced households they surveyed between 1998 and 2002 used up more space, occupying between 33 and 95 percent more rooms per person than in married households.

This is certainly a novel use of statistics, and likely to see much use in intra-family discussions this holiday season. I foresee the use of this statistic as another arrow in the quiver of passive-aggressive matchmaking parents everywhere. (”I don’t see why George can’t just find a nice girl, settle down, and save the environment.”) But really, the stats seem to prove too much, don’t they?

First, the environmental loss or gain isn’t really coming from marriage, is it? It’s coming from shared use of resources. And two people don’t have to be married to share resources. Unmarried cohabitation would have exactly the same environmental impact due to shared resource use. It won’t just be parents citing this article over Christmas dinner. “I know you’re mad that Cindy moved in with me, Mom — but we’re only doing it to help save the planet.”

And second, if two-people-cohabitating really creates such great environmental impact — why stop at two? The benefits of shared resource use can be expanded to greater heights, can’t they?

For one thing, this is an incentive for families to keep their kids longer. There will be no more nagging at little Junior to go get his own place now that he’s 35. Let’s keep him in his old room, and save the planet.

But wait, there’s more! What about polygamy? Now you’re talking real resource savings. Think Big Love<, or perhaps Brigham Young and 56 wives. That's not just 56 wives -- that's 56 times a 40% reduction in water and electricity use. Wowzers! You may see a problematic patriarchal family system, but I see forward-looking, responsible use of scarce environmental resources.

Of course, removing 56 women from the marriage market skews the gender balance of the dating pool -- so we would need a reverse-Brigham as well, a woman who lived polyandrously with 56 husbands. And viola -- even more resources saved! You never knew it, but what's really destroying the environment these days is monogamy.

I hope Mitt Romney includes this discussion in his speech on Thursday.