Category: Law School

2

Flat-Rate Law School Tuition?

Articles in Slate and  the Times make a convincing psychological and economic argument against discounting tuition, especially outside of super-elite institutions. The data suggest that schools ought to offer fixed, lower, rates which all students pay equally.  If widely adopted, no-haggle tuition pricing would be both revenue neutral and significantly more transparent than the current system. So why don’t law schools follow the model? Off the top of my head:

  1. Student scholarships are donor-magnets; and
  2. The Prisoner’s Dilemma.

Donor preferences would be a tough nut to crack.  In a world of increasingly stretched resources, schools are going to be loath to abandon a tried-and-true way of activating their alumni networks. Except for at those super-elite schools, pitches in support of faculty (scholarly) resources or curricular offerings are often tough sells.  I suppose that donors could be channeled into other kinds of student support, but there’s nothing quite as compelling as helping individuals access legal education.

The second problem is also a doozy.  Look at what happened to J.C. Penny.  However, it’s not as if every day low pricing is impossible.  For instance, if the federal government were to condition aid on granular tuition transparency, I think we’d see uniform pricing rather quickly. To see why, imagine a world where all students’ real costs were knowable. There’d be immediately and power leveling pressure from the student body.  The easiest solution would be to eliminate discounts but charge a lower real rate. However, I’ve not seen proposals on the table to change accreditation in this direction, and the current system is clearly hostile to a no-discount tuition strategy. Thus, we’re going to continue to live in a world where every student coming in the door pays something different.

 

3

Hacker Legal Education

In my Jotwell review of Coding Freedom, I commented that “Coleman’s portrait of how hackers become full-fledged members of Debian is eerily like legal education.”

[T]he hackers who are trained in it go through a prescribed course of study in legal texts, practice applying legal rules to new facts, learn about legal drafting, interpretation, and compliance, and cultivate an ethical and public-spirited professional identity. There is even a written examination at the end.

This is legal learning without law school. Coleman’s hackers are domain-specific experts in the body of law that bears on their work. It should be a warning sign that a group of smart and motivated lay professionals took a hard look at the law, realized that it mattered intensely to them, and responded not by consulting lawyers or going to law school but by building their own parallel legal education system. That choice is an indictment of the services lawyers provide and of the relevance of the learning law schools offer. A group of amateurs teaching each other did what we weren’t.

Their success is an opportunity as well as a challenge. The inner sanctums of the law, it turns out, are more accessible to the laity than sometimes assumed. One response to the legal services crisis would be to give more people the legal knowledge and tools to solve some of their own legal problems. The client who can’t afford a lawyer’s services can still usually afford her own. More legal training for non-lawyers might or might not make a dent in law schools’ budget gaps. But it is almost certainly the right thing to do, even if it reduces the demand for lawyers’ services among the public. There is no good reason why law schools can only impart legal knowledge to by way of lawyers and not directly.

Hacker education, however, also shows why lawyers and the traditional missions of law schools are not going away. Law is a blend of logic and argument, a baseball game that depends on persuading the umpire to change the rules mid-pitch. Hacker legal education, with its roots in programming, is strong on formal precision and textual exegesis. But it is notably light on legal realism: coping with the open texture of the law and sorting persuasive from ineffective arguments. The legal system is not a supercomputer that can be caught in a paradox. The professional formation of lawyers is absent in hacker education, because theirs is a different profession.

Legal academics also play a striking role in hacker legal education. Richard Stallman was of course the driving personality behind free software. But Columbia’s Eben Moglen had an absolutely crucial role in crafting amending the closest thing the free software movement has to a constitution: the GNU GPL. And Coleman documents the role that Larry Lessig‘s consciousness-raising activism played in politicizing hackers about copyright policy. They, and other professors who have helped the free software community engage with the law, like Pamela Samuelson, in turn, drew heavily on the legal scholarly tradition even as they translated it into more practical terms. The freedom to focus on self-chosen projects of long-term importance to society is a right and responsibility of the legal academic. Even if not all of us have used it as effectively as these three, it remains our job to try.

0

UCLA Law Review Volume 60 Symposium: Volume 60, Issue 6 (September 2013) and Discourse

UCLA Law Review, Volume 60 Symposium

Twenty-First Century Litigation: Pathologies and Possibilities

A Symposium in Honor of Stephen Yeazell

 

Volume 60, Issue 6 (September 2013)
Articles

Complexity, the Generation of Legal Knowledge, and the Future of Litigation Ronald J. Allen 1384
Regulation by Liability Insurance: From Auto to Lawyers Professional Liability Tom Baker & Rick Swedloff 1412
When Courts Determine Fees in a System With a Loser Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants Theodore Eisenberg, Talia Fisher, and Issi Rosen-Zvi 1452
Symmetry and Class Action Litigation Alexandra D. Lahav 1494
Atomism, Holism, and the Judicial Assessment of Evidence Jennifer L. Mnookin 1524
Altering Attention in Adjudication Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, and Chris Guthrie 1586
Wolves and Sheep, Predators and Scavengers, or Why I Left Civil Procedure (Not With a Bang, but a Whimper) D. Michael Risinger 1620
Gateways and Pathways in Civil Procedure Joanna C. Schwartz 1652
Pleading and Access to Civil Justice: A Response to Twiqbal Apologists A. Benjamin Spencer 1710
Teaching Twombly and Iqbal: Elements Analysis and the Ghost of Charles Clark Clyde Spillenger 1740
Unspoken Truths and Misaligned Interests: Political Parties and the Two Cultures of Civil Litigation Stephen C. Yeazell 1752

 

 

Volume 61, Discourse

Discourse

Re-Re-Financing Civil Litigation: How Lawyer Lending Might Remake the American Litigation Landscape, Again Nora Freeman Engstrom 110
Of Groups, Class Actions, and Social Change: Reflections on From Medieval Group Litigation to the Modern Class Action Deborah R. Hensler 126
Procedure and Society: An Essay for Steve Yeazell William B. Rubenstein 136
What Evidence Scholars Can Learn From the Work of Stephen Yeazell: History, Rulemaking, and the Lawyer’s Fundamental Conflict David Alan Sklansky 150
Procedure, Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the Labor Law Katherine V. W. Stone 164

Accelerated Learning in an Era of Decelerated Earning

There are two basic responses to an economy as depressed as ours. In a neoclassical paradigm, the central problem is that certain people have become too expensive.  They demand too much in wages, education, and health care.  Coddled by food stamps and subsidies, they refuse to take low-paying jobs. Wealthy owners and managers are the ultimate arbiters of value.  They can recognize valuable labor and will pay for it. If significant numbers of people remain unemployed, it’s because they have assigned too high a value to their own abilities.

The neoclassicals also have a theory of adjustment and positive change.  Once low-productivity workers realize the sobering truth of their own diminished value, the market for labor will clear.  Moreover, reduced wages won’t render them starved or homeless. For the neoclassicals, the decline of purchasing power of, say, the bottom 99% of the economy has a salutary, deflationary effect on the price of staples.  If the poor can’t afford bread, its price will decline.  Knock out the tax break for employer sponsored insurance, and health costs have nowhere to go but down.

Another school sees the commanding position of the wealthy as a problem to be solved, rather than the grounding framework of economic life.  In this, more Keynesian, paradigm, government ought to redistribute some income from rentiers at the top of the economy to those who presently cannot afford food, education, health care, and housing. The Keynesian recognizes the stickiness of certain prices, and how disruptive (indeed, deadly) the situation can become if, say, income falls much faster than food prices. Read More

1

Temple Law Hiring Announcement

On behalf of this year’s committee, I pass along the following:

Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law invites applications from both entry-level and lateral candidates for full-time, tenure-track faculty positions to commence in the Fall Semester 2014.  We welcome applications from candidates with a wide variety of interests.  Although areas of need are subject to change, priority areas are likely to include health law, business and commercial law, civil procedure, intellectual property, law and technology, trust and estates, torts, and employment law/employment discrimination.

Lateral candidates should contact Professor Gregory Mandel, Lateral Faculty Appointments Subcommittee (gmandel@temple.edu).  Entry level candidates should contact Professor Donald Harris, Faculty Appointments Subcommittee (donald.harris@temple.edu).  Temple University is committed to a policy of equal opportunity for all in every aspect of its operations.  The University has pledged not to discriminate on the basis of an individual’s age, color, disability, marital status, national or ethnic origin, race, religion, sex (including pregnancy), sexual orientation, gender identity, genetic information or veteran status.

 

Questions for the ABA Task Force on the Future of Legal Education

The ABA Task Force working paper has many interesting ideas in it.* But it also has several points of weakness, glossing over critical perspectives and insufficiently supporting important factual claims. We can hope that a footnoted final draft will take care of the latter issue. But the lack of acknowledgment of critical perspectives is a deeper problem, and one I hope participants at this Saturday’s meeting will raise. Questions could include:

1) When clients refuse to pay for the work of recent law school graduates, do they say, “We’re not paying for first or second year attorneys,” or “We’re not paying for attorneys without the following ‘practice ready’ skill set”?

If it’s the former, isn’t the problem more one of bargaining power than one of inadequate education? If it’s the latter, shouldn’t the ABA solicit some critical mass of major clients to articulate the skills that need to be trained, and to pledge to pay those who possess them?

2) Why are (certain types of) law jobs in decline?

The Task Force strongly believes that there are “structural changes” in legal employment. The “structural vs. cyclical” dispute over the causes of unemployment is deeply ideological. A conservative economist may characterize the great recession as a “great vacation” of people unwilling to work (or learn new skills). Paul Krugman and Mike Konczal challenge the structural story generally, and Mike Simkovic & Frank McIntyre give us some reason to doubt it in the case of attorneys. They believe that the “data does not support” the view that “law continues to be depressed while the rest of the labor market has recovered.” Many other types of professionals are also faring worse than they have in the past. For every “death of biglaw” story, there’s a skeptic who’s heard it all before.

I have no doubt that certain types of law jobs are in decline. But this raises a deeper question: why is this happening? Let’s think outside the BigLaw box, and consider, say, elder abuse attorneys. Stipulate, for purposes of this discussion, that there has been some decline in the number of attorneys specialized in the regulation of assisted living and nursing home facilities (and tort lawsuits for neglect and abuse). Why might that occur?
Read More

6

ABA Task Force on Legal Education: Down with Status

aba status merceGood news for law professors now submitting articles seeking offers from high-status journals: the importance of status in American law schools is over-rated and is about to be reduced. At least that is the urging of an American Bar Association Task Force Working Paper released last Friday addressing contemporary challenges in U.S. legal education.

Obsession with status is a culprit in the woes of today’s American law schools and faculty, the Working Paper finds.  It charges law professors with pitching in to redress prevailing woes by working to reduce the role of status as a measure of personal and institutional success.  The group’s only other specific recommendation for law faculty is to become informed about the topics the 34-page Working Paper chronicles so we might help out as needed by our schoools. 

Much of the rest of the Working Paper is admirable, however, making the two specific recommendations to law faculty not only patently absurd but strange in context.   After all, the Working Paper urges reform of ABA/AALS and state regulations with a view toward increasing the variety of law schools. It calls for serious changes in the way legal education is funded, though it admits that the complex system of education finance in the U.S. is deeply and broadly problematic and well beyond the influence of a single professional task force.

The Task Force urges US News to stop counting expenditure levels as a positive factor in its rankings.  It stresses problems arising from a cost-based rather than market-based method of setting tuition. It notes a lack of business mind-sets among many in legal education.  It questions the prevailing structure of professorial tenure; degree of scholarship orientation; professors having institutional leadership roles; and, yes, faculty culture that makes status an important measure of individual and institutional success.

But amid all that, law professors have just two tasks: becoming informed and demoting status.  So there must be some hidden meaning to this idea of status as a culprit and the prescription for prawfs to reduce the importance of status as a measure of success.  I am not sure what it is. The Working Paper does not explain or illustrate the concept of status or how to reduce its importance.

I’ll to try to be concrete about what it might mean.   Given the other problems the Task Force sees with today’s law faculty culture (tenure, scholarship and leadership roles), I guess they are suggesting that faculty stop making it important whether: Read More

2

Gatekeeping and the Economic Value of a Law Degree (Part 2)

LincolnIn my last post, I discussed how the commentary on Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre’s “The Economic Value of a Law Degree” has illuminated a separate and worthwhile avenue for further research—namely, whether the presence of powerful gatekeepers who oversee the practice of law should make us confident that the value of the law degree will be relatively stable.

Most helpful in this regard has been Deborah Merritt’s post regarding the impact of the typewriter on lawyer education requirements.  At the risk of putting words into her mouth, Merritt observed that the typewriter may have contributed to the decision of the New York bar to make attendance at a three-year law school a prerequisite to bar admission and, therefore, that S&M were too hasty in concluding that people misconceived the typewriter to be a threat to the value of the law degree.

My earlier post explained that we must be careful not to conflate structural changes in the law degree’s value with structural changes in the credentials that one will need to become a lawyer.  By keeping the two separate, we can better understand how the gatekeepers to the industry might be able to insulate the value of the degree from exogenous forces.

In this second post, I’d like to offer some final observations on gatekeeping.  I begin with the acknowledgement that the effects of gatekeeping extend well beyond the population of degree holders, though S&M had perfectly valid reasons for focusing on that population.  Thereafter, I return to the relationship between gatekeeping and nostalgia, highlighting the strange role that the late Abe Lincoln played in the adoption of education requirements.  To finish up, I briefly explain how gatekeeping measures have long been—and will continue to be—a tempting tool for those with the power to wield them. Read More

7

Gatekeeping and the Economic Value of a Law Degree (Part 1)

gatekeepers image

When I first read the commentary concerning Michael Simkovic and Frank McIntyre’s “The Economic Value of a Law Degree,” I was most surprised by the attention that the commenters paid to the paper’s passing reference to the typewriter. S&M are aware that their work arrives at a time when it is popular to believe that technology has wrought a structural change to lawyers’ earnings. For their part, S&M cite Frank Miles Finch’s obloquy against typewriters in the first volume of the Columbia Law Review to show that worries of technological ruin are nothing new in our line of work. After listing several other examples (such as word processing and Westlaw), S&M maintain that “lawyers have prospered while adapting to once threatening new technologies and modes of work.”

Taken out of context, this last statement might sound as if S&M are engaging in bold fortunetelling based on a scant historical record, but a few paragraphs later, S&M concede that “past performance does not guarantee future returns” and “[t]he return to a law degree in 2020 can only be known for certain in 2020.” When read in conjunction with the rest of the paper, the typewriter reference serves as a brief and lighthearted reminder that we, like others before us, can fall victim to nostalgic gloom and doom.

Despite its minor role in the article, commenters have been eager to mention the typewriter observation, with references ranging from the favorable (here), to the neutral (here and here), to the mildly dismissive (here and here), to the critical (here). Having given some thought to the last entry on this list, Deborah Merritt’s wonderful blog entry on Law School Cafe, I now realize that I shouldn’t have been surprised by the attention paid to the typewriter; it turns out to be an important point for S&M to make.

Merritt argues contra S&M that (1) Finch was not engaging in sky-is-falling melodrama and (2) that the typewriter “may have contributed” to a structural change in lawyers’ earnings—specifically, the creation of three-year law schools and formal schooling requirements for bar admission.  As to the first point, Merritt explains that Finch mentioned the typewriter to bolster his argument that apprenticeships had ceased to be a viable training environment for lawyers. He was not predicting that the typewriter would lead to the demise of his profession; rather, he was talking about the need for an adequate training substitute. As to the second point, Merritt points out that the New York bar adopted Finch’s recommendations, in part, because it was persuaded by his Columbia article. I add that the ABA would eventually adopt similar requirements as well, also referencing Finch’s article in the process. Merritt highlights that Finch’s main point was that the typewriter limited apprentices’ exposure to the study of important legal texts and created a difficult learning environment. As a result, Finch argued, law school was the far better educational option.

Merritt’s post is thoughtful, well-researched, and concise. Moreover, she is largely right. Finch was not engaging in nostalgic sky-is-falling reasoning. In S&M’s defense, however, the notion of a Typewriter Doomsday was not altogether uncommon in the early Twentieth Century. To take but one example, Arkansas law titan George B. Rose mentioned the following in a 1920 speech to the Tennessee Bar Association:

A great menace to the wellbeing of the bar is the disproportionate increase of its numbers. With the invention of the typewriter, the simplification of pleadings and the improved methods of travel, one lawyer can now do the work of two in the olden time; yet the proportion of lawyers to the remainder of the community has enormously increased.

Rose’s remarks were received with great applause and an honorary membership into the Tennessee bar.

More importantly, Merritt stands on solid ground when she argues that technological change contributed to a shift in the business practices of legal professionals and, in turn, the shape of American legal education. There can be little doubt that this shift can be described as “structural.”

But I disagree with Merritt insofar as she believes that a structural shift in schooling requirements weakens S&M’s paper. To the contrary, it helps the paper by providing a prima facie explanation for relative stability in the law degree’s value.

We must be mindful of the distinction between structural shifts in lawyers’ earnings and structural shifts in other aspects of the legal profession, such as educational requirements. Clearly, Merritt’s focus is the latter, and S&M’s focus is the former. And just because S&M have chosen to focus on one kind of structural shift does not mean that they have “dismissed” other structural shifts, as Merritt says. S&M readily acknowledge that the structural shifts can occur with law school enrollment:

These distinctions and widespread publicity may enable critics to influence college graduates’ career plans, the judiciary, and perhaps the future of legal education. They may have already contributed to a steep three-year decline in law school applications and enrollments.

The more critical point is that breaking up structural shifts into various types can be a useful analytic tool. Distinguishing between structural shifts in the value of a law degree and structural shifts in access to the practice of law permits us to make an important observation—namely, that it is possible for the latter to prevent the former. Critics of S&M doubt that the past performance of law degree holders is a reliable predictor of future performance. We can hypothesize that, to the extent law degree holders can insulate themselves from exogenous forces that threaten the value of their services, they will increase the stability of the degree’s value and, therefore, the reliability of predictions based on their past performance.  The underlying reasoning for the hypothesis is as follows.  All other things being held constant, those who are within service industries that have the power and willingness to manipulate the supply of available service providers will likely be better at braving exogenous shocks than those who are not. Under those circumstances, when such measures are taken to protect those already possessing the credentials necessary to perform that service, the value of those credentials will tend to be relatively stable.  Whether these measures have been or will be effective enough to stabilize the value of the law degree is a question worth considering.

There are several important gatekeepers to the practice of law: law schools, the American Bar Association, state bar associations, state supreme courts, etc. These gatekeepers possess, and sometimes use, tools that have the potential to protect the economic value of the law degree. They can change the qualifications for entry, expand or contract the domain of permissible services, raise or lower rate maximums, or regulate advertising practices, among other things.  And while a considerable minority of law degree holders do not practice law (about 40% according to the SIPP data that S&M consider), there are enough practicing lawyers to give protectionist measures a fighting chance to stabilize the overall value of the degree.

Merritt deserves much credit for bringing this observation to the fore in connection with the S&M paper, although she did not expand upon it (an excusable omission in light of the fact that we are talking about a single blog post).

Having the luxury of multiple posts, I will use Part 2 to discuss a few of the protectionist measures that gatekeepers have taken over the last century.  I will focus in particular on the measure that Merritt discusses–the advent of a law school prerequisite for admission to the bar.

6

Incorporating Skills Training in Substantive Courses

Historically, skills training was not part of the education students received in law school. Things have changed, of course, and recently many have emphasized the need for practice-ready law grads. Incorporating skills training in substantive courses offers one promising option for improving students’ education. I’m prepping Sales (UCC Article 2) for the fall, and the course seems to lend itself well to a more skills-oriented approach. I plan to use problem-solving exercises and assignments which will not only teach students the law governing sales of goods, but will also enhance their statutory and contractual interpretation, drafting, and client-counseling skills. I have extensive experience litigating contractual disputes, so I know these skills are essential for commercial litigators. And they seem equally important to transactional lawyers.