Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of three responses in conjunction with the October issue of the Columbia Law Review.

The first piece is a response to Noah D. Zatz’s article, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent by Professor Tristin K. Green of Seton Hall Law School.  In his Article Professor Zatz exploits the anomaly in Title VII doctrine of employer liability for third-party harassment to develop a new theory of employment discrimination law which relies on the ideas of membership causation and employer responsibility.  In the Response, Professor Green criticizes Professor Zatz’s discussion of the applicability of his account to employer liability for the bias of a subordinate.  She argues that by failing [...]]]>

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of three responses in conjunction with the October issue of the Columbia Law Review.

The first piece is a response to Noah D. Zatz’s article, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent by Professor Tristin K. Green of Seton Hall Law School.  In his Article Professor Zatz exploits the anomaly in Title VII doctrine of employer liability for third-party harassment to develop a new theory of employment discrimination law which relies on the ideas of membership causation and employer responsibility.  In the Response, Professor Green criticizes Professor Zatz’s discussion of the applicability of his account to employer liability for the bias of a subordinate.  She argues that by failing to distinguish between direct and vicarious liability Professor Zatz creates a risk that courts will limit employer liability based on considerations of “notice” and “feasibility” even where traditionally strict liability has been imposed.

The second is a response to Darrell A.H. Miller’s article Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment by Professor Eugene Volokh of the UCLA School of Law.  In his Article, Professor Miller suggests treating the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms for self-defense the same as the right to own and view adult obscenity under the First Amendment—a robust right in the home, subject to near-plenary restriction by elected government everywhere else.  In the Response Professor Volokh challenges the analogy between guns and obscenity.  He notes that obscenity is one of the least protected and marginal categories of speech, while the personal right to bear arms is at the core of the second amendment.

Finally, we have published a reply to Professor Volokh by Professor Miller in which he points out that much of Professor Volokh’s Response is a challenge to the accuracy of the analogy, rather than to arguments that underpin the analogy and independently justify the home-bound Second Amendment.

The Yale Law Journal Online is pleased to announce the publication of Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech by Elizabeth Pollman, a Stanford Law Fellow and former practitioner at Latham & Watkins LLP.  Pollman’s piece covers the potential for sweeping changes to corporate political speech law in light of the Supreme Court proceedings in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.

The Yale Law Journal is pleased to present its new online platform, The Yale Law Journal Online (http://www.yalelawjournal.org/). YLJ Online will continue the Journal’s mission of providing accessible and substantive scholarship through the online medium. It offers original essays on timely and novel legal developments and responses to articles in the print Journal, as well as adapted lectures and recordings/podcasts of featured pieces.

When the Journal launched The Pocket Part in 2005, it was the first law review to establish an original online companion; as the Journal nears its 120th anniversary, YLJ Online represents the next step in that endeavor. The launch of YLJ Online’s original content section features an essay by Hiro N. Aragaki, addressing the Hall Street v. Mattel litigation and [...]]]>

The Yale Law Journal is pleased to present its new online platform, The Yale Law Journal Online (http://www.yalelawjournal.org/). YLJ Online will continue the Journal’s mission of providing accessible and substantive scholarship through the online medium. It offers original essays on timely and novel legal developments and responses to articles in the print Journal, as well as adapted lectures and recordings/podcasts of featured pieces.

When the Journal launched The Pocket Part in 2005, it was the first law review to establish an original online companion; as the Journal nears its 120th anniversary, YLJ Online represents the next step in that endeavor. The launch of YLJ Online’s original content section features an essay by Hiro N. Aragaki, addressing the Hall Street v. Mattel litigation and manifest disregard, as well as responses by selected scholars to Michael Stokes Paulsen’s The Constitutional Power To Interpret International Law (118 Yale L.J. 1762 (2009)).

In the coming weeks, YLJ Online will present a variety of essays and features on marriage, property, and corporate law, as well as a selection of pieces from the Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson III and other participants in its inaugural Washington, D.C. conference on the Supreme Court’s certiorari process. Among the many features that YLJ Online offers are Essays (4,000-6,000 words), Commentaries (under 2,000 words), Responses, adapted lectures and solicited pieces. More information can be found on the Submissions page (http://www.yalelawjournal.org/submissions.html). All YLJ Online publications are available and fully searchable through LexisNexis and Westlaw. The Journal also provides all YLJ Online pieces in PDF/reprint format, and podcasts on its website/iTunes for selected pieces. For questions regarding YLJ Online, please contact the Journal’s Managing Online Editor, Jeff K. Lee, here.

Now available on YLJ Online:

Essay

Hiro N. Aragaki, The Mess of Manifest Disregard, 119 Yale L.J. Online 1 (2009). [HTML] [PDF]

Responses

Julian Ku, The Prospects for the Peaceful Co-Existence of Constitutional and International Law, 119 Yale L.J. Online 15 (2009). [HTML] [PDF]

Peter J. Spiro, Wishing International Law Away, 119 Yale L.J. Online 23 (2009). [HTML] [PDF]

Margaret E. McGuinness, Old W(h)ine, Old Bottles: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 119 Yale L.J. Online 31 (2009). [HTML] [PDF]

Robert Ahdieh, The Fog of Certainty, 119 Yale L.J. Online 41 (2009). [HTML] [PDF]

CRITICAL RACE THEORY SPEAKER SERIES CRT 20: HONORING OUR PAST, CHARTING OUR FUTURE

Introduction

Celebrating Critical Race Theory at 20 Angela Onwuachi-Willig

Articles

Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical Race Theory Richard Delgado

The Re-Emergence of Race as a Biological Category: The Societal Implications—Reaffirmation of Race Alex M. Johnson, Jr.

Post-Racialism Sumi Cho

Jim Crow Ethics and the Defense of the Jena Six Anthony V. Alfieri

Notes

The Branding of America: The Rise of Geographic Trademarks and the Need for a Strong Fair Use Defense Joseph C. Daniels

There’s “No Such Thing as Too Much Speech”: How Advertising Deregulation and the Marketplace of Ideas Can Protect Democracy in America Kristen M. Formanek

The Antifraud Savings Clause of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 Evan J. Leitch

Real Estate Causes Real Problems for Investors: Regulating Executive Liquidation of Stock Options as a Source of [...]]]>

CRITICAL RACE THEORY SPEAKER SERIES
CRT 20: HONORING OUR PAST, CHARTING OUR FUTURE

Introduction

The Yale Law School Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic and The Yale Law Journal Online, the forthcoming online platform of The Yale Law Journal, will host a half-day conference, “Important Questions of Federal Law”: Assessing the Supreme Court’s Case Selection Process, on September 18, 2009, at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. The conference will consider the nature and causes of changes in the Supreme Court’s docket in recent years, as well as suggestions for reform of the certiorari process. The conference is made possible by the generous support of the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund. Practicing attorneys, judges, academics, and students are invited to attend. There is no charge for the conference, but space is limited, so all attendees must pre-register here. [...]]]>

The Yale Law School Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic and The Yale Law Journal Online, the forthcoming online platform of The Yale Law Journal, will host a half-day conference, “Important Questions of Federal Law”: Assessing the Supreme Court’s Case Selection Process, on September 18, 2009, at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. The conference will consider the nature and causes of changes in the Supreme Court’s docket in recent years, as well as suggestions for reform of the certiorari process. The conference is made possible by the generous support of the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund. Practicing attorneys, judges, academics, and students are invited to attend. There is no charge for the conference, but space is limited, so all attendees must pre-register here. Breakfast and refreshments will be provided. If you are unable to attend, podcasts of conference sessions and downloadable papers from the panelists will be made available by Yale Law School’s main website. Select papers will also be published by The Yale Law Journal Online. Information on the conference can also be downloaded by clicking here.  For more information on The Yale Law Journal Online and the conference, please contact YLJ Online Editor Kathleen Claussen here.

http://www.concurringopinions.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/yljonline.jpg

Articles

Saving Facebook James Grimmelmann

Attempt by Omission Michael T. Cahill

Strange Bedfellows: Criminal Law, Family Law, and the Legal Construction of Intimate Life Melissa Murray

Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles Donna M. Nagy

Notes

Corporate Liability for Violations of Labor Rights Under the Alien Tort Claims Act Wesley V. Carrington

The Right and Wrong Ways to Sell A Public Forum John C. Crees

Searching for a Solution: A Proposed Change to the Code of Iowa Chapter 808A Morgan N. Engling

Nonprofits: Are You at Risk of Losing Your Tax-Exempt Status? Gina M. Lavarda

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City of Houston, and Remedial Rationing by Professor Jennifer Laurin of the University of Texas School of Law.

In her Essay, Professor Laurin identifies a trend in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence to restrict the enforcement of criminal procedure rights to either criminal defense or civil rights litigation, something she calls remedial rationing. Using Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts—a criminal appeal decided by the Supreme Court last term—and Rodriguez v. City of Houston—a civil rights suit which the author participated in litigating—as examples, Professor Laurin discusses the prospects for each type of remedy to regulate law enforcement conduct.  She concludes that neither [...]]]>

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, Rodriguez v. City of Houston, and Remedial Rationing by Professor Jennifer Laurin of the University of Texas School of Law.

In her Essay, Professor Laurin identifies a trend in recent Supreme Court jurisprudence to restrict the enforcement of criminal procedure rights to either criminal defense or civil rights litigation, something she calls remedial rationing. Using Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts—a criminal appeal decided by the Supreme Court last term—and Rodriguez v. City of Houston—a civil rights suit which the author participated in litigating—as examples, Professor Laurin discusses the prospects for each type of remedy to regulate law enforcement conduct.  She concludes that neither regime can adequately protect criminal defendants’ rights on its own, and that the two regimes work together in important ways.

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a companion piece to Federalization Snowballs:  The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform by Professor Abigail Moncrieff of Boston University.

In her Essay, Professor Moncrieff discussed the way in which federal healthcare programs have effected states incentives by allowing states to externalize some of the costs of their malpractice policies, resulting in a need for federal regulation in that area.  She called this a “federalization snowball”—federal intervention through spending programs creates a need for further federal regulation in areas that are traditionally state functions.

In her companion piece, A Closer Look at the Federalization Snowball, Professor Moncrieff explores the scope of the problem of federalization snowballs and its historical and theoretical underpinnings in [...]]]>

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a companion piece to Federalization Snowballs:  The Need for National Action in Medical Malpractice Reform by Professor Abigail Moncrieff of Boston University.

In her Essay, Professor Moncrieff discussed the way in which federal healthcare programs have effected states incentives by allowing states to externalize some of the costs of their malpractice policies, resulting in a need for federal regulation in that area.  She called this a “federalization snowball”—federal intervention through spending programs creates a need for further federal regulation in areas that are traditionally state functions.

In her companion piece, A Closer Look at the Federalization Snowball, Professor Moncrieff explores the scope of the problem of federalization snowballs and its historical and theoretical underpinnings in a debate over the interpretation of the Spending Clause.

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a response to W. David Ball’s article Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment by Professor Berman of Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law.

In his article Ball explores the ramifications of Apprendi for indeterminate sentencing systems where parole boards may deny parole based on their findings of fact about the original crime, even when these findings contradict the jury’s.  Ball argues that while parole boards may be competent to make factual determinations about a prisoner’s rehabilitation, juries, as the moral representatives of the community, must find facts related to retribution.

In his response, Professor Berman challenges the idea that modern juries can act [...]]]>

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a response to W. David Ball’s article Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate Sentencing, and the Meaning of Punishment by Professor Berman of Ohio State University’s Moritz College of Law.

In his article Ball explores the ramifications of Apprendi for indeterminate sentencing systems where parole boards may deny parole based on their findings of fact about the original crime, even when these findings contradict the jury’s.  Ball argues that while parole boards may be competent to make factual determinations about a prisoner’s rehabilitation, juries, as the moral representatives of the community, must find facts related to retribution.

In his response, Professor Berman challenges the idea that modern juries can act as the conscience of the community.  He points out that the vast majority of criminal cases never reach a jury and that restrictions on juries prevent them from being able to effectively express moral condemnation through their findings.  Professor Berman argues instead that in order  to develop sound procedural rules for sentencing we must pay greater attention to rights other than the jury right.

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a response to Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement by Alex Raskolnikov.

In his article, Professor Raskolnikov argues that the current tax enforcement regime could better take account of differing taxpayer motivations if it were replaced with two regimes: a “deterrence regime,” similar to the current regime but with higher penalties, and a “compliance regime,” which would feature lower penalties but would include procedural mechanisms, such as a pro-government presumption in litigation and a requirement to submit to binding arbitration, which would tend to resolve disputes in the government’s favor. Raskolnikov argues that requiring a choice between these two regimes would serve to separate those taxpayers who seek to [...]]]>

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a response to Revealing Choices: Using Taxpayer Choice to Target Tax Enforcement by Alex Raskolnikov.

In his article, Professor Raskolnikov argues that the current tax enforcement regime could better take account of differing taxpayer motivations if it were replaced with two regimes: a “deterrence regime,” similar to the current regime but with higher penalties, and a “compliance regime,” which would feature lower penalties but would include procedural mechanisms, such as a pro-government presumption in litigation and a requirement to submit to binding arbitration, which would tend to resolve disputes in the government’s favor. Raskolnikov argues that requiring a choice between these two regimes would serve to separate those taxpayers who seek to game the system from those who do not, so that enforcement mechanisms could be targeted appropriately, leading ultimately to gains in compliance and efficiency.

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a response to Judging the Voting Rights Act by Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles.

Professors Cox and Miles’ study found that judicial ideology and race are closely related to findings of liability in voting rights cases. In their response Professors Staudt and VanderWeele argue that, because Cox and Miles failed to investigate the possibility of dependencies between the variables they were studying, their results may be biased. Staudt and VanderWeele develop an alternative approach for exploring the effects of judicial attributes on voting using causal directed acyclic graphs. This methodology can help empirical researchers investigate the relationships between variables in order to posit statistical models with appropriate controls and to identify true cause [...]]]>

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a response to Judging the Voting Rights Act by Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles.

Professors Cox and Miles’ study found that judicial ideology and race are closely related to findings of liability in voting rights cases. In their response Professors Staudt and VanderWeele argue that, because Cox and Miles failed to investigate the possibility of dependencies between the variables they were studying, their results may be biased. Staudt and VanderWeele develop an alternative approach for exploring the effects of judicial attributes on voting using causal directed acyclic graphs. This methodology can help empirical researchers investigate the relationships between variables in order to posit statistical models with appropriate controls and to identify true cause and effect relationships when they exist. While this methodology has become popular in a number of disciplines—including statistics, biostatistics, epidemiology, and computer science—and is widely believed to be a valuable tool for empirical research, it has yet to appear in the empirical law literature. Staudt and VanderWeele offer a brief introduction of the method in their response in order to initiate discussion as to its worth in empirical legal studies.

The Yale Law Journal Online* is pleased to present the Note published by Sonia Sotomayor in Volume 88 (1979).  Judge Sotomayor, who has been nominated by President Obama to the Supreme Court of the United States, was a member of the Yale Law School Class of 1979 and an editor of The Yale Law Journal.   If confirmed by the U.S Senate, she would be the Court’s first Hispanic justice and its third woman.  Judge Sotomayor would also join two other Yale Law School graduates currently on the Court—Justice Clarence Thomas ’74 and former Journal editor Justice Samuel Alito ’75.

Judge Sotomayor’s piece, Statehood and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case for Puerto Rican Seabed Rights, analyzed issues regarding Puerto Rico’s ability to maintain rights to its seabed if it pursued statehood.   The Note can [...]]]>

The Yale Law Journal Online* is pleased to present the Note published by Sonia Sotomayor in Volume 88 (1979).  Judge Sotomayor, who has been nominated by President Obama to the Supreme Court of the United States, was a member of the Yale Law School Class of 1979 and an editor of The Yale Law Journal.   If confirmed by the U.S Senate, she would be the Court’s first Hispanic justice and its third woman.  Judge Sotomayor would also join two other Yale Law School graduates currently on the Court—Justice Clarence Thomas ’74 and former Journal editor Justice Samuel Alito ’75.

Judge Sotomayor’s piece, Statehood and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case for Puerto Rican Seabed Rights, analyzed issues regarding Puerto Rico’s ability to maintain rights to its seabed if it pursued statehood.   The Note can be accessed here.

*Effective Fall 2009, The Pocket Part will be integrated into The Yale Law Journal Online, the new online companion and platform of the Journal.  Further details will be forthcoming.

Articles

Cause for Concern: Causation and Federal Securities Fraud Jill E. Fisch

Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access Robert G. Bone

Values and Value Creation in Public–Private Transactions Nestor M. Davidson

Green Is Good: Sustainability, Profitability, and a New Paradigm for Corporate Governance Judd F. Sneirson

Notes

A Newsworthiness Privilege for Republished Defamation of Public Figures Matthew J. Donnelly

The NLRB’s Oil Capitol and Toering Decisions and Their Effects on Unionization and American Labor Law Michael J. Hilkin

Stuck in a Bind: Can the Arbitration Fairness Act Solve the Problems of Mandatory Binding Arbitration in the Consumer Context? Joshua T. Mandelbaum

Extending Refugee Definitions to Cover Environmentally Displaced Persons Displaces Necessary Protection Kara K. Moberg

The Minnesota Law Review is proud to announce the launch of our new online companion journal, Minnesota Law Review Headnotes. Headnotes will serve as the online archive of the Law Review’s print articles, available in PDF format, but it will also feature original, online-only Response articles in which prominent academics respond to the articles the Law Review publishes.

In our inaugural round of Headnotes Responses:

Orin Kerr (George Washington University Law School) responds to Jack Balkin’s Lecture, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State. In The National Surveillance State: A Response to Balkin, Kerr agrees with Balkin’s premise that the development of surveillance and data-gathering technology presents problems for the law, but argues against Balkin’s conclusion that these new technological developments require a fundamental shift in governance.

Lisa [...]]]>

The Minnesota Law Review is proud to announce the launch of our new online companion journal, Minnesota Law Review Headnotes. Headnotes will serve as the online archive of the Law Review’s print articles, available in PDF format, but it will also feature original, online-only Response articles in which prominent academics respond to the articles the Law Review publishes.

In our inaugural round of Headnotes Responses:

Orin Kerr (George Washington University Law School) responds to Jack Balkin’s Lecture, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State. In The National Surveillance State: A Response to Balkin, Kerr agrees with Balkin’s premise that the development of surveillance and data-gathering technology presents problems for the law, but argues against Balkin’s conclusion that these new technological developments require a fundamental shift in governance.

Lisa Blomgren Bingham and David S. Good (Indiana University School of Public and Environmental Affairs) respond to Michael LeRoy’s article, Do Courts Create Moral Hazard? When Judges Nullify Employer Liability in Arbitrations. In A Better Solution to Moral Hazard in Employment Arbitration: It Is Time to Ban Predispute Binding Arbitration Clauses, Bingham and Good take a second look at LeRoy’s statistics and probe some of his empirical conclusions.  They then suggest an entirely different policy prescription to solve the arbitration problem: banning binding predispute arbitration agreements in employment altogether.

Alexandra B. Klass (University of Minnesota Law School) responds to Sara Bronin’s article, The Quiet Revolution Revived: Sustainable Design, Land Use Regulation, and the States. In Climate Change and Reassessing the “Right” Level of Government, Klass further explores and amplifies the federalism issues that Bronin introduced in her article. Klass ultimately advocates applying the “cooperative federalism” approach used in other areas of environmental law to the problems of local regulation of green building.

In addition to its original online content, Headnotes also features an archive of the Law Review’s print issues. Currently, the past four years of articles (Volumes 90-93) are available online, with greater coverage to come over the next few months. In the next few weeks, we will also be updating our Table of Contents entries here on Concurring Opinions to reflect our most recent articles, now available online.

This month, three print authors from the past year reply to the PENNumbra Responses to their articles.

In The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, Professor Bowers supports his argument from Punishing the Innocent by individually addressing each of the responses to his article in turn. Bowers begins by arguing that, while Professor Bibas would be right to view guilty pleas by innocent defendants as a “moral horrors” in a “well-functioning and transparent criminal justice system,” we do not have such a system. Under the flawed system we do have, however, Bowers contends that his proposal would promote “an odd, but very real, kind of honesty in lies—an honesty that innocent defendants do, and often should, falsely admit guilt [...]]]>

PENNumbra’s featured works are now available at www.pennumbra.com.

This month, three print authors from the past year reply to the PENNumbra Responses to their articles.

In The Unusual Man in the Usual Place, Professor Bowers supports his argument from Punishing the Innocent by individually addressing each of the responses to his article in turn. Bowers begins by arguing that, while Professor Bibas would be right to view guilty pleas by innocent defendants as a “moral horrors” in a “well-functioning and transparent criminal justice system,” we do not have such a system. Under the flawed system we do have, however, Bowers contends that his proposal would promote “an odd, but very real, kind of honesty in lies—an honesty that innocent defendants do, and often should, falsely admit guilt in order to secure the benefits of defendant-favorable pleas.” Bowers then questions both the possibility and the wisdom of the “bold proposal” in Professor Thomas’ response. He asserts that although Thomas “surely does not want to engender more false guilty pleas, his proposal may have that principle effect.” Finally, Bowers acknowledges that Professor Wright’s call for targeted reforms may be correct, but argues that in regards to “voluntary and intelligent rational-choice pleas, we must opt for rules that either permit such pleas or forbid them—categorically.”

>Read the full response by Josh Bowers

In Excluding Religion: A Reply, Professor Tebbe defends his argument that as a matter of constitutional law, “governments ought to be given wider constitutional latitude to exclude religion from their support programs.” Tebbe first accepts the invitations of his responders to “explore the legal implications” of his argument on political theory, concluding that while his approach may seem to “appeal chiefly to separationists, . . . [it] may also hold some appeal for people who favor greater governmental influence over matters of conscience and morality.” He then devotes the remainder of his response to answer several critiques, including Professor Berg’s assertion that Excluding Religion cannot be squared with the “no-influence approach” to the First Amendment, Professor Garnett’s call for a more “muscular” form of liberalism, and Professor Smith’s criticism that Tebbe has not provided a “unitary principle” for religious freedom. Finally, Tebbe addresses why he even “bother[s]” to write in an area of law where some scholars believe arguments can only convince those readers who are already inclined to agree.

>Read the full response by Nelson Tebbe

In Making Sense of Immigration Law, Professor Cox continues his argument from Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles that the distinction between rules that select migrants and rules that regulate migrants “serves to obfuscate rather than illuminate the important normative principles at stake when we choose amongst competing immigration laws and policies.” In his rebuttal to Professors Schuck’s and Huntington’s responses, Cox contends that in many ways both scholars’ arguments “embody some of the same conceptual mistakes that . . . infect the field as a whole.” Cox first addresses what he believes is a “misapprehen[sion]” of the argument from Organizing Principles: Schuck’s contention that the article wrongly argues for “essential equivalence” between the concepts of “selection” and “regulation.” After clarifying the structure of his argument, Cox turns to Huntington’s claim that there is “some” conceptual distinction between the two types of rules. Cox argues that the distinction offered by Huntington—”between (a) admission and deportation rules and (b) other rules that regulate noncitizens”—can neither be understood as widely shared today nor a viable “dividing criterion” around which agreement could be found.

>Read the full response by Adam B. Cox

As always, please visit PENNumbra to read previous Responses and Debates, or to check out pdfs of the Penn Law Review’s print edition articles.

Volume 119 of The Pocket Part is pleased to announce the publication of The Example of America by Owen Fiss, Sterling Professor of Law at the Yale Law School.  The Example of America is an adapted Essay from the 13th Annual John W. Hager Distinguished Lecture at the University of Tulsa College of Law, where Professor Fiss tackled legal issues involved in the war on terror. ]]>

Volume 119 of The Pocket Part is pleased to announce the publication of The Example of America by Owen Fiss, Sterling Professor of Law at the Yale Law School.  The Example of America is an adapted Essay from the 13th Annual John W. Hager Distinguished Lecture at the University of Tulsa College of Law, where Professor Fiss tackled legal issues involved in the war on terror. ]]> http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/05/the-yale-law-journal-pocket-part-the-example-of-america.html/feed 0 http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/05/vanderbilt-law-review-en-banc.html http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2009/05/vanderbilt-law-review-en-banc.html#comments Tue, 05 May 2009 19:32:05 +0000 Vanderbilt Law Review http://www.solove.org/archives/2009/05/vanderbilt-law-review-en-banc.html

Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc

Reforming the Legal Ethics Curriculum: A Comment on Edward Rubin’s “What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and What To Do About It”

by Lauren Solberg

This Response addresses Edward Rubin’s March 2007 article “What’s Wrong With Langdell’s Method and What to Do About It,” which discusses the need for curriculum reform in U.S. law schools. He proposes a curriculum overhaul to reform, at a minimum, first-year law school courses, and he advocates that law schools develop more concentrations—programs akin to undergraduate majors—to offer students a more cohesive curriculum. Rubin also briefly mentions general student and faculty distaste for the course in professional responsibility required by most law schools but proposes no remedy for this issue.

This Response proposes to supplement Rubin’s suggested comprehensive reform with [...]]]>

Vanderbilt Law Review En Banc

Reforming the Legal Ethics Curriculum: A Comment on Edward Rubin’s “What’s Wrong with Langdell’s Method and What To Do About It”

by Lauren Solberg

This Response addresses Edward Rubin’s March 2007 article “What’s Wrong With Langdell’s Method and What to Do About It,” which discusses the need for curriculum reform in U.S. law schools. He proposes a curriculum overhaul to reform, at a minimum, first-year law school courses, and he advocates that law schools develop more concentrations—programs akin to undergraduate majors—to offer students a more cohesive curriculum. Rubin also briefly mentions general student and faculty distaste for the course in professional responsibility required by most law schools but proposes no remedy for this issue.

This Response proposes to supplement Rubin’s suggested comprehensive reform with just such a remedy. Recent publications suggest that the required professional responsibility course in its current form is indeed disliked, outdated, and fails to teach law students adequately about real-world ethical issues in legal practice. To resolve this problem, law schools should implement a re-tooled legal ethics curriculum that weaves legal ethics into each core course in the law school curriculum. This method of integration, known as the “pervasive method,” will educate students about practical and relevant ethical issues associated with the particular legal discipline in conjunction with the standard course material. It will serve to reduce monotony in the coursework and provide a better setting than the standard Professional Responsibility course for examining real-world ethical issues in legal practice.

This Response will discuss how to implement the pervasive method in the law school setting and the advantages and disadvantages that accompany it.

Interested in writing a response for En Banc? Check out our website to find out how.

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a response to The Federal Common Law of Nations by Anthony J. Bellia Jr. and Bradford R. Clark.

In their Article Professors Bellia and Clark describe the role that the law of nations has played throughout American history. They argue that federal courts have not viewed enforcement of the law of nations as an Article III power to fashion federal common law, but have instead applied rules derived from the law of nations as a way to implement the political branches’ Article I and Article II powers to recognize foreign nations, conduct foreign relations, and decide momentous questions of war and peace. This allocation of powers approach, they contend, best explains the most important [...]]]>

Columbia Law Review’s Sidebar is pleased to announce the publication of a response to The Federal Common Law of Nations by Anthony J. Bellia Jr. and Bradford R. Clark.

In their Article Professors Bellia and Clark describe the role that the law of nations has played throughout American history. They argue that federal courts have not viewed enforcement of the law of nations as an Article III power to fashion federal common law, but have instead applied rules derived from the law of nations as a way to implement the political branches’ Article I and Article II powers to recognize foreign nations, conduct foreign relations, and decide momentous questions of war and peace. This allocation of powers approach, they contend, best explains the most important federal cases involving the law of nations across American history.

Professor Ernest Young’s Response questions the historical account provided by Bellia and Clark on two grounds: first, that the debate over reception of the common law at the federal Constitutional Convention shows greater early skepticism about judge-made common law than Bellia and Clark suggest; and second, that the jurisdictional provisions of Article III covering cases implicating foreign affairs were not intended fully to centralize power over such cases in federal courts because they left concurrent jurisdiction in the state courts. In addition Professor

Young questions the extent to which the Founding Era history is directly relevant to contemporary debates about how to treat customary international law (CIL). He contends that what does the real work in the Bellia and Clark approach is simply constitutionally-grounded concerns about the separation of powers in foreign affairs cases, not anything about CIL per se.

Volume 56, Issue 4 (April 2009)

Articles

A Constitutional Birthright: The State, Parentage, and the Rights Of Newborn Persons (pdf)

James G. Dwyer

“Which Is To Be Master,” The Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Directives Violate Separation Of Powers (pdf)

Linda D. Jellum

Normative Methods for Lawyers (pdf)

Joseph William Singer

Comment

Sex Outside of the Therapy Hour: Practical and Constitutional Limits on Therapist Sexual Misconduct Regulations (pdf)

S. Wesley Gorman

Volume 118 of The Pocket Part is pleased to announce our final publication, The Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial Matching by Natalie Ram. Ram’s piece discusses a new rule requiring federal officials to collect and retain DNA not only from persons convicted of a federal offense, but also from those merely arrested on suspicion of being involved in a federal offense. Among its flaws, this rule exacerbates the tension between the shared nature of genetic information and the standards justifying DNA collection and retention. By linking DNA collection to probable cause, the new regulation threatens to destabilize our understandings about what constitutes probable cause and to put millions of never-arrested individuals under perpetual genetic suspicion.