Category: Law and Psychology

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Money Matters in Ongoing Marriage Law

Married life is characterized by a sharing norm. As I described in an earlier post, spouses commit to and in fact engage deeply in sharing behavior, including a shared family economy. Overwhelmingly, spouses pool economic resources, including labor, and decide together how to allocate them to benefit the family as a whole.

In addition to its affects in the paid labor market (see my last post), sharing money matters inside a functioning marriage.  It shapes the couple relationship as well as each partner individually. Research shows that in an ongoing marriage, money is a relational tool. For example, making money a communal asset is a way to demonstrate intimacy and commitment, and that can nurture a couple’s bond. Yet, in some circumstances, an assignment of resources to just one spouse can also be understood (by both partners) to be appropriate and deserved—a recognition of the individual within a sharing framework. Conversely, it is also possible that spouses’ monetary dealings can undermine individual autonomy and the relationship as well. For example, one person might exercise authority over money in a way that disregards the other. Accordingly, power to influence financial resource allocation within the family is important for individual spouses and for togetherness.

It becomes a special concern then, that sharing patterns in marriage are gendered.  As highlighted in my previous post, role specialization remains a part of modern intimate partner relations. Particularly true for married couples, men continue to perform more as breadwinners, and women more as caregivers. As a result, women tend to have reduced earning power in the market. How does this market asymmetry translate into economic power at home? Happily, in a significant departure from the past, a majority of couples report that they share financial decisionmaking power roughly equally. Indeed, most married couples today endorse gender equality as an important value in their relationship. However, in a significant minority of marriages, spouses agree that husbands have more economic power. For some couples then, a husband’s breadwinning role and/or perhaps his gender, confers authority in contentious money matters.

How should law governing an ongoing marriage respond to these sharing dynamics? Consider this hypothetical fact situation. A husband has a stock account from which he plans to make a gift to his sister who he feels really needs the money. The husband suspects that his wife would not approve of the gift. Even though the wife too loves the sister, she believes the sister is irresponsible with money. Let’s assume that the money in that stock account was acquired while the parties were married, and that it came from the market wages of one or both of the spouses earned during marriage. It was a product of the couple’s shared life. Does contemporary law allow the husband to give his sister the gift without her consent? Without even telling her? How should legal power over the money be allocated?

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Hypotheticals, the Classroom, and Moral Biology

Hypotheticals are a ubiquitous pedagogical tool in both the law and philosophy classrooms. I have recently been thinking about the different functions they serve and whether they are well-suited for the weight we give them. These reflections were prompted by a conference on “Moral Biology,” hosted by the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School (which I co-direct), in cooperation with The Project on Law and Mind Sciences at Harvard Law School, the Gruter Institute, the Harvard Program on Ethics and Health, and the MacArthur Law and Neuroscience Project.

I may blog a little bit later about some other of the marvelous things I learned over these two days, but for now I wanted to concentrate on some thoughts that stemmed from a public portion of the conference that can be seen here, involving Josh Greene from Harvard’s Psychology Department, William Fitzpatrick from the University of Rochester’s Philosophy Department, Adina Roskies from Dartmouth’s Philosophy Department, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong from Duke’s Philosophy Department, and Tim Scanlon, from Harvard’s philosophy department.

At around the 43 to 50 minute mark in the video, Josh discusses Trolley Problems (which ask participants a thought experiment about whether to divert a trolley from one track to another with many versions of the hypothetical) and an experiment done on them by Fiery Cushman (and a collaborator, Switzgable I believe, I could not find the actual paper) in Josh’s lab.  In the experiment, before being asked whether they would endorse the principle of double effect, ethicists with PhDs were asked to reason about variants of the Trolley problem (switch vs. footbridge) presented in different orders. The experiment found that if one varied the order in which the versions were presented (but always presented all of them,) ethicists reached different conclusions about whether they would endorse the principle. [This is Josh's description in the video, again if anyone can find the paper he is discussing I will try and like to that].  The result is surprising in that it appears even those with PhD training in ethics are susceptible to order effects in reasoning about a very fundamental issue.

As Josh concedes, and others (in the panel and in written pieces discussing his work emphasize) the fact that these ordering effects occur is not itself fatal to the enterprise of philosophical analysis using intuitions. It depends on further views about how one uses these kinds of intuitions in the analysis. For present purposes, though, I want to partially side-step that question in favor of thinking about the law classroom, and how this experiment might should us a little more careful about the way we use hypotheticals.

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Litigating Toward Settlement

What is the relationship between litigation and settlement?  In a new working paper, Christina Boyd and I explore that question using data from federal trial dockets.  Our basic intuition is that motion practice propels cases toward faster settlements, as it unlocks information about the facts, the parties’ strategies, the resources they will spend on the case, and (sometimes) what the judge thinks of the merits.  Our results essentially support such hypotheses: the mere filing of a motion speeds case settlement. Moreover, “motions which are granted are more immediately important to the settlement rate than motions denied, plaintiff victories are more important than defendant victories, motions about unclear areas of law are more important than motions about settled law, and motions later in cases are more important that motions earlier in cases.”  These findings are suggestive.  Though motion practice is often thought of as parasitic, driven by agency costs, and part the problem of litigation, our results imply that it has significant pro-social consequences.  Indeed, paying homage to Gilson, why not re-imagine lawyers as canny litigation costs engineers?

We also found some nifty case effects.  Women judges were on average (as Boyd had previously established) better at encouraging settlement than men: “the likelihood of a case settling in any given month is, on average, 25% larger when a female judge presides than when a male judge does.” Also, imbalance between the size of the firms representing the plaintiff and the defendant had a significant influence on compromise’s timing, as the figure below illustrates:

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Mechanical Turk, Research Ethics, and Research Assistants

A recent faculty workshop by my witty and brilliant colleague Jonathan Zittrain on “ubiquitous human computing,” (this youtube video captures in a different form what he was talking about ), prompted me to thinking about some ways in which platforms like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, interface with university research and research ethics in interesting ways.

For those unfamiliar, Mechanical Turk allows you to farm out a variety of small tasks (label this image, enter date of this .pdf to a spreadsheet, take a photo of yourself with the sign “will turk for food,” etc) at a price per unit you set. Millions of anonymous users can then do the task for you and collect the bounty, a form of microwork.

As Jonathan detailed, this raises a host of fascinating issues, but I want to focus on two that are closer to bioethics.

First, I have begun to see some legal academics recruiting populations for experimental work using Mechanical Turk, and there is an emerging literature on the pros and cons of subject recruitment from these populations. Are Mechanical Turkers “research subjects” within the legal (primarily the Common Rule if one receives federal funding) or broader ethical sense of the term? Should they be? Take as a tangible example the implicit bias research of the kind Mahzarin R. Banarji has made famous, and imagine it was done over something like Mechanical Turk. How (if at all) should the anonymity of the subject, the lack of subject-experimenter relationship of any sort, the piecemeal nature of the task, etc, change the way an institutional review board reviews the research? It is a mantra in the research ethics community that informed consent is supposed to be a “process” not a document, but how can that process take place in this anonymous static cyberspace environment?

Second, consider research assistance.

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 57, Issue 5 (June 2010)

Volume 57, Issue 5 (June 2010)

Articles

Introduction to the Symposium Issue: Sexuality and Gender Law: The Difference a Field Makes Nan D. Hunter 1129
Elusive Coalitions: Reconsidering the Politics of Gender and Sexuality Kathryn Abrams 1135
The Sex Discount Kim Shayo Buchanan 1149
What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation Mary Ann Case 1199
Lawyering for Marriage Equality Scott L. Cummings Douglas NeJaime 1235
Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From Malignant to Benign to Productive William N. Eskridge, Jr. 1333
Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimination Suzanne B. Goldberg 1375
The Dissident Citizen Sonia K. Katyal 1415
Raping Like a State Teemu Ruskola 1477
The Gay Tipping Point Kenji Yoshino 1537

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VICTIMS’ UNDERSTANDINGS AND MOTIVATIONS IN PROCESSING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS CASES IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH

The proliferation of international human rights treaties, committees and courts over the last sixty years represents enormous achievement. International human rights laws are now asserted throughout the world by individuals of many cultures and traditions. Yet, at the same time human rights ideas and principles continue to have difficulty in establishing their relevance in the daily lives of those who are geographically and culturally distant from international institutions (Stacy, 2009). In my forthcoming piece in Human Rights Quarterly, I argue that notwithstanding the fact that giving voice to those oppressed is a main function of the international human rights movement (Baxi, 2009), and that the meaning of human rights must be grounded in local culture at grassroots levels, relatively little scholarship bases its analyses on the discourse of those actually involved in human rights violations cases in the Global South. What are victims’ conceptions and expectations of human rights and their agendas and experiences in formal and informal justice systems processing their cases? This knowledge is critical to enable greater understanding of victims’ needs, epistemologies and micro-realities in order to innovatively engage the controversies in international human rights theory and practice and to effect realizable change for the subjects of human rights in the Global South.

I provide some such data in my forthcoming book based on my empirical research in India, detailed in my earlier post. This includes voices of female victims of violence discussing their comprehensions, objectives, and practices in processing their cases (74 interviews with victims, and 24 with their family members). I link victims’ discourse to norm diffusion theory in international relations (Risse et al. 1999) and to vernacularization theory in law and anthropology (Merry, 2006), which engage the issue of permeation of human rights standards to grassroots levels.

In terms of female victims of violence in India where CEDAW was ratified in 1993, I show that notwithstanding State enactments of laws in line with international human rights obligations, and the dissemination of human rights concepts by transnational activists and domestic NGOs who work to make them meaningful within particular societies, the subjectivities of victims of violence in two major cities (Delhi, Bangalore) as illustrated in their discourse on their motivations and aims in approaching formal courts and informal justice mechanisms suggest little if any human rights emancipation. Those with little education had either never heard of human rights or lacked an understanding of their meaning. More educated victims who had a general sense of human rights concepts knew little of specifics. Moreover, both groups generally felt that fundamental human rights ideas, though something positive, were primarily of use on an inspirational level.

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Paradoxes in Formal Courts versus Informal Justice / Quasi-Legal Processing of Human Rights Cases in India

Continuing from my previous post, I will elaborate here on some of the initial arguments from my forthcoming book, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THEORY, GLOBAL STANDARDS AND SOUTHERN ACTORS’ PRAXIS based on the empirical research I conducted throughout India, which I described earlier. Some of these issues are discussed in my forthcoming article, International Human Rights and Southern Realities, 112 HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY (2010), HTTP://PAPERS.SSRN.COM/SOL3/PAPERS.CFM?ABSTRACT_ID=1592042 . There, I argue that on the basis that a culturally plural universalism in human rights is an acceptable aim, we are in dire need of a new integrated analytical framework, one that is grounded not only in the understandings and perceptions of Southern actors (i.e. individuals from the Global South), but that simultaneously imbeds their perspectives within the realities of human rights case processing in the legally pluralistic Global South. This involves not only formal courts but also informal justice or quasi-legal non-state mechanisms processing human rights cases.

PARADOXES IN FORMAL COURTS VERSUS INFORMAL JUSTICE / QUASI-LEGAL MECHANISMS IN INDIA - Paradoxically, the data suggest that the bulk of lawyer advocates and judges working in the lower criminal and civil courts, as well as court-linked ‘lok adalats’ (mediations)–who process great numbers of cases involving serious violence against women involving food deprivation as a means of punishment, physical and mental torture, and rape–utilize international human rights principles to a far lesser extent, if at all, in dealing with these cases than do some informal justice / quasi-legal mechanisms processing the very same type cases. In contrast, the non-lawyer mediators/arbitrators in the informal justice mechanisms studied—who  were not only not formally legally trained, but many of whom had poor literacy skills—were far more geared towards resolving cases utilizing principles of international human rights law and CEDAW in particular (e.g. equality, autonomy).

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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THEORY, GLOBAL STANDARDS AND SOUTHERN ACTORS’ PRAXIS – Some highlights from a forthcoming book

My second book is entitled INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: THEORY, GLOBAL STANDARDS AND SOUTHERN ACTORS’ PRAXIS (forthcoming). It is based on data I collected over three years in eight states of India and in seven languages while I was a postdoctoral research fellow at Columbia Law School and the LSE (London School of Economics, Dept. of Law, where I continue to be a research fellow). This data was collected with the help of eight teams of about 200 research assistants throughout India. The United Nations Development Program (Delhi), 11 law school Deans, domestic judges, state legal services authorities, local district and high courts, NGO’s and human rights/public interest lawyers throughout India were also involved in the project. The dataset comprises 400 semi-structured depth interviews and questionnaires from victims, accused, lawyers, judges, arbitrators and mediators in 193 cases involving human rights violations of serious violence against women. It also includes case hearing observations in lower formal courts, court-linked mediations known as “lok adalats” and non-state, quasi-legal women’s arbitrations known as “mahila panchayats” and “nari adalats” (British Academy Award PDF/2006-09/64).

Similar to my first book, the South Asian research analyzes legal and lay actors’ understandings, objectives and experiences during case processing. However, the South Asian research builds on and takes in new directions the theories and conceptual arguments I developed in PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION . In particular, it focuses on local, Southern actors’ perspectives (i.e. individuals from the Global South) on the permeation and perceived relevance of international human rights laws and norms in formal courts and non-state informal justice mechanisms.

Drawing on interdisciplinary scholarship (international relations, law & anthropology, law & development, and victimology literatures), the book questions how the current proliferation of international human rights has shaped case processing systems at grassroots levels. Expanding on my North American findings, Southern legal and lay actors provide local perspectives on non-western models of formal courts and informal justice processes as forms of legal pluralism. I examine how, if at all, international human rights laws and norms (e.g. CEDAW 1979, ICCPR 1976, UN Declaration on Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power 1985) have permeated the processing of these cases, comparing how receptive the different spaces of lower courts versus quasi-legal regimes are to claims made from the international sphere. I further examine the theoretical ideas informing these processes (including norm diffusion theory, universalism versus cultural relativism, restorative justice, and feminist critiques of mainstream human rights paradigms) and how these ideas are understood by those on the ground. The research also highlights the interdependence of all human rights and the link between human rights, women’s rights and development, which has been the subject of much debate. Finally, the findings provide a critique on the boundaries created both between formal and informal justice, as well as between ratified international law and the permeation of international human rights norms in case processing at grass roots levels.

Interestingly, depending on arbitrary factors including parties’ geographic and/or socioeconomic positions within India, the same type cases might be heard in either criminal or civil lower courts (magistrates/sessions/district) or in the above-mentioned court-linked or non-state quasi-legal mediations or arbitrations. The dataset additionally comprises “in-chambers mediations”, which are newly exported forms of American justice to India. These are case management tools that include ADR and plea bargaining methods, which have been and are being taught to Indian judges and advocates by a number of Californian judges and US Department of Justice representatives with the aim of deflecting cases from the overburdened Indian courts where trial waits of 10 years or more are not uncommon. This is being done predominantly for US commercial interests. However, these case management tools also affect the processing of violence against women cases.

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Book Review: Richards’s Fundamentalism in American Religion and Law

David A.J. Richards, Fundamentalism in American Religion and Law: Obama’s Challenge to Patriarchy’s Threat to Democracy, Cambridge University Press, 2010.

“Fundamentalist religious doctrines and autocratic and dictatorial rulers will reject the ideas of public reason and deliberative democracy.”

Mr. Richards takes the epigraph (in full, above) to his volume from a late essay by John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,”  in which fundamentalist doctrines—whose comprehensive vision of the truth conflicts with the principles of deliberative democracy—are presented as a threat to a reasonable and just society.  Rawls was content to state his case, as the epigraph shows, in a measured tone.  One finds less restraint and greater risk in Richards, whose spirited challenge to religious and legal fundamentalism is noisy, passionate, and deeply personal.
As the courts have led the United States closer to civility, permitting women and gay men to participate in democracy as free and equal citizens, the reactionary forces of fundamentalism have struggled to keep the newly liberated in a state of “moral slavery” (e.g., 31) where women are considered weak-willed and best kept for child-rearing, and homosexuality a vice.  “Moral slavery” is the status quo ante bellum, a return to the hierarchical order that governed before the culture wars, before the civil rights movement and the progressive recognition of the right to intimate life.  Each fundamentalism is a project of restoration: originalism that reads the Constitution as though over Madison’s shoulder; New Natural law that draws moral principles from the vanguard of the 13th century; Protestant fundamentalism that insists on demonizing homosexuality based on a literal reading of scripture; the theology of Joseph Smith that promotes the sexual order of the (original) patriarchs.  These Edenic visions of a world that once was ordered as fundamentalists would have it ordered—these rejections of Rawls’ principle of public reason—are what Richards finds so dangerous, and against which he writes so movingly.

Even a sympathetic reader will have quibbles.  When, for instance, Richards writes in his critique of the unreasonableness of originalism that “[n]o approach to constitutional interpretation may be regarded as reasonable if its leading advocates never pursue its requirements consistently” (54), one wonders what he means by “leading advocates,” “never pursue,” “requirements,” and “consistently.”  So much has been written about originalism that one is inclined to believe it exists, but Richards’ slippery language does little to raise the phantom, and does far less to dispel it.  The same may be said for fundamentalism and for patriarchy, neither of which are well defined.  The word “originalism” is, in the volume under consideration, a circumlocution meant to call forth Scalia and Thomas, Bork and Berger without naming them individually.   Too much is made of the ideologues whose personalities are, after all, public projections of greater intellectual consistency than is to be found in the projectors, and too little is made of fundamentalism as a public event.  One may speak about John Finnis and Billy Sunday, but having done so what has been said?  Have the prejudices of the average fundamentalist, whoever or whatever that is, come into clearer focus?  Are the names of “leading advocates” the only clarity to be had?

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Some data from PERCEPTIONS IN LITIGATION AND MEDIATION: LAWYERS, DEFENDANTS, PLAINTIFFS AND GENDERED PARTIES (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009)

I want to provide some support for the claims made in my previous post, summarizing the main findings of my book Perceptions in Litigation and Mediation. Below are two of the many areas that support the “parallel worlds” theme relating to the different understandings of legal case processing and case resolution as between legal actors and lay litigants.

CHAPTER 2 EXCERPTS ON UNDERSTANDINGS OF WHAT PLAINTIFFS WANT:

Chapter 2 explores and attempts to make sense of an issue fundamental to litigation in general as well as mediation in particular: What do plaintiffs want? Why plaintiffs sue, and their consequent litigation aims should have a marked impact on their objectives and experiences in litigation and litigation-linked mediations. Likewise, attorneys’ objectives, approaches to their cases and conduct throughout litigation and mediation are affected by their basic understandings of what those who commence these suits want; that is, what the cases are about. Little is known about what litigants really want from the civil justice system and what they aim to achieve. Consequently we have little knowledge of whether litigants’ real objectives are met by the realities of civil litigation including litigation–linked processes such as mediation.

PHYSICIAN LAWYERS: IT’S ONLY ABOUT MONEY

Virtually all physician lawyers were of the strong belief that plaintiffs had sued for financial compensation alone. Even the two who mentioned that non-fiscal objectives might also have been involved put much emphasis on claimants’ primary monetary aims.

The following excerpts are typical of defense physician lawyers in answering the global question, ‘WHAT IN YOUR VIEW WERE THE PLAINTIFF’S AIMS IN LITIGATING?’

‘My view is the issue was money, to compensate for the pain associated with the deterioration, and to compensate for lost income associated with the surgery that was necessary. SO IT WAS MONEY ALONE? I believe so.’ Male attorney-50’s-prescription alleged to have destroyed bone tissue, resulting in 40-year-old plaintiff undergoing hip replacement surgery-litigating several months

‘To settle it. Their assumption was that this would never go to trial; that they would get money out of this beforehand. SO, YOU FEEL IT IS SOLELY AN ISSUE OF OBTAINING FINANCIAL COMPENSATION Yes, but I also think that they are of the view that if they obtain financial compensation it will make…them feel better. I think they’re misguided on that.’ Female attorney-30’s-abdomen not left intact after surgery litigating several months

‘I think in virtually all cases it’s directly driven by their desire for compensation…The sole aim, you know, in most of the cases it is to be financially compensated for the wrong. And I would say that’s in 99% of the cases I do, that’s what plaintiffs want.’ male attorney-30’s-child fatality case-litigating 4 years Read More