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Category: Intellectual Property

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Bring Out Your Brands, More Brand Scholarship

If you’re looking for some perspectives on brands, maybe some reading for holiday trips or early conferences, the first part of the Brand New World Symposium is up at the UC Davis Law Review site. The Review is publishing, I believe, almost all the presenters’ work, which is a testament to the group that came together for the event. My piece will be in part two; more on that later. Part I kicks off with Mario Biagioli, Anupam Chander, and Madhavi Sunder’s introduction. It continues with work by law, i-school, design, business, anthropology, history of science, history of art & architecture, and Chinese studies professors from around the world. I am thrilled to see this work in print. The multi-disciplinary perspectives and depth make me even more excited for the next part of my brand work.

In addition, my friend, Paul Duguid, who has a piece in the symposium, also has a piece in Enterprise and Society called Information in the Mark and the Marketplace: A Multivocal Account (pay wall however). He digs into information theory and trademarks (a subject with which I have been playing), history of union marks, issues around producers as in mark holders versus the people involved with the actual production of goods, and much much more. The material about the politics and race issues with early marks systems and the application of Bhaktin to marks made this work a fun, insightful read. Paul has been a favorite sounding board and source for my work. This article adds to that respect and gratitude.

So into the New Year with more on brands to come.

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Digital Death – What Happens to Your Digital Stuff

What happens to your to your email and other digital content after you die? That question continues to pop up. Back in 2008, I wondered about the issue in a paper called Property, Persona, and Preservation. I noticed a sort of cloud effect. Once we moved email to the web, we were distanced from our creations. For those interested in the theories behind my argument, read the whole paper. But if you want to skip to the policy and application material, skip to part III starting at page 111.

In fact, while I was at Google, Google and a few other email providers started to come up with ways to let heirs access content and to let creators of content signal whether they wanted that work to be shared with heirs. Those solutions tracked some ideas I offered. I am not sure whether the paper was part of their reading but was happy to see the changes. Nonetheless as Pew shows, how we preserve, protect, and control that work will continue to be a problem. The Pew report notes that states and the Uniform Law Commission are starting to come up with laws to address digital estate issues. I will write a follow up to this post, but for now, I offer that any solution should allow Service Providers the ability to set defaults and users to alter them. In short, if someone wants to have an email account for things he or she would rather not have known, the user should be able to click a setting that says “This email account will self-destruct upon the provision of a death certificate.” Now we might want to let an executor verify these wishes and so on rather than relying on Service Provider’s insight or discretion. Still a clear signal about what one wants can be built into how we preserve or destroy our digital history.

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NSA, Its Seal, and the First Amendment

Speech, Citizenry, and the Market in real life. It seems the NSA has invoked a public law to prevent someone from making parody NSA T-shirts. The shirt displayed the seal and the words “THE NSA, The only part of the government that actually listens.” The NSA was not amused. The first site to offer the shirts stopped offering the shirts after a letter from the NSA (apparently they were able to talk about that one for now). The NSA wrote to one online outlet, “The NSA seal is protected by Public Law 86-36, which states that it is not permitted for “…any person to use the initials ‘NSA,’ the words ‘National Security Agency’ and the NSA seal without first acquiring written permission from the Director of NSA.” The company, Liberty Maniacs, has sued under the First Amendment. That case may be near settlement.

In the Liberty Maniacs case, the obvious parody should suffice. If not, I suggest that the NSA is public figure entity and so mocking it by using its name and logo (just like we use a person’s name and face) should be protected under that reasoning as well. That said, I would think that under Alvarez, most special laws regarding seals, the Olympics, and so on will need some extra explanation to stay in place.

The video below is from Cafe Press which also offers the shirts and mugs.

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Santa’s Brand

Quietbook has a mock re-branding Santa guide up. It is a “refresh.” Refresh. The word triggered a flashback to corpspeak where irony goes to die. I scanned the rest of the page. “*Santa* is a Concept, not an idea. It’s an Emotion, not a feeling. It’s both Yesterday and Today. And it’s Tomorrow as well.” Ah yes. They get it. The Santa Brand book is a great example of the way branders operate. I dove into those ideas in my paper From Trademarks to Brands. These folks take you on a similar but funnier journey. Good times and a belated but truly meant Merry Christmas and Happy Holidays to all.

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On Lust, Dust, and Books

Bow down. Bow down to the queen of books. As a kid, if a foot touched a book, we employed a hand gesture, akin to genuflection, to make up for our disrespect. It’s an Indian thing. Doris Lessing’s Nobel speech captures why that gesture makes sense to me. It makes her my queen of books. We have the luxury of arguing over whether books are findable, searchable. We should pay attention to what Lessing said. In 2007 Lessing spoke of Africa, dust filled and hungry for books:

“Please send us books when you get back to London,” one man says. “They taught us to read but we have no books.” Everybody I met, everyone, begged for books.

And I do mean hungry:

Not long ago a friend who had been in Zimbabwe told me about a village where people had not eaten for three days, but they were still talking about books and how to get them, about education.

Lessing captures the faith that education will raise someone from poverty. Perhaps it is ironic that she attacks the Internet and blogging while wondering from where and the publishing of ideas will emerge in Africa. But her criticism seems to me more about the thin nature and “inanities” of much online than the technology itself. Her real concern is that reading begets reading and writing. She focuses on the simple fact that people want to read and write. Some learn from labels on jars or torn sections of novels left behind by those fortunate to have read the whole novel and who tore it for travel ease. In contrast, “We have a treasure-house of literature, going back to the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans. It is all there, this wealth of literature, to be discovered again and again by whoever is lucky enough to come upon it. A treasure. Suppose it did not exist. How impoverished, how empty we would be.”

For all the debate on scanning books and incentives to create, I have to stop and say rot and rubbish. Get the books, the texts to everyone. Now. Don’t tell me someone does not want to read or learn math or engage. Build and reinforce the culture that wanted to feed the body and the mind. As Lessing concluded:

That poor girl trudging through the dust, dreaming of an education for her children, do we think that we are better than she is – we, stuffed full of food, our cupboards full of clothes, stifling in our superfluities? I think it is that girl, and the women who were talking about books and an education when they had not eaten for three days, that may yet define us.

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Google Books and the Social (Justice) Contract

In channeling Judge Baer, Judge Chin at long last dropped the other shoe in the judicial effort to bring new information technology uses for copyrighted works fully in to the copyright regime. Congress has been slow to address the challenge of tapping the full copyright social utility/justice potential of these advances and it’s been left to the courts to sort it all out in the context of individual adversarial conflicts. Poignantly, when Jonathan Band asks “What [was] the Authors Guild fighting for?”, he also illustrates the tree-myopic/forest blind nature of the Guild’s position. What the Guild failed to see is that property rights fit into a larger socio-legal system: Yes your neighbor is precluded from trespassing on to your land but your ability to engage in whatever “private” activity strikes your fancy while thereon is limited by the legal system as a whole. Your land is individual private property, not an independent sovereign state.

 

Judge Baer reminded rights holders of this aspect of the social contract and now Judge Chin has made it clear to the Guild that this is not some narrow, eccentric application of copyright social utility. Property rights, including copyrights, exist to advance society, and to state the obvious, information technology has evolved our society. Like all other rights, customs, and expectations, however, whereas some aspects of copyright as previously envisioned fit comfortably into our new configuration others don’t fit at all. And when that ill-fit impedes important social progress modifications must be made, and if necessary, expectations altered.

 

The courts’ reasoning in both Hathitrust and Google Books moves fair use jurisprudence further toward the express consideration of copyright social justice in the application of the doctrine. As Kevin Smith notes, the judges in both cases have seized this opportunity to retrofit fair use, and it seems to me that these decisions push beyond questions of aesthetic and even functional transformation and pave the way for weighing social transformation in assessing the first fair use factor. I have also applied some of the legal conclusions drawn from Bill Graham Archives and other Grateful Dead archive projects to specific copyright social justice needs, for example, that of socially beneficent access to the literature of the Harlem Renaissance. Like some other historically and culturally important works, many of these books enjoy only marginal commercial market value and similar to the information harvested through data mining, “digital fair use” may be the only means by which to return these works to the general public. The social resuscitation of significant works through mass-digitization, and other uses that serve important and otherwise unattainable copyright social objectives, should be considered a purpose that satisfies the first fair use factor.

 

Authors and other copyrights holders would do well to finally get ahead of the information technology curve. The Authors Guild’s mistake was not so much in the effort to preserve what they considered to be their property rights or even in the effort to extract every conceivable drop of revenue out those rights, but rather, in failing to accept that in order for these rights to retain any value they must function as part of a thriving societal system or eventually forfeit the basis for legal recognition. In the analog world, the public’s access to most books remains largely dependent upon the vagaries of the commercial marketplace. Digital information technology has presented the opportunity to compile the world’s books toward the creation of global libraries accessible to every human being on a socially equitable basis. To believe that analog social inequity will be permitted to endure indefinitely in the face of digital information possibilities is simply unrealistic. Keeping in mind that the stimulation, perpetuation, and re-ignition of the cultural expression/dissemination/inspiration combustive cycle is the raison d’etre of copyright will enable authors to embrace digital change and as Gil Scott Heron sang, possibly even direct the change rather than simply be put through it.

 

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Google Books and Author’s Rights

I agree with James Grimmelmann that the Google Books decision is a bit anticlimactic (although the appeal has the potential to add suspense by bringing the case back from the dead). After last October’s decision in Authors Guild v. Hathitrust, the only question really was whether Judge Chin would distinguish HathiTrust on the grounds that the defendants there were nonprofit institutions of higher education, while the defendant here was a commercial entity. To be sure, Judge Chin was not bound by Judge Baer’s analysis that HathiTrust’s use was transformative and did not in any way harm the market for the works at issue,  but these holdings were so consistent with precedent in the Second and Ninth Circuit that it was hard to imagine that Judge Chin would disagree with them. That left the commercial/non-commercial distinction, which has become far less significant in recent years in cases involving transformative uses.

Both judges’ recognition of the enormous social utility of creating a searchable index of books, and the absence of harm to authors caused by such an index (to the contrary, the index benefits authors by making their works more discoverable), highlights the mystery at the heart of these cases: What is the Authors Guild fighting for? Why did it not settle last year, when the publishers dropped their suit against Google? Why did it continue to pursue its litigation against HathiTrust after HathiTrust abandoned its orphan works project?

For some Authors Guild members, it might be about the money. They may believe that there is a pot of gold at the end of the Google rainbow. If the Internet could make instant millionaires (if not billionaires) out of all these kids who express themselves through Internet acronyms, emoticons, and 140 character tweets, then surely authors who spend years writing finely crafted books deserve a share of that fortune.

For others, it seems to be a matter of principle. But exactly what principle? Apparently, that no one should use their works without their permission. While they may agree with fair use in the abstract, they oppose it as applied to their works. The fact that the use is socially beneficial and does not harm them economically is irrelevant. I would amend James’s “three c” formulation with a fourth c: creators should have complete control over copies.

The Authors Guild’s belief in complete control is based more on the Continental “author’s rights” (droit d’auteur) tradition than on the Anglo-American utilitarian tradition. In the author’s rights approach, copyright springs not from statutes but from natural law. The relationship between the author and his work is intimate and indivisible. By contrast, in the Anglo-American system, copyright is not a response to natural law, but rather is a matter of legislative choice directed at incentivizing the creation of works for the benefit of society.  The Anglo-American utilitarian approach in theory provides only as much protection as is necessary to encourage creative activity, while the author’s rights approach provides more robust protections of both economic rights and moral rights such as the right of attribution and integrity.  Historically, the difference between the two approaches translated into longer copyright terms and narrower exceptions in author’s rights jurisdictions.

However, in response to lobbying by rights-holders, Congress has enacted certain features of author’s rights systems — for example, the ever-increasing copyright term. The first U.S. copyright act provided a term of 14 years, renewable for another 14 years, for a total of 28 years. Now, the copyright term matches the European Union’s term of life of the author plus 70 years.

Efforts are underway to import other author’s rights features. The U.S. Copyright Office just released a report recommending that Congress consider adoption of a resale royalty (droit de suite) for visual artists. Under this framework, a visual artist would receive a percentage of the amount paid for a work each time it was resold by a third party.  A resale royalty is in effect a tax on the sale of copyright products and is directly contrary to the long-established first sale doctrine.

The complete control over copyrighted works sought by the Authors Guild and reflected by proposals such a resale royalty are inconsistent with the public interest purpose of our copyright system. Fortunately, Judge Chin, and Judge Baer before him, recognized that the objective of copyright is not to enrich rights-holders, but “to advance the progress of the arts and sciences.”

 

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Software Patents

On Friday the Supreme Court granted certiorari in CLS Bank v. Alice Corp, an en banc decision of the Federal Circuit that addressed the subject-matter eligibility of software patents.  I’ll have more to say about this in the coming months.  My initial impression, though, is that watching the Supreme Court handle patent cases is like watching one of those old Mr. Magoo cartoons.  The Justices stumble around and come close to disaster after disaster, but they somehow manage to avoid trouble.  We’ll see if that holds this time.

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More Patent Fun, New York Times and another DC event

My paper with Gerard Magliocca made the New York Times in a piece called “Beyond 3-D Printers’ Magic, Possible Legal Wrangling,” and the fun continues. With patent reform on the table (pdf to the bill), the New America Foundation is holding a conference called Just How Broken Is the Patent System?. I will be on the kick-off panel with my friend Adam Mossoff. After some jousting over patents, property, and more with the help of Annie Lowery, the day will turn to industry folks, policy wonks, and more professors, to get into health and patents, green innovation, patent assertion, fixes to the patent system, and a keynote by Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission.

It promises to be a fun day. Hope to see folks there.

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Plant Patents

Here’s something sort or random that I wonder about from time to time.  Why do we have a separate category of plant patents?  In other words, is there any good explanation for why a separate statute governing plant patents was enacted, and is there any valid reason for treating plants differently from other utility patents?  It is a curiosity in that we use the same patent requirements for all other functional inventions.  (Design patents are distinct and have their own issues, but leave that aside).  Plant patents are probably an inadequately theorized subject, for anyone who is looking for a topic.