Archive for the ‘Immigration’ Category

Pretext, the Rule of Law, and the Good Official

posted by Jeffrey Kahn

How should citizens in a republic bound by the rule of law regard the pretextual use of law by state officials?  If the United States Supreme Court is any indicator of the answer in our own republic, we are pretty ambivalent about pretext. 

Sometimes we don’t care very much.  In its most well-known case on the subject, Whren v. United States (1996), the Court upheld the pretextual use of the traffic code (which was prolix enough to be violated sooner or later by just about any car on the road).  Whren’s car was stopped by a vice squad cop who had a hunch (but not probable cause to believe) that Whren had drugs in his car.  One lesson of this case is that you should always signal before making a turn.  Justice Scalia, writing for a unanimous Court, had another one: the police are free to do “under the guise of enforcing the traffic code what they would like to do for different reasons.”  In other words, a green light to pretextual traffic stops.

Sometimes, we care a great deal.  In Kelo v. City of New London (2005), the Supreme Court categorically rejected the idea that government officials may “be allowed to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when [their] actual purpose was to bestow a private benefit.”  Likewise, interpreting Title VII in their concurrence in Ricci v. DeStefano (2009) (which concerned a city fire department), Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas highlighted the subjective component of liability in a civil suit for employment discrimination in a disparate-treatment case: the employer is liable if its facially legitimate reason for a decision turns out to be “just a pretext for discrimination.”  Justice Frankfurter long ago chastised the Court for sustaining a law “because Congress wrapped the legislation in the verbal cellophane of a revenue measure.”  The concept of limited and enumerated powers seems to suggest a general disapproval of pretext.

Does repeated pretextualism — whether one is making or enforcing the law — weaken the rule of law?  When tempted to use a law for an unintended purpose, how should the “good” official (read the adjective however you like) distinguish an innovative use from a destructive one?  My own motivation for this research stems from concern that using law to achieve an objective that the law was clearly unintended to achieve might do something destructive to the rule of law itself.  Maybe it does some harm to the official who wields power in that pretextual way, too, an official who may be the worst-placed government agent to exercise the sort of discretion that creative administration of the law demands.  Pretextualism may be habit-forming and, like cigarettes, unhealthy.

After the break, I’ll share my working definition of pretext and two cases separated by more than fifty years, but adopting the same pretextual technique to evade restrictions on government action.  One involves a Soviet spy whose case troubled the Supreme Court so much that the Court heard oral argument twice.  Surprisingly, that case foretold and influenced the “easy” Whren case.  The other involves a former college football player caught up in the current “War on Terror.”  That case, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, was decided in May, also referencing Whren, but this time without such unanimity and with a lot more unease about pretext.

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  November 29, 2011 at 3:15 pm   Posted in: Administrative Law, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure, Immigration, Supreme Court, Uncategorized   Print This Post   No Comments

The Know-Nothing Party Platform

posted by Gerard Magliocca

I have now reached the year 1856 in the Bingham biography, which means I am working through some interesting materials on the Know-Nothing (or American) Party, which was a strong nativist and anti-Catholic movement that competed with the Republicans in 1854 and 1856. (Bingham pandered to anti immigrant sentiment off and on throughout his congressional career.)  Some of the planks in the Know-Nothing platform are startling and had credibility because Millard Fillmore, the former President, was the Party’s presidential nominee.  For example:

–  ”Americans must rule America, and to this end native-born citizens should be selected for all State, Federal, and municipal offices of government employment, in preference to all others.”

–  ”A change in the laws of naturalization, making a continued residence of twenty-one years, of all not heretofore provided for, an indispensable requisite for citizenship hereafter, and excluding all paupers, and persons convicted of crime, from landing upon our shores.”

  October 19, 2011 at 5:41 pm   Posted in: Immigration, Uncategorized   Print This Post   2 Comments

From Safety Net to Dragnet

posted by Frank Pasquale

The fourth Class Crits conference will be held in DC in about a month. Titled “Criminalizing Economic Inequality,” it focuses on the US’s “increasing reliance on the criminal justice system to make and enforce economic policy.” A few recent items highlight the conference’s timeliness:

1) Barbara Ehrenreich on “How America Turned Poverty Into a Crime:” It’s hard to believe that Ehrenreich’s Nickeled and Dimed came out 10 years ago. As she’s written in the book’s re-issue, things have only gotten worse for the struggling families whose plight she chronicled in the book. Ehrenreich describes how officials at public assistance programs treat many beneficiaries with contempt.  One needy mom named Kristen says caseworkers “treat you like a bum. They act like every dollar you get is coming out of their own paychecks.”

Nationally, according to Kaaryn Gustafson of the University of Connecticut Law School, “applying for welfare is a lot like being booked by the police.” There may be a mug shot, fingerprinting, and lengthy interrogations as to one’s children’s true paternity. The ostensible goal is to prevent welfare fraud, but the psychological impact is to turn poverty itself into a kind of crime. Read the rest of this post »

  August 19, 2011 at 10:17 pm   Posted in: Criminal Law, Culture, Current Events, Immigration, Law and Inequality, Privacy   Print This Post   One Comment

UCLA Law Review Vol. 58, Issue 5 (June 2011)

posted by UCLA Law Review

Volume 58, Issue 5 (June 2011)

Articles

Melville B. Nimmer Memorial Lecture: What Is a Copyrighted Work? Why Does It Matter?	Paul Goldstein	1175
Equal Opportunity for Arbitration	Hiro N. Aragaki	1189
Asymmetrical Jurisdiction	Matthew I. Hall	1257

Comments

Multiracial Work: Handing Over the Discretionary Judicial Tool of Multiracialism	Scot Rives	1303
Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, and Your Queer: The Need and Potential for Advocacy for LGBTQ Immigrant Detainees	CT Turney	1343

  June 29, 2011 at 11:42 pm   Posted in: Immigration, Intellectual Property, Law Rev (UCLA), LGBT, Race   Print This Post   No Comments

YLJ Online Symposium: A Republic of Statutes

posted by Yale Law Journal

  March 31, 2011 at 1:25 pm   Posted in: Conferences, Government Secrecy, Health Law, Immigration, Law Rev (Yale)   Print This Post   No Comments

Randomization, Intake Systems, and Triage

posted by Jaya Ramji-Nogales

Thanks to Jim and Cassandra for their carefully constructed study of the impact of an offer from the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau for representation before the Massachusetts Division of Unemployment Assistance, and to all of the participants in the symposium for their thoughtful contributions.  What Difference Representation? continues to provoke much thought, and as others have noted, will have a great impact on the access to justice debate.  I’d like to focus on the last question posed in the paper — where do we go from here? — and tie this in with questions about triage raised by Richard Zorza and questions about intake processes raised by Margaret Monsell.   The discussion below is informed by my experience as a legal service provider in the asylum system, a legal arena that the authors note is  strikingly different from the unemployment benefits appeals process described in the article.

My first point is that intake processes vary significantly between different service providers offering representation in similar and different areas of the law.  In my experience selecting cases for the asylum clinics at Georgetown and Yale, for example, we declined only cases that were frivolous, and at least some intake folks (yours truly included) preferred to select the more difficult cases, believing that high-quality student representation could make the most difference in these cases.  Surely other legal services providers select for the cases that are most likely to win, under different theories about the most effective use of resources.  WDR does not discuss which approach HLAB takes in normal practice (that is, outside the randomization study).  On page twenty, the study states that information on financial eligibility and “certain additional facts regarding the caller and the case”  are put to the vote of HLAB’s intake committee.  On what grounds does this committee vote to accept or reject a case?  In other words, does HLAB normally seek the hard cases, the more straightforward cases, some combination, or does it not take the merits into account at all?

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  March 28, 2011 at 9:14 pm   Posted in: Behavioral Law and Economics, Civil Rights, Empirical Analysis of Law, Immigration, Law Practice, Law Rev (Yale), Symposium (What Difference Representation), Uncategorized   Print This Post   One Comment

The Old Illegitimacy Part II: Facilitating Societal Discrimination

posted by Solangel Maldonado

In a prior post, I demonstrated that the law makes explicit distinctions between marital and nonmarital children and denies the latter benefits automatically granted to its marital counterparts.  The harms resulting from the law’s continued distinctions on the basis of birth status are significant.  For example, these distinctions impair nonmarital children’s ability to acquire property and wealth.  While individuals often use part of their inheritance for a down payment on a home, to start a business, or to fund their own children’s education, nonmarital children are denied the same access to intergenerational wealth.

These legal distinctions may also stigmatize nonmarital children. Denying nonmarital children access to post-secondary educational support that is granted to marital children suggests that the former are less deserving of support.  It also signals that fathers’ responsibilities to their children differ depending on whether they are marital or nonmarital.  Denying U.S. citizenship to the children of unmarried fathers unless their fathers expressly agreed to support them similarly signals that nonmarital children are not automatically entitled to support.

These legal distinctions also facilitate societal discrimination by encouraging individuals (either intentionally or otherwise)  to make negative assumptions about unmarried parents and their children.  Many Americans (not just former Gov. Mike Huckabee) believe that it is wrong for unmarried persons to have children.  Seventy-one percent of participants in a recent Pew Research Center study indicated that the increase in nonmarital births is a “big problem” for society and 44% believe that it is always or almost always morally wrong for an unmarried woman to have a child.  Some people assume that unmarried mothers are sexually irresponsible and that their children will be burdens on the public purse.  They also expect nonmarital children to underachieve academically, economically, and socially.

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  March 15, 2011 at 10:27 pm   Posted in: Constitutional Law, Estates and Trusts, Family Law, Immigration   Print This Post   3 Comments

Rejecting Refugees

posted by Jaya Ramji-Nogales

The New York Times today reports on my most recent co-authored empirical study of the U.S. asylum system, Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, forthcoming in the William and Mary Law Review. As the title suggests, this article focuses on asylum law’s one-year filing deadline, which was created by the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). Scholars and practitioners have long expressed concern that refugees have been denied asylum due solely for failure to apply within a year of entry, and fear that the bar has had a significant impact on the U.S. asylum system. Our article is the first systematic empirical study of the effects of the deadline on asylum seekers and the asylum system.
We focus on decision-making by the Department of Homeland Security, which adjudicates most applications for asylum in the first instance. The findings are troubling. Most notably, it is likely that since the one-year bar came into effect, in April 1998, through June 2009, DHS rejected on the deadline more than 15,000 asylum applications (affecting more than 21,000 refugees) that would otherwise have been granted.
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  September 30, 2010 at 6:45 am   Posted in: Administrative Law, Immigration   Print This Post   6 Comments

The Insidious List

posted by Danielle Citron

News recently broke that, in Salt Lake City, Utah, a group calling itself “Concerned Citizens of the United States” sent a memo to local newspapers, radio stations, television outlets, state law enforcement, immigration and DHS agents, and Utah legislators listing over 1,300 alleged “illegal immigrants” who the group believed should be “immediately deported.”  Next to each name appeared the person’s Social Security number, date of birth, address, and, at times, medical information, such as a pregnant woman’s due date.  The group claimed that it “observe[d] these individuals in our neighborhoods, driving on our streets, working in our stores, attending our schools, and entering our public welfare buildings.”  It continued: “We spen[t] the time and effort needed to gather information along with legal Mexican nationals who infiltrate thei social networks and help us obtain the necessary information we need to add them to our list.”  The group then stepped up the volume: “We see a direct relationship between these illegal aliens and the escalation of crime in our communities in the form of drug and alcohol abuse, theft, and domestic violence. . . . They need to go and now.”  The group signed off with this missive: “We will be listening and watching.”

This feels eerily familiar.  In 1997, an anti-abortion group set up a website called Nuremberg Files that revealed abortion providers’ home addresses, birth dates, Social Security numbers, and the names of their childrens’ schools.  The site listed abortion providers who had been wounded in grey and those who had been killed with their names struck in black.  To be sure, the “Concerned Citizens” memo neither threatened nor sought to incite violence as in the Nuremberg case.  Nonetheless, the memo took a hateful “us versus them” turn in suggesting that illegal aliens bear responsibility for increased drug abuse, crime, and domestic violence.  Akin to the Nuremberg Files case, the “Concerned Citizens” invaded the privacy interests of the listed individuals by giving publicity to their Social Security numbers.  While they declined to identify themselves, one imagines that they will be found and could face tort privacy claims.

Aside from its privacy implications, the list seems bent on intimidation, suggesting that the group inflitrated the alleged illegal aliens’ communities and would be “watching.”  Of course, the group could have provided tips to ICE and law enforcement — that would not be troubling.  But the group went so much further than that, sending the list of individuals’ personal information to media of all stripes.  This suggests an agenda to intimidate and bully.

  July 14, 2010 at 11:21 pm   Posted in: Anonymity, Immigration, Privacy   Print This Post   9 Comments

UCLA Law Review Vol. 57, Issue 5 (June 2010)

posted by UCLA Law Review

Volume 57, Issue 5 (June 2010)

Articles

Introduction to the Symposium Issue: Sexuality and Gender Law: The Difference a Field Makes	Nan D. Hunter	1129
Elusive Coalitions: Reconsidering the Politics of Gender and Sexuality	Kathryn Abrams	1135
The Sex Discount	Kim Shayo Buchanan	1149

What Feminists Have to Lose in Same-Sex Marriage Litigation	Mary Ann Case	1199
Lawyering for Marriage Equality	Scott L. Cummings Douglas NeJaime	1235
Sexual and Gender Variation in American Public Law: From Malignant to Benign to Productive	William N. Eskridge, Jr.	1333

Sticky Intuitions and the Future of Sexual Orientation Discrimination	Suzanne B. Goldberg	1375
The Dissident Citizen	Sonia K. Katyal	1415
Raping Like a State	Teemu Ruskola	1477

The Gay Tipping Point

Kenji Yoshino

1537

  July 5, 2010 at 7:12 pm   Posted in: Articles and Books, Constitutional Law, Current Events, Feminism and Gender, History of Law, Immigration, Law and Humanities, Law and Inequality, Law and Psychology, Law Practice, Law Rev (UCLA), Law School, Legal Theory, Politics, Psychology and Behavior, Supreme Court   Print This Post   No Comments

Immigration Federalism: Red and Blue

posted by Robert Schapiro

In a previous post, I discussed some of the federalism implications of Arizona’s recent legislation concerning immigrants.  I noted that in immigration, as in other areas, it is difficult to define enclaves of exclusive state or exclusive federal jurisdiction.  Rather, contemporary federalism entails a dynamic interaction of state and federal authority.

If Arizona’s law constitutes an example of “red state” federalism, a recent announcement by New York’s Governor David Paterson illustrates the “blue state” version of immigration federalism. 

Under federal immigration law, conviction of certain state crimes constitutes grounds for deportation.  But, in many circumstances a subsequent state pardon removes the threat of deportation.  In what The New York Times termed “a major rebuke of federal immigration policy,” Governor Paterson created a panel to assist him in evaluating pardon requests from immigrants subject to deportation based on state convictions.  The Governor characterized some federal immigration laws as “embarrassingly and wrongly inflexible.”  “In New York,” Paterson explained, “we believe in renewal.”

So, now New York has joined Arizona in rebuking federal immigration policy, though from a very different perspective.

Even the United States Supreme Court has gotten into the immigration federalism act.  In Padilla v. Kentucky, decided in March, the Court held that defense counsel’s failure to advise a state criminal defendant that a guilty plea carries a risk of deportation constitutes ineffective assistance in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution.  In what will be one of Justice Stevens’ last majority opinions, he explained that as a matter of federal law, deportation is an “integral part” of the penalty for the state crime.

Padilla confirms the obvious: In immigration, state and federal law are closely intertwined.  What are we to make of this feature of our federal system?  If some are troubled by Arizona’s inhospitable voice, they might find solace in New York’s dulcet tones of ”renewal.”  That counterpoint provides cold comfort to immigrants in Arizona, but then the United States Constitution provides some protection for all people throughout the country. 

Complicated? Yes, but simple would be superior only if we all agreed on the answers.  And we do not.  In the meantime, New York seeks to vindicate its immigrant heritage.

  May 13, 2010 at 9:02 pm  Tags: Constitutional Law, Current Events, federalism, Immigration  Posted in: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Current Events, Immigration, Politics, Supreme Court, Uncategorized   Print This Post   4 Comments

Red State Federalism

posted by Robert Schapiro

It is a great pleasure to be a guest blogger.  My current interests center around federalism.  My posts likely will as well.  Here goes.

Did a vision of progressive federalism die in the desert of Arizona?  No, but the recent (anti-)immigration legislation there reveals the Grand Canyon dividing the concept of federalism from particular policy outcomes.

In the wake of a conservative resurgence in national politics, some commentators (including this one) noted the progressive potential of federalism.  We cited examples of “blue state federalism,” in which states stepped into the breach left by federal inaction and provided innovative solutions for problems ranging from climate change to predatory lending, from gay rights to health care.  Here, and elsewhere, I argued that a key to understanding the achievements of the states was to abandon outdated notions of distinct and non-overlapping realms of state and federal prerogative (bye bye dual federalism).  Climate change was not really a federal issue or really a state issue.  Rather, federalism provided an opportunity for both the states and the federal government to address pressing concerns.  Federalism functioned through the dynamic overlap and interaction of state and federal authority.  Or so I argued in my book, Polyphonic Federalism: Toward the Protection of Fundamental Rights.

But where does this leave Arizona?  Or for that matter, the lawsuits filed by numerous state attorneys general against federal health care legislation.  Are these examples of illegitimate state meddling in federal matters or ongoing expressions of dynamic or (as I term it) polyphonic federalism?  The answer is yes.

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  May 5, 2010 at 9:55 am  Tags: Constitutional Law, Current Events, federalism  Posted in: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Health Law, Immigration, Politics, Uncategorized   Print This Post   3 Comments

Illegal Immigration and Fugitive Slaves

posted by Gerard Magliocca

One way of thinking about the new Arizona statute on illegal immigration is through a comparison with the debate over state regulation of fugitive slaves during the antebellum period.  Now before the angry comments start pouring in, I’m not saying that people who favor more border security are like slaveowners or that those who are here illegally are like slaves.  What I mean is that in both cases there was a controversial issue that turned on whether there should be exclusive federal authority or a diverse set of state policies.

The Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution was implemented initially by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.  By the 1830s, though, a number of free states passed laws that made it a crime to catch or aid in the capture of fugitive slaves.  Other free states insisted on certain procedural protections for those alleged to be fugitives, otherwise free African-Americans would be subject to what amounted to legalized kidnapping.

In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that these state statutes were invalid because the Fugitive Slave Clause (even though it was not in Article One, Section gave the federal government exclusive power over the subject.  In other words, states could not legislate at all on this topic — either to help or hinder slave captures.  Chief Justice Taney concurred but argued that state laws that furthered the federal policy by giving aid to slave catchers were not unconstitutional.  One could view the Court’s position as a compromise that attempted to take the entire topic off of the topic even though it was probably inconsistent with preemption principles.  Moreover, in practice slave catchers in the North could not operate well without the protection of state law or the aid of state officials.  (Indeed, Prigg contained language similar to the modern Supreme Court’s anticommandeering doctrine.)

Now we have a similar issue.  States like Arizona want to crack down on illegal immigration.  Others want to be sanctuaries for them and refuse to cooperate with deportations.  One solution to this would be to say that all state regulation of the subject is barred.  That is not neutral with respect to outcomes, but it would channel all reform efforts to Washington.  Or courts could say that only state laws that assist immigration policy as set by Congress is permissible.  Of course, that would require someone to determine what that policy is.  The major problem in immigration policy, it seems to me, is that the country is uncertain what it wants.  Is illegal immigration a harm or a benefit?  Should we be deporting people or giving them amnesty? Thus, courts that go with something other than “states can’t regulate this at all” might have a hard time reasoning their way to a conclusion.

  April 30, 2010 at 6:51 pm   Posted in: Immigration, Uncategorized   Print This Post   No Comments

A Well-Founded Fear of School?

posted by Jaya Ramji-Nogales

Tuesday’s Washington Post discusses an intriguing asylum case: an immigration judge in Memphis granted asylum to a German couple who fled their homeland to avoid its mandatory schooling policy.  Uwe Romeike, along with his wife and five chilren, are evangelical Christians who had decided to homeschool their children both because they believed the public school curriculum to be “against Christian values” and because their children faced violence, bullying, and peer pressure in public schools.  The Romeikes took their children out of school in their home state of Baden-Wuerttemberg in 2006, and paid fines of approximately $10,000 over 2 years for doing so.  That state constitution requires that children attend public or private schools; parents who refuse to comply can face fines or even jail time, or in severe cases, Germany’s highest appellate court ruled that social service officials could remove children from their parents.

There are so many interesting angles to the decision that it’s hard to know where to start.  Some might question whether the ability to choose how to school one’s child is a fundamental human right that should be protected by asylum law.  The German consul for the Southeast U.S. noted that “German parents have a wide range of educational options for their children.”  Should the Romeikes be sent back to Germany on the assumption that they could find a religious school that provided instruction acceptable to their value system?  Under U.S. asylum law, if internal relocation is an option to avoid persecution, applicants must move within their own country to find safety before coming to the United States.  The Romeikes had the option not only of relocating within Germany but also, as citizens of the European Union, of living and working in any member state (some of which allow home schooling and others of which surely offer affordable education that accords with evangelical religious values).

The involvement of the German consul also raises questions about the appropriateness of immigration court as a messenger in foreign affairs.  Romeike’s lawyer said that he took on the case in part because he hoped to influence public opinion in Germany, while the consul defended the law as a policy decision that “ensures a high standard of learning for all children.”  Should our immigration courts be questioning the policy judgments of solidly democratic nations with robust and procedurally fair legal systems?  Asylum has for many years been used as a political tool, for better or for worse, but this seems one step too far.  In any case, I’m interested in readers’ thoughts — are the Romeikes modern-day pilgrims, or is this just another misguided decision by our dysfunctional immigration courts?

  January 29, 2010 at 2:43 pm   Posted in: Immigration   Print This Post   6 Comments

The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 119, Issue 3 (December 2009)

posted by Yale Law Journal

  January 12, 2010 at 9:48 pm   Posted in: Constitutional Law, Immigration, International & Comparative Law, Law Rev (Yale), Law Rev Contents, Property Law, Tax   Print This Post   No Comments

Integration through contract?

posted by Jaya Ramji-Nogales

Though European states have received increasing numbers of immigrants over the past few decades, they have failed to integrate these immigrants as successfully as traditional immigrant-receiving nations such as the United States and Canada.  There are undoubtedly many factors that contribute to this differential in integration success rates, but access to education and employment may be the most important.  Examining these measures, a recent OECD report found that the children of migrants living in Europe have significantly worse education and labor market outcomes than the children of migrants in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

So what then should we make of German Immigration Commissioner Maria Boehmer’s proposal to address Germany’s integration problem through contracts?   Expected to be introduced during the current legislative period, these contracts will explain the services and assistance available to immigrants while requiring immigrants to learn German and avow their support for liberal values such as freedom of expression and equality of women.  Dr.  Boehmer acknowledges that the key to integrating immigrants is access to schooling and employment markets (the latter through recognition of qualifications from abroad). Read the rest of this post »

  November 24, 2009 at 8:22 pm   Posted in: Contract Law & Beyond, Immigration, International & Comparative Law   Print This Post   One Comment

A Note on Comprehensive Immigration Reform

posted by Kevin Johnson

For several years, “comprehensive” immigration reform has been discussed in the U.S. Congress and among the general public.   Supporters contend that enforcement-only measures — such as extending the border fence, increasing the number of Immigration & Customs Enforcement officers, efforts to increase deportations, etc. — will not address the true causes of immigration, especially the thirst of the American economy for relatively inexpensive labor.   Although “comprehensive” immigration reform has meant many things to many people, reform proposals often include a regularization program for certain group of undocumented immigrants (i.e., the dreaded “amnesty”), some kind of guest worker program supported by agricultural and other employers, and increased immigration enforcement measures.  Some proposals also have included increasing the number of visas to eliminate long lines in certain visa categories and increased employment visas. 

In the spring of 2006, hundreds of thousands of people — U.S. citizens as well as immigrants — marched in cities across the United States, protesting the tough-on-immigrants Sensenbrenner bill passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in December 2005.  Two U.S. Senators, including now-President Barack Obama, participated in the marches.

President Obama long has supported comprehensive immigration reform.  Supporters of reform were buoyed by his election, feeling that comprehensive immigration reform just might finally be on the horizon.  Well, it just may — or may not — be.

Immigration reform is politically difficult in the best of times — and these most definitely are not the best of times economically in the United States.  Although some members of Congress — Congressman Luis Gutíerrez immediately comes to mind, continue to push for immigration reform, the economy and health care reform now seem to dominate the Congressional legislative agenda.

As the old Brooklyn Dodgers slogan (“Wait until next year!”) went, some members of the Obama administration have argued for restraint and to wait until next year.  But, next year is an election year in Congress.  Enacting legislation on a contentious issue that touches on volatile issues of race and class, seems unlikely in an election year.

At the same time, the Obama administration seems devoted to pursuing more and more immigration enforcement measures.  For discussion of the latest measure, click here.  Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano does not seem to have found an enforcement measure that she does not like.   The political calculus  appears to be that, by so doing, the administration will gain the public trust on enforcement and then be in a better position to seek immigration reform that benefits immigrants.  This strategy was pursued — very unsuccessfully — by the Bush administration — more and more enforcement.  We saw infamous workplace raids in New Bedford, Massachusetts and Postville, Iowa, record levels of deportations year after year, aggressive positions in the courts (while always disputing the court’s jurisdiction), and the like.   The Bush administration ended up with more (and more) enforcement and no immigration reform.

This is precisely the risk that the Obama administration runs.  As it fashions and implements more and more immigration enforcement measures, it may never be able to push balanced immigration reform through Congress.  And delay is dangerous because there is always some reason to put off a national debate on a controversial issue.

Hopefully, the Obama administration knows what it is doing politically on immigration.  Latinos, immigrant rights advocates, and employers have been patient for now.  But, they all have seen what happens when immigration is put off until the second term of a Presidency.  As President Bush acknowledged, such delay was a mistake before — and, many think, a mistake now.

  July 29, 2009 at 9:23 am   Posted in: Civil Rights, Immigration   Print This Post   11 Comments

The Supreme Court’s Immigration Cases From Last Term

posted by Kevin Johnson

Last Term, the U.S. Supreme Court decided four immigration-related cases. The Court rarely takes so many immigration cases, which suggests that it – like the general public – views immigration as an important issue. In the four decisions, the Court also addressed some conflicts on immigration law among the circuits.

The U.S. government lost three out of four of the immigration cases before the Supreme Court. This is a relatively low win percentage for the government in immigration cases, especially in light of the fact that the proverbial deck is often stacked against noncitizens — the immigration laws are not particularly generous to immigrants and the courts frequently afforded broad deference to the immigration bureaucracy. It thus at first glance may seem surprising in some respects that the Roberts Court sided with noncitizens in 75 percent of the cases. A closer look reveals that the Supreme Court pretty closely followed the law and precedent and rejected positions of the Bush administration that pushed the limits.

Identity Theft

The U.S. government has increasingly used identity theft statutes as a tool against undocumented immigrants. The Supreme Court limited the U.S. government’s power to use that tool in Flores-Figueroa v. United States. The decision below, which held for the United States, was unanimously reversed and remanded in an opinion by Justice Breyer. The Court held that prosecutors must prove that defendants knew that fraudulent Social Security numbers or other documents they used belonged to a real person as opposed to an identity being fabricated. In a fairly routine manner, the Court interpreted the language of the statute and in effect applied the traditional rule of lenity, resolving statutory ambiguities in favor of the criminal defendant.

Flores-Figueroa v. U.S. clarifies what federal prosecutors must prove in order to obtain a conviction for criminal identity theft under federal law. The Bush administration had increasingly – and aggressively — used identity fraud criminal charges in immigration enforcement. An infamous example is the raid on the Agriprocessors kosher food plant in Postville, Iowa in May 2008, in which hundreds of undocumented workers faced criminal identity theft charges (as opposed to simply being deported, as had generally been the past practice in immigration raids). The Court resolved the conflict that had emerged in the federal appellate courts over the government’s burden of proof in aggravated identity theft cases.

Stays of Removal Pending Appeals

Noncitizens facing deportation who lose appeals of removal orders in the Board of Immigration Appeals often seek a stay of removal while an appeal is pending in the court of appeals. The question in Nken v. Holder was whether 1996 reforms to the immigration statute continued to permit such stays, which until that time had been routinely granted. As a practical matter, many appeals would be abandoned or mooted if the noncitizen were deported.

Chief Justice Roberts, in a workmanlike opinion, wrote for the 7-2 majority:

“This case involves a statutory provision that sharply restricts the circumstances under which a court may issue an injunction blocking the removal of an alien from this country. The Court of Appeals [for the Fourth Circuit] concluded, and the Government contends, that this provision applies to the granting of a stay by a court of appeals while it considers the legality of a removal order. Petitioner disagrees, and maintains that the authority of a court of appeals to stay an order of removal under the traditional criteria governing stays remains fully intact, and is not affected by the statutory provision governing injunctions. We agree with petitioner, and vacate and remand for application of the traditional criteria.” In so holding, the Court resolved a split between the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, on one side, and the Second, Third, Fifth Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits on the other. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, emphasizing that “[t]he Court’s decision nullifies an important statutory provision that Congress enacted when it reformed the immigration laws in 1996.”
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  July 6, 2009 at 8:13 am   Posted in: Constitutional Law, Immigration   Print This Post   4 Comments

Analogous or Not?

posted by Gerard Magliocca

Suppose that a family enters an area of land when they have no legal right to do so. They stay and live there for years using the property for lawful purposes (apart from their continuing trespass). At some point, the actual owner or authority returns and tries to kick them out.

Am I describing a case of adverse possession (where the squatter may well get title) or a case of illegal immigration (where deportation is the result)? This comparison raises some interesting questions, though the idea is not original to me. See Timothy J. Lukas & Minh T Hoang, “Open and Notorious: Adverse Possession and Immigration Reform,” 27 Wash. U. J. L. Pol’y 123 (2008); Monica Gomez, “Immigration by Adverse Possession: Common Law Amnesty For Long-Residing Illegal Immigrants in the United States,” 22 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 105 (2007).

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  April 15, 2009 at 4:51 pm   Posted in: Immigration   Print This Post   2 Comments

The Supremes Speak

posted by Jaya Ramji-Nogales

This week, the Supreme Court took the rare step of deciding an asylum case, Negusie v. Holder, which examines the availability of a duress exception to the persecutor bar. The Court has decided very few asylum cases in its history, and when it does so, the result is often messy. The Negusie decision is no exception– while Justice Kennedy commands a majority of six, the proliferation of concurrences and dissents doesn’t inspire confidence in the unity of the court. It does, however, make for a fun read for immigration law junkies as well as for aficionados of administrative law and moral philosophers.

First, for the admin law types, this case continues and amplifies recent tussles in the immigration field over who has the authority to interpret the Immigration and Nationality Act — the federal courts or the Board of Immigration Appeals (the administrative entity charged with reviewing immigration court decisions and establishing national uniformity in immigration law). Kennedy’s majority opinion gives some deference to the administrative agency (deference that, in my opinion, is misplaced, given the dysfunctional nature of the Board, which I’ve discussed in more detail here), finding that while the Board misapplied precedent in interpreting the statute to preclude a duress exception to the persecutor bar, it should be allowed to reinterpret the statute free from this error. But as Scalia notes in his concurrence, the tone of the opinion indicates that Kennedy thinks the Board should come down in favor of a duress exception. Scalia disagrees with this approach, arguing that the Board “deserve[s] to be told clearly whether we are serious about allowing them to exercise . . . discretion, or are rather firing a warning shot across the bow.”

Stevens and Breyer, on the other hand, think the warning shot isn’t clear enough, finding that the question of whether the duress exception exists is one for the courts, and that the role of the administrative agency should be to determine how to apply the standard to be used in deciding whether participation in persecution was voluntary or coerced. Thomas doesn’t explicitly address whether the authority to interpret this provision of the statute should lie with the courts or the administrative agency; he thinks that the Board’s underlying decision was correct because the language of the statute doesn’t contain a duress exception.

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  March 5, 2009 at 9:30 pm   Posted in: Immigration   Print This Post   3 Comments

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