Category: Google & Search Engines

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Yahoo! and YouTube

Mozilla switched to using Yahoo! for its search engine, and so I noticed something about how it shows YouTube results; something that may upset YouTube aka Google. When I was writing about lightsabers and 3D printing, I wanted to embed a clip from Return of the Jedi. The search on Yahoo! showed me a potential clip. I hit play to confirm that. It was good for my needs. I looked for the embed code, and it wasn’t there. There was a share button up top, but for the full page and codes, I had to go to the YouTube page. Now that is what happens when one embeds a YouTube video. But I wonder whether YouTube posters will be upset (or maybe even YouTube/Google) to find that a rival search engine maybe undercutting them. For example, it seems, I stress seems as I ran only one test, that a YouTube video that has an ad before a video lacks that ad when on Yahoo! Banner ads seem to be present on both, but they differ. I am guessing Google gets to serve those and maybe they vary depending on where the video is served. That would make sense given the targeting should vary depending on where the video is shown. Still if Yahoo! is taking content and showing it on its site, perhaps making money that way too (or at least keeping it from the Goog), will we see a replay of the early Internet cases on framing, diversion, etc., but with Google as the plaintiff? If so, is that an ironic moment where some folks will be saying Google just got Googled (i.e., I am thinking certain industries see being “Googled” as something other than being searched for; hey that may show that the whole genericisim question is less of an issue.).

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Hello Stigler: Google Trusted Stores, Amazon, and Price Discrimination

Hello, Stigler. Matchmaking and advertising are Google’s forte. It has upped its game. Never to leave things as they are, Google has been rolling out a trusted vendor system. I noticed the service for a company that I cannot recall. Not a good sign for the company, but then again I don’t notice Amazon third parties either. If Google can use algorithms and other options such as requiring applications by vendors to be part of a trusted network of retailers, that change could be huge. There are, however, some issues.

First, Amazon should keep an eye on this program as it might be the first one to challenge Amazon’s excellent third party system. For that to be a true threat, Google will have to find a way to protect customers. Amazon has been great, in my experience, when it comes to protecting me while I deal with sellers far away and sometimes dubious. It does not give away my credit card etc. So if a lemon is in play, Amazon covers me. I assume it takes a fee for being the broker. Google customer service may have to evolve, if it is to match Amazon. A series of online, automated loops that end up hitting walls will make me stay with Amazon. But as Google gets better at identifying good sellers and protecting consumers, the service may work well. In addition, the play should feed into Google’s foray into ecommerce. Again if it can aid in delivery and resolve poor third party service, Google could do quite well in this space.

Second, will search results be influenced by participation in the program? On the one hand, I’d love results that lead to better sellers. Heck if Amazon or eBay ratings figured into Google results and improved knowing whether an ad or listed result was trust-worthy, that’d be great. Then again, right or wrong, I expect Google watchers/haters/worriers will argue that Google has promoted results unfairly. As long as a company can go through certification, it seems that argument should fail. I imagine Amazon, eBay, and others require some level of clearance to be in their system. Regardless of purveyor, it seems systems that are relatively low-cost (or maybe free except for time to fill out forms) to join and then are monitored should be embraced. In other words, Yelp etc. are near useless to me. Crowds are not as smart as folks think. As the great agent Kay in Men in Black said, “A person is smart. People are dumb, panicky dangerous animals and you know it.” More ways to improve how each of us, separately, evaluates options would be welcome, and plays to the way we each are capable of being smart. Options that limit us and feed echoes of dubious sources, behaviors, and beliefs, I’d like to avoid.

So we’ll see whether Google can one-up Amazon in connecting buyers and sellers. If so, I may buy more LPs and who knows what from folks I will never meet. And prices should be more competitive. Of course, that will be so until Christmas hits. Then as happened this year, prices may go up. But hey, Amazon listed the MSRP and connected me to a retailer whose markup combined with Amazon shipping worked for a gift to my niece. That was great. Wait, did I just agree with perfect price discrimination?!!? Damn, you Goog! and Amazon! Or is that Happy Holidays! I got what I wanted without fighting through stores.

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Goliath aka Google aka No Surprises in Hollywood versus Silicon Valley

This just in: Hollywood hates/fears/plots against Google! The Sony security breach and following leaks have yielded many insights, sort of. If anyone thought Hollywood executives were discrete, that was naive and now debunked. If anyone thought most people knew not to use work email for personal business, that too is shown false. (I am continually amazed at how many law professors have thought it “odd” or “paranoid” that I use different emails for work and non-work communication). And yes, Hollywood aka the copyright industry is quite savvy and plots ways to go after its competitors and/or threats. The revealed emails do show the details of the plans and that there was a code word, Goliath, for Google (which I take as a place holder for Silicon Valley). All of which seems very Dr. Evil. But let’s be clear. Strategies to go after state attorneys general or legislators and to push negative news stories are endemic. They are endemic to Hollywood, telecoms, Silicon Valley, Wall Street, pharmaceuticals, and really any major industry. I am not saying that these practices are great or that policy is well-made from them. But they are real and should be understood. And, for those interested in the open Internet debates there are some other lessons. If you thought SOPA was the end, think again.

Vigilance and support for many companies and groups that support your issue (regardless of what it is) matters. The game is afoot. It will not end. Disclosure moment: Yes, I worked at Google in the policy group, and I have also worked on a political campaign. And one thing that I know from my experience and research (check Jessica Litman’s work on the copyright industry for a great lesson in this industry’s ability to play the game) is that if ideas come from only one entity, they seem weak. For better or worse, trade groups, NGOs, etc. matter. I prefer those that are independent and offer some nuances, but overall the concerted voices of many can be powerful. No matter what issue you wish to see succeed, backing only one entity dilutes the power of the idea or makes it seem like one company or group is crying over its lot in life. Some other post may get into the public choice issues here. But for now, the Sony leaks show that nothing much has changed. “The sun also ariseth, and the sun goeth down, and hasteth to his place where he arose. The wind goeth toward the south, and turneth about unto the north; it whirleth about continually, and the wind returneth again according to his circuits.” Ecclesiastes, 1:5-6.

Hollywood will always lobby for its interests and so will everyone else. “So it goes.”

European Parliament Resolution on Google

The European Parliament voted 384 – 174 today in favor of a “resolution on Supporting Consumer Rights in the Digital Single Market.” The text of the resolution:

Stresses that all internet traffic should be treated equally, without discrimination, restriction or interference, independently of its sender, receiver, type, content, device, service or application;

Notes that the online search market is of particular importance in ensuring competitive conditions within the Digital Single Market, given the potential development of search engines into gatekeepers and their possibility of commercialising secondary exploitation of obtained information; therefore calls on the Commission to enforce EU competition rules decisively, based on input from all relevant stakeholders and taking into account the entire structure of the Digital Single Market in order to ensure remedies that truly benefit consumers, internet users and online businesses; furthermore calls on the Commission to consider proposals with the aim of unbundling search engines from other commercial services as one potential long-term solution to achieve the previously mentioned aims;

Stresses that when using search engines, the search process and results should be unbiased in order to keep internet search non-discriminatory, to ensure more competition and choice for users and consumers and to maintain the diversity of sources of information; therefore notes that indexation, evaluation, presentation and ranking by search engines must be unbiased and transparent, while for interlinked services, search engines must guarantee full transparency when showing search results; calls on Commission to prevent any abuse in the marketing of interlinked services by operators of search engines;

Some in the US tech press has played this up as an incipient effort to “break up” Google, with predictable derision at “technopanic.” (Few tend to reflect on whether the 173 former firms listed here really need to be part of one big company.) But the resolution’s linking of net and search neutrality suggests other regulatory approaches (prefigured in my 2008 paper Internet Nondiscrimination Principles: Commercial Ethics for Carriers and Search Engines). I’ve developed these ideas over the years, and I hope my recently released book‘s chapters on search and digital regulation will be of some use to policymakers. Without some regulatory oversight and supervision, our black box society will only get more opaque.

The Right to be Forgotten: Not an Easy Question

I’ve previously written on regulation of European data processing here. I’ll be presenting on the “right to be forgotten” (RtbF) in Chicago this Spring. I’ll be writing a series of posts here to prepare for that lecture.

Julia Powles offers an excellent summary of the right in question. As she explains, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has ruled that, “in some circumstances—notably, where personal information online is inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive in relation to data-processing purposes—links should be removed from Google’s search index.” The Costeja case which led to this ruling involved Google’s prominent display of results relating to the plaintiff’s financial history.

Unfortunately, some US commentators’ views are rapidly congealing toward a reflexively rejectionist position when it comes to such regulation of search engine results–despite the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s extensive regulation of consumer reporting agencies in very similar situations. Jeffrey Toobin’s recent article mentions some of these positions. For example, Jules Polonetsky says, “The decision will go down in history as one of the most significant mistakes that Court has ever made.” I disagree, and I think the opposite result would itself have been far more troubling.

Internet regulation must recognize the power of certain dominant firms to shape impressions of individuals. Their reputational impact can be extraordinarily misleading and malicious, and the potential for harm is only growing as hacking becomes more widespread. Consider the following possibility: What if a massive theft of medical records occurs, the records are made public, and then shared virally among different websites? Are the critics of the RtbF really willing to just shrug and say, “Well, they’re true facts and the later-publishing websites weren’t in on the hack, so leave them up”? And in the case of future intimate photo hacks, do we simply let firms keep the photos available in perpetuity?
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Interview on The Black Box Society

BBSBalkinization just published an interview on my forthcoming book, The Black Box Society. Law profs may be interested in our dialogue on methodology—particularly, what the unique role of the legal scholar is in the midst of increasing academic specialization. I’ve tried to surface several strands of inspiration for the book.

How We’ll Know the Wikimedia Foundation is Serious About a Right to Remember

The “right to be forgotten” ruling in Europe has provoked a firestorm of protest from internet behemoths and some civil libertarians.* Few seem very familiar with classic privacy laws that govern automated data systems. Characteristic rhetoric comes from the Wikimedia Foundation:

The foundation which operates Wikipedia has issued new criticism of the “right to be forgotten” ruling, calling it “unforgivable censorship.” Speaking at the announcement of the Wikimedia Foundation’s first-ever transparency report in London, Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales said the public had the “right to remember”.

I’m skeptical of this line of reasoning. But let’s take it at face value for now. How far should the right to remember extend? Consider the importance of automated ranking and rating systems in daily life: in contexts ranging from credit scores to terrorism risk assessments to Google search rankings. Do we have a “right to remember” all of these-—to, say, fully review the record of automated processing years (or even decades) after it happens?

If the Wikimedia Foundation is serious about advocating a right to remember, it will apply the right to the key internet companies organizing online life for us. I’m not saying “open up all the algorithms now”—-I respect the commercial rationale for trade secrecy. But years or decades after the key decisions are made, the value of the algorithms fades. Data involved could be anonymized. And just as Asssange’s and Snowden’s revelations have been filtered through trusted intermediaries to protect vital interests, so too could an archive of Google or Facebook or Amazon ranking and rating decisions be limited to qualified researchers or journalists. Surely public knowledge about how exactly Google ranked and annotated Holocaust denial sites is at least as important as the right of a search engine to, say, distribute hacked medical records or credit card numbers.

So here’s my invitation to Lila Tretikov, Jimmy Wales, and Geoff Brigham: join me in calling for Google to commit to releasing a record of its decisions and data processing to an archive run by a third party, so future historians can understand how one of the most important companies in the world made decisions about how it ordered information. This is simply a bid to assure the preservation of (and access to) critical parts of our cultural, political, and economic history. Indeed, one of the first items I’d like to explore is exactly how Wikipedia itself was ranked so highly by Google at critical points in its history. Historians of Wikipedia deserve to know details about that part of its story. Don’t they have a right to remember?

*For more background, please note: we’ve recently hosted several excellent posts on the European Court of Justice’s interpretation of relevant directives. Though often called a “right to be forgotten,” the ruling in the Google Spain case might better be characterized as the application of due process, privacy, and anti-discrimination norms to automated data processing.

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Fifty Years of “I know it when I see it.”

On June 22, 1964, Justice Potter Stewart coined the phrase “I know it when I see it” in his concurring opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio. Fifty years later, that expression holds the distinction of being one of the few modern legal phrases to become a regularly accepted expression among educated Americans. The half-century anniversary of Jacobellis provides a fitting opportunity to ask why “I know it when I see it” has enjoyed such popularity and what lessons that phrase and its history might hold for us today.

Jacobellis reversed the conviction of an Ohio movie theater manager for showing obscene material in the form of the French film Les Amants (The Lovers), which included a sex scene at its conclusion. The court’s 6-3 decision was highly fragmented, with six opinions in total and the plurality garnering only two votes.

Potter Stewart

In a short 144-word concurring opinion, Stewart wrote that he found it almost impossible to define obscenity precisely, which should only include “hard-core pornography.” His now famous line concluded the opinion:

 “But I know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this case is not that.”

At the time, the pithy phrase actually garnered little interest in the public sphere. Many newspapers chose instead to focus on another obscenity case decided that same day, Quantity of Books v. Kansas. Those journalists who did write about Jacobellis largely ignored “I know it when I see it” and chose to focus on the legal technicalities the case posed.

While it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when Stewart’s iconic expression became common, we can chart its growing popularity via Google’s Ngram search engine. Google Ngram measures the percentage of English language books that contain a phrase up to five words long. Because “I know it when I see it” is seven words, I ran the search for each five-letter segment of the phrase (“I know it when I;” “know it when I see;” “it when I see it.”). The graph clearly shows the steeply rising and still growing interest in Stewart’s phrase, starting slightly after 1964:

I know it when I see it Ngram

 

The Ngram search also reveals some interesting instances of similar phrases, both legal and not, pre-dating Jacobellis. Consider two examples: In an obituary for Benjamin Cardozo that ran in the Columbia, Yale and Harvard law journals in 1939, Learned Hand praised Justice Cardozo for his wisdom, writing:

“And what is wisdom — that gift of God which the great prophets of his race exalted? I do not know; like you, I know it when I see it, but I cannot tell of what it is composed.”

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The right to be forgotten and the global reach of EU data protection law

It is a pleasure to be a guest blogger on Concurring Opinions during the month of June. I will be discussing issues and developments relating to European data protection and privacy law, from an international perspective.

Let me begin with a recent case of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) that has received a great deal of attention. In its judgment of May 13 in the case C-131/12 Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez, the Court recognized a “right to be forgotten” with regard to Internet search engine results based on the EU Data Protection Directive 95/46. This judgment by the highest court in the EU demonstrates that, while it is understandable that data protection law be construed broadly so that individuals are not deprived of protection, it is also necessary to specify some boundaries to define when it does not apply, if EU data protection law is not to become a kind of global law applicable to the entire Internet.

I have already summarized the case elsewhere, and here will only deal with its international jurisdictional aspects. It involved a claim brought by an individual in Spain against both the US parent company Google Inc, and its subsidiary Google Spain. The latter company, which has separate legal personality in Spain, acts as a commercial agent for the Google group in that country, in particular with regard to the sale of online advertising on the search engine web site www.google.com operated by Google Inc. via its servers in California.

The CJEU applied EU data protection law to the Google search engine under Article 4(1)(a) of the Directive, based on its finding that Google Spain was “inextricably linked” to the activities of Google Inc. by virtue of its sale of advertising space on the search engine site provided by Google Inc, even though Google Spain had no direct involvement in running the search engine. In short, the Court found that data processing by the search engine was “carried out in the context of the activities of an establishment of the controller” (i.e., Google Spain).

Since the Court applied EU law based on the activities of Google Spain, it did not discuss the circumstances under which EU data protection law can be applied to processing by data controllers established outside the EU under Article 4(1)(c) of the Directive (see paragraph 61 of the judgment), though the Court did emphasize the broad territorial applicability of EU data protection law (paragraph 54). Since the right to be forgotten has effect on search engines operated from computers located outside the EU, I consider this to be a case of extraterritorial jurisdiction (or extraterritorial application of EU law: I am aware of the distinction between applicable law and jurisdiction, but will use “jurisdiction” here as a shorthand to refer to both).

The Court did not limit its holding to claims brought by EU individuals, or to search engines operated under specific domains. An individual seeking to assert a right under the Directive need not be a citizen of an EU Member State, or have any particular connection with the EU, as long as the act of data processing on which his or her claim is based is subject to EU data protection law under Article 4. The Directive states that EU data protection law applies regardless of an individual’s nationality or residence (see Recital 2), and it is widely recognized that it may apply to entities outside the EU.

Thus, it seems that there would be no impediment under EU law, for example, to a Chinese citizen in China who uses a US-based Internet search engine with a subsidiary in the EU asserting the right to be forgotten against the EU subsidiary with regard to results generated by the search engine (note that Article 3(2) of the proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation would limit the possibility of asserting the right to be forgotten by individuals without any connection to the EU, since the application of EU data protection law would be limited to “data subjects residing in the Union”). Since only the US entity running the search engine would have the power to amend the search results, in effect the Chinese individual would be using EU data protection law as a vehicle to bring a claim against the US entity. The judgment therefore potentially applies EU data protection law to the entire Internet, a situation that was not foreseen when the Directive was enacted (as noted by the Court in paragraphs 69-70 of its 2003 Lindqvist judgment). It could lead to forum shopping and “right to be forgotten tourism” by individuals from around the world (much as UK libel laws have lead to criticisms of “libel tourism“).

It is likely that the judgment will be interpreted more restrictively than this. For example, the UK Information Commissioner’s office has announced that it will focus on “concerns linked to clear evidence of damage and distress to individuals” in enforcing the right to be forgotten. However, if one takes the position that Article 16 the Treaty on the Foundation of the European Union (TFEU) has direct effect, then the ability of individual DPAs to limit the judgment to situations where some “damage or distress” has occurred seems legally doubtful (see paragraph 96, where the Court remarked that the right to be forgotten applies regardless of whether inclusion of an individual’s name in search results “causes prejudice”). Google has also recently announced a procedure for individuals to remove their names from search results under certain circumstances, and the way that online services deal with implementation of the judgment will be crucial in determining its territorial scope in practice.

In any event, the Court’s lack of concern with the territorial application of the judgment demonstrates an inward-looking attitude that fails to take into account the global nature of the Internet. It also increases the need for enactment of the proposed Regulation, in order to provide some territorial limits to the right to be forgotten.

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Google Books and the Social (Justice) Contract

In channeling Judge Baer, Judge Chin at long last dropped the other shoe in the judicial effort to bring new information technology uses for copyrighted works fully in to the copyright regime. Congress has been slow to address the challenge of tapping the full copyright social utility/justice potential of these advances and it’s been left to the courts to sort it all out in the context of individual adversarial conflicts. Poignantly, when Jonathan Band asks “What [was] the Authors Guild fighting for?”, he also illustrates the tree-myopic/forest blind nature of the Guild’s position. What the Guild failed to see is that property rights fit into a larger socio-legal system: Yes your neighbor is precluded from trespassing on to your land but your ability to engage in whatever “private” activity strikes your fancy while thereon is limited by the legal system as a whole. Your land is individual private property, not an independent sovereign state.

 

Judge Baer reminded rights holders of this aspect of the social contract and now Judge Chin has made it clear to the Guild that this is not some narrow, eccentric application of copyright social utility. Property rights, including copyrights, exist to advance society, and to state the obvious, information technology has evolved our society. Like all other rights, customs, and expectations, however, whereas some aspects of copyright as previously envisioned fit comfortably into our new configuration others don’t fit at all. And when that ill-fit impedes important social progress modifications must be made, and if necessary, expectations altered.

 

The courts’ reasoning in both Hathitrust and Google Books moves fair use jurisprudence further toward the express consideration of copyright social justice in the application of the doctrine. As Kevin Smith notes, the judges in both cases have seized this opportunity to retrofit fair use, and it seems to me that these decisions push beyond questions of aesthetic and even functional transformation and pave the way for weighing social transformation in assessing the first fair use factor. I have also applied some of the legal conclusions drawn from Bill Graham Archives and other Grateful Dead archive projects to specific copyright social justice needs, for example, that of socially beneficent access to the literature of the Harlem Renaissance. Like some other historically and culturally important works, many of these books enjoy only marginal commercial market value and similar to the information harvested through data mining, “digital fair use” may be the only means by which to return these works to the general public. The social resuscitation of significant works through mass-digitization, and other uses that serve important and otherwise unattainable copyright social objectives, should be considered a purpose that satisfies the first fair use factor.

 

Authors and other copyrights holders would do well to finally get ahead of the information technology curve. The Authors Guild’s mistake was not so much in the effort to preserve what they considered to be their property rights or even in the effort to extract every conceivable drop of revenue out those rights, but rather, in failing to accept that in order for these rights to retain any value they must function as part of a thriving societal system or eventually forfeit the basis for legal recognition. In the analog world, the public’s access to most books remains largely dependent upon the vagaries of the commercial marketplace. Digital information technology has presented the opportunity to compile the world’s books toward the creation of global libraries accessible to every human being on a socially equitable basis. To believe that analog social inequity will be permitted to endure indefinitely in the face of digital information possibilities is simply unrealistic. Keeping in mind that the stimulation, perpetuation, and re-ignition of the cultural expression/dissemination/inspiration combustive cycle is the raison d’etre of copyright will enable authors to embrace digital change and as Gil Scott Heron sang, possibly even direct the change rather than simply be put through it.