Category: General Law

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Vanderbilt Law Review, Volume 67, Number 5

The Vanderbilt Law Review is pleased to announce the publication of our October 2014 issue:

ARTICLES

Mehrsa Baradaran, Regulation by Hypothetical, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1247 (2014).

Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language of Mens Rea, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1327 (2014).

Anna Su, Speech Beyond Borders: Extraterritoriality and the First Amendment, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1373 (2014).

NOTES

Philip L. Lu, Trademarked for Death? A Licensee’s Trademark Rights After an Executory Contract Is Rejected in Bankruptcy, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1431 (2014).

Courtney J. Mitchell, Keep Your Friends Close: A Framework for Addressing Rights to Social Media Contacts, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1459 (2014).

Tom S. Xu, Confrontation and the Law of Evidence: Can the Language Conduit Theory Survive in the Wake of Crawford?, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1497 (2014).

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“Unpublished” Supreme Court Orders

Supreme Court watchers are expressing some consternation about the Court’s willingness to take significant steps in recent cases (same-sex marriage, abortion, and voting rights) without explanation.  This is especially true with respect to granting or denying stays, though in the same-sex marriage cases that concern extends to the denial of certiorari.  What in blazes is going on here, they ask?  Doesn’t the Court owe us some explanation?

I wonder if the Justices should consider an option used in the circuit courts–an unpublished order–to provide more transparency in these situations.  One can understand why the Court would not want to use a published opinion to explain a decision about a stay (which is only a preliminary or tentative act) or the denial of certiorari (as that would set a precedent without the benefit of full briefing and argument).  I can, though, imagine doing so through an order that says “this may not be cited as precedent” if the Court felt an explanation was necessary.  Granted, people would still try to cite these orders (as a law clerk, I often saw attorneys citing unpublished orders), but a norm could develop that would make these statements non-binding.

Most of the discretionary actions that the Court takes would not warrant an explanation (certiorari denials, petitions for rehearing, original habeas petitions), but there is the occasional exception.  Right now only a dissenter can open a window into what goes on with respect to these important choices.  I’m not sure that is always good enough.

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The Leaked TPP: Some notes, and Criminal Copyright

Today Wikileaks released the latest leaked draft of the IP chapter of the Transpacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). The TPP is a plurilateral trade agreement being negotiated between select countries across the Pacific, and is the latest in a longish line of free trade agreements that address IP law in great detail.

Free trade agreement negotiations are subject to a surprising amount of secrecy, but select industry advisers have access to detailed US negotiating objectives. Today’s leaked text, dated May of 2014, allows public interest groups and the general public a chance to play catch-up to US industry advisers.

I suspect that the drafts are often leaked, or “pleaked“,  by negotiating partners seeking to activate US public interest groups more sympathetic to their negotiating positions than to the positions proffered by the US. The leaked text shows evidence that such pleaking can work: more controversial provisions from older leaked drafts, including one in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s decision on first sale doctrine in Kirtsaeng, have been removed. And the repeated leaking raises the question of why the US doesn’t voluntarily open the process up earlier- if leaking is now so prevalent that we’re going to see what’s in the agreements anyway, why insist on the dirty haze of secrecy and keep the public one step behind?

A number of people at public interest organizations (KEI, Public Citizen) have criticized the leaked text’s patent provisions for blocking access to medicines. The text also contains extensive provisions on geographical indications, and public performance rights, each of which raise significant issues (especially performance rights in light of the controversial Ninth Circuit decision in Garcia- for more on this issue in the international context, see Jacob Victor’s just-released essay).

The leaked draft also contains language on trade secrets that could be read to require a private cause of action, and may end up being used to launder federal law in the current debates over whether the U.S. should create a federal trade secrets private cause of action.

But the portion of the draft I would like to highlight is its provisions on criminal copyright law. Criminal copyright is a large part of what got ACTA rejected in the EU. As many have noted, the United States does not have the greatest interface between its copyright law and free speech rights, thanks to Supreme Court decisions in Eldred and Golan. As a consequence, Congress has been able to legislate into existence criminal copyright law that impinges on free speech values both by defining a low level of infringement as criminal, and by employing enforcement tools (such as the seizure of websites) that restrict freedom of expression.

The leaked draft shows a fight between the US and Canada over the scope of criminal copyright infringement and enforcement. Canada wishes to clarify that countries may restrict the criminalization of infringement to truly commercial scale infringement (see fn 183), while the US, per our domestic statute (the NET Act), wishes to reach noncommercial acts. The US fought China on this exact issue at the WTO and lost, so has been using free trade agreements to try to raise the TRIPS standard. The TPP parties are evidently debating whether to include the following: “For greater certainty, “financial gain” does not obligate a Party to provide criminal procedures and penalties in cases of de minimis infringements.” My guess, given past FTA language, is that the US comes down strongly against this footnote.

The underlying standard for criminal copyright infringement matters because it brings with it a host of enforcement tools, and active involvement by the state, thus implicating privacy in addition to free speech.

And when the low standard gets exported from the US, it can result in unintended consequences abroad. In Colombia, which enacted its current criminal copyright law pursuant to its free trade agreement with the US, a graduate student was arrested for posting a fellow scholars’ academic paper online without permission. Annemarie Bridy points to this prosecution as the consequence of US trade policy. And while the EFF is optimistic that the student should be acquitted under Colombian law, the case shows that free-speech fears over criminal copyright enforcement are real.

Until enhanced criminal copyright law comes off the US trade agenda, free trade agreements will continue to face opposition from those concerned about free expression and privacy online.

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FAN 36.1 (First Amendment News) Skover to Speak on McCutcheon Case

By way of a shameless plug for my coauthor:

INFLUENTIAL VOICES  

David Skover

David Skover

Seattle University School of Law
is proud to present
Professor David Skover

SCOTUS Books-in-Brief: When Money Speaks: A New Venture in E-Publishing

Wednesday, October 29
Room C6, Sullivan Hall, 4:30 p.m.
Reception to follow

The event is open to all, but RSVPs are requested.

Professor Skover will speak about the creation of the SCOTUS Books-in-Brief imprint and his latest coauthored book, When Money Speaks: The McCutcheon Decision, Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment.

When Money Speaks analyzes the controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. FEC, which struck aggregate limits on contributions to political candidates. It has been called “a brilliant discussion of campaign finance in America” and “the best book on the topic.”

The SCOTUS Books-in-Brief series provides readers with reliable, informative, and engaging narrative accounts of significant Supreme Court rulings shortly after they come down.

Introduction by Dean Annette E. Clark 

 

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One More Thing on Redistricting . . .

The Court has held that a state can use a referendum as part of its redistricting process.  See Davis v. Hildebrandt, 241 U.S. 565 (1916).  In Davis, a referendum was used to reject a redistricting plan drawn up by the Ohio Legislature.  Thus, one cannot say that Article One, Section 4 prohibits states from using a referendum to limit the Legislature in this context.  Maybe the Legislature must be the one to draft the redistricting plan–the difference in the Arizona case is that the Legislature is not permitted to draft anything.  But clearly the Legislature does not have the exclusive power to redistrict or the final say over redistricting.  Is drafting really so different?

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The Law of the Land

I thought I would flag the fact that Akhil Amar has a new book coming out that is available for pre-order on Amazon.  Here is the summary of The Law of the Land:  A Grand Tour of Our Constitutional Republic:

From Illinois to Alabama, and from Florida to Utah, our laws and legal debates arise from distinctive local settings within our vast and varied nation. As the renowned scholar Akhil Amar explains, Abraham Lincoln’s argument against the legality of succession can be traced to his Midwestern upbringing, just as a close look at the Florida legislature and state Supreme Court reveals the fundamental wrongness of the Bush v. Gore decision.

Amar profiles Alabama’s Hugo Black, the dominant constitutional jurist of the twentieth century, and California’s Anthony Kennedy, the powerful swing justice on the current Court. He probes Brown v. Board of Education, and explores the divisiveness of the Second and Fourth Amendments. An expert guide to America’s constitutional landscape, Amar sheds new light on American history and politics and shows how America’s legal tradition unites a vast and disparate land.

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FAN 36 (First Amendment News) Forgotten Free Press Advocates — The Women Lawyers in NYT v. Sullivan

These three women were active in ACLU First Amendment work during those early years and had an enormously powerful and lasting impact on the law we enjoy today. — Joel Gora (longtime ACLU lawyer)

The news follows, but before it does I want to say a few words about three remarkable women and their roles in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). They are:

  1. Harriet Pilpel (1911-1991)
  2. Nanette Dembitz (1913-1989)
  3. Nancy F. Wechsler (1916-2009)
Harriet Fleischl Pilpel

Harriet Fleischl Pilpel

Among others places, you will find their names on the cover of the ACLU amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court on September 9, 1963 in the Sullivan case. Beyond the single sentence they receive in the Supreme Court Reports and in Anthony Lewis’ Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (1991), the women are virtually unknown players in the First Amendment world. As their respective stories reveal, there is more, much more, to be said about the people in the landmark case and how it came to be so. (BTW: Doris Wechsler — the wife of Herbert Wechsler, the attorney for the Times — helped write the merits brief in Sullivan and is listed on it. She sat in the lawyers’ section when Sullivan was argued in the Supreme Court.)

Recently, I had occasion to say a few words about some of those people in connection with a conference hosted by the University of Oregon School of Journalism and Communications and the Law School, a conference to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Sullivan. That is how I came upon the ACLU brief filed in Sullivan.

The lead attorneys for the ACLU and the New York Civil Liberties Union were Edward S. Greenbaum (of the famed Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst firm) and Harriet Pilpel. Melvin L. Wulf, Nanette Dembitz, and Nancy Wechsler were of counsel.

Here is how things began: Mel Wulf, the ACLU attorney, contacted Greenbaum and asked if his firm would file a brief on behalf of ACLU. Greenbaum agreed and, as Wulf recalls, Nancy Wechsler wrote the first draft along with help from Harriet Pilpel. Nanette Dembitz added her own comments, whereafter Wulf did the final read and edit. Greenbaum, the lead attorney, had little or no meaningful input on the brief. The ACLU brief was 37 pages long (plus appendix) and made three basic arguments:

  1. Alabama’s exercise of its long-arm jurisdiction over the Petitioners violated the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
  2. Alabama’s defamation law as applied to criticism of public officials on matters of public concern violated the First Amendment as applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment
  3. The trial judge denied the Petitioners due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

Those arguments were teased in a variety of ways — e.g., Alabama’s use of its defamation laws was analogous to the Alien and Sedition acts; there was no reasonable basis for presuming malice or damages; and the trial was so rife with racial prejudice against the Petitioners as to deny them equal protection. More could be said about the brief, but for now let me leave it there so as to return to my sketch of the three women who contributed to the ACLU brief.

 Harriet Pilpel was an accomplished public-interest advocate with sterling credentials: A graduate of Vassar College and Columbia Law School (1936, second in her class), she went to wotk for the firm of Greenbaum, Wolf & Ernst. Later, she served as general counsel for both the ACLU (1979-1986) and Planned Parenthood. In 1982 she joined the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges. During her career, she participated in 27 cases that came before the Supreme Court. She argued on behalf of Planned Parenthood in Poe v. Ulman (1961). She wrote yet other briefs for Planned Parenthood in cases such as Griswod v. Connecticut (1964, with Nancy Wechsler), Roe v. Wade (1973, with Nancy Wechsler), and Carey v. Population Services International (1977). Pilpel was also on the briefs for the Appellees in Harris v. McRae (1980).

In the free speech context, Pilpel was co-counsel with Edward Greenbaum in Farmers Union v. WDAY (1959), a statutory interpretation defamation case.

Harriet was very helpful in supporting my initial run for the ACLU National Board of Directors (a very competitive process), and she also debated Catharine MacKinnon about pornography at an ACLU Biennial Conference.Nadine Strossen

Read More

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More on Arizona State Legislature–Reply to Mike Ramsey

The always insightful Mike Ramsey has posted about my posts about the Arizona State Legislature case.  I thought I would offer a couple of further comments.

In several places the Constitution clearly says that only “the Legislature” can do something.  For the regulation of congressional districts, though, the Constitution says that “[T]he Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”  I submit that this is not clear as Mike suggests.  Why is that?  Because governors have always had the power to veto redistricting plans (as the Supreme Court held in Smiley v. Holm and as the practice was going back to the Founding), whereas they have not had the power to veto, for example, ratifications of constitutional amendments under Article V.  As a result, Article I, Section IV must mean “prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof” consistent with the lawmaking process set forth in the state constitution.

Does this principle include a state constitution that drastically reduces the Legislature’s role in an unprecedented way?  I’m not sure.  The Arizona scheme may go too far given the text and the Court’s holding in Holm, but I don’t see an originalist ground to object.  Were the Framers opposed to state referenda for regulating elections?  I doubt that you can find any evidence for that.  In that sort of vacuum, I think it is relevant to point out the policy implications of saying that the remedy for partisan gerrymandering lies only with the legislature doing the partisan gerrymandering.  That is not, as Mike says, “purely an argument from policy.”  Moreover, Congress could have exercised its Article I, Section 4 powers to bar independent commissions mandated by a state constitution for redistricting.  It has not done so.  A judicial decision doing so would (as I said in my last post) create a “Dormant Elections Clause,” which I do not think is consistent with any original understanding.

All of this leads me to the conclusion (albeit marginally) that the Arizona plan is constitutional.  What would change my mind?  Probably learning something relevant about the history of state regulation of redistricting or the reasons behind the Framers’ choice to give Congress and state legislatures joint ownership over this power.  So we’ll see what the briefs have to say.

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Vaccination Negligence

I thought I’d offer some thoughts on an issue that is starting to get attention:  Should parents who choose not to vaccinate their children against standard childhood illnesses (measles, mumps, whooping cough) be held liable if their child makes someone else’s child sick with one of these diseases?  For purposes of this discussion, let’s make two assumptions.  First, the choice not to vaccinate was not made for religious reasons.  (That presents a more complex problem.)  Second, there is no contributory negligence (in those jurisdictions) or significant comparative negligence (in jurisdictions that bar recovery when plaintiff is more negligent than defendant) by the parents of the sick child.

The most plausible factual scenario goes something like this.  Plaintiff’s child is too young to be vaccinated fully against a disease or cannot be vaccinated for some unavoidable reason.  This child is exposed to defendant’s child, who is old enough for full vaccination but was not given vaccine and is a host for the disease.  The choice not to give vaccine is made because of concern about the risks that vaccines pose, the belief that they increase the chance of becoming autistic, or some other non-religious reason.Now the question that will generate the most controversy is whether parents are negligent for not vaccinating their child under these circumstances.  I want, though, to focus on how the causation issue would play out.  How would a plaintiff show that exposure to defendant’s child was the cause of the disease?

Here we face an ironic problem.  One thought behind vaccination is “herd protection.”  The idea is that if everyone in a given population who can be inoculated is inoculated then it is far less likely that those who cannot get vaccinated will get sick.  (You can argue that those who are not vaccinating are free riding on those who do.)  When it comes to legal liability, though, herd protection favors those who choose not to vaccinate.  The more children there are like that, the harder it will be for a plaintiff to show but-for cause with respect to any individual child.

How should courts deal with that?  Is the answer that these claims should be viable when a plaintiff can prove that only one child could have exposed his or her child to measles?  Or should we shift the burden of proof to defendants?  Is this a Summers v. Tice situation (at least if we could narrow culpability to a few children)  That question depends, in part, on how bad we think not vaccinating is.  Generally the more egregious the wrong, the more likely we are to extend the scope of causation to hold the wrongdoer liable.

Anyway, I’m sure this will be litigated at some point, and it’s a topic to watch.

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FAN 35.2 (First Amendment News) — Former NSA Director counsels against going after James Risen

Hey, I knew we were playing up against the line.

. . . I don’t understand the necessity to pursue Jim.

– General Michael Hayden

On Sunday October 12th, James Risen of the New York Times appeared on 60 Minutes. He was interviewed by Lesley Stahl. Below are some selected excerpts from that installment of the CBS news program.

Stahl:  Will you divulge your source?

James Risen on 60 Minutes with Lesley Stahl

James Risen on 60 Minutes with Lesley Stahl

Risen:  No, never; I’m not going to talk.

Stahl: Sometimes you get yourself in trouble.

Risen: [Chuckles] Yea, the government has been after me for a while now. . . .

Stahl: What was your first reaction when you realized that the New York Times was onto the NSA story?

General Michael Hayden: First reaction was this is not good news. . . . [The NSA surveillance practices] were warrantless but not unwarranted. It would have been irresponsible for NSA not to have done this in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9-11. . . . Hey, I knew we were playing up against the line. . . . Jim is going to go to jail, why? Because Jim wants to protect his sources. . . .

Stahl: What kept you from walking out [when your editors initially held back your story]? Read More