Andrew DeVore, a former federal prosecutor who co-founded a regional computer crime unit in New York, said Friday the interpretation raises constitutional issues related to speech and due process — in the latter case, because it doesn’t allow for adequate notice of when using an alias online is criminal.
Because corporations would end up setting criminal standards, a completely legal act at one site could be illegal at another, said DeVore, who has no direct involvement in the case.
Currently, the crime of harassment includes communications meant to frighten or disturb another person. Under this act, communications conducted to knowingly frighten, intimidate, or cause emotional distress to another person are included. Harassment includes communications by any means.
Harassment includes knowingly using unwanted expressions that put the person in reasonable apprehension of offensive physical contact or harm or knowingly making unwanted communications with a person.
A person also commits harassment:
1) By knowingly communicating with another person who is, or who purports to be, seventeen years of age or younger and in so doing, and without good cause, recklessly frightens, intimidates, or causes emotional distress to such other person; or
2) By engaging, without good cause, in any other act with the purpose to frighten, intimidate, or cause emotional distress to another person, cause such person to be frightened, intimidated, or emotionally distressed, and such person’s response to the act is one of a person of average sensibilities considering the person’s age.
This law is incredibly dumb, and I hope that the governor is wise enough not to sign this uniformed and very poorly crafted piece of legislation. It is yet another misguided response to the Megan Meier incident. As I discussed in my book, The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet (Yale 2007), we must be careful not to adopt responses to problematic online communication that are too authoritarian and too chilling of free speech.
Under this law, a person could be guilty of a crime for recklessly frightening, intimidating or causing emotional distress to a person they know is 17 or younger. That’s incredibly broad — most likely overbroad under the First Amendment. It sweeps in a potentially broad range of protected expression under the First Amendment.