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Category: Environmental Law

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 61 Symposium: Vol. 61, Issue 6

Volume 61, Issue 6 (July 2014)
Articles

Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future William Boyd 1614
An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid Joel B. Eisen 1712
Valuing National Security: Climate Change, the Military, and Society Sarah E. Light 1772
Lessons From the Past for Assessing Energy Technologies for the Future Albert C. Lin 1814
Complexity and Anticipatory Socio-Behavioral Assessment of Government Attempts to Induce Clean Technologies Gary E. Marchant 1858
Feasibility of Flexible Technology Standards for Existing Coal-Fired Power Plants and Their Implications for New Technology Development Dalia Patino-Echeverri 1896
Socio-Political Evaluation of Energy Deployment (SPEED): A Framework Applied to Smart Grid Jennie C. Stephens, Tarla Rai Peterson & Elizabeth J. Wilson 1930
Energy and Climate Change: A Climate Prediction Market Michael P. Vandenbergh, Kaitlin Toner Raimi & Jonathan M. Gilligan 1962
Regulating Domestic Carbon Outsourcing: The Case of China and Climate Change Alex L. Wang 2018

 

Comments

Smart Meters, Smarter Regulation: Balancing Privacy and Innovation in the Electric Grid Samuel J. Harvey 2068

 

 

 

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 5

Volume 61, Issue 5 (June 2014)
Articles

Opinions First—Argument Afterwards Daniel J. Bussel 1194
How the California Supreme Court Actually Works: A Reply to Professor Bussel Goodwin Liu 1246
The Best of All Possible Worlds? A Rejoinder to Justice Liu Daniel J. Bussel 1270
Deprivative Recognition Erez Aloni 1276
Immigration Detention as Punishment César Cuauhtémoc García Hernández 1346
Toward a Theory of Equitable Federated Regionalism in Public Education Erika K. Wilson 1416
The Dark Side of the First Amendment Steven H. Shiffrin 1480

 

Comments

Misdiagnosing the Impact of Neuroimages in the Courtroom So Yeon Choe 1502
Under the (Territorial) Sea: Reforming U.S. Mining Law for Earth’s Final Frontier James D. Friedland 1548

 

 

 

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Economic Dynamics and Economic Justice: Making Law Catastrophic, Middling, or Better?

Contrary to Livermore,’s post,  in my view Driesen’s book is particularly powerful as a window into the  profound absurdity and destructiveness of the neoclassical economic framework, rather than as a middle-ground tweaking some of its techniques.  Driesen’s economic dynamics lens makes a more important contribution than many contemporary legal variations on neoclassical economic themes by shifting some major assumptions, though this book does not explore that altered terrain as far as it might.

At first glance, Driesen’s foregrounding of the “dynamic” question of change over time may, as Livermore suggests, seem to be consistent with the basic premise of neoclassical law and economics:   that incentives matter, and that law should focus ex ante, looking forward at those effects.   A closer look through Driesen’s economic dynamics lens reveals how law and economics tends to instead take a covert ex post view that enshrines some snapshots of the status quo as a neutral baseline.  The focus on “efficiency” – on maximizing an abstract pie of “welfare”  given existing constraints –  constructs the consequences of law as essentially fixed by other people’s private choices, beyond the power and politics of the policy analyst and government, without consideration of how past and present and future rights or wrongs constrain or enable those choices.  In this neoclassical view, the job of law is narrowed to the technical task of measuring some imagined sum of these individual preferences shaped through rational microeconomic bargains that represent a middling stasis of existing values and resources, reached through tough tradeoffs that nonetheless promise to constantly bring us toward that glimmering goal of maximizing overall societal gain (“welfare”) from scarce resources.

Driesen reverses that frame by focusing on complex change over time as the main thing we can know with certainty.  In the economic dynamic vision, “law creates a temporally extended commitment to a better future.” (Driesen p. 52). Read More

Latour on Agnotology

Bruno Latour reminds us of a rather important development in modern times: the ascent of an “unlearning” industry. He sheds new light on the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor:

[I]n the United States alone something like a billion dollars . . . is being spent to generate ignorance about the anthropic origin of climate mutations. In earlier periods, scientists and intellectuals lamented the little money spent on learning, but they never had to witness floods of money spent on unlearning what was already known. While in times past thinking critically was associated with looking ahead and extracting oneself from an older obscurantist past, today money is being spent to become even more obscurantist than yesterday! “Agnotology”, Robert Proctor’s science of generating ignorance, has become the most important discipline of the day.

Doubt can be a profitable product.

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Partial Taking in the Dunes of New Jersey: The Harvey Cedars Case

This past July, the New Jersey Supreme Court handed down Borough of Harvey Cedars v. Karan, 70 A.3d 524 (2013). In one sense this is a technical case about the rules of just compensation for a partial taking. The New Jersey Supreme Court clarified the distinction between “special benefits,” which can be offset against the compensation owed for a partial taking, and “general benefits,” which cannot. Where a dune restoration project would provide protection to a home in immediate proximity to the shore, if the value of that protection can be determined, it should be deducted from the compensation owed, even though the dune provides flood protection of the same kind—but in significantly less degree–to rows of houses further back from the ocean. The New Jersey Supreme Court determined that an evidentiary ruling excluding evidence of the benefit was erroneous as a matter of law, and remanded for a new trial. All five Justices participating in the opinion agreed.

The case is of more general interest because the public project involved concerned construction of a dune barrier on private property along New Jersey’s barrier islands. It’s a disaster law and climate change case. Dune projects have been underway here for some time–this one began in 2008–with the United States Corps of Engineers doing the heavy lifting, state and municipalities cooperating and chipping in a smallish part of the cost. All of Long Beach Island is part of a big old beach and dune project. And dune projects have gained special salience after Superstorm Sandy.

In the Borough of Harvey Cedars, on Long Beach Island, dune construction required the cooperation of all 82 beachfront property owners. Sixteen of them declined, forcing the municipality to begin condemnation proceedings for a strip of each recalcitrant property owner’s land. In this particular case, the Karans refuse to grant a dune easement over about a quarter of their property; the easement included a dune 22 feet high, replacing one 16 feet high. A right of public access came along with the new dune as well. So the Karans wound up with a view of other folks’ beach recreation activities on the higher dune, not the water view they had previously enjoyed. Evidence supporting the argument that the Karans’ $1.9 million home would benefit from the flood protection afforded by the dune to the tune of several hundred thousand dollars was excluded from a jury by the trial court, on the theory that the entire community also benefitted, and that therefore the flood protection was a “general benefit” which could not legally be offset against the compensation owed the Karans. The Karan’s expert had testified that they should receive $500,000 from Harvey Cedars. The Harvey Cedars expert (from the Corps of Engineers) testified that the proper amount of compensation was $300. But he couldn’t point to evidence of benefit from flood protection because it had been excluded. The jury returned a compensation award of $375,000, principally for loss of view. You can do the math and see what this does to the possibility of any dune project. Holdouts galore. No project. Read More

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A Modest Proposal: Install Permanent Blue Lines Physically Along the Coast

There’s been quite a hullaballoo nationally and regionally on this the first anniversary of Superstorm Sandy. Sandy, you will recall, pummeled the coast of New Jersey and New York for days last October, killing an estimated 285 people, destroying or damaging 650,000 homes and 200,000 businesses, leaving 8,600,000 homes and businesses without power, gas, or water, and shutting down New York City’s subway system for days, crippling the city. The estimated cost of Sandy was $65 billion dollars.

Monmouth University held an excellent online symposium about the response to Sandy on October 29, the anniversary of Sandy’s landfall. Here are youtubes of the morning and afternoon sessions.

Among the notable speakers was Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, who directed the national response to hurricanes Katrina and Rita, served as the National Incident Commander in the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout, and was appointed by New York Governor Cuomo to co-chair a task force on New York State’s responses to future weather-related disasters. Another notable was Christine Todd Whitman, former Governor of New Jersey and former Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency. She resigned as I recall over differences with the George W. Bush administration over whether climate change was going to be a serious problem.

A pollster from and institute at Monmouth University reported that only about half the folks who were supposed to evacuate the New Jersey shore did so; and that when polled later, about the same number said they would not evacuate the next time.

And there surely will be a next time. Another speaker suggested that even a four foot sea level rise by 2100, somewhere in the mid-range of credible estimates, would drastically increase the frequency of severe floods. He offered the analogy of a basketball court. Raise the floor a few inches and you get more dunks. Raise the floor a couple of feet and all you get is dunks. Add to that that many major cities are less than five feet above sea level now – among them Hoboken and Atlantic City here in New Jersey – and that spells trouble with a capital T.

And yet there is this persistent insistence on retaking the land, rebuilding bigger and better, standing up to the storm. Read More

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Shame On You! Hand Over That Dune Easement!

This blog post is the second in my series of four this month on coastal land management and disaster. It will be just a bit shorter than the last, and focuses on the efforts of one among several Jersey Shore beach communities, Long Beach Township, in Ocean County, to use shame as an incentive and punishment for beachfront property owners who have refused to negotiate easements necessary for a protective beach and dune restoration project.

First, some background. New Jersey has something like 127 miles of Atlantic Ocean shoreline – barrier islands, marshes, and inlets. All of its length is developed, with few exceptions. This practice of barrier island development goes well back into the 19th century. Long Branch, in Monmouth County (not to be confused with Long Beach), called itself the “home of Presidents”. It became accessible by rail early on, and seven nineteenth-century presidents summered there. One, James Garfield, died there, after he was shot and taken there for what turned out to be some very bad medical treatment.

Apart from the results of a few episodic impulses to preserve (among them Island Beach State Park and the Sandy Hook element of the Gateway National Recreation Area), all the rest of the buildable New Jersey shore is built. And how! There are the more exclusive enclaves, and also towns with beaches that are narrow and crowded and commercial. In most places you have to pay to get onto the beach. To the chagrin of many a first-year property student, there’s a whole case law and scholarly literature about beach access below the mean high tide line and the public trust doctrine, centered on a series of New Jersey cases. More exclusive towns still try various stratagems to exclude outsiders (What, no all day parking? No changing facilities?). Other towns just let outsiders in as daily visitors or weekly renters and take their money.

For protection against storms, much of the Jersey Shore has been reinforced with hard structures such as sea-walls and groins, which project out into the ocean and supposedly prevent sand from migrating down current. Coastal geologists generally consider what has happened in New Jersey a very bad way to manage beaches on barrier islands. It just fosters erosion and imperils structures that shouldn’t have been built there anyway. Beaches gotta move. See, e.g., Wallace Kaufman & Orrin H. Pilkey, Jr., The Beaches Are Moving: The Drowning of America’s Coastline. Read More

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Homeownership, Flood Insurance, and Stupid Land Uses: The Kolbe Decision

First, thanks to Concurring Opinions for inviting me back.  It’s been years.  What took you so long? 

I plan to spend some of my month’s effort here discussing coastal land use and disasters and the law.  In light of Superstorm Sandy and likely future megastorms, and given climate change and sea level rise, I can’t help noting that, whatever is going on with managing CO2 levels at a global scale, one class of disasters results from what I have come to call in conversation (and now in writing) Stupid-A** Land Use Decisions (SALUD).   We build houses in harm’s way.  I’ve written about the folly of allowing homes on the parts of barrier islands that are most likely to flood or wash away, noting in passing the folly of building homes on scenic hillsides subject to rock- and mudslides.  In the news lately, there’s much about the costs of rescuing homes built in forests that are just waiting to catch fire.  At some point, we have to disincent SALUD, or at least insist that the full cost of risk and rescue and rebuilding be reflected in the market cost of building in Stupid-A** places, and let that expense disincent.  It’s very hard to do.  As my own dear New Jersey Governor Chris Christie said after Superstorm Sandy, we will rebuild!

 Which brings me to the case I’m discussing today.  It came down last Friday. The case is Kolbe v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (1st Cir. No. 11-2030, Sept. 27, 2013) (en banc), 2013 WL 5394192.  It is a First Circuit en banc decision, on a 3-3 vote, failing to reverse the District of Massachusetts, which granted a motion to dismiss a putative class action seeking an interpretation of a form mortgage contract provision concerning flood insurance.  Warning, I’m not an expert in all of the doctrinal areas involved, so please forgive if I miss something, but boy, is it interesting. 

The provision in dispute is Covenant 4, a three-sentence paragraph required by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to be included in all single family dwelling mortgage contracts insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).  Covenant 4 was established by a regulation promulgated in 1989 after notice and comment rulemaking.  It allows a lender to require that the homeowner purchase insurance for “any hazards . . . in the amounts and for periods that the Lender requires.”  Covenant 4 also requires the borrower to insure against loss from floods to the extent required by the Secretary of HUD.  HUD requires flood insurance whenever a property is located in a “special flood hazard area,” the most risky category under the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) classification scheme.  HUD requires flood insurance at least equal to the outstanding balance of the mortgage, that is, the lender’s stake in the property, but there is a cap of $250,000.  Thus, as to hazard (but not flood), the lender clearly has authority under Covenant 4 to require further hazard insurance.  But it is, arguably, unclear whether Covenant 4 empowers the lender to require a homeowner to purchase additional flood insurance.  Perhaps the provision of Covenant 4 referring to requirements by HUD insulates the homeowner from lender requirements as to purchasing flood insurance.  Perhaps Covenant 4′s authorization for lenders to require additional hazard insurance includes flood insurance, because floods are a type of hazard.  That’s the interpretation question. Read More

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Agencies in the Cathedral?

AgenciesAreas of law dominated by government agencies haven’t taken advantage of the rich literature on property rules and liability rules, which are “workhorse concepts that permeate every corner of the economic analysis of law.” In their 1972 article Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, Calabresi and Melamed observed that there are fundamentally two types of remedies: (1) property rules, such as injunctions or disgorgement, which aim to deter, and (2) liability rules, like compensatory damages, which aim to compensate. This framework has paid rich dividends in areas like torts, property, IP, contracts, and conlaw — but seems to have bypassed areas of law dominated by agencies.

Government agencies’ remedies can be classified as either property rules or liability rules. For example, if a business has a permit from the EPA but violates the permit’s conditions, the remedy could be either taking away the permit (a property rule), or requiring proportional compensation (a liability rule). Similarly, if a broker has a license from the SEC and violates securities law, the remedy could be either yanking the license (a property rule), or requiring compensation for the harmed parties (a liability rule).

I apply the property rule and liability rule framework to my favorite agency — the IRS — in a forthcoming Virginia Law Review article. When a taxpayer violates a tax-law requirement, the remedy can be either yanking the taxpayer’s favorable tax status (a property rule), or requiring compensatory additional tax (a liability rule). Counterintuitively, anecdotal evidence shows that property-rule remedies may be less effective at deterring violations, because the threat of political and media blowback may make the IRS unwilling to impose a draconian property-rule remedy. As a result, when Congress protects a requirement with the property-rule remedy of yanking a favorable tax status, politically-powerful or sympathetic taxpayers are rarely deterred from violating the requirement. The IRS doesn’t dare impose it. Surely similar problems plague enforcement by other agencies.

Anyone working in any agency-dominated area of law could consider how the property-rule/liability-rule framework fits into their area.

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Surveillance You Might Dig

NOAA’s video of green patterns earth shows how visualization helps show what data may indicate. The assertion that the visualization and data analysis helps understand weather, fire seasons, fertile areas, droughts, and more are tantalizing. If true at some level, this surveillance seems cool.