Category: Empirical Analysis of Law

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Randomization, Intake Systems, and Triage

Thanks to Jim and Cassandra for their carefully constructed study of the impact of an offer from the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau for representation before the Massachusetts Division of Unemployment Assistance, and to all of the participants in the symposium for their thoughtful contributions.  What Difference Representation? continues to provoke much thought, and as others have noted, will have a great impact on the access to justice debate.  I’d like to focus on the last question posed in the paper — where do we go from here? — and tie this in with questions about triage raised by Richard Zorza and questions about intake processes raised by Margaret Monsell.   The discussion below is informed by my experience as a legal service provider in the asylum system, a legal arena that the authors note is  strikingly different from the unemployment benefits appeals process described in the article.

My first point is that intake processes vary significantly between different service providers offering representation in similar and different areas of the law.  In my experience selecting cases for the asylum clinics at Georgetown and Yale, for example, we declined only cases that were frivolous, and at least some intake folks (yours truly included) preferred to select the more difficult cases, believing that high-quality student representation could make the most difference in these cases.  Surely other legal services providers select for the cases that are most likely to win, under different theories about the most effective use of resources.  WDR does not discuss which approach HLAB takes in normal practice (that is, outside the randomization study).  On page twenty, the study states that information on financial eligibility and “certain additional facts regarding the caller and the case”  are put to the vote of HLAB’s intake committee.  On what grounds does this committee vote to accept or reject a case?  In other words, does HLAB normally seek the hard cases, the more straightforward cases, some combination, or does it not take the merits into account at all?

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How Much Enthusiasm for Randomized Trials? A Response to Kevin Quinn and David Hoffman

We thank Kevin Quinn and David Hoffman for taking the time to comment in our paper.  Again, these are two authors whose work we have read and admired in the past.

Both Dave and Kevin offer  thoughts about the levelof enthusiasm legal empiricists, legal services providers, and clinicians should have for randomized studies.  We find ourselves in much but not total agreement with both.  To Kevin, we suggest that there is more at stake than just finding out whether legal assistance helps potential clients.  In an era of scarce legal resources, providers and funders have to make allocation decisions across legal practice areas (i.e., should we fund representation for SSI/SSDI appeals or for unemployment appeals or for summary eviction defense).  That requires more precise knowledge about how large representation (offer or actual use) effects are, how much bang for the buck.  Perhaps even more importantly, scarcity requires that we learn how to triage well; see Richard Zorza’s posts here and the numerous entries in his own blog on this subject.  That means studying the effects of limited interventions.  Randomized trials provide critical information on these questions, even if one agrees (as we do) that in some settings, asking whether representation (offer or actual use) helps clients is like asking whether parachutes are useful.

Thus, perhaps the parachute analogy is inapt, or better, it requires clarification:  we are in a world in which not all who could benefit from full-service parachutes can receive them.  Some will have to be provided with rickety parachutes, and some with little more than large blankets.  We all should try to change this situation as much as possible (thus the fervent hope we expressed in the paper that funding for legal services be increased).  But the oversubscription problem is simply enormous.  When there isn’t enough to go around, we need to know what we need to know to allocate well.  Meanwhile, randomized studies can also provide critical information on the pro se accessibility of an adjudicatory system, which can lay the groundwork for reform.

To Dave, we say that our enthusiasm for randomized studies is high, but perhaps not high enough to consider a duty to randomize among law school clinics or among legal services providers.  We provided an example in the paper of practice in which randomization was inappropriate because collecting outcomes might have exposed study subjects to deportation proceedings.  We also highlighted in the paper that in the case of a practice (including possibly a law school clinic) that focuses principally on systemic change, randomization of that practice is not constructive.  Instead, what should be done is a series of randomized studies of an alternative service provider’s practice in that same adjudicatory system; these alternative provider studies can help to assess whether the first provider’s efforts at systemic change have been successful.

Our great thanks to both Kevin and Dave for writing, and (obviously) to Dave (and Jaya) for organizing this symposium.

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What Difference Representation: Case Selection and Professional Responsibility

Thanks for the invitation to participate in this interesting and provocative symposium.

I’m a legal services attorney in Boston. My employer, Massachusetts Law Reform Institute (MLRI), has as one of its primary tasks to connect the state’s field programs, where individual client representation occurs, with larger political bodies, including legislatures and administrative agencies, where the systemic changes affecting our clients most often take place. (The legal services programs in many states include organizations comparable to MLRI; we are sometimes known by the somewhat infelicitous name “backup centers.”) Among the programs with which MLRI is in communication is the Harvard Legal Assistance Bureau, and I would take this moment to acknowledge the high regard in which I and my colleagues regard their work.

The substantive area of my work is employment law. It is no surprise that during the past three years of our country’s Great Recession, the importance of the unemployment insurance system for our clients has increased enormously and, consequently, it has occupied a greater portion of my time than might otherwise have been the case.

I’m not a statistician nor do I work in a field program representing individual clients, so my comments will not address in any detail the validity of the HLAB study or the conclusions that may properly be drawn from it. As one member of the community of Massachusetts legal services attorneys, however, I have an obvious interest in the way the study portrays us: we are variously described as self-protective, emotional, distrustful of being evaluated, and reluctant to the point of perverseness in participating in randomized studies of the kind the authors wish to conduct. Our resistance in this regard has itself already been the subject of comment here. Happily, it is not often that one looks into what seems to be a mirror and sees the personage looking back wearing a black hat and a snarl. But when it does happen, it’s hard to look away without some effort at clarification. So I will devote my contribution to the symposium to the topic of the perceived reluctance of the legal services community to cooperate in randomized trials. It goes without saying, but the following thoughts are those of only one member of a larger community.

My understanding is that in the HLAB study, no significant case evaluation occurred prior to randomization. Many of us in legal services view with trepidation the idea of ceding control over case selection to the randomization process. Others have more sanguine views, either because they assume that randomization is already taking place or that it ought to be. For example, in his comments from a few months ago, Dave Hoffman was working under the assumption that to randomize client selection would not change an agency’s representation practices at all, and on that basis, he criticized resistance to randomized control trials as “trying to prevent research from happening.”

The authors of the study are enthusiastic about randomization not only because of its scientific value in statistical research but also because it can help to solve one of the thorniest problems facing legal services programs – the scarcity of resources as compared to the demand. As long as the demand for legal assistance outstrips the supply, Professor Greiner has said, randomization – a roll of the dice or the flip of a coin — is an easy and appropriate way to decide who gets representation and who does not.

I believe it’s erroneous to assume that randomization would not change representation practices, at least in the area of legal services in which I work. I also acknowledge that it is possible, at least theoretically, for all the cases in a randomized control trial to have met the provider’s standards for representation. This would provide some measure of reassurance. However, in one area of law, immigration asylum cases, the authors have concluded that time constraints make such an effort unworkable.

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What Difference Representation: Inconclusive Evidence

Congratulations to the authors on an excellent study that promotes and explores the importance of random assignment.

My comment supports the article’s emphasis on caution and not overgeneralizing. My focus is on the article’s Question 2: Did an offer of HLAB representation increase the probability that the claimant would prevail? My analysis of the simple frequencies (I have not delved into the regressions and ignore weights) suggests that HLAB attorneys should view the results as modest, but inconclusive, evidence that an offer of representation improves outcomes.

Based on Table 1, page 24, there are 129 No offer observations and 78 Offer observations. Ignoring weights, which I think are said not to make a huge difference, page 26 reports that .76 of claimants who received an offer prevailed in their first level appeals, and that .72 of claimants who did not receive an offer prevailed in their first level appeal.

So, those who were offered representation fared better; one measure of which is they did .04/.72 x 100, or 5.6% better. Given the high background (no offer condition) rate of prevailing, the maximum improvement (to 1.00 success rate) is .28/.72 x 100 or 38.9%.  Another measure could be the proportionate reduction in defeat. The no offer group was “defeated” 28% of the time. The offer group was defeated 24% of the time.  The reduction in defeat is .04/.28 x 100 is 14.3%. This measure has the sometimes attractive feature that it can range from 0% to 100%. So by this measure the offeree group did 14% better than the non-offeree group, a modest improvement for the offer condition.

A concern expressed in the paper is that the result is not statistically significant. This raises the question: given the sample size, how likely was it that a statistically significant effect would be detected? Assessing this requires hypothesizing what size effect of an offer would be of societal interest.  Suppose we say that lawyers should do about 10% better and move the win rate from .72 for non offerees to .80 for offerees.  This is an 11.1% improvement by the first measure and a 28.6% improvement by the second measure.  Both strike me as socially meaningful but others might specify different numbers.

We can now pose the question: given the sample size and the effect of specified size, what is the probability of observing a statistically significant effect if one exists?  I use the following Stata command to explore the statistical power of the study:

sampsi .72 .80,n1(129) n2(78), which yields the following output:

Estimated power for two-sample comparison of proportions

Test Ho: p1 = p2, where p1 is the proportion in population 1 and p2 is the proportion in population 2

Assumptions:

alpha =   0.0500  (two-sided)

p1 =   0.7200

p2 =   0.8000

sample size n1 = 129

n2 = 78

n2/n1 = 0.60

Estimated power:

power =   0.1936

A power of 0.19 is too low to conclude that the study was large enough to detect an effect of the specified size at a statistically significant level. If one concluded that an offer of representation did not make a significant difference from this study, there is a good chance the conclusion would be incorrect. To achieve power of about 0.70, one would need a sample four times as large as that in the study. If one thought that smaller effects were meaningful, the sample would be even more undersized.

I think my analysis so far underestimates the benefit of an offer by HLAB attorneys.  Perhaps we can take .72 as a reasonable lower bound on success. Even folks without an offer succeeded at that rate.  The realistic upper bound on success is likely not 1.00.  Some cases simply cannot be won, even by the best lawyer in the world. Perhaps not more than 90% of cases are ever winnable, with the real winnable rate likely somewhere between .8 and .9.  If the winnable rate was .8, then the offer got clients halfway there, from .72 to .76. If the real rate was higher, the offer was less effective but not trivial in size.  At .9, the offer got the clients 22% closer to the ideal. The study just was not large enough to detect much of an effect at a statistically significant level.

So while I agree that the study provides no significant evidence that an offer increases success, my analysis (obviously incomplete) suggests that the study provides no persuasive evidence that an offer does not increase success. The study is inconclusive on this issue because of sample size.

HLAB lawyers should not feel that they have to explain away these results; the results modestly, but inconclusively, support the positive effect of an offer because they are in the right direction in a small study.

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What Difference Presentation?

David Udell is the Executive Director of the National Center for Access to Justice and a Visiting Professor from Practice at Cardozo Law School.

In my line of work, I have seen many efforts in the political realm to shut down civil legal services for the poor, and have continually worked to combat such efforts.  In 1996, when the Gingrich Congress barred federally funded legal services lawyers from bringing class actions on behalf of the poor, I left Legal Services for the Elderly in order to finish a lawsuit on behalf of widows and widowers who were suing to compel the United States Treasury to fix its practices for replacing stolen Social Security payments.  When I later moved to the Brennan Center for Justice, I helped bring a lawsuit against the rules that barred legal services lawyers from participating in such class actions, I filed another lawsuit against similar rules that barred law school clinic students from bringing environmental justice cases in Louisiana, and I built a Justice Program at the Brennan Center dedicated to countering such attacks on the poor and on their lawyers.

In their March 3, 2011 draft report, What Difference Representation? Offers, Actual Use, and the Need for Randomization (“the Study”), authors D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanyak are right about the importance of developing a solid evidence base – one founded on methodologies that include randomization – to establish what works in ensuring access to justice for people with civil legal cases. They are right again that in the absence of such evidence, both the legal aid community and its critics are accustomed to relying on less solid data.  And they are smart to “caution against both over- and under-generalization of these study results.”  But, unfortunately, the bare exhortation to avoid over- and under-generalization is not sufficient in the highly politicized context of legal services.

While the authors obviously do not have any obligation to arrive at a particular result, they can be expected to recognize a need to avoid statements that have a high probability to mislead, especially in light of the likely inability of much of the Study’s audience to understand the authors’ methodology and findings.  In fact, because of the Study’s novelty and appearance in a non-scientific journal, it will be relied on to analyze situations where it doesn’t apply, and by people who have no background in social science research, plus it will be given disproportionate weight because so few comparable studies exist to judge it against.  It is these factors, in combination with the politicization of legal services, that make it crucial that the authors’ assertions, particularly in the sections most likely to be seen by lay readers (the title and the abstract), do not extend beyond what the findings justify.

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What Difference Representation – A Response

I am the Executive Director of Greater Boston Legal Services, the primary provider of civil legal services to poor people in the greater Boston area.  My program and I have a great stake in assuring that our limited resources are used where they can be most effective.  Indeed we are participating with Professor Greiner in a study of the impact of our staff attorneys’ representation in defense of eviction cases.  My comments refer to the draft dated February 12, 2011.

It is important with any study; however, to know what it concludes and what it does not.  For instance, and most importantly, the study concedes on page 43 that it could draw no conclusions about the effect on outcome for claimants actually receiving representation, as opposed to just an offer of representation.  Thus, this study should be recognized for what it is: a limited analysis of the somewhat abstract concept of “offering” assistance.  Indeed, the study wisely cautions against drawing any conclusions from the study about the usefulness of free legal assistance or even about the usefulness of offers of representation in unemployment cases in general (page 47).

I feel some changes are necessary to avoid much confusion about (and misuse of) this study’s conclusions (or lack thereof) as to the effect of representation itself, as opposed to just the offer.  For instance, given that this study’s principal conclusions are about an offer of representation and not actual representation, a more accurate title to this study would be, “What Difference an Offer of Representation?”  And the very first sentence of the Introduction on page 5 currently reads, “Particularly with respect to low-income clients in civil cases, how much of a difference does legal representation make?”  It is only a footnote that explains the study looks at offers as well as effect, and much later in the study (page 32) that no conclusions were reached at all as to the effect of representation.  Similarly, the conclusion (“Where Do We Go From Here?”) states, “the present study primarily concerned representation effects on legal outcomes affecting the potential client’s pecuniary interests.”

I am concerned also that the results reported in the study with respect to offers of representation by HLAB are misleading at best and of little utility at worst.  This is because nearly half of the control group were represented by counsel and, more significantly, probably that many and perhaps more in the control group got an offer of free representation from my program or another providing free legal services in unemployment cases.  To make an analogy to the medical world, suppose there was a Pfizer drug trial where 50% of Pfizer’s control group were offered the exact same medication from Merck.  Wouldn’t that cast serious doubt on the outcome of the study?  There is no mention of this 49% in either the abstract or introduction which unfortunately are all many readers will read.

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Uncompensated Torts

There’s a fantastic new article out by Rick Swedloff (Rutgers-Camden) called Uncompensated Torts.  Swedloff examines the obstacles (largely insurance-related) to victim compensation for intentional torts, and offers a sobering take on possible solutions.  The one that most interests me is an insurance mandate.  Though I take it from Swedloff’s article that these kinds of mandates are perhaps less popular than the used to be?  Anyway, the whole thing is well-worth checking out.

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What Difference Representation: Introduction to the Symposium

Should Law School Clinics Select Clients by Roulette?

I am delighted to announce that Concurring Opinions will be hosting a symposium next Monday and Tuesday on What Difference Representation? Offers, Actual Use, and the Need for Randomization, the forthcoming Yale Law Journal article by Jim Greiner and Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak.  [Update: You can read all posts in the symposium by clicking on this link.]  As you may recall, What Difference has already caused quite a stir in the clinical and legal aid communities. Given our shared interest in questions of empirical methodology, and Jaya’s background in clinical legal services, we decided that bringing that debate to CoOp would be an excellent use of our time and energy. Here’s the (revised) abstract) – though you should download the article if you haven’t already:

“We report the results of the first in a series of randomized control trials designed to measure the effect of an offer of, and the actual use of, legal representation. The results are unexpected. In the context of administrative litigation to determine eligibility for unemployment benefits, a service provider’s offer of representation to a claimant had no statistically significant effect on the claimant’s probability of a victory, but the offer caused a delay in the proceeding. Because a substantial percentage of the provider’s client base consisted of claimants who were initially denied benefits but who would later have that initial denial reversed as a result of the litigation, the offer of representation inflicted a harm upon such claimants in the form of an additional waiting time for benefits to begin, this with no discernible increase in the probability of a favorable outcome. In other words, within the limits of statistical uncertainty, these claimants would have been better off without the offer of representation. The size of the delay (around two weeks, depending on how measured) was not large in absolute terms, and would have been negligible in many other legal settings, but was relevant in the context of this particular administrative and legal framework, one in which speed has remained a special concern for decades. Moreover, in a small number of cases with a certain profile, the delay caused the unemployment system to continue paying benefits erroneously for a longer period of time, potentially imposing costs on the financing of the unemployment system. We were also able to verify a delay effect due to the actual use of (as opposed to an offer of) representation; we could come to no firm conclusion on the effect of actual use of representation on win/loss.

We hypothesize three potential explanations for our findings (and acknowledge that others are possible). First, it is possible that the client base that reached out to the service provider (and thus was subject to randomization) was a specialized subset of unemployment claimants, a subset that did not actually need legal assistance. This theory suggests special attention to provider intake systems. Second, it is possible that the administrative adjudicatory system at issue, with its semi-inquisitorial style of judging, is pro se friendly. Third, it is possible that the subject matter in dispute in these cases is less legally, factually, or procedurally complex than in other settings.

We caution against both over- and under-generalization of these study results. We use these results as a springboard for a comprehensive review of the quantitative literature on the effect of representation in civil proceedings. We find that this literature provides virtually no credible information, excepting the results of two randomized evaluations occurring in different legal contexts and separated by over three decades. We conclude by advocating for, and describing challenges associated with, a large program of randomized evaluation of the provision of representation, particularly by legal services providers.”

We have assembled a terrific group of symposiasts, mixing clinicians, academic empiricists and practitioners. Besides Jim, Cassandra, Jaya and me,  the group includes twelve contributors, lauded in detail after the jump:

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UCLA Law Review Vol. 58, Issue 3 (February 2011)

Volume 58, Issue 3 (February 2011)


Articles

Good Faith and Law Evasion Samuel W. Buell 611
Making Sovereigns Indispensable: Pimentel and the Evolution of Rule 19 Katherine Florey 667
The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences Jennifer L. Mnookin et al. 725
Commentary on The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences Joseph P. Bono 781
Commentary on The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences Judge Nancy Gertner 789
Commentary on The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences Pierre Margot 795


Comments

What’s Your Position? Amending the Bankruptcy Disclosure Rules to Keep Pace With Financial Innovation Samuel M. Kidder 803
Defendant Class Actions and Patent Infringement Litigation Matthew K. K. Sumida 843


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The Representation Debate Continues

Jim Greiner and Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak have emailed me a reply to the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau’s comment on What Difference Representation. Since the topic has been the subject of several posts here, as well as some off-line communication from interested readers, I figured that I owed Greiner/Pattanayak a public space for reply.  It consists of a bit of introductory text, and a longer (9-page) paper.

“We recently became aware that HLAB President Rachel Lauter and HLAB Faculty Director David Grossman had written an email to the clinical listserve addressing our paper “What Difference Representation?”.  The email has been posted to various locations in the blogosphere.  Because the email expresses criticisms of the paper that we also have received from one or two other sources, we thought we would take the opportunity the email presented to clarify certain issues.  For example, President Lautner and Professor Grossman echo reactions we have received from another legal aid provider when they say that our study produced “only limited information,” and that more (and more useful) information would be available if we would just analyze the data properly.  We explain here that the analysis the email (and one or two other legal services providers) have advocated is statistically invalid, and that in any event the data required for it do not presently exist and cannot at this time be ethically collected.  As ought to be clear by now, we have the greatest respect for the students of HLAB, including President Lautner, and HLAB’s clinical faculty, including Professor Grossman.  We are using President Lautner and Professor Grossman’s email as a convenient foil representative of a few other comments we have received.

The substance of our response can be captured in the answers to two questions.

1.  Why study the effect of offers of HLAB representation?  All agree that the effect of actual use of representation is interesting, although as we will explain, perhaps less so than one might think at first.  But why study the effect of HLAB offers?

2.  Why not compare those who got offers from any source, not just HLAB, to those who did not get any such offers?}  This is what President Lauter, Professor Grossman, and a few others have suggested.  Why not make this comparison?

We also answer one final question:

3.  So how can we find out about the effect of offers from other service providers?”

To read the full response, click here.