Category: Empirical Analysis of Law

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Does Topic Sequence in Teaching Matter?

What are we really teaching our students?  Those of us who complain that our students are too focused on learning rules and doctrines should read a provocative empirical study recently published on SSRN by my colleague Don Gifford, Villanova sociologist Brian Jones, and two of Don’s former students with expertise in statistical analysis, Joseph Kroart and Cheryl Cortemeglia. Donald G. Gifford, Joseph Kroart, Brian Jones & Cheryl Cortemeglia, What’s on First?: Organizing the Casebook and Molding the Mind, 44 Ariz. St. L.J. ___ (2013) (forthcoming).  The article describes an empirical study suggesting that whether the Torts professor begins with intentional, negligent, or strict liability torts affects the students’ understanding of the role of the common-law judge in a statistically significant way. The authors argue that the judge’s role in deciding intentional tort cases is at least to some extent more rule-based than her role in negligence and strict liability cases. Applying the work of sociologist Eving Goffman, they posit that beginning with intentional torts frames the judicial role in this manner. Further, they hypothesize that once frequently anxious first-semester students latch onto one particular conception of the judicial role during the initial weeks of the semester, it becomes anchored and resistant to change even after the students have studied other categories of tort liability.

Gifford et al. surveyed more than 450 first-year law students at eight law schools that vary widely in terms of their
reputational ranking. The students were surveyed at the beginning, middle, and end of the first semester. The survey results supported the authors’ hypothesis that students who begin their study of Torts with strict liability experience a greater shift toward understanding the judge’s role as being influenced by social, economic, and ideological factors and a sense of fairness and less as a process of rule application than do students who begin their study with either intentional torts or negligence.  Even when the authors controlled for the ranking of the law school, topic sequence still generated a significant effect on students’ perceptions of the role of the common law judge.  Nor did the effect of topic sequence vary by gender. The authors were surprised to find that students who began with intentional torts experience a greater attitudinal shift toward perceiving the judicial role as being policy influenced than do students who began with negligent torts.

Despite their disclaimers, the authors implicitly criticize the overwhelming majority of Torts professors who begin with intentional torts. Most Torts casebooks begin with intentional torts, at least after a brief introductory chapter.  Their editors claim that these cases are “accessible,” “memorable,” and provide “a nice warm up” for studying other torts. Some of these same editors admit that intentional torts comprise a “backwater” in modern tort practice. Gifford et al. suggest that the real reason for beginning with intentional torts may be because that is the way it always has been done. They note that the first Torts casebook, edited by James Ames Barr, Dean Langdell’s colleague, began with intentional torts. They provocatively suggest that Ames may have begun with intentional torts in part precisely because these torts were most rule-like in nature and furthered Langdell’s mission to make the law appear “scientific” in order to justify its inclusion within the university curriculum. If this is true, note the authors, then most modern-day Torts professors are “unwitting conscripts” in the Langdellian mission. Read More

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Stanford Law Review Online: Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Jonathan Baker and Carl Shapiro entitled Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration. Professors Baker and Shapiro take issue with Daniel Crane’s assertions in his Essay of July 18:

We recently concluded that government merger enforcement statistics “provide clear evidence that the Obama Administration reinvigorated merger enforcement, as it set out to do.” Three weeks later, in an article published in the Stanford Law Review Online, Professor Daniel A. Crane reached the opposite conclusion, claiming that “[t]he merger statistics do not evidence ‘reinvigoration’ of merger enforcement under Obama.”

Crane is simply wrong. The data regarding merger enforcement unambiguously support our conclusion and cannot reasonably be read to support Crane’s assertions. Crane’s conclusion regarding merger enforcement is inaccurate because he relies upon flawed metrics and overlooks or misinterprets other important evidence.

They conclude:

Our analysis of merger enforcement at the DOJ during the George W. Bush Administration—based on the enforcement statistics and more—showed that it was unusually lax and in need of reinvigoration. It is too early to reach a comparably definitive conclusion about merger enforcement at the DOJ during the Obama Administration, but nothing in Daniel Crane’s article seriously challenges our interpretation of the preliminary data as demonstrating that the necessary reinvigoration has taken place.

Read the full article, Evaluating Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration by Jonathan Baker and Carl Shapiro, at the Stanford Law Review Online.

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Stanford Law Review Online: The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Edward McCaffery entitled The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform. Professor McCaffery argues that Congress encourages and perpetuates the cycle of special interest spending on the tax reform issue:

Spoiler alert! The dirty little secret of estate tax reform is the same as the dirty little secret about many things that transpire, or fail to transpire, inside the Beltway: it’s all about money. But no, it is not quite what you think. The secret is not that special interests give boatloads of money to politicians. Of course they do. That may well be dirty, but it is hardly secret. The dirty little secret I come to lay bare is that Congress likes it this way. Congress wants there to be special interests, small groups with high stakes in what it does or does not do. These are necessary conditions for Congress to get what it needs: money, for itself and its campaigns. Although the near certainty of getting re-elected could point to the contrary, elected officials raise more money than ever. Tax reform in general, and estate tax repeal or reform in particular, illustrate the point: Congress has shown an appetite for keeping the issue of estate tax repeal alive through a never-ending series of brinksmanship votes; it never does anything fundamental or, for that matter, principled, but rakes in cash year in and year out for just considering the matter.

He concludes:

On the estate tax, then, it is easy to predict what will happen: not much. We will not see a return to year 2000 levels, and we will not see repeal. The one cautionary note I must add is that, going back to the game, something has to happen sometime, or the parties paying Congress and lobbyists will wise up and stop paying to play. But that has not kicked in yet, decades into the story, and it may not kick in until more people read this Essay, and start to watch the watchdogs. Fat chance of that happening, too, I suppose. In the meantime, without a meaningful wealth-transfer tax (the gift and estate taxes raise a very minimal amount of revenue and may even lose money when the income tax savings of standard estate-planning techniques, such as charitable and life insurance trusts, are taken into account), one fundamental insight of the special interest model continue to obtain. Big groups with small stakes—that is, most of us—continue to pay through increasingly burdensome middle class taxes for most of what government does, including stringing along those “lucky” enough to be members of a special interest group. It’s a variant of a very old story, and it is time to stop keeping it secret.

Read the full article, The Dirty Little Secret of (Estate) Tax Reform by Edward McCaffery, at the Stanford Law Review Online.

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Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Daniel Crane entitled Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement?. Professor Crane assesses antitrust enforcement in the Obama and Bush administrations using several empirical measures:

The Justice Department’s recently filed antitrust case against Apple and several major book publishers over e-book pricing, which comes on the heels of the Justice Department’s successful challenge to the proposed merger of AT&T and T-Mobile, has contributed to the perception that the Obama Administration is reinvigorating antitrust enforcement from its recent stupor. As a candidate for President, then-Senator Obama criticized the Bush Administration as having the “weakest record of antitrust enforcement of any administration in the last half century” and vowed to step up enforcement. Early in the Obama Administration, Justice Department officials furthered this perception by withdrawing the Bush Administration’s report on monopolization offenses and suggesting that the fault for the financial crisis might lie at the feet of lax antitrust enforcement. Even before the AT&T and Apple cases, media reports frequently suggested that antitrust enforcement is significantly tougher under President Obama.

For better or worse, the Administration’s enforcement record does not bear out this impression. With only a few exceptions, current enforcement looks much like enforcement under the Bush Administration. Antitrust enforcement in the modern era is a technical and technocratic enterprise. Although there will be tweaks at the margin from administration to administration, the core of antitrust enforcement has been practiced in a relatively nonideological and nonpartisan way over the last several decades.

He concludes:

Two points stressed earlier should be stressed again: (1) statistical measures of antitrust enforcement are an incomplete way of understanding the overall level of enforcement; and (2) to say that the Obama Administration’s record of enforcement is not materially different than the Bush Administration’s is not to chide Obama for weak enforcement. Rather, it is to debunk the claims that antitrust enforcement is strongly dependent on politics.

This examination of the “reinvigoration” claim should not be understood as acceptance that tougher antitrust enforcement is always better. Certainly, there have been occasions when an administration would be wise to ease off the gas pedal. At present, however, there is a high degree of continuity from one administration to the next.

Read the full article, Has the Obama Justice Department Reinvigorated Antitrust Enforcement? by Daniel Crane, at the Stanford Law Review Online.

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Are We Really Growing “More Divided” By Party Over Time?

Over at the Cultural Cognition Blog, I’ve written a bit about some new evidence about partisan division.  The headline news is that partisanship is a better predictor than it used to be of cultural division.  But as I read the data, the undernews is that we’re actually no more divided than we used to be on common ideological and cultural measures.  Given all that’s happened in the last quarter-century – including media differentiation, the digital revolution and 24-hour news cycle, more bowling alone, sprawl – isn’t that kind of a huge deal? The fact that partisan self-identification is a better predictor of cultural views than it used to be simply means that the parties are cohering better.  That might be bad for the functioning of our particular form of representative government, but it doesn’t mean that we’re drifting apart as a country.

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A Taxonomy of Federal Litigation

For the last two years, Christy Boyd and I, along with some friends, have been working on a paper on how attorneys construct complaints.  The project began when we were working to code some other detritus of federal litigation and decided to collect the causes of action in complaints to understand the legal issues in our cases in a better manner than NOS codes alone permitted.  Soon enough, we got to thinking that our causes of action were pled in distinctively patterned ways.  Obviously, this isn’t an earth-shaking insight, as most first year students have thought, at one time or another, that each of their classes’ exam fact patterns could easily substitute for any other.  That is: causes of action are alternative, mutually complementary, theories that channel a limited number of fact patterns into claims to legal relief.   Everyone knows that contract and tort claims are pled together, and that constitutional claims come accompanied by state law torts.  But we thought it’d be worthwhile to nail down this insight using a very similar analysis to the one that enables Amazon to tell you which books you might like — i.e., if you plead a particular cause of action, what other causes of action are you likely to bring in a particular case?

We gathered a set of 2,500 complaints (from a much larger sample of federal complaints derived through RECAP).  The complaints were sampled to be fairly representative of all federal litigation, excluding pro se, social security, and prisoner petition cases. The sample contained 11,500 individual causes of action – around 4.6 causes of action per case.  Guided by co-authors at Temple’s Center for Data Analytics, we used spectral clustering to examine the relationship between causes of action.  Two years later and presto, we’ve a (draft) paper is up on SSRN!  The ungainly title is Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in Federal Complaints. I welcome your comments, and your suggestions for a better title. Follow me after the jump for an exploration of our findings.

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Cultural Cognition and the Trayvon Martin Case

Over at the Cultural Cognition blog, Dan Kahan has two posts up, with a third promised, on the Trayvon Martin case. In the first, Dan argued that motivated cognition helps to explain why we disagree so vehemently about the facts of the Martin-Zimmerman incident. Indeed, he claimed that “we’ll never know what happened, because we—the members of our culturally pluralistic society—have radically different understandings of what a case like this means.”

In his second post, he connects the shooting to the history of stand-your-ground laws – and the NRA’s successful strategy to combine self-defense norms with gun rights.  Arguing that turning Martin’s death into a discussion of the empirics of gun violence is exactly what the NRA would like, he urges that commentators “to just back off.  Not only are you needlessly sowing division; you are destroying the prospects for a meaningful conversation of the values that—despite our cultural differences—in fact unite us. ”

As as is so often the case, Dan states offers a subtle and compelling argument for the relevance of motivated cognition in understanding public policy.  I’ve actually been toying with writing a similar post – but it wouldn’t have been nearly as well-executed. So I hope you’ll go to the CCP blog and read what he’s written – it might cause you to rethink your priors on the tragedy in florida. Then please come back for a few further thoughts.

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Measurable Things

The Misleadingly Convenient Source of Information

A common criticism one reads of ELS is that “too much of the work is driven by the existence of a data set, rather than an intellectual or analytical point.”  It’s ironic that this is the very critique that the realists made of traditional legal scholarship. Consider the great Llewellyn:

“I am a prey, as is every man who tries to work with law, to the apperceptive mass.  I see best what I have learned to see.  I am a prey, too — as are the others — to the old truth that the available limits vision, the available bulks as if it were the whole.  What records have I of the work of magistrates?  How shall I get them?  Are there any?  And if there are, must I search them out myself?  But the appellate courts make access to their work convenient.  They issue reports, printed, bound, to be had all gathered for me in the libraries.  The convenient  source of information lures.  Men work with it, first, because it is there; and because they have worked with it, men build it into ideology.  The ideology grows and spreads and gains acceptance, acquires a force and an existence of its own, becomes a thing to conjure with:  the rules and concepts of the courts of last resort.”

Or to put it differently, all of our work – quantitative empiricists, doctrinalists, corporate finance wizards, administrative regulation parsers, legal philosophers, and derivative social psychologists alike – is driven by the materials at hand. For most lawyers and legal academics, appellate opinions are the most convenient pieces of information available; we use such opinions to create mental models of what the “law” is, and (ordinarily in legal scholarship) what it ought be. Indeed, whenever trial court opinions are cited, they are often discounted as aberrant or transitory, in part because they are known to be unrepresentative!

Why, you might wonder, is the convention of data-driven-scholarship a particular problem in quantitative empirical work? ELS’s detractors make three interrelated claims:

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Greiner and Pattanayak: The Sequel

In a draft essay, Service Delivery, Resource Allocation and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the Research Imperative, Tony Alfieri, Jeanne Charn, Steve Wizner, and I reflect on Jim Greiner and Cassandra Pattanayak’s provocative article reporting the results of a randomized controlled trial evaluating legal assistance to low-income clients at the Harvard Legal Aid Bureau. (The Greiner and Pattanayak article was the subject of a Concurring Opinions symposium last March.) Studying the outcomes of appeals from initial denials of unemployment insurance benefit claims, Greiner and Pattanayak asked, what difference does legal representation make? Their answer is that “an offer of HLAB representation had no statistically significant effect on the probability that a claimant would prevail, but that the offer did delay the adjudicatory process.” That is, not only was an offer of legal assistance immaterial to the case outcome, it may have harmed clients’ interests.

The Greiner and Pattanayak findings challenge our intuition, experience and deeply-held professional belief that lawyer representation of indigent clients in civil matters is fundamental to the pursuit of justice. Our first reaction is that the study must have fatal conceptual or methodological flaws – the researchers studied the wrong thing in the wrong way. Even when we learn that the study is credible and well designed, we doubt that this kind of research is a worthwhile use of our time or money relative to serving needy clients. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we worry that the published results will only serve as fodder for the decades-long political assault on legal services for the poor.

If replicated across venues, however, studies like Greiner and Pattanayak’s can tell us a great deal about individual representation, program design and systemic access to justice questions. In fact, we cannot make genuine progress in any of these areas – much less marshal the case for more robust legal aid investments and the right to counsel in some civil cases – without better evidence of when, where and for whom representation makes a difference. Fortunately, developments in law schools, the professions and a growing demand for evidence-driven policymaking provide support, infrastructure and incentive for such research. For these reasons, we urge legal services lawyers and clinical law professors to collaborate in an expansive, empirical research agenda.

 

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Dockets and Data Breach Litigation

Alessandro Acquisti, Sasha Romanosky, and I have a new draft up on SSRN, Empirical Analysis of Data Breach Litigation.  Sasha, who’s really led the charge on this paper, has presented it at many venues, but this draft is much improved (and is the first public version).  From the abstract:

In recent years, a large number of data breaches have resulted in lawsuits in which individuals seek redress for alleged harm resulting from an organization losing or compromising their personal information. Currently, however, very little is known about those lawsuits. Which types of breaches are litigated, which are not? Which lawsuits settle, or are dismissed? Using a unique database of manually-collected lawsuits from PACER, we analyze the court dockets of over 230 federal data breach lawsuits from 2000 to 2010. We use binary outcome regressions to investigate two research questions: Which data breaches are being litigated in federal court? Which data breach lawsuits are settling? Our results suggest that the odds of a firm being sued in federal court are 3.5 times greater when individuals suffer financial harm, but over 6 times lower when the firm provides free credit monitoring following the breach. We also find that defendants settle 30% more often when plaintiffs allege financial loss from a data breach, or when faced with a certified class action suit. While the compromise of financial information appears to lead to more federal litigation, it does not seem to increase a plaintiff’s chance of a settlement. Instead, compromise of medical information is more strongly correlated with settlement.

A few thoughts follow after the jump.

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