What does it mean to grade fairly?
At my law school, and presumably elsewhere, law students aggrieved by a grade can petition that it be changed. Such petitions are often granted in the case of mathematical error, but usually denied if the basis is that on re-reading, the professor would have reached a different result. The standard of review for such petitions is something like “fundamental fairness.” In essence, replicability is not an integral component of fundamental fairness for these purposes.
Law students may object to this standard, and its predictable outcome, asserting that if the grader can not replicate his or her outcomes when following the same procedure, then the total curve distribution is arbitrary. On this theory, a student at the least should have the right to a new reading of their test, standing alone and without the time-pressure that full-scale grading puts on professors.
To which the response is: grading is subjective, and not subject to scientific proof. Moreover, grades don’t exist as platonic ideals but rather distributions between students: only when reading many exams side by side can such a ranking be observed. We wouldn’t even expect that one set of rankings would be very much like another: each is sort of like a random draw of a professor’s gut-reactions to the test on that day.
This common series of arguments tends to engender cynicism among high-GPA and low-GPA students alike. To the extent that law school grading is underdetermined by work, smarts and skill, it is a bit of a joke. The importance placed on these noisy signals by employers demonstrates something fundamentally bitter about law – the power of deference over reason.