Category: Economic Analysis of Law

0

What Is IP Good For? Madhavi Sunder Has an Answer: The Good Life

Why bother to have intellectual property rights? That question is the question for IP. Madhavi Sunder has answers. Some excellent work on the subject has looked at whether economics has new answers about IP rights and their structure. Others have taken a hard look at whether any economic argument works. Like books by James Boyle, Brett Frischmann, and Julie Cohen, Sunder’s book runs right at intellectual property law and tackles the hard question. Sunder proposes that we have left off asking what is the good; not just the good produced but the good for all of us. In the tradition of critique she asks about power dynamics and whether free culture is also fair culture. She forces us to consider the realities of exchange culture and rules that bind our ability to engage and thus limit our freedom to author ourselves. In my work on trademarks, brands, and culture, I looked at specific ways we have moved from one-way mass market systems to two-way interactive ones as I questioned whether trademark rules make sense and improve society. I love this book because Sunder takes this point and drills into local, national, and global levels. She challenges current narratives about how and why we create with concrete examples of overflowing creation, unfair results, and troubling societal outcomes all of which abound despite claims about incentives and social welfare creation in IP law. Still, she believes the law has the foundations for “plural values at stake in cultural production.” Her prescription is that we should be “ripping, mixing, and burning” law to get to the world where we have not only goods, but a good life. I recommend the book and look forward to our discussion here at Concurring Opinions.

7

Symposium on Madhavi Sunder’s From Goods to a Good Life, September 11-13

This week Concurring Opinions is hosting a symposium on Madhavi Sunder’s From Goods to a Good Life (Amazon) published by Yale Press which offers a preview. Madhavi’s work has pushed how many colleagues and I think about intellectual property. I am honored to organize this discussion.

I have more to say about the book, but to whet your appetites, I offer this quote:

The full cultural and economic consequences of intellectual property policies are hidden. We focus instead on the fruits of innovation—more iPods, more bestsellers, more blockbuster drugs—without concern for what is being produced, by whom, and for whose benefit. But make no mistake: intellectual property laws have profound effects on human capabilities…

The symposium will include contributions from Mike Carroll, Laura DeNardis, Brett Frischmann, Mike Madison, Mark McKenna, Frank Pasquale, Zahr Said, Lea Bishop Shaver, Jessica Silbey, and Molly Van Houweling.

1

The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign Finance

The Center for American Progress has just issued a report on judicial campaign finance that documents the increasing costs of campaigning in judicial elections and raises alarm that “[i]nstead of serving as a last resort for Americans seeking justice, judges are bending the law to satisfy the concerns of their corporate donors.”  Jeffrey Toobin followed up in the New Yorker that “the last thing you want to worry about is whether the judge is more accountable to a campaign contributor or an ideological group than to the law. . . . [b]ut it’s clear now that in many states you should worry—a lot.”

My colleague Joanna Shepherd and I study judicial campaign finance and argue that what is regularly missed in this simple narrative is the crucial role of the major parties.  In our empirical work, we find a very real relationship between contributions to judges and judicial decisions favorable to contributors, but the intuitive narrative of direct exchanges of money for decisions between individual contributors and judges is too simplistic to describe the larger realities of modern judicial elections.  The Republican and Democratic Parties broker connections between contributors and their candidates, and we argue that parties, not elections, seem to be the key to money’s influence on judges.

In a new paper still in progress, The Partisan Foundations of Judicial Campaign Finance, we identify broad left- and right-leaning political coalitions, allied with the Democratic and Republican Parties, whose collective contributions exercise systematic influence across the range of decisions by judges who receive their money.  The parties appear to coordinate judicial campaign finance under partisan elections where their investment and involvement is greatest, and what is more, we find that the robust relationship between money and judicial decisions largely disappeared in our data for judges elected in nonpartisan elections where parties are relatively less involved.

In addition, we go on to find a striking partisan asymmetry between Republicans and Democrats in judicial campaign finance.  Money from conservative groups in the Republican coalition, as well as from the party itself, is associated with more conservative judicial decisionmaking by Republican judges, even controlling for individual ideology.  However, decisionmaking by Republican judges is not responsive to money from liberal sources.  Decisionmaking by Democratic judges, by contrast, is influenced by campaign support from both liberal and conservative sources and thus cross pressured in opposite directions.  The result is that judicial campaign finance reinforces party cohesion for Republicans while undermining it for Democrats.  Campaign finance thus predicts judicial decisionmaking by judges from both parties in some sense, but is much more successful in serving partisan ends for Republicans, netting out in a conservative direction between the two parties.

0

Stanford Law Review, 64.5 (2012)

Stanford Law Review

Volume 64 • Issue 5 • May 2012

Articles
The City and the Private Right of Action
Paul A. Diller
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1109

Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers
Merritt B. Fox
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1173

How Much Should Judges Be Paid?
An Empirical Study on the Effect of Judicial Pay on the State Bench

James M. Anderson & Eric Helland
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1277

Note
How Congress Could Reduce Job Discrimination by Promoting Anonymous Hiring
David Hausman
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1343

The Corporate University: Recent Developments

There are many memorable images in Rob Nixon’s book Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Describing the “risk relocation” that is a prime function of the global economy, he offers this vision of Nigeria:

Often, as a community contends with attritional assaults on its ecological networks, it isn’t granted equitable access (or any access at all) to modernity’s basic infrastructural networks . . . . Like those Niger Delta villages where children for decades had no access to electricity for studying at night, while above their communities Shell’s gas flares created toxic nocturnal illumination. Too dark for education, too bright for sleep: modernity’s false dawn. (42)

Exxon is now “a corporation so large and powerful — operating in some 200 nations and territories — that it really has its own foreign policy.” As Steve Coll observes, the US “gives Chad only a few millions dollars a year in aid, while Exxon’s taxes and royalties can be worth as much as $500 million.” Had Exxon directed only 10% of its 2008 profits to political expenditures that year, it would have spent “more than every candidate for President and every candidate for Senate spent at the last election.” In a surprising number of contexts, corporations enjoy far more freedom of action, and secrecy, than states.

Is it any wonder, then, that universities are beginning to shift allegiance, to pursue the agenda of corporate donors instead of public values? Conferences like EduFactory have chronicled the long history of the corporate university; Philip Mirowski has critiqued it in books and edited collections. But it feels like we are on the verge of a phase change, an irreversible acceleration of dynamics once muted and slowed by the ancient cultural identity of the university. Consider these developments:

1) Martha McCluskey has described “economics scholars simultaneously acting as academic experts on the public interest and as sellers of this expertise to the highest private bidder.” She has chronicled a number of troubling aspects of a recent report on fracking issued by the “Shale Resources and Society Institute” (SRSI) of SUNY Buffalo:
Read More

15

Swindling/Selling, Bribing/Contributing, Extorting/Taxing

At the recent Security and Human Behavior conference, I got into a conversation that highlighted perhaps my favorite legal book ever, Arthur Leff’s “Swindling and Selling.”  Although it is out of print, one measure of its wonderfulness is that used copies sell now for $125.  Then, in my class this week on The Ethics of Washington Lawyering (yes, it’s a fun title), I realized that a key insight from Leff’s book applies to two other areas – what is allowed in campaign finance and what counts as extortion in political office.

Swindling/selling.  The insight I always remember from Leff is to look at the definition of swindling: “Alice sells something to Bob that Bob thinks has value.”  Here is the definition of selling: “Alice sells something to Bob that Bob thinks has value.”  See?  The exchange is identical – Bob hands Alice money.  The difference is sociological (what society values) and economic (can Bob resell the item).  But the structure of the transaction is the same.

Bribing/contributing.  So here is a bribe: “Alice gives Senator Bob $10,000 and Bob later does things that benefit Alice, such as a tax break.”  Here is a campaign contribution: “Alice gives Senator Bob $10,000 and Bob later does things that benefit Alice, such as a tax break.”  Again, the structure of the transaction is identical.  There are two likely differences: (1) to prove the bribe, the prosecutor has to show that Bob did the later action because of the $10,000; and (2) Alice is probably careful enough to give the money to Bob’s campaign, and not to him personally.

 Extorting/taxing.  Here is the classic political extortion: “Alice hires Bob, and Bob has to hand back ten percent of his salary to Alice each year.”  Here is how it works when a federal or state government hires someone: “Alice hires Bob, and Bob has to hand back ten percent of his salary to Alice each year.”  The structure of the transaction is the same – Bob keeps 90% of the salary and gives 10% to Alice.  The difference here?  Like the previous example, the existence of bureaucracy turns the bad thing (bribing or extorting) into the acceptable thing (contributing/taxing).  In the modern government, Alice hires Bob, and Bob sends the payment to the IRS.  The 10% does not go to Alice’s personal use, but the payment on Bob’s side may feel much the same.

For each of these, drawing the legal distinction will be really hard because the structure of the transaction is identical for the lawful thing (selling, contributing, taxing) and for the criminal thing (swindling, bribing, extorting).  Skeptics can see every transaction as the latter, and there is no objective way to prove that the transaction is actually legitimate.

I am wondering, did people know this already?  Are there citations to previous works that explain all of this?  Or, perhaps, is this a simple framework for describing things that sheds some light and merits further discussion?

0

BRIGHT IDEAS: Welcoming Barbara van Schewick to Discuss Network Non-Discrimination in Practice

On Friday, I learned that Professor Barbara van Schewick would be releasing a ground-breaking white paper entitled Network Neutrality and Quality of Service: What a Non-Discrimination Rule Should Look Like.  Lucky for us, Professor van Schewick agreed to come aboard to talk to us about her white paper, which she released on Monday, see her post here.  Her paper provides the first detailed analysis of the Federal Communications Commissions’ non-discrimination rule and of its implications for network providers’ ability to manage their networks and offer Quality of Service.  Crucially, it proposes a non-discrimination rule that policy makers can, and should, adopt around the world – a rule that the FCC adopted at least in part.

Professor van Schewick is an Associate Professor of Law and Helen L. Crocker Faculty Scholar at Stanford Law School, an Associate Professor (by courtesy) of Electrical Engineering in Stanford University’s Department of Electrical Engineering, and Director of Stanford Law School’s Center for Internet and Society.

This post is a terrific prelude to our online symposium on van Schewick’s book Internet Architecture and Innovation (MIT Press 2010), which is considered the seminal work on the science, economics and policy of network neutrality.  We will be holding our symposium in honor of the book’s paperback release in the early fall.

Thanks so much for coming aboard, and I hope this post gets you excited for our discussion in the fall.

H/T: Marvin Ammori and Elaine Adolfo

7

Are Hackers Inefficient?

It’s been a very interesting first day at the Security and Human Behavior 2012 conference, chaired by computer security guru Bruce Schneier.

A number of speakers agreed on a basic description of computer security vulnerabilities: (1) there is a long run-up period where vulnerabilities exist but are not exploited; and (2) an exploit is developed and other attackers adopt it rapidly.

That raises the question — are the hackers (collectively) being efficient? The analogy is to the debate in economics about the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis (ECMH).  The ECMH essentially says that you cannot expect to get above-normal returns — the market is efficient and you can’t beat the market.  (Since the 2008 crash there has been lots of new doubt about the ECMH among mainstream economists.)

The long period of non-attacks at least raises the possibility that there is “inefficiently low investment in hacking.”  I use “inefficient” here in a special sense — the market is “inefficient” if there are attack strategies for the hackers that are likely to get a high risk-adjusted return.  When there are so many vulnerabilities that are not attacked, the idea is that hackers collectively quite possibly are leaving money on the table.

Of course, a certain level of non-attacks is rational.  Suppose you expect to spend $1000 in time and effort to write an attack, and the expected pay-off is only $700.  Then we rationally don’t see that attack.  But the large number of existing vulnerabilities at least hints that if you spend $1000 then you might expect a big pay-off, such as $5000. After all, the attacks get used a lot once they are publicized, showing a potential pay-off.

I actually wrote about the ECMH and computer security in a 2004 article called “A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What is Different About Computer and Network Security?”  But it was a short discussion at the end of a piece that people read for other reasons.  The computer security folks at the conference today hadn’t worked through the comparison and seemed intrigued — I think it might be a fruitful way to think about vulnerabilities and hacker behavior.

6

Constitutional Limits on the Inter-State Market for Sovereign Territory

On Friday, I asked why there seems to be no inter-governmental market for sovereign territory, at least in the United States. Many of the thoughtful comments to the post suggested important political considerations that might prevent the market from clearing, particularly in the international context. I’ll try to address some of those considerations in my next post, but first I want to focus on the domestic context, and specifically on what limits the Constitution might place on inter-state sales of sovereign territory.

 

Read More

British Paradoxes

I’ve recently heard Martin Wolf described as one of the world’s preeminent financial journalists (here and here). I was therefore puzzled to read his column characterizing banking as a “high productivity sector[].” In March, 2011, Wolf called the financial sector “locusts” in his Ralph Milliband Lecture. I doubt anyone who listened to the lecture would get the idea that Wolf wanted to praise the implicit governmental backing that is at the heart of the sector’s prosperity as a model of “productivity.” The paradoxes here are enough to make me turn to James Livingston’s discussion of productive capacity in the appendix of his recent book Against Thrift.

On another puzzling note from Britain: it appears that Nassim Taleb has become a key advisor to David Cameron, the Prime Minister. The Tories have seized on Taleb’s withering skepticism as an epistemological foundation for a politics of austerity (that is, since no one has any idea what to do, the safest thing is for government to do nothing but downsize itself). I think Taleb may be poised for a long career as a bipartisan advisor, since Labour could use theories of epistemic modesty to prove that no one knows if government intervention would fail.

The Tories aren’t going whole hog for Taleb, though: they appear singularly uninterested in his proposals to end bonuses at TBTF banks, or to break them up. I strongly suspect that the only parts of the Taleb program that will pass are those that help entrench existing elites—a selective adoption that only exacerbates the fragility he identifies as the critical problem of modern society.