Category: Courts

Posner
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On Judicial Reputation: More Questions for Judge Posner

Successful people often are insecure (though they may hide their insecurity behind a facade of bluster); it is what drives them to success. – Richard Posner (1994)

We are experts in self-presentation, in acting a part to further our aims and interests. We have, all of us, a public relations strategy.  Richard Posner (May 5, 2011)

I have never yearned for greatness!  Richard Posner (November 26, 2014)

This is the eighth installment in the “Posner on Posner” series of posts on Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. The first installment can be found here, the second here, the third here, the fourth here, the fifth here, the sixth here, and the seventh one here.

In Judge Richard Posner’s The Essential Holmes, he echoed a line from Oliver Wendell Holmes concerning John Marshall. This is that line: “A great man represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or to vary the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of his greatness consists in his being there.”

Holmes’s resort to the word “ganglion” (meaning a swelling, or mass of nerve cell bodies, or a nerve cell cluster) is rather opaque — his use of the term is not readily apparent. But to tease the Holmesian metaphor out a bit, part of a judge’s greatness depends on a willingness and ability to successfully affect or change the nerve center of a society. In other words, a true capacity to alter something central. The alternative Holmesian account of greatness hinges on a combination of strategy and timing (or one might say Fortuna). That is, judicial reputation depends on a special ability to seize the perfect moment and act boldly – the case of John Marshall, circa, 1803, comes immediately to mind.

Surprisingly, to talk with Richard Posner one might assume from what he says in his all-too-causal manner that he has little or no interest in greatness or judicial reputation as it pertains to him. Strange from a man who has written on book on judicial reputation (not to be confused, he tells us, with judicial greatness) and who in so many ways seems to have a will for greatness. But don’t believe it, he admonishes us emphatically: “I have never yearned for greatness!”  

According to Judge Posner, Cardozo was a highly reputed jurist and Holmes was a great jurist. But what of Posner? Silence. Apparently, he doesn’t care to discuss it. Why? Perhaps because as a maverick jurist (and he is surely that), he cannot appear to seek public approval. And yet, if one were to invoke his own criteria for measuring judicial reputation, Judge Posner would rank quite high. (See e.g., Ronald Collins & David O’Brien, “Gauging Reputations, National Law Journal, pp. 13-14, April 1, 1991, and Lawrence Cunningham, “Cardozo and Posner: A Study in Contracts,” William & Mary Law Review (1985).) Fine, he might say, brushing it off with a disinterested look. And what of his legal legacy? Of that he claims to care not: “I have absolutely no interest in my posthumous reputation,” he assures us.

So there you have him: a great jurist (or should I say a highly reputed jurist?) who really does not care a bit about being seen as great. Speaking of that subject, see Richard Posner, “The Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial Greatness,” 104 Yale Law Journal 511, (1994).

All that said, in what follows, Judge Posner says a few things about these matters in connection with various American jurists.

Note: Some of the links used below will open in Firefox and Chrome but not in Safari.

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Max Lerner

Max Lerner

Question: In his book Nine Scorpions in a Bottle (1994), the late Max Lerner asserted: “There is no recipe for judicial greatness. Yet, if hard-pressed, I should settle for someone with a flexible mind, a compassion for the walking wounded, a refusal to be cowed by power, a capacity to live with the contradictions of life and to separate the permanent from the transient.” And then he added: “That is what I should call a passionately judicial temperament, and only a few have had it.” Before we turn to your own particular views on the subject, what is your opinion of Mr. Lerner’s recipe (albeit tentative) for judicial greatness?

Posner: [As for Lerner’s formula for greatness, I find it] a little puffed up. Forget greatness. A very good judge is a judge who is well educated and intelligent, hard working, willing to write his own opinions, curious about the real-world activities, transactions, and institutions out of which the cases he hears arise, collegial, and aware (so far as anyone can be aware) of his limitations and of the influences that play on him as a result of his upbringing, ideology, career, and temperament.

Posner on the Criteria for Judicial Greatness

For one thing the criteria of judicial greatness are contested. Some might insist that a judge’s greatness consists in the “rightness” of his decisions as judged by the test of time. I think that this is too demanding a standard. Most judicial decisions, even of the agreed-to-be-the-greatest judges, like most scientific discoveries, even of the universally acknowledged greatest scientists, usually are superseded and in that sense eventually proved “wrong.” I believe that the test of greatness for the substance of judicial decisions, therefore, should be, as in the case of science, the contribution that the decisions make to the development of legal rules and principles rather than whether the decision is a “classic” having the permanence and perfection of a work of art. . . Creativity is .  . . one possible criterion ofjudicial greatness. Another . . . . is the gift of verbal facility that enables a familiar proposition to be expressed memorably, arrestingly, thus enforcing attention, facilitating comprehension, and, often, stimulating new thought (in which case the expressive dimension of judicial greatness merges with the creative). [Source here]

Question: Almost a quarter-century ago you called on scholars to pay considerably more attention to “critical judicial study” by way of quantitative analysis of judicial reputation, influence, and achievement. Do you think that call has been heeded?

Posner: A little, not a great deal.

UnknownQuestion: The quantitative analysis you employed in Cardozo: A Study in Reputation (1990) turned largely, and understandably so, on a judge’s reputation within the legal community. But greatness surely extends beyond the confines of that domain and into the larger public realm. How is judicial reputation to be gauged at that macro level? And how does that pursuit of greatness differ, if at all, from one confined to the legal community?

Posner: No one outside the legal profession (with the intermittent exception of politicians) is interested in judges other than Supreme Court Justices. I don’t think it’s healthy for judges to worry about what lay people think of them.

Question: Most judges, you contend, “would rather be regarded as sound than as original, as appliers of the law rather than inventors of it. Judges find it politic to pretend that they are the slaves of the law, never its masters and the competitors of legislators.” If a judge takes that creed of moderation seriously, is such a jurist likely to be heralded as great?

Posner: As I said earlier, forget greatness. The judges who adopt the pretense will be respected by many other judges and applauded by legislators, who don’t like the idea of judges making law, though judges to make a great deal of law.

Question: You have suggested that “rhetorical power may be a more important attribute of judicial excellence than analytical power.” Why? And should that be so?

Posner: The analytical issues presented by cases are rarely complex or difficult, though lawyers and judges and law professors try to make them seem so. The insights of the excellent judges tend to be the result of intuition, experience, and temperament rather than of analysis, and the rhetorical power in which they are expressed are important to the persuasiveness and reception of the insights.

None of the [current Justices] has any empirical, technical background. They’re just humanities majors. Richard Posner, Oct. 23, 2014, University of Chicago Law School remarks.

Question: In terms of his position in American law, what single trait do you think best helps to explain Chief Justice John Marshall’s revered and lasting reputation?

Posner: He had a great deal of common sense and government experience, and he wrote forcefully and lucidly.

Justice Joseph Story

Justice Joseph Story

Question: By the time he died in 1845, Justice Joseph Story published twenty-one books after his three-volume Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, which was a major legal work for its time and long afterwards. And he authored some important opinions such as Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816), Swift v. Tyson (1842), and Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842). And yet, today the man and his work seem to be largely forgotten. Why do you suppose that is?

Posner: I don’t know. I’ve never read anything by him. Prompted by your question, I read his opinion in Swift v. Tyson. I thought it was well written, though not as well written as Marshall’s opinions.

[RC: Consider Bernard Schwartz, “Supreme Court Superstars: The Ten Greatest Justices” (1995) (ranking Story as second greatest Justice.]

Question: I was struck by how much the reputational stock of some of the judges and scholars you listed in Tables 1-4 of your Cardozo book has dropped since you published that work in 1990. Is judicial reputation thus akin, at least in some general way, to the rise-and-fall celebrity stardom of, say, the Michael Jackson variety? If so, how does a judge best secure a reputation that lasts over generational time?

Posner: The decline is experienced by almost all judges, simply because law changes as society changes, and the old cases cease to have any relevance. Well-written opinions have the best survival chances, because the quality of the writing is independent of the currency or importance of the issues.

Question: The filaments of Holmes’ thought, you maintain, included “Nietzschean vitalism.” Tell us more about that and why you think it important. Read More

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On Free Expression & the First Amendment — More Questions for Judge Posner

 The American concept of freedom of speech poses a challenge to the pragmatist because, like ‘democracy,’ it is the repository of a great deal of unpragmatic rhetoric. It is at the heart of the American ‘civil religion,’ a term well chosen to convey the moralistic fervor in which free speech is celebrated. — Richard Posner (2003)

This is the sixth installment in the “Posner on Posner” series of posts on Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. The first installment can be found here, the second here, the third here, the fourth here, and the fifth one here.  

Here, as elsewhere, controversy is never far from the conceptual corner where Richard Posner lingers. Merely consider, for example, the following point he made in a 2001 article: “political free speech is not an unalloyed blessing.” Or consider his take on the most famous line from NYT v. Sullivan — he tags it (see below) “empty rhetoric.” Or think about his views on privacy and the First Amendment (see Glenn Greenwald’s criticisms below). Such comments are sure to raise skeptical eyebrows among the rah-rah First Amendment crowd.

Then again, that crowd happily hails the Judge for the robust defense of free speech he displayed in NAACP v. Button (1963), which he takes credit for authoring while he was a law clerk to Justice William Brennan. And then there are his opinions in cases such  American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick, the violent video game case. For staunch conservatives, such as Justice Clarence Thomas, protection of such expression “does not comport with the original public understanding of the First Amendment.” No matter, Posner paves his own path, sans any Hugo Black-like passion in defense of free speech or any Clarence Thomas-like zeal in defense of originalism.  

Of course, there is more to be said about Posner’s pragmatic approach to our free speech jurisprudence, and on that score some will approve and others not. In the tumble of it all, he remains a Maverick, which is how he likes it.  

Some of the Judge’s more notable writings on free expression can be found in the following works:

  1. Economic Analysis of Law (9th ed. 2014) (chapter 29)
  2. Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of a National Emergency (2009) (chapter 5)
  3. Law, Pragmatism and Democracy (2003) (chapter 10)
  4. Frontiers of Legal Theory (2001) (chapter 2)
  5. The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck,” in Lee Bollinger & Geoffrey Stone, eds., Eternally Vigilant: Free Speech in the Modern Era 121 (2002)
  6. Pragmatism versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis,” 54 Stanford Law Review 737 (2002)
  7. Free Speech in an Economic Perspective,” 20 Suffolk University Law Review 1 (1986)

For a sampling of his First Amendment opinions, go here and search “First Amendment.”

Below are some questions, on the topic of free expression and the First Amendment, that I posed to the Judge followed by his replies. (Note: Some links will only open in Firefox or Chrome.)

NB: A segment of this post, quoting a well-known journalist, has been temporarily omitted because of a strong objection. I will explain why in this Monday’s post.      

Question: Is speech overprotected by our courts and in our culture?

Posner: I think so. The most notorious example is expenditures on political advertising — Citizens United and its sequels.

Question: Though the Pentagon Papers Case (1971) is much celebrated in First Amendment circles, you seem to think that the Court might have gone too far. Two questions:

  1. What is your criticism of the case?
  2. Does over classification of national security information raise a a First Amendment issue?

Posner:

  1. I don’t think there is a right to read classified material. National security classification is one of many sensible exceptions to freedom of speech, along with threats, trade secrets, defamation, distribution of child pornography, lawful wiretapping and other lawful searches for communicative material, copyright infringement, and much else.
  2. It could, if there were no security justification.

Question: The so-called “war on terrorism” is unlike the Great Wars in that the enemy is ever changing and even hard to identify and the duration of the conflict is indeterminate. How does this affect the calculus of free speech “in wartime”?

Posner: I don’t see why the nature of the military conflict should make a difference.

Question: You have written that “some restrictions on speech actually promote speech.” That general idea seems to be getting some traction among egalitarian-minded liberal scholars dissatisfied with certain tenets of current free speech doctrine. Can you say more about your thinking here, especially as it might apply to the liberal defense of speech restrictions?

Posner: An obvious example is copyright protection, which restricts speech (the speech of copiers) but promotes speech overall by granting legal protection to original speech. Another obvious example is restricting the number of speakers in a political debate so that the debate won’t degenerate into an unintelligible babble of interruptions. Similarly one doesn’t want to allow the use of threats to silence people. A subtle example is the censorship of the Elizabethan theatre, which may well have promoted creativity by forcing playwrights like Shakespeare to situate contemporary problems in exotic times and places, in order to get by the censor.

Question: You pride yourself on being a “balancer,” as one who compares the social pluses and minuses of restrictions on free speech. Can you be an effective balancer absent a reliable record of the actual or even conjectural harms and benefits of speech? And what if the lawyers, as if often the case, tender no reliable empirical evidence one way or the other? Who wins, where is the conceptual default? Or must the reviewing court do its own research to resolve the question?

Posner: I don’t know how much empirical work has been done on the subject. In its absence, there is just guesswork, although the basic structure of American free speech law seems okay. Some of it strikes me as silly, notably granting rights of free speech to school kids.

[RKLC: 12-12-14: See William Baude’s commentary here.]

Question: Whatever its shortcomings, one of the benefits of a category-based approach to free speech (combined with certain tailoring tools, e.g., overbreath, etc.), is judicial efficiency. The rules are not unworkably open-ended and subjective, and are therefore relatively manageable for judges and lawyers alike.

  1. Mindful of that, how judicially efficient is your economic-based approach with its assorted variables? – e.g., taking into account and balancing the relevant benefits (B), harms (H), offensiveness (O), probability (P), the number of years between when speech occurs and when the harm is likely to materialize, and the administrative costs of a regulation (A).
  2. What about lawmakers, the focus of the First Amendment (Congress shall make no law . . . )? How likely are they to engage in such sophisticated cost-benefit analysis? Is your proposed approach a realistic test for them to employ in considering the constitutionality of proposed laws affecting speech?

Posner:

  1. One can hardly exclude offensiveness, other harms, probability of harm, remoteness of harm, etc. from consideration, any more than you can do that in an ordinary tort case.
  2. Do lawmakers ever do sophisticated cost-benefit analysis?

Question: In cases such as Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010), is the purported harm so great as to preclude any meaningful balancing? It was precisely that concern that prompted Justice Stephen Breyer to complain in dissent: “I believe the Court has failed to examine the Government’s justifications with sufficient care. It has failed to insist upon specific evidence, rather than general assertion.”

How would you weigh in on this? By your standards, was Holder a case of failed balancing?

Judge Learned Hand

Judge Learned Hand

Posner: I haven’t read the case.

Question: You have expressed some conceptual approval of Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Dennis (1950) in which he upheld the convictions of eleven Communist Party leaders for violating the Smith Act. Do you agree with the judgment in that case? Please say a few words about why you agree or disagree with the Dennis judgment.

Posner: Hand’s formula in Dennis is I think fine—it is a variant of the famous Hand negligence formula from his opinion in Carroll Towing. The Communist Party leaders were essentially agents of the Soviet Union, so I don’t see why their speech should be thought privileged by the First Amendment.

Question: Don’t phrases like “clear and present danger” (which, by the way, was used by the attorney Benjamin W. Shaw in 1918) invite, as Paul Freund suggested in 1949, a kind of mantra-like application devoid of the kind of realist and pragmatic balancing you endorse?

Posner:  It’s a dumb phrase. A murky remote danger could be very great.

Question: Based on what you know in light of the book you edited on Holmes, did he get the judgments right in Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs?

Posner: Probably not in Schenck or Debs; I don’t recall Frohwerk.

Question: “Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open . . . .”

Do you consider those lines from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) to be “unpragmatic rhetoric”?

Posner: Empty rhetoric.

 Question: The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have said relatively little about textualism when it comes to free speech and press issues. Why do you suppose that is?

Posner: There is no text. “Freedom of speech” is a heading, not a test.

Chief Justice John Roberts

Chief Justice John Roberts

Question: The Roberts Court has rendered 36 First Amendment free expression rulings. How would you characterize the First Amendment jurisprudence of the current Court?

Posner: Very nice for fat cats and enemies of abortion.

Question: You have long been on record as being a critic of the Court’s decision in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). You maintain that the “American system of campaign financing is extremely porous and is widely and probably correctly believed to constitute a thinly disguised system of quasi-bribes of elected officials; at the very least it tilts the playing field very steeply toward the wealthy and the well organized . . . .” Given that, how bad in your view have things become in light of rulings such as McCutcheon v. FEC (2014)?

Posner: Very bad.

Question: Do you favor some kind of constitutional amendment to remedy the problems you have identified

Posner: [The idea of a constitutional amendment is] a waste of time.

Posner on Roberts

Can so naive-seeming a conception of the political process reflect the actual beliefs of the intellectually sophisticated Chief Justice? Maybe so, but one is entitled to be skeptical. Obviously, wealthy businessmen and large corporations often make substantial political contributions in the hope (often fulfilled) that by doing so they will be buying the support of politicians for policies that yield financial benefits to the donors. [Source here]

Question: In his dissent in McCutcheon v. FEC (2014), Justice Breyer declared: “the First Amendment advances not only the individual’s right to engage in political speech, but also the public’s interest in preserving a democratic order in which collective speech matters.” What is you view on this idea “collective speech” and the First Amendment?

Posner: A little high-falutin’ for my taste. I would just say that large corporations and wealthy people shouldn’t be allowed to buy elections.

Question: Despite your criticisms of Buckley and its progeny, you have also expressed serious doubts about campaign finance reform proposals. Please explain why you think such efforts are problematic.

Posner: Have I? I don’t recall

Question: In Frontiers of Legal Theory you wrote: “Individuals or groups that have more money than the average amount of money have always had more than the average ability to spend money on trying to influence public opinion. We do not consider such inequality a compelling reason for limiting free speech.” Do you still believe that?

Posner: The mere fact of inequality is not critical. And it would be very difficult for a new candidate to get launched without access to substantial donors. The problems are the concealment of the identity of big donors, the implicit quid pro quo (donor is buying influence, and donee who is not influenced is unlikely to obtain substantial future donations), and the failure to place some ceiling on the amount of donations that a particular individual should be free to make. And I doubt that companies as distinct from individuals should be permitted to make campaign contributions.

Question: As you know, the speech in question in Citizens United involved a political documentary titled Hillary: The Movie. A conservative non-profit group sought to air it within 30 days of the primary. During oral arguments in the case, the question was asked: “What if the particular movie involved here had not been distributed by Video on Demand? Suppose that people could view it for free on Netflix over the Internet? Suppose that free DVDs were passed out. Suppose people could attend the movie for free in a movie theater; suppose the exact text of this was distributed in a printed form.”

 How would you answer that question? Is it your position that showing that political documentary and/or publishing a book on it during an election is not protected speech under the First Amendment?

Posner: The question is the scope of protection. I don’t think the First Amendment should be interpreted to prevent government from limiting the amount of broadcasting (or equivalent, like movies) in the last few weeks before a national election.

Question: What is your view of the secondary effects doctrine as it has been applied by the Court and lower courts since its use in Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986) and then again in Barnes v. Glen Theatre (1991), which overruled an opinion that you authored. In 1988, your former boss, Justice William Brennan, warned that the doctrine “could set the court on a road that will lead to the evisceration of First Amendment freedoms.” Do you agree? Where do you stand on this matter?

Posner: I don’t think there’s anything wrong with it if it is supported by real evidence, though I think it was misapplied in the Barnes case because there wasn’t any evidence that nude dancing promotes crime to any significant extent.

The next installment, the seventh, in the Posner on Posner series was scheduled to be “On Judicial Reputation.” It will now be preceded by a special post on free speech and privacy.  

Posner
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The Judge & Company – Questions for Judge Posner from Judges, Law Professors & a Journalist

That’s a sensitive question to put to a judge.

                      – Richard Posner (see below)

This is the fourth in the “Posner on Posner” series of posts on Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner. The first installment can be found here, the second one here, and the third one here.

Has any sitting appellate jurist ever entertained a wide swath of questions from a journalist, fellow judges, and law professors? The answer: Never, to the best of my knowledge. But if one had to pick such a jurist, Richard Posner would surely be (and is) that person. True to his realist image, he answered all of the questions posed to him and did so promptly and, for the most part, without reservation. 

In order to get a range of views from different perspectives, I invited a number of noted legal figures to pose questions to Judge Richard Posner. Twenty-four responded; they are:

  • Thomas Ambro
  • William Baude
  • Ryan Calo
  • Erwin Chemerinsky
  • Lawrence Cunningham
  • Michael Dorf
  • Barry Friedman
  • David Hoffman
  • Yale Kamisar
  • Judith Kaye
  • Hans Linde
  • Adam Liptak
  • Andrea Mays
  • Linda Mullenix
  • Robert O’Neil
  • Frederick Schauer
  • David Skover
  • Daniel Solove
  • Geoffrey Stone
  • Kellye Testy
  • David Vladeck
  • Eugene Volokh
  • Kathryn Watts
  • Adam Winkler

Their questions, organized into 26 topics, are set out below followed by Judge Posner’s replies. Hyperlinks have been added where useful. Note: Some links will open in Firefox or Chrome but not in Safari. –RKLC

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I.     Clerking for Justice Brennan

Professor Robert M. O’Neil: Perhaps your most remarkable contribution as a Supreme Court clerk for Justice William Brennan was the total change in the status of Gray v. Sanders (1963).  You initially drafted an opinion for the Justice that would have resulted in a decisive reversal of the Ninth Circuit ruling. But you quickly learned that the Court had preliminarily voted 7-2 to affirm. On the basis of your persuasive draft opinion, however, Justice Brennan promptly asked the Chief Justice to reassign the case. That soon resulted in a 7-2 reversal with only Justices Clark and Harlan dissenting.  Two intriguing questions arise:

  1. Given the oral argument and the statutory context, why were you so sanguine about the prospects for reversal?
  2. And how did you eventually persuade Justice Brennan and four of his colleagues to reach a wholly different result?

[RC: Professor O’Neil clerked with Justice Brennan when Posner did.]

Judge Posner:

  1. I wasn’t. I was under the mistaken impression that the Court had voted to reverse.
  2. I didn’t use any persuasion. When Justice Brennan read my opinion, he said it was persuasive and he’d tried to persuade the Court to change its vote from affirm to reverse. His persuasive efforts must have been effective, though I don’t recall his having said anything to me about them.

Professor Robert M. O’Neil:

  1. Among the Supreme Court opinions to which you made substantial and invaluable contributions, how would you appraise the Philadelphia National Bank (1963) case?
  2. To what extent did Justice Brennan or other members of the Court (or fellow clerks, or for that matter teachers like Harvard Professor Donald Turner) shape your views on those issues?

Judge Posner:

  1. Of the opinions I worked on, that was my favorite. I think it was influential on antitrust law and also convinced me to specialize in antitrust, which I did for the early part of my career, following the clerkship.
  2. The principal influence was Derek Bok, then a professor at Harvard Law School and later, of course, dean of the law school and later still president of Harvard University. He had written an important article on merger antitrust law, part of which I had cite-checked when I was on the Harvard Law Review. The article stuck in my mind and played a crucial role in my thinking about the Philadelphia Bank 
Justice William Brennan

Justice William Brennan

II.     Judging Justice Brennan

Professor Geoffrey Stone: You served as a law clerk to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., a half-a-century ago. With the benefit of hindsight, how would you assess his contributions as a Justice?

Judge Posner: Obviously, he was very influential, in part because of his warm personality and willingness to compromise. I think Warren relied heavily on him. A number of the Warren Court’s most important decisions were his.

III.     Jurisprudence

Professor Frederick Schauer: When you were a law student, Lon Fuller was a major figure at the Harvard Law School, and only a few years earlier his published debate with H.L.A. Hart was a major event at the school and in legal scholarship generally.

Could you comment on your views about the contemporary state of Anglo-American jurisprudence, whether that state is different from what it was fifty years ago, and, if different, what might account for the change?

Judge Posner: I never met or had a class from Fuller, and never cottoned to his views, and I don’t remember whether I ever read that debate. I never took a course on jurisprudence and I don’t think I had any interest in it. As an academic I became interested in it and wrote about it.

I like your work in jurisprudence, and that of Neil Duxbury and a few others, but much of the jurisprudence literature I find rather sterile. I found Ronald Dworkin’s approach unconvincing; likewise with H.L.A. Hart’s. I love the legal realists, above all Holmes, but also John Dewey, Jeremy Bentham, of course, Hans Kelsen, and Richard Rorty (not an exhaustive list), though law was far from a major interest of Dewey and Rorty.

 IV.     Law in a Globalized World

Judge Judith Kaye (ret):

  1. What is the impact of our radically globalized world on the business of the U.S. courts? How is our jurisprudence, our decision-making process, in any way influenced by the cultural diversity of the international issues we increasingly face?
  2. In that connection, what is the impact of the increased use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in international matters, inevitably still requiring resort to our courts?

Judge Posner:

  1. We get more cases involving foreign and international law, but I think the influence of foreign legal practices on our jurisprudence and decision-making processes is slight. We continue to resist inroads into the adversary system. I think that resistance is a big mistake, but I also think it’s a mistake to look to foreign judicial decisions for guidance to how we should deal with issues such as capital punishment, abortion, and international human rights. I think one has to have a deep understanding of a foreign culture in order to be comfortable with borrowing a foreign country’s law.
  2. I don’t know; I haven’t studied the issue, and have only a few cases.

V.     Law & Economics

Professor Michael Dorf: I detect in your academic work (and to a lesser extent your work as a judge) a gradual drift from an economic analysis of law to pragmatism more broadly. Do you agree with that assessment, and if so, what do you think accounts for it?

[RC: Professor Dorf wrote the biographical entry on Judge Posner for the Yale Biographical Dictionary of American Law (2009).]

Judge Posner: You’re correct. It is partly a result of the inroads that psychology has made on economic analysis, partly a result of the economic profession’s failure to understand finance and monetary policy in the period leading up to the crash of 2008, and (relatedly) the revelations of unexpected extensive greed and corruption in American business, not limited to the financial industry.

Professor Ryan Calo: You are famously skeptical of the idea that the law should protect the efforts of market participants to conceal information about themselves. But the beauty of markets lies precisely in their ability to facilitate transactions between parties with wildly disparate backgrounds, tastes, and views — people who otherwise would avoid one another, but come together on the basis of a willingness to pay or receive a particular price.

How do you respond to the contention that a world without a meaningful degree of privacy in such situations would be a world full of balkanized, and hence deeply inefficient, markets?

Posner on Privacy

Judge Posner: I’m not opposed to legal protection of privacy. But I do regard privacy as a common means by which people present a misleading impression of themselves, often deceiving the people with whom they deal, either personally or in transacting. So I think we must be careful not to overprotect privacy.

Justice Hans A. Linde (ret.): You are widely known for linking law and economics and for advocating a pragmatic jurisprudence. These seem to pose two problems for a federal judge:

  1. Federal cases often arise from acts of Congress, not judge-made common law. What should a judge do when an enactment plainly places some people’s non-economic demands over the economic interests of the majority?
  2. Other disputes are between citizens of different states (or nations) that may have different legal answers to the disputed issue. How should a federal judge choose which state’s law applies to the case? That is, should a judge choose the laws of the state that is economically preferable, or is the choice prescribed by law?

MET-AJ-POSNER-0919Judge Posner:

  1. If a statute is clear, and constitutional, then I am bound. But the statutory provisions that get involved in appellate litigation very often are unclear, and then the judge has considerable freedom to select the interpretation that makes the most sense, though it won’t always be an economic sense.
  2. Conflict of law rules seem to me readily understandable in economic terms. If one thinks of the reasons for applying one state’s law rather than another’s, they generally have to do with which state has the greater interest in regulating the activity that gave rise to the suit. That’s the basis of lex loci delicti, which continues to be a sound doctrine that has largely survived modern loosey-goosey conflicts doctrine.

VI.     The Record of a Case

Professor Frederick Schauer: You tend to go beyond the record, the briefs, and oral argument more often than most appellate judges, and you have noted that you have been criticized for it. Could you explain your practice, explain the criticism, and explain why you think the criticism misses the mark?

Judge Posner: I find that the briefs and arguments, and lower-court opinions, very often do not answer the questions that I think are important to a sound understanding of the case. So, I look for the answers, often by an Internet search. I tell lawyers if you don’t like me doing that, do it yourselves. I do try to be sensitive to risk of error in judicial fact research. I understand the criticism, because the lawyers want to control the case. They invoke the glories of the adversary system. I think the adversary system is overrated. Not that I want to convert to the inquisitorial system that prevails in Europe (except the U.K.) and most of the rest of the world, but I want to see the adversary system taken down a peg. I am a big fan of Fed. R. Evid. §706, which allows a judge to appoint his own expert witness, as opposed to having to depend entirely on party experts.

VII.     Experiential Knowledge Read More

1

7 Member Supreme Court Votes 4-1 to Suspend One of its Own

This is ugly.  PA Supreme Court has voted to suspend one of its members for various infractions, including the dissemination of pornographic emails from work computers.  The suspension order issued per curium, but apparently only attracted the votes of 4 of 7 possible justices.  One justice, dissenting, would have sent the matter to a judicial conduct board. The suspended justice didn’t vote, and neither did a justice who just accused the suspended justice of trying to blackmail him over yet more pornographic emails.  One of the four votes comes from a justice appointed by Pennsylvania’s governor, to replace another justice who had been suspended after being indicted.

Still with me? Here’s where the fun starts.  Pennsylvania’s Chief Justice, who has been long-involved in a heated fight with the newly suspended justice over control over Philadelphia’s court system, concurred in the per curium opinion. His “concurring statement,” destined for the headlines, contains the following astonishing paragraph:

wowThat, friends, is what it means to vent your spleen.

4

Cognitive Biases, the Legal Academy, and the Judiciary

It’s a pleasure to be here at Concurring Opinions.  I would like to thank Dan, Sarah, and Ron for inviting me.  During my visit, I hope to talk a bit about my core research areas of land use and local government law (including why you, who are statistically unlikely to be interested in either land use or local government law, should be interested), but also about other issues such as the current state of the legal academy and the legal profession, often using land use or local government law to examine these broader issues.

On Cognitive Biases

On that last note, Slate.com recently ran a great piece by Katy Waldman regarding how the human brain processes information, observing that people have a predilection to believe factual claims that we find easy to process.  Waldman synthesizes the results of several interesting studies, including one eye-opening study that identifies three persistent cognitive biases that humans possess.  As Waldman summarizes these biases: “First, we reflexively attribute people’s behavior to their character rather than their circumstances.” Second, “we learn more easily when knowledge is arranged hierarchically, so in a pinch we may be inclined to accept fixed status and gender roles.” And third, “we tend to assume that persisting and long-standing states are good and desirable, which stirs our faith in the status quo absent any kind of deep reflection.” The studygreen-lizard-1427838-s attributes these biases to the basic human need, rooted in the primitive recesses of our lizard brain (pictured), to manage uncertainty and risk.

While Waldman argues that there is some relationship between these biases and conservative political beliefs, what struck me about these findings is how well the biases describe judicial behavior.

Read More

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Residence Requirement of the Federal Circuit

One of the most curious provisions in federal law is 28 U.S.C. Sec. 44(c), which states the following:

“While in active service, each circuit judge of the Federal judicial circuit . . . and the chief judge of the Federal judicial circuit, whenever appointed, shall reside within fifty miles of the District of Columbia.”

There is a residency requirement for active circuit judges in the other circuits (you have to live in the circuit), but drawing a 50 mile circle around DC for all federal circuit judges seems really silly.  First, it sharply limits who can be on that court.  Second, what’s so special about where you live when you hear (mostly) patent appeals.  And finally, why 50 miles?  Folks can easily take a train from New York to DC or live, say 60 miles away and commute.  Congress ought to consider repealing this residency rule.

UPDATE:  I wonder how this requirement could be enforced against an Article III judge.  Impeachment for Federal Circuit judges who move to New York?  Does the Chief Judge bar the person from hearing new cases until he or she moves back into the 50-mile zone?

1

En Banc Review

The DC Circuit is considering a petition for rehearing en banc in Halbig (the Affordable Care Act case).  I have no opinion on what the Court should do, and I think that it’s silly for outsiders to advise judges on a discretionary matter.  (In other words, there is no “expertise” on whether to go en banc.)

I thought this would be a good opportunity, though, to reflect on how circuits differ with respect to en bancs.  Some have many and others have few.  Why is that?  One answer is that large circuits (I’m talking to you–Ninth) tend to go en banc more often.  In part this is because a panel is more likely to be unrepresentative of the court as a whole, and in part because large circuits are just less collegial because there are more judges who live further apart.  Another thought is that circuits that are badly split along ideological lines (I’m talking to you–Sixth) go en banc more often.

But there is also a distinctive culture that develops in each circuit about this issue.  The Second Circuit (where I clerked) has long had a strong aversion to going en banc.  (Indeed, the year that I clerked there were no en banc hearings.)  This practice is usually attributed to Learned Hand, who thought that en bancwere a waste of time and showed disrespect for the judges on the panel.  I think all of us would be interested to hear from former DC Circuit clerks about their thoughts on the norms there.

0

What Berkshire Hathaway Teaches About Hobby Lobby

Eleven years ago tomorrow, the abortion issue led Berkshire Hathaway, the huge conglomerate Warren Buffett built and now owned by one million different shareholders, to end its shareholder-directed charitable contribution program. Under the program, Berkshire’s board earmarked an amount for charitable giving and then let the company’s class A shareholders designate the charities to which their share went. In twenty-two years, the program distributed $197 million to thousands of different charities.

Berkshire terminated the program on July 3, 2003 because activists boycotted products of one of its subsidiaries to protest giving to organizations they opposed on religious grounds: some designated Planned Parenthood, which facilitates a woman’s choice to abort an unwanted pregnancy, while others gave to Catholic Social Services, which opposes abortions.

Berkshire stood for neither position, of course, because it is a business organization whose mission is to increase its intrinsic economic value, which has nothing to do with religion. Berkshire’s board chose to terminate the program because the boycotts hurt Berkshire’s business and its personnel while offering shareholders only a slight convenience and tax advantage.

The scenario speaks to the debate that erupted this week between foes in the abortion debate thanks to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hobby Lobby case. The issue in that case, narrower and more technical than accompanying rhetoric suggests, was whether the word persons in a federal statute about religious freedom includes corporations owned by a small number of people with a specific set of religious beliefs. If so, then regulations implementing Obamacare cannot require them to fund birth control devices in conflcit with their religious beliefs.

A majority of the Court concluded that closely-held corporations are persons for the purpose of the statute because they are readily seen as merely a convenient legal form through which individuals do business. The dissent complained that only individuals can have religious beliefs and therefore corporations, whether closely held or otherwise, aren’t persons for purposes of the federal law.

The Berkshire example is instructive on both opinions. Buffett has always boasted that Berkshire, though using the corporate form, adopts a partnership attitude. The shareholder charitable contribution program epitomized this attitude. It gave the decision to the owners, as is done in partnerships and closely held corporations, not the board, the practice in public corporations. Those owners, moreover, were the class A shareholders, a subset of Berkshire’s shareholder body made up of people with larger and older stakes—including hundreds who really were Buffett’s original partners.

Berkshire shareholders, class A and class B, readily agree on a wide variety of business and ownership topics. For example, in a vote earlier this year on the company’s dividend policy, 98 percent ratified the existing—and unusual—no-dividend practice. But put a question about hot-button religious or political  issues of the day such as abortion and expect deep divisions.

Berkshire’s shareholders may be able to act like partners or closely-held shareholders on business issues while the charitable giving program proved they were unable to do so on others. For the Court in Holly Lobby, this perspective supports the majority’s holding about the nature of close corporations while validating the dissent’s appetite for a sharp boundary between them and the typical business organization.

Lawrence A. Cunningham is the author of the upcoming Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values and editor of The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America. He teaches business-related courses at George Washington University Law School.

5

Judge Posner and Anti-Abortion Protestors

Based on Judge Posner’s recent piece on slate.com, I think that the next time he is on a panel in a case involving a free speech claim by anti-abortion protestors their counsel should file a motion seeking his recusal.  Consider this passage discussing yesterday’s Supreme Court decision on buffer zones around abortion clinics:

Who wants to be buttonholed on the sidewalk by “uncomfortable message[s],” usually delivered by nuts? Lecturing strangers on a sidewalk is not a means by which information and opinion are disseminated in our society. Strangers don’t meet on the sidewalk to discuss “the issues of the day.” (Has Chief Justice John Roberts, the author of the opinion, ever done such a thing?) The assertion that abortion protesters “wish to converse” with women outside an abortion clinic is naive. They wish to prevent the women from entering the clinic, whether by showing them gruesome photos of aborted fetuses or calling down the wrath of God on them. This is harassment of people who are in a very uncomfortable position; the last thing a woman about to have an abortion needs is to be screamed at by the godly.

The issue is not mainly, as the court stated in the last sentence that I quoted, the maintenance of public safety. Most abortion protesters are not violent, and police will be present to protect the visitors to the clinic. The issue is the privacy, anxiety, and embarrassment of the abortion clinic’s patients—interests that outweigh, in my judgment anyway, the negligible contribution that abortion protesters make to the marketplace of ideas and opinions.

I submit that this calls into question whether Judge Posner could fairly adjudicate the First Amendment rights of these “nuts” who make a “negligible contribution.”

 

0

Intellectual Disability and Uncertainty in Hall v. Florida

I’ve been meaning to post about the Supreme Court’s decision last week in Hall v. Florida—the case in which the Court struck down as unconstitutional Florida’s law for determining whether an offender is intellectually disabled and thus cannot be executed. In its 2002 case of Atkins v. Virginia, the Court concluded that it is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment to execute a “mentally retarded” individual. (Thankfully, in Hall, the Court switched over to the term “intellectually disabled.” I’ll be using the terms interchangeably in this post.) In Atkins, the Court stated that it was leaving it up to individual legislatures to determine when a person is “mentally retarded”—in the Court’s words, it was “leav[ing] to the States the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon their execution of sentences.” Now, other states and the medical community generally agree with Florida that a defendant is intellectually disabled if he has (1) “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning,” (2) “deficits in adaptive functioning,” (3) and “onset of these deficits during the developmental period” (by age 18). The first prong—the one at issue in Hall—is ordinarily determined by a defendant’s IQ score. States have concluded that an IQ score that is 70 or lower meets the “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” standard. The Hall case raises the issue as to whether uncertainty in obtained IQ scores (or confidence intervals) ought to be included in determining the defendant’s true IQ score for the purpose of this first prong of the intellectual disability test.

In a 6-3 decision, the Hall Court concluded that Florida’s approach—of finding that an obtained IQ score greater than 70 may be determinative of the fact that the defendant is not intellectually disabled—is unconstitutional. In reaching this conclusion, the Court took a detour from its ordinary Eighth Amendment analysis, focusing heavily on the opinions of professional organizations. As in prior opinions, the Court was loose with the numbers in the state-counting aspect of its Eighth Amendment analysis, concluding that a “significant majority of States” have adopted procedures contrary to Florida’s approach. The dissent explains that, of the death penalty states, nine have adopted an approach similar to Florida, nine have not addressed the issue, and twelve take the approach that the Court finds to be constitutionally required. It is difficult to find a national consensus in these numbers. In finding a consensus, though, the majority includes the eighteen states that have abolished capital punishment. Whether to include non-death-penalty states in this calculus is an issue that the Justices have debated before. But the Court’s approach to finding a consensus in this case is especially interesting because of the metric it uses in doing so. Instead of looking at the number of states that have categorically prohibited a punishment—such as tallying the number of states that have banned executing the “mentally retarded,” the “insane,” or juveniles—the Court is counting the number of states that take into account standard errors of measurement (SEMs) in determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled. This metric accounts for the uncertainty inherent in obtained IQ scores and provides a range in which it’s likely the defendant’s true IQ score falls based upon his obtained score. In examining this metric, the Court frames the question as whether it is unconstitutional for a state to not take into account SEMs in determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled. But is it really this procedural matter that’s at issue here? Or do we instead care about whether individuals who actually have true IQ scores of 70 or below are being executed? For example, if a state were to conclude that a defendant is intellectually disabled if he has an obtained IQ score of 90 or below, and if the test used in the state has a SEM of 2.5—suggesting that it is quite unlikely that a defendant scoring above 90 on an IQ test would have a true IQ score of 70 or below—would it be unconstitutional for that state’s courts not to take into account the SEM in determining whether a defendant is intellectually disabled? The dissent suggests that another way to probe the uncertainty is to admit multiple obtained IQ scores—a practice the Florida procedures in question allowed. While multiple obtained IQ scores are relevant to determining the reliability of the obtained scores, using this evidence, alone, means working with a fairly small sample size. In Hall, the defendant submitted nine obtained IQ scores, and two were excluded by the sentencing court.

The Court’s decision in this case continues to chip away at the death penalty, albeit quite slowly. The majority’s departure from its traditional Eighth Amendment framework for analysis—a step that is far from new for the Court—injects further uncertainty into the limits on punishments under the Constitution. The Court’s willingness to think more deeply about the methodologies, math, and science underlying some of its decisions, though, furthers the understanding that the meaning of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is evolving. Unfortunately, uncertainty remains about how the Court gathers information about these complicated aspects of law and fact, and how adept the Court is at understanding and employing these concepts.

There is much more that could be said about the Hall case, the Eighth Amendment, and judges’ uses of science and technology, but it has come time for me to sign off of Concurring Opinions for now. Thanks again to the Co-Op gang for asking me to visit, and I look forward to the next time!