Archive for the ‘Courts’ Category
posted by Frank Pasquale
Both Judge Gertner and Judge Kopf have suggested that the bizarre nature and circumstances of the motions panel’s order raise questions about whether it is Judges Cabranes, Walker, and Parker, rather than Judge Scheindlin, who have “breached the rules” of judicial conduct. In a manner rich with irony, coming from a panel that had just faulted Judge Scheindlin for her application of the Southern District’s related cases rule, the three judges announced that, “[i]n the interest of judicial economy,” the motions panel would retain jurisdiction to hear the merits of the appeal “in due course,” rather than having that case randomly assigned to another panel. (“Evidently when it comes to related cases,” writes Professor David Cole, “what’s sauce for the district court is not sauce for the court of appeals.”)
The entire post is well worth reading.
posted by Dave Hoffman
Where were we? I know: throwing stink-bombs at a civil procedure panel!
At the crack of dawn saturday I stumbled into the Contracts II panel. Up first was Ian Ayres, presenting Remedies for the No Read Problem in Consumer Contracting, co-authored with Alan Schwartz. Florencia Marotta-Wurgler provided comments. The gist of Ayres’ paper is that consumers are optimistic about only a few hidden terms in standard-form contracts. For most terms, they guess the content right. Ayres argued that should be concerned only when consumers believe that terms are better than they actually are. The paper proposes that firms make such terms more salient with a disclosure box, after requiring firms to learn about consumer’s knowledge on a regular basis. Basically: Schumer’s box, psychologically-calibrated, for everyone. Florencia M-W commented that since standard-form contracts evolve rapidly, such a calibrated disclosure duty might be much more administratively complex than Ayres/Schwartz would’ve thought. A commentator in the crowd pointed out that since the proposal relies on individuals’ perceptions of what terms are standard, in effect it creates a one-way ratchet. The more people learn about terms through the Ayres/Schwartz box, the weaker the need for disclosure. I liked this point, though it appears to assume that contract terms react fairly predictably to market forces. Is that true? Here are some reasons to doubt it.
Zev Eigen then presented An Experimental Test of the Effectiveness of Terms & Conditions. Ridiculously fun experiment — the subjects were recruited to do a presidential poll. The setup technically permitted them to take the poll multiple times, getting paid each time. Some subjects were exhorted not to cheat in this way; others told that the experimenters trusted them not to cheat; others were given terms and conditions forbidding cheating. Subjects exhorted not to cheat and trusted not to cheat both took the opportunity to game the system significantly less often than those presented with terms and conditions. Assuming external validity, this raises a bit of a puzzle: why do firms attempt to control user behavior through T&Cs? Maybe T&Cs aren’t actually intended to control behavior at all! I wondered, but didn’t ask, if T&Cs that wrapped up with different formalities (a scan of your fingerprint; a blank box requiring you to actually try to sign with your mouse) would get to a different result. Maybe T&Cs now signal “bad terms that I don’t care to read” instead of “contract-promise.” That is, is it possible to turn online T&Cs back into real contracts?
Next, I went to Law and Psych to see “It All Happened So Slow!”: The Impact of Action Speed on Assessments of Intentionality by Zachary C. Burns and Eugene M. Caruso. Bottom line: prosecutors should use slow motion if they want to prove intent. Second bottom line: I need to find a way to do cultural cognition experiments that involving filming friends jousting on a bike. I then hopped on over to International Law, where Adam Chilton presented an experimental paper on the effect of international law rules on public opinion. He used a mTurk sample. I was a concern troll, and said something like “Dan Kahan would be very sad were he here.” Adam had a good set of responses, which boiled down to “mTurk is a good value proposition!” Which it is.
After lunch it was off to a blockbuster session on Legal Education. There was a small little paper on the value of law degrees. And then, Ghazala Azmat and Rosa Ferrer presented Gender Gaps in Performance: Evidence from Young Lawyers. They found that holding all else equal, young women lawyers tend to bill somewhat fewer hours than men, a difference attributable to being less likely to report being highly interested in becoming partners while spending more time on child care. What was noteworthy was the way they were able to mine the After the JD dataset. What seemed somewhat more troubling was the use of hours billed as a measure of performance, since completely controlling for selection in assignments appeared to me to be impossible given the IVs available. Next, Dan Ho and Mark Kelman presented Does Class Size Reduce the Gender Gap? A Natural Experiment in Law. Ho and Kelman found that switching to small classes significantly increases the GPA of female law students (eliminating the gap between men and women). This is a powerful finding – obviously,it would be worth it to see if it is replicable at other schools.
The papers I regret having missed include How to Lie with Rape Statistics by Corey Yung (cities are lying with rape statistics); Employment Conditions and Judge Performance: Evidence from State Supreme Courts by Elliott Ash and W. Bentley MacLeod (judges respond to job incentives); and Judging the Goring Ox: Retribution Directed Towards Animals by Geoffrey Goodwin and Adam Benforado. I also feel terrible having missed Bill James, who I hear was inspirational, in his own way.
Overall, it was a tightly organized conference – kudos to Dave Abrams, Ted Ruger, and Tess Wilkinson-Ryan. There could’ve been more law & psych, but that seems to be an evergreen complaint. Basically, it was a great two days. I just wish there were more Twiqbal papers.
October 29, 2013 at 8:37 pm Posted in: Capital Punishment, Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Conferences, Constitutional Law, Contract Law & Beyond, Courts, Economic Analysis of Law, Empirical Analysis of Law Print This Post No Comments
posted by Ronald K.L. Collins
What makes Alex Kozinski tick? That is the question that many have asked ever since the Romanian-born lad, who once considered himself a Communist, tasted the “forbidden luxuries” of bubble gum and bananas while in Vienna. It was at that pinpoint in time that he became “an instant capitalist.” Fast forward four decades or so and Kozinski, now the Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, continues to baffle folks on all sides of the ideological divide. “I disagree with the liberals on the bench half of the time,” he chuckles, “and the conservatives the other half” is how he put it in a 2006 Reason magazine interview.
Ever the maverick, always the wit, and unvaryingly brainy, the trimmed jurist (he’s lost weight) is just as comfortable listening to a rough version of “Gloria” by Jim Morrison and the Doors as he is with taking in Beethoven’s Violin Concerto in D (recorded by Jascha Heifetz with the Boston Symphony Orchestra).
Make no mistake: Alex Kozinski is an acquired taste. Like anchovies, his flavor is bold – a true delight to uninhibited types, a true displeasure to staid types. Dating Game pick, Anthony Kennedy law clerk (while on the Ninth Circuit) and thereafter clerk to Warren Burger, assistant White House Counsel to President Reagan, Special Counsel of the Merit Systems Protection Board, chief judge on the Court of Federal Claims, and now circuit judge, he relishes a lively give-and-take during oral arguments and likewise welcomes the thrill of an exhilarating bungie jump. In other words, he likes to mix it up.
So who is this all-American with an accent who enjoys complex judicial work almost as much as a savory corned-beef sandwich at Attman’s Deli in Baltimore? Who is this man who flies his fanciful flag when others shy away into the quiet of the dark? Some answers to such questions can be found in a recent Reason magazine interview with the Chief Judge. Entitled “Judge Alex Kozinski: From Communist Romania to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,” the transcribed and video Las Vegas exchange with Matt Welch is quite revealing. At times serious, at times humorous, and at other times surprising, the interview exemplifies the kind of diverse brand of thinking and speaking that is quintessentially Kozinski.
With the kind permission of the folks at Reason, I am happy to share a few snippets of the recent interview with the Judge, who, by the way, is also my good-hearted friend . . . notwithstanding our sometimes different takes on life, law, and rock-n-roll. With that said, here’s Alex:
On tyranny: “[O]ne time I [said] something that sounded somewhat critical of the government, and my father almost lost his job over it. . . . There was a newspaper called Free Romania, and I was seven years old. [People in my father’s office asked:] ‘Do you know how to read?’ And I said, ‘Oh, yes.’ And they said, ‘Can you read [the paper] here?’ And I said, ‘Well, why is it called Free Romania? All those people are in prison.”
On Communism: While Communism may seem good on paper, it is really “a prescription for oppression. It [is] a prescription to give people power over other people that are not subject to lawful control or lawful checks . . . . [I]t inevitably leads to corruption [and] it inevitably leads to oppression.”
posted by Dave Hoffman
Sorry to interrupt the symposium, but this is in the way of a breaking law-news update. I asked Jonathan Lipson (Temple), a former guest blogger here and all-around bankruptcy superstar, to offer our readers some thoughts on the recent decision out of the Detroit bankruptcy. Here are his views:
Detroit: Kicking the Federalism Question Down the Rhodes
Yesterday, Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhodes stayed a state court suit to derail Detroit’s chapter 9 bankruptcy. While Judge Rhodes may ultimately dismiss the bankruptcy petition on his own, the decision forestalls one of the harder questions underlying the filing: To what extent may an Article I bankruptcy judge approve a bankruptcy plan that (may) conflict with state constitutional protections for municipal union members?
The answer will be difficult for several reasons, mostly having to do with the recursive interactions between federal and state law in this context. Bankruptcy Code § 943(b)(4) permits a bankruptcy judge to approve a “plan of adjustment” (as it is called) if the “debtor is not prohibited by law from taking any action necessary to carry out the plan.”
While chapter 9 case-law is sparse, one court has interpreted this to mean that it could not approve a plan that altered state-law priority-protections for bondholders. In re Sanitary & Improv. Dist. #7, 98 B.R. 970 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989). Municipal union members may cite this, and then point to Michigan’s constitution, which provides: “The accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or impaired thereby.” Mich. Const. Article IX, § 24.
Because the plan proposed by Detroit’s emergency financial manager, Kevyn Orr, apparently reduces accrued benefits significantly, retirees would argue that the plan would diminish and impair their contractual rights.
But Orr may respond in three ways. First, he may cite the recent City of Stockton case, and argue that state law cannot prevent a municipal debtor from “adjusting” (i.e., reducing) debts, because federal law is supreme. See In re City of Stockton, 478 B.R. 8, 16 (Bank. E.D. Cal. 2012). Of course, if the federal law in question (the Bankruptcy Code) defers to conflicting state law, this argument doesn’t get him very far.
So, his second move may be to argue that a plan that diminished accrued contractual benefits would not violate the law, because it has long been accepted that the Bankruptcy Power is far greater with respect to contract rights than property rights.
As I (and others) have explained elsewhere, this distinction seems foundational. Michigan’s constitution may protect municipal union members’ contract rights, in other words, but that’s all they are: contract claims, subject to “adjustment” under federal bankruptcy law. If municipal retirees had really wanted solid protection, Michigan’s constitution should have characterized their accrued benefits as “property,” not “contract,” rights.
Third, and most instrumentally, the Michigan constitution does not appear to prevent Orr from exiting current agreements prospectively. Bankruptcy Code section 365 would give Detroit the power to reject such contracts if they are burdensome (there are actually a couple different rejection standards, but it seems likely he could meet them). Even if Orr’s hands are tied as to accrued obligations, the argument would go, he could terminate large numbers of current employees, some of whom he may rehire at lower wages. If municipal employees want their jobs back, they (or their unions) would have to compromise accrued benefits claims.
This would in effect pit current employees against former ones (retirees). Like those who have successfully reorganized mass-tort, Orr may be able to use this tension to extract concessions from the unions. Or, the unions may be able to use this same tension to get a better deal than the one that’s on the table.
Either way, setting up these sorts of bargains is, in my view, one of the most important federal interests here. I have argued in the context of the Catholic Church bankruptcies, for example, that that should be the system’s overarching goal, especially in normatively difficult cases.
Yet, further confounding the analysis are the mixed signals the Supreme Court has sent on the interaction between Congress’ Article I powers (especially bankruptcy court power, in cases such as Stern v. Marshall) and “states’ rights.” On one hand, cases such as Seminole Tribe and Alden (and, indirectly, Stern) suggest that the Court takes state sovereignty seriously: the federal government has limited powers to intrude into states’ affairs, which may include interpreting their constitutions (okay, let’s ignore Bush v. Gore). On the other hand, cases such as Hood and Katz suggest that the Court will make an exception for bankruptcy, discharging state claims and permitting suits against states to recover preferential transfers, respectively (okay, let’s ignore Stern). Perhaps Judge Rhodes will have a relatively free hand here.
How this will unwind in Detroit is difficult to predict, but seems likely to matter to the outcome. In the meantime, we will have to wait for Judge Rhodes to decide whether to permit Detroit’s case to go forward at all. Bankruptcy Code section 921(c) provides that the bankruptcy “order for relief” cannot be entered until resolving objections to the petition. This can include an objection that the filing “does not meet the requirements of this title.”
The unions are likely to argue that Detroit’s bankruptcy petition flunks because Orr’s plan would violate the state constitution, as “incorporated” by Bankruptcy Code section 943(b)(4). Orr would respond by arguing the supremacy of federal bankruptcy law, perhaps along the lines noted above . . . . And so on.
Given these complexities, it would be understandable if Judge Rhodes wanted to kick the federalism question further down the road, in the hope that all major stakeholders—e.g., bondholders and employees—can avoid the costs of litigating these questions, and settle them in a plan they agree on.
posted by Christine Chabot
While in recent decades the Court has become more diverse in some areas, such as gender and race, presidents have also appointed Justices with increasingly uniform educational and professional backgrounds. This lack of professional and educational diversity may be sub-optimal. Adrian Vermeule, for example, offers a carefully-reasoned argument for having at least one Justice with training in another discipline (he suggests appointing a Justice with a PhD in economics). At its most extreme, Vermeule’s argument insists that the professionally-diverse Justice have no training in law, to correct for correlated biases held by lawyer Justices.
My research suggests, however, that the extreme step of eliminating formal legal training will introduce a particular bias which some will find objectionable. In the past, Justices who did not attend law school were significantly more politically predictable than Justices who shared the benefit of formal legal education. Today, of course, a president choosing a Justice who did not attend law school would likely select a person who also has expertise in another field. But it is not clear a Justice with an advanced degree in economics or another discipline would exhibit the same political restraint as a Justice who went to law school. It seems more likely that Justices who attend law school will be either better-equipped or more inclined than others to vote independently of their personal political views. This may be reflected in greater levels of judicial restraint, incremental decision-making, and application of doctrines such as stare decisis.
July 23, 2013 at 11:47 am Tags: diversity, Legal Education, Supreme Court appointments Posted in: Constitutional Law, Courts, Law School, Politics, Supreme Court, Uncategorized Print This Post One Comment
posted by Kaimipono D. Wenger
San Diego County Clerk Ernest Dronenburg filed a petition yesterday seeking to prevent California county clerks from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples until a set of legal issues have been clarified. A reporter from the Union-Tribune called me to discuss the filing, and I ended up being quoted for the idea that the filing was “reasonable” because of legal uncertainties, as a sort of counter-balance to an Aaron Caplan quote that the request will not not “go far.”
Both of which are, I think, correct — but in different ways. Due to the limits of the newspaper medium, a twenty-minute phone interview ended up condensed into a soundbite which — well, which may not seem reasonable. I suspect that this has to do with word limits and editors and the need for a news story with a particular narrative balance. (“I mostly agree with what the other guy said” is a boring article.) But here on blog, we can elaborate in more detail on exactly which ways the Dronenburg filing may or may not be reasonable. Read the rest of this post »
posted by Christine Chabot
Do Justices vote independently of all political forces surrounding their appointments? My earlier post discusses how, even in recent decades, Justices’ votes have been surprisingly independent of the ideologies of Senates to which they were nominated. Even so, it may be that presidents fared better than the Senate and recently enhanced their ability to appoint ideologically-compatible Justices.
History is rife with examples of Justices who disappointed their appointing presidents. As recounted by Henry Abraham, Teddy Roosevelt complained vociferously about Justice Holmes’ ruling in Northern Securities, Truman called Justice Clark his “biggest mistake,” and Eisenhower also referred to Justices Warren and Brennan as “mistakes.” My earlier study finds frequent grounds for presidential disappointment, based on voting records for eighty-nine Justices over a 172-year period. Just under half of these Justices voted with appointees of the other party most of the time. Still, of the last twelve Justices, only two, Stevens and Souter, aligned most often with appointees of the other party. This low number calls into question whether the frequency of presidential disappointments has diminished recently.
My recent paper identifies change over time using regression analysis and more nuanced measures of presidential ideology. The analysis shows ideologies of appointing presidents did not significantly predict Justices’ votes before the 1970s, but they gained significant predictive power thereafter. This enhanced success coincides with Presidents Nixon’s and Reagan’s efforts to prioritize ideology in appointments to the bench. While earlier presidents did not uniformly ignore nominees’ ideology, they lacked modern technological resources. By the Reagan administration, computerized databases allowed presidential aides to quickly assemble and analyze virtually all of a nominee’s past writings. The improved information may have enabled presidents to better anticipate nominees’ future rulings.
July 10, 2013 at 11:22 am Tags: appointments, presidents, Supreme Court Posted in: Constitutional Law, Courts, Empirical Analysis of Law, Law Rev (Hastings), Politics, Supreme Court, Uncategorized Print This Post 5 Comments
posted by Christine Chabot
Thanks, Sarah, for the warm welcome. It is a pleasure to guest blog this month.
With pundits already speculating about President Obama’s next Supreme Court nominee, it seems a good time to discuss relationships between political forces surrounding Supreme Court appointments and Justices’ decisions. Justices sometimes disappoint their appointing presidents, and ideologically-distant Senates are often blamed for presidents’ “mistakes.” For example, David Souter and John Paul Stevens turned out to be far more liberal than the Republican presidents who appointed them (Bush I and Ford, respectively). These presidents both faced very liberal Senates when they selected Souter and Stevens.
Are nominees like Souter and Stevens anomalies or part of a larger pattern of senatorial constraint? My recent article in the Hastings Law Journal offers the first empirical analysis of the Senate’s role in constraining presidents’ choices of Supreme Court nominees over an extended period. It considers ideologies of Senates faced by nominating presidents and measures whether the ideologies of these Senates predict Justices’ voting behavior. The analysis substantially qualifies earlier understandings of senatorial constraint.
Earlier empirical studies consider only limited numbers of recent nominees (see article pp. 1235-39). They suggest that the Senate has constrained presidents’ choices, and many scholars theorize that the Senate has enhanced its role in the appointments process since the 1950s. Analysis of a larger group of nominees shows the Senate’s ideology has had significant predictive power over Justices’ votes in only two isolated historical periods. Senatorial ideology was last significant in the 1970s, shortly after the filibuster of Abe Fortas’s nomination to be Chief Justice, but then it actually lost significance after the Senate rejected Bork in 1987.
July 3, 2013 at 12:19 pm Tags: appointments, judicial selection, Senate confirmation process, Supreme Court Posted in: Constitutional Law, Courts, Current Events, Empirical Analysis of Law, Law Rev (Hastings), Politics, Supreme Court Print This Post 5 Comments
posted by Danielle Citron
At Slate, Barry Friedman and Dahlia Lithwick have a provocative new piece entitled “What’s Left? Have Progressives Abandoned Every Cause Save Gay Marriage?” Great read.
posted by Danielle Citron
A new casebook co-authored by University of Virginia law professor Brandon Garrett and my brilliant colleague Lee Kovarsky is the first to comprehensively cover habeas corpus, particularly exploring the topics of post-conviction review, executive and national security detention litigation, and the detention of immigrants. The book, just published by Foundation Press, is titled “Federal Habeas Corpus: Executive Detention and Post-conviction Litigation.”
The privilege of habeas corpus — which ensures that a prisoner can challenge an unlawful detention, such as for a lack of sufficient cause or evidence — has grown increasingly complex and important. Just this week, the Supreme Court decided important habeas cases recognizing an innocence-exception to habeas time-limits, and making it easier for state inmates to use habeas corpus to challenge the ineffectiveness of their trial lawyer. See Garrett and Kovarsky on ‘Two Gateways to Habeas’)
Here is an excerpt of an interview of Professor Garrett and Professor Kovarsky posted on the UVA website:
“In writing this casebook, our goal was to create the subject,” Garrett said. “There is something deep connecting different parts of habeas corpus that are often taught in far-flung parts of courses or are not taught at all. Habeas corpus is now an extremely valuable and exciting course to teach, and we thought the subject demanded a rich set of teaching materials.”
Garrett, who has taught habeas corpus at UVA Law for eight years, co-wrote the book with Kovarsky, a 2004 Virginia Law graduate and a leading habeas and capital litigator who joined the University of Maryland’s Francis King Carey School of Law as an assistant professor in 2011.
“A few years ago, I started talking to Lee about habeas corpus,” Garrett said. “Lee writes insightful scholarship about habeas corpus, and is also a longtime habeas practitioner; he still works on high-profile death penalty cases in Texas. I sent him my course materials because he was starting teaching as a law professor at Maryland. And he immediately said that this should be a casebook.”
Kovarsky said he and Garrett decided to work together on the project to identify — and establish — a habeas canon that was “divorced from any immediate political, ideological or institutional objective.”
”The decisional law and academic literature is polluted with too much erroneously accepted wisdom about the [writ of habeas corpus'] essence and, by implication, its limits,” he said. “That accepted wisdom, in turn, fuels legally substantial narratives that are, in many ways, best explored, challenged and modified in a classroom.”
Traditionally, Garrett said, law schools have taught habeas corpus as a short segment in federal courts or criminal adjudication courses rather than as a full class. Yet these brief segments, he said, are no longer sufficient.
The law of habeas corpus became significantly more complicated after Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act in 1996, which was passed in the wake of the Oklahoma City bombing and the first World Trade Center bombing. Read the rest of this post »
posted by David Schwartz
Previously I posted on the issue of proxy patent litigation. Basically, mass patent aggregators (entities which own or control a large number of patents that they have acquired from elsewhere) litigate only a few of the patents in their portfolio against a large accused infringer. The litigated patents serve as proxies for the quality of their entire portfolio. If the aggregator is successful on the merits (or at least in preliminary rulings, such as defeating the accused infringer’s motions for summary judgment on invalidity and non-infringement), it strengthens their hand considerably in negotiations for a license for the entire portfolio. The proxy litigation is also only one part of a broader dynamic from the aggregator’s perspective: the aggregator’s success in court against one practicing entity not only puts it in a stronger bargaining position against that entity, it may also do so with the rest of industry as well (i.e., other firms may be willing to pay more for a portfolio license).
I now attempt to answer a question I posed in my previous post. Specifically, if the court understood the underlying dispute was litigation-by-proxy, would it (or could it) proceed any differently?
I think it is useful to consider this question through the prism of the classic project management triangle. According to theory, a project has three core attributes: speed, quality, and cost. There is tension among the three attributes, and consequently, one can never maximize more than two of them. For instance, if one wants a project of the highest quality in the fastest time, then it can’t be cheap. Alternatively, if one wants a project fast and cheap, then it can’t be of the highest quality.
Now let’s translate the project management triangle into the judicial process. Several core attributes of a case are speed of resolution, depth and thoroughness of the analysis, and accuracy or correctness of the decision. If the project management triangle is correct and applies to the courts, then all three of these can’t be maximized at once. While the court and litigants want speedy, thorough, and accurate justice, not all are possible in a case.
Now turn back to the proxy litigation by patent aggregators. I submit that the optimal level of speed, thoroughness, and accuracy may be different in proxy litigation than run-of-the-mill litigation. The depth and thoroughness of the opinions may be of less importance in proxy litigation because the adjudicated dispute is not the entire dispute between the parties. Accuracy may be more important since the results of the single dispute will be used to determine the value of a larger portfolio.
Thoughts on the analysis?
posted by David Schwartz
In the last decade or so, patent litigation in the United States has undergone enormous changes. Perhaps most profound is the rise in enforcement of patents held by people and entities who don’t make any products or otherwise participate in the marketplace. Some call these patent holders ‘non-practicing entities’ (NPEs), while others use the term ‘patent assertion entities’ (PAEs), and some pejoratively refer to some or all of these patent holders as ‘trolls.’ These outsiders come in many different flavors: individual inventors, universities, failed startups, and holding companies that own a patent or family of patents.
This post is about a particular type of outsider that is relatively new: the mass patent aggregator. The mass patent aggregator owns or controls a significant number of patents – hundreds or even thousands – which it acquired from different sources, including from companies that manufacture products. These mass aggregators often seek to license their portfolios to large practicing entities for significant amounts of money, sometimes using infringement litigation as the vehicle. Aggregators often focus their portfolios on certain industries such as consumer electronics.
Mass aggregator patent litigation and ordinary patent litigation appear to differ in one important aspect. Mass aggregators sue on a few patents in their portfolio, which serve as proxies for the quality of their entire portfolio. The parties use the court’s views of the litigated patents to determine how to value the full patent portfolio. By litigating only a small subset of their portfolio, the aggregator and potential licensee avoid the expense of litigating all of the patents. But the court adjudicates the dispute completely oblivious to the proxy aspect of the litigation. Instead, the court handles it like every other case – by analyzing the merits of the various claims and defenses.
If the court understood the underlying dispute was litigation-by-proxy, would it (or could it) proceed any differently? I will discuss my thoughts on this question in another blog post. For now, I have a question: does proxy litigation occur in other areas of law?
May 27, 2013 at 11:42 pm Tags: aggregator, Intellectual Property, non-practicing entity, npe, patent, patent litigation, proxy litigation Posted in: Courts, Intellectual Property Print This Post 6 Comments
posted by David Schwartz
While patent law is my core area of scholarly interest, I have also studied the use of legal scholarship by the courts. My co-author Lee Petherbridge from Loyola-LA and I have conducted several comprehensive empirical studies using large datasets on the issue. More precisely, we have analyzed how often federal courts cite to law review articles in their decisions. We have empirically analyzed the issue from a variety of angles. We have studied the use of legal scholarship by the U.S. Supreme Court (available here), by the regional U.S. Courts of Appeals (study available here), and by the Federal Circuit (available here). I won’t recount the finding of those studies here. Instead, I will report some new information and ask readers for potential explanations of the data.
posted by David Schwartz
This post reflects my initial impressions of an important Federal Circuit development in patent law, which is my primary area of scholarly focus. On Friday, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled on a controversial and divisive patent law issue, whether software inventions are patent eligible subject matter. Unfortunately, I find the decision in this case, CLS Bank v. Alice Corp., quite unsatisfying.
The court, sitting with 10 judges, issued 7 separate opinions spanning 135 pages. The court only agreed upon a very brief – 55 words – per curiam opinion affirming the district court ruling that the asserted patents were invalid. The per curiam opinion explained that the “method” and “computer readable media” claims were deemed not patent eligible by the Federal Circuit, while the court was equally divided on the status of the “system” claims. (Basically, there are several different ways that a software invention can be claimed in a patent, including as a process/method of performing steps; as software embedded upon a computer readable medium (i.e., a DVD); and as a system (i.e., software running on a machine/computer).) None of the remaining substantive opinions garnered more than 5 votes – thus, none are binding precedent. Although a majority of the Federal Circuit judges found the method and media claims invalid, a majority could not agree upon the reasoning. Below I will briefly provide a few preliminary observations about the opinions.
posted by Kaimipono D. Wenger
Last Friday, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg spoke at the 13th Annual Women and Law Conference at Thomas Jefferson Law School. A packed house listened as panelists discussed a variety of issues relating to women in the judiciary, and the highlight of the day was an extended and candid Q&A with Justice Ginsburg herself. Read the rest of this post »
posted by UCLA Law Review
Volume 60, Discourse
|Discovery From the Trenches: The Future of Brady||Laurie L. Levenson||74|
posted by Lawrence Cunningham
In this season’s law review submission process, I am circulating an article about deferred prosecution agreements (DPAs) and corporate governance. DPAs are controversial tools increasingly-used to settle corporate criminal cases, usually without indictment. Targets admit facts, pay fines and promise governance reforms—such as replacing officers, adding directors and prescribing reporting lines.
Some view DPAs as coerced extractions of overzealous prosecutors, while others say they are mere whitewash that let corporate crooks off the hook. The weight of commentary urges prosecutors to get out of this business, to avoid corporate governance entirely, while some wonder why the intrusions are not deeper and more frequent.
I explain why prosecutors should invest in corporate governance and take a measured approach to reforming it. Ignoring governance can be perilous and embracing it can produce more effective reforms.
My diagnosis indicates a lack of both investment and transparency so I make two prescriptions: prosecutors should profile the corporate governance of businesses they target at the outset and publicly articulate rationales for reforms when settling.
The paper first surveys the landscape of contemporary corporate governance, stressing two normative points. First: one-size-does-not fit all. Corporate governance varies enormously from company to company, depending on such factors as ownership structures, management characteristics and employment policies. Second: failure to appreciate that poses serious risks, always to given companies, and sometimes to the economy at large.
That is the proper lesson to draw from the 2002 case of Arthur Andersen, where an indictment destroyed the auditing firm because it was a partnership owned and managed by its members in the veracity business.
Instead, prosecutors took a broader and cruder lesson: that they should always be averse to indicting any large business. The result of that aversion has been the proliferation of DPAs—which, despite controversy and criticism, is not necessarily a bad effect, so long as these lessons are incorporated into their production.
posted by Danielle Citron
My colleague Aaron Zelinsky, who is visiting with University of Maryland School of Law before heading off to the Supreme Court to clerk, has written an incisive post at the Huffington Post on the federal judiciary’s failure to stick to the hiring plan, the troubles defection causes, and his recommendation for what we ought to do about it. The entire post is here. For a bit of his wisdom:
So what’s to be done?
If judges are serious about creating a new plan to fix this race to the bottom, there’s an easy solution: use the old plan. The old plan worked just fine. It only had one problem; it was voluntary, so it unraveled. The solution is simple: make the plan mandatory.
Remember the story of Odysseus, who wanted to hear the song of the Sirens but was worried that doing so would cause him to sail too close to the rocks and wreck his ship? To get around the problem he had his crew tie him to the mast.
The judicial branch tried this solution with the old hiring plan, but they made a critical mistake: Odysseus didn’t tie himself to the mast. He had his crew do it. That way he couldn’t get the knots undone. Otherwise, tying yourself up is about as useful as putting that piece of chocolate cake in the back of the refrigerator. Sure, it helps for about ten minutes, but then you open the door, move the mayonnaise to the side, and there it is.
Instead of voluntary compliance, the judicial branch should ask someone else to tie them to the mast. In the context of our constitutional system, the term of art for this is one you may remember from middle school civics: the separation of powers.
Congress has the power of the purse. It allocates funds for building courthouses, keeping the lights on, and employing staff. For instance, law clerks are employed under 28 U.S.C. 752 (for district courts) and 28 U.S.C. 712 (for circuit courts). If the judiciary really wants to fix the hiring plan, then judges should request that Congress condition salaries for law clerks upon them being hired in compliance with the judicial hiring plan. In other words, if you don’t play by the rules, you don’t have law clerks.
But wait, isn’t that unconstitutional? Nope. The Constitution prevents Congress from lowering the salaries of federal judges, but says nothing about their staff (anyways, such a law could be written to apply only to those hired in the future, not those already employed). And Congress isn’t infringing on the judicial power in any way – this law does not effect how judges make use of their clerks, just the timing of how they hire them. And it would leave the actual formation of the plan up to the judiciary.
Federal judges could ask Congress to make the hiring plan mandatory via a proposal from a special judicial working group, or even in Chief Justice Roberts’s year end report to Congress. And they should. A new, mandatory plan would be fairer for less-advantaged law students and late-bloomers, more efficient for federal judges, and maybe even better for you.
posted by Stanford Law Review
The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Matthew I. Hall entitled How Congress Could Defend DOMA in Court (and Why the BLAG Cannot). Professor Hall argues that the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group lacks standing to defend DOMA:
In one of the most closely watched litigation matters in recent years, the Supreme Court will soon consider Edith Windsor’s challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA). The Court surprised many observers by granting certiorari, not only on the merits of Windsor’s equal protection and due process claims, but also on the question whether the defendants—the United States and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House of Representatives (the BLAG)—have Article III standing to defend DOMA. The United States has agreed with plaintiffs that DOMA is unconstitutional, prompting the BLAG to intervene for the purpose of defending DOMA’s constitutionality. No lower court has yet addressed whether the BLAG has standing, so the Supreme Court will have the first crack at the issue. But it turns out that the answer is straightforward: Under settled precedent, the BLAG lacks authority to represent either the United States or Congress, and having claimed no interest of its own, it therefore lacks Article III standing.
Congress could solve these problems by statute or resolution, but until it does so the BLAG is a mere bystander, with no stake in defending DOMA. This lack of standing may play a decisive role in the Windsor litigation. Both the BLAG and the executive branch defendants appealed the District Court’s judgment to the Second Circuit, and petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. If the BLAG lacks standing, however, then it had no authority to appeal or to seek Supreme Court review, and the Court’s jurisdiction must turn on whether the United States, which has agreed with the plaintiff that DOMA is unconstitutional, has standing to proceed with the case. Interestingly, the BLAG itself has argued that no such standing exists—a controversial position that is beyond the scope of this short piece. But if the BLAG is correct, then there is no case or controversy before the Court, and the Court will have to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The widespread expectation that Windsor will be a significant decision appears to be well-founded. But it remains to be seen whether its significance will lie in the area of individual rights or in the areas of federal court jurisdiction and the separation of powers.
Read the full article, How Congress Could Defend DOMA in Court (and Why the BLAG Cannot) at the Stanford Law Review Online.
January 28, 2013 at 10:30 am Tags: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, same sex marriage, standing, Supreme Court Posted in: Civil Procedure, Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Courts, Current Events, Law Rev (Stanford), Supreme Court Print This Post One Comment
posted by Dave Hoffman
Like many of you, I’ve been horrified by the events in Newtown, and dismayed by the debate that has followed. Josh Marshall (at TPM) thinks that “this is quickly veering from the merely stupid to a pretty ugly kind of victim-blaming.” Naive realism, meet thy kettle! Contrary to what you’ll see on various liberal outlets, the NRA didn’t cause Adam Lanza to kill innocent children and adults, nor did Alan Gura or the army of academics who helped to build the case for an individual right to gun ownership. Reading discussions on the web, you might come to believe that we don’t all share the goal of a society where the moral order is preserved, and where our children can be put on the bus to school without a qualm.
But we do.
We just disagree about how to make it happen.
Dan Kahan’s post on the relationship between “the gun debate”, “gun deaths”, and Newtown is thus very timely. Dan argues that if we really wanted to decrease gun deaths, we should try legalizing drugs. (I’d argue, following Bill Stuntz, that we also/either would hire many more police while returning much more power to local control). But decreasing gun deaths overall won’t (probably) change the likelihood of events like these:
“But here’s another thing to note: these very sad incidents “represent only a sliver of America’s overall gun violence.” Those who are appropriately interested in reducing gun homicides generally and who are (also appropriately) making this tragedy the occasion to discuss how we as a society can and must do more to make our citizens safe, and who are, in the course of making their arguments invoking(appropraitely!) the overall gun homicide rate should be focusing on what we can be done most directly and feasibly to save the most lives.
Repealing drug laws would do more — much, much, much more — than banning assault rifles (a measure I would agree is quite appropriate); barring carrying of concealed handguns in public (I’d vote for that in my state, if after hearing from people who felt differently from me, I could give an account of my position that fairly meets their points and doesn’t trade on tacit hostility toward or mere incomprehension of whatever contribution owning a gun makes to their experience of a meaningful free life); closing the “gun show” loophole; extending waiting periods etc. Or at least there is evidence for believing that, and we are entitled to make policy on the best understanding we can form of how the world works so long as we are open to new evidence and aren’t otherwise interfering with liberties that we ought, in a liberal society, to respect.”
Dan’s post is trying to productively redirect our public debate, and I wanted to use this platform to bring more attention to his point. But, I think he’s missing something, and if you follow me after the jump, I’ll tell you what.