Category: Constitutional Law

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FAN 29.1 (First Amendment News) — Florida Bar Joins Petitioner in Urging Court Review of Judicial Elections Case

Barry Richard, counsel for Florida Bar

Barry Richard, counsel for Florida Bar

As difficult as it is to obtain review in the Supreme Court, sometimes a case comes along that makes it hard for the clerks and their bosses to ignore. Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar may be just such a case as the stars seem to be aligning in favor of the Petitioner, Lanell Williams-Yulee, having her case ruled upon by the Justices.

In a post a few weeks back, I flagged the Williams-Yulee case in which review was pending in the Court. The issue in the case is whether a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds violates the First Amendment. In a per curium opinion, a divided Florida Supreme Court denied the First Amendment challenge.

As I mentioned, a petition for certiorari had been filed by Andrew Pincus, Charles Rothfeld, and Michael Kimberly with assistance from Ernest Myers and Lee Marcus along with Eugene Fidell of the Yale Law School Clinic.

So much for the old news; now, here is the latest development in that case. Last week the Florida Bar filed its response — Barry Richard is the Bar’s counsel of record. Here is what is interesting about the Bar’s response:

The Florida Bar submits that the Florida Supreme Court correctly determined that the challenged Canon 7C(1) of the Florida Code of Judicial Conduct complies with the First Amendment. However, The Florida Bar believes that this Court should issue its writ of certiorari to resolve the significant conflicts existing between state high courts and federal circuit courts and among federal circuit courts on this fundamental issue of constitutional rights.

Additionally, the Respondent urges that the Court review the case for three reasons:

  1. “The issues at the heart of the conflicts are not such that they can accommodate different interpretations and applications in different jurisdictions and judicial forums without insulting fundamental principles,”
  2. “Judicial conflicts over the issues raised by the petition are likely to increase in the foreseeable future. Over twenty states that provide for popular election of judges have rules similar to Canon 7C(1)”, and
  3. “The Florida Bar joins the Petitioner in respectfully urging this Court to accept this case for review not only because there is a national need for resolution, but because of the particularly troublesome position in which it places The Florida Bar. Denial of the petition for certiorari would leave the decision of the Florida Supreme Court standing, but would provide The Florida Bar with little comfort. The existing indirect conflict between the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, and the decision of the Eleventh Circuit in Weaver v. Bonner . . . a case involving a Georgia judicial candidate, is likely to become a direct conflict when the Eleventh Circuit is inevitably called upon to adjudicate the constitutionality of Canon 7C(1) in a case involving a Florida judicial candidate.”

Of course, counsel for the Petitioner (Andrew Pincus) endorses the Respondent’s request for review:

Typically, a respondent joins in a petitioner’s request for further review only when “there is a clear conflict of decisions” and “the question is undoubtedly of such importance as to need a Supreme Court determination.” Stephen M. Shapiro, et al., Supreme Court Practice 510 (10th ed. 2013). That is precisely the case here. Because this case offers an opportunity to answer the question presented free of any doubt that the controversy here is both ripe and ongoing (see Pet. 15-16 & n.9; Resp. Br. 3), the petition for a writ of certiorari should be granted. 

(Hat tip to Maureen Johnston over at SCOTUSblog)

Additional information about the case is set out in FAN #25. Stay tuned for future developments.

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FAN 29 (First Amendment News) — Exceptional Freedom: How many exceptions are there to the First Amendment?

[W]e decline to carve out from the First Amendment any novel exception.                     – Chief Justice John Roberts (2010)

When we talk about exceptions to the First Amendment’s guaranty of freedom of expression, Justice Frank Murphy’s famous 1942 dictum in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire comes to mind:

There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ―fighting words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. 

Note that the list of exceptions he offered was an incomplete one. To much the same effect as Chaplinsky, in his majority opinion in United States v. Stevens (2010) Chief Justice John Roberts declared:

From 1791 to the present, however, the First Amendment has ―permitted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas, and has never ―include[d] a freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.  . . . These historic and traditional categories [are] long familiar to the bar, . . . [and include] obscenity, . . . defamation, . . . fraud, . . . incitement, . . . and speech integral to criminal conduct . . . . [They] are well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.

Against that backdrop, the Chief Justice emphasized: “we decline to carve out from the First Amendment any novel exception.” He Unknownalso cautioned: “cases cannot be taken as establishing a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First Amendment.”

The question, of course, is exactly how many “well-defined and narrowly limited classes” of exceptions are there (Chaplinsky), or  precisely how many “historic and traditional categories” of speech fall outside of the First Amendment (Stevens)?

To answer that question it is important to note that not all of the categories listed by the Chief Justice are single-subject exceptions. For example, consider the “speech integral to criminal conduct” category. That exception itself consists of more than a few particularized exceptions. And then there are the other exceptions that were left unmentioned.

So many exceptions

Mindful of the above, and as I have noted elsewhere, here is a list of the additional (or more particularized) types of expression that have been deemed unprotected:

(1)       blackmail

(2)       bribery

(3)       misleading commercial expression

(4)       incitement to lawless action

(5)       expression that violates an intellectual property right

(6)       criminal conspiracy expression

(7)       threatening expressions

(8)       expression that endangers national security

(9)       insider trading expression

(10)     perjurious expression

(11)     harassment in the workplace expression

(12)     expression in contempt of court

(13)     plagiaristic expression

(14)     criminal solicitation (e.g., prostitution or murder for hire)

(15)     child pornography

(16)     speech that amounts to bullying

(17)     intentionally false speech likely to create a dangerous public panic

(18)     intentionally misrepresenting oneself as a government official

(19)  intentionally false material statements made to voters concerning authorship or endorsement of political campaign materials

(20)     certain kinds of intentionally false statements made about a political or public figure

(21)     certain kinds of prisoner expression

(22)     certain kinds of government employee expression

(23)     certain kinds of government funded expression

(24)     certain kinds of student expression

(25)     certain kinds of expression by those in the military

(26)     expression deemed secret owing to a private contract or law

(27)      certain kinds of expression expression that unfairly places another in a false light

(28)     intentional expression that causes emotional distress

(29)     expression in violation of anti-trust laws

(30)      certain kinds of expression that cause prejudicial publicity that interferes with a fair trial

(31)     intentionally disclosing the identity of secret government agents

(32)     certain kinds of expression that invade the privacy of another

(33)     certain kinds of expression limited by time, place, and manner restrictions

(34)     certain kinds of expression that involves intentional lying

(35)     certain kinds of expression by sitting judges

(36)     certain kinds of expression aired on the public airwaves

(37)     certain kinds of panhandling

(38)     certain kinds of telemarketing

(39)     certain kinds of speech harmful to minors

(40)     certain kinds of commercial solicitation (e.g. lawyers soliciting business)

(41)   certain kinds of expression concerning the unauthorized practice of some licensed profession (e.g., medicine or law)

(42)     certain kinds of intentional lying to government officials (e.g., lying to Congress while under oath or false police reports) and

(43)     certain kinds of evidence introduced into court and in courtroom expression governed by the rules of evidence.

And what of revenge porn & cyber harassment?

Are there more? Perhaps. Might some of the above ones now be deemed unconstitutional? Perhaps. That said, my point is that the lists offered in Chaplinsky and Stevens (among other Supreme Court opinions) give the impression that the number of exceptions to the First Amendment is actually far fewer than may well be the case.

In all of this, however, I do not mean to undermine a robust commitment to free speech freedom — a commitment well beyond what is fashionable in many circles of academia today. Still, if originalism is to be a significant and even determinative guide here, we must be duly mindful of its true dimensions. This is not to say the results reached by the Roberts Court in several First Amendment cases could not otherwise be justified, but rather that some of the Court’s originalist language needs to be more fully stated and explained.

Justices asked to review Secondary Effects case  Read More

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Halbig and Originalism

One criticism of originalism in constitutional law is that we cannot always determine with reasonable certainty what the Framers of the 1787 Constitution, the Bill of Rights, or the Fourteenth Amendment intended or what the public understood those provisions to mean.  Nonsense, say defenders of originalism.  There is plenty of evidence on what the Constitution meant, and even where there is less we can still pull enough together to give courts guidance.

Halbig pokes a hole in this argument.  At issue is a major provision in the most visible statute passed by Congress in years (if not decades).  And we cannot agree what that provision was trying to accomplish just four years after it was enacted.  Did Congress use subsidies to give states an incentive to set up health insurance exchanges, or was that not the case?  Was there a drafting error, or was this intentional?  If that is unknowable, what are we supposed to do with ambiguous constitutional provisions ratified more than two centuries ago?

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FAN 28.1 (First Amendment News) — The First Amendment in the Era of ISIS

This is beyond anything we’ve seen.

                                  – Chuck Hagel, Aug. 21, 2014

The Threat

→ Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel told reporters at the Pentagon: “They are an imminent threat to every interest we have, whether it’s in Iraq or anywhere else.”

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel

Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel

“Asked if the hardline Sunni Muslim organization posed a threat to the United States comparable to that of the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, Hagel said it was ‘as sophisticated and well-funded as any group we have seen.’”

→ According to a report in The Hill, ISIS, also known as Islamic State, “has long threatened to carry out a catastrophic attack on American soil, with a spokesman recently boasting that the militant group would fly its flag over the White House.”

Senator Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.) Now is in “the most dangerous position we’ve ever been in.” ISIS members, he added, are “rapidly developing a method of blowing up a major U.S. city and people just can’t believe that’s happening.” 

imagesRecruiting in the U.S.? 

→ “The director of the FBI visited Colorado this week and detailed how the terror organization ISIS is recruiting Americans to take up their cause.It’s not just the recruitment of Americans that’s concerning to the FBI, it’s the method of recruitment — the Internet. FBI Director James Comey said how they are recruiting new members is getting the attention of the U.S. government.” [Source: CBS News]

James Comey: “We have seen an emergence since I was last in government of the people we call home grown violent extremists.” [Source: CBS News]

The Law

The Newseum in Washington, D.C.

The Newseum in Washington, D.C.

“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.” – Schenck v. United States (1919)

→ See also: Dennis v. United States (1951) (“In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the `evil,’ discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.”)

→ See also: Yates v. United States (1957) (re “advocacy of actions” versus advocacy in the abstract).

“the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)

 Everyone agrees that the Government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order. . . .  Plaintiffs’ complaint is that the ban on material support, applied to what they wish to do, is not ‘necessary to further that interest.’ The objective of combating terrorism does not justify prohibiting their speech, plaintiffs argue, because their support will advance only the legitimate activities of the designated terrorist organizations, not their terrorism. . . .  We are convinced that Congress was justified in rejecting that view.  . .  . We see no reason to question Congress’s finding . . . ” – Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2010)

→ See also: Geoffrey Stone. Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime (2004)

→ See also Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in Time of National Emergency (2006) and Posner, Countering Terrorism: Blurred Focus, Halting Steps (2007)

→ See generally “Symposium, Free Speech in Wartime,” 36 Rutgers Law Journal 821-951 (2005) (contributors: Geoffrey Stone, Earl Maltz, Ronald Collins & David Skover, Adrian Vermeule, Leonard Niehoff, Floyd Abrams, David Strauss, Nadine Strossen, Eric Foner, David Rabban, and Raymond Solomon).

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PASPA, Uniformity Requirements, and the “Equal Sovereignty” Principle

Fans of federalism and/or sports betting were likely disappointed to see the Supreme Court deny cert last month in Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association.  The case involved the constitutionality of the federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, which generally prohibits the licensing, promoting, and authorization of sports-betting activities in all states except for Nevada (and a few other states to a lesser extent).  One of the challengers’ claims involved the so-called “equal sovereignty” doctrine, most recently recognized by the Court in Shelby County v. Holder.  PASPA, the challengers argued, was functionally indistinguishable from Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in that it unjustifiably treated some states differently from others.  Therefore, invoking the authority of Shelby County (and the Court’s other “equal sovereignty” decisions), the challengers claimed that PASPA had to go.***

The Third Circuit upheld PASPA and thus rejected the challengers’ “equal sovereignty” claim.  The court had a number of things to say about Shelby County and the VRA, including this:

[T]he VRA is fundamentally different from PASPA.  It represents, as the Supreme Court explained, “an uncommon exercise of congressional power” in an area “the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves . . . the power to regulate elections.”  Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623, 2624.  The regulation of gambling via the Commerce Clause is thus not of the same nature as the regulation of elections pursuant to the Reconstruction Amendments.  Indeed, while the guarantee of uniformity in treatment amongst the states cabins some of Congress’ powers, see, e.g., U.S. Const., art. I., § 8, cl. 1 (requiring uniformity in duties and imposts); id. § 9, cl. 6 (requiring uniformity in regulation of state ports), no such guarantee limits the Commerce Clause.  This only makes sense: Congress’ exercises of Commerce Clause authority are aimed at matters of national concern and finding national solutions will necessarily affect states differently; accordingly, the Commerce Clause, “[u]nlike other powers of [C]ongress[,] . . . does not require geographic uniformity.” Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 388 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

I find this argument puzzling.  The first half of the paragraph sets forth the proposition that Commerce Clause regulation is different from Reconstruction Amendment regulation; the second half then defends this proposition by noting that the Commerce Clause, unlike other provisions of Article I, does not contain an explicit “uniformity” requirement. The problem is that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment also lack “uniformity” requirements, and those provisions—as we know from Shelby County—still trigger application of the “equal sovereignty” principle.  So, Shelby County actually seems to undercut rather than support the Third Circuit’s “Commerce-Clause-Lacks-a-Uniformity-Requirement” claim.

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Some Textual Questions

I was rereading the Constitution the other day, and two things stuck out this time that I had not thought about before.

1.  Article I, Section 3 says “each senator shall have one Vote.”  But Article I never says that each Representative shall have one vote.  I wonder why.  Perhaps because the Senate was new, the Framers felt the need to clarify the role of a Senator.  Representatives, by contrast, were more familiar and thus everyone knew that each one would get one vote.

2.  When addressing impeachment, Article I, Section 3 also says that anyone removed from office shall “be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”  Does this mean that an indictment is a requirement?  In other words, if a state wanted to proceed by information against an impeached and removed official, can they do that?

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FAN 28 (First Amendment News) — The Demise of Stare Decisis?

Professor Randy Kozel

Professor Randy Kozel

Start here: “Under the conventional view of constitutional adjudication, dubious precedents enjoy a presumption of validity through the doctrine of stare decisis.” Okay, so much for the gospel regularly taught in law schools.

But there is another gospel — the one actually practiced by judges. (Somewhere the old Florentine grins.)

Now consider this: “[W]ithin the First Amendment context, there is no such presumption. When the Court concludes that a precedent reflects a cramped vision of expressive liberty, adherence to the past gives way. Unfettered speech, not legal continuity, is the touchstone.”

So contends Notre Dame Law School Professor Randy Kozel in a draft of an article titled “Second Thoughts About the First Amendment.” As his research reveals, “in recent years the Court has marginalized its prior statements regarding the constitutional value of false speech. It has revamped its process for identifying categorical exceptions to First Amendment protection. It has rejected its past decisions on corporate electioneering and aggregate campaign contributions. And it has revised its earlier positions on union financing, abortion protesting, and commercial speech.”

And why? What accounts for this purported demise of stare decisis? “The best explanation for this phenomenon,” say Professor Kozel, “is the role of free speech in the constitutional order. The Court’s tendency is to characterize affronts to expressive liberty as dangerous steps toward governmental repression and distortion. From this perspective, it is little wonder that the Court eschews continuity with the past. Legal stability may be significant, but official orthodoxy seems like an excessive price to pay.”

And is all of this a problem? Here is how the former Kozinski-Kennedy law clerk turned law professor answers that question: “Yet the Court’s practice raises serious questions. Departures from precedent can be problematic, especially when they become so frequent as to compromise the notion of constitutional law as enduring and impersonal. If the doctrine of stare decisis is to serve its core functions of stabilizing and unifying constitutional law across time, the desire to protect expressive liberty must yield, at least occasionally, to the need for keeping faith with the past.”

With a guarded measure of nuance, Professor Kozel adds: “For some, this state of affairs may be unobjectionable. There is no denying that robust expression is a core tenet of American legal and political culture. Still, there is something to be said for stare decisis, even when continuity comes at a hefty price.”

→ Of course there is more, much more in this thoughtful work-in-progress. I urge readers to take a look at it and send along your thoughts. Who knows, it might even make for an interesting topic for a future First Amendment salon?

Speaking of that salon, I may soon have some news on that front. Stay tuned.

Another great quote from Justice Jackson

[T]he very essence of constitutional freedom of press and of speech is to allow more liberty than the good citizen will take. The test of its vitality is whether we will suffer and protect much that we think false, mischievous and bad, both in taste and intent.

– Justice Robert Jackson, in-chambers opinion in Williamson v. United States (1950):

→ Hat tip to Eugene Volokh

Two New Books Read More

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Vice Presidential Proxy Voting

96px-Joe_Biden_official_portrait_cropThere have been a few stories recently speculating on how the Senate would function if the November elections resulted in a 50-50 split between Republicans and Democrats.  The standard answer is that that Joe Biden would have to spend a lot more time on Capitol Hill to cast his tie-breaking vote.  While the practice has always been that a vice-president must cast his Senate vote in person, I wonder if that should be changed.

There are good reasons for not allowing proxy voting by House and Senate members.  You might think part of the duty of being a member is to show up and cast votes.  Verifying the accuracy of proxy votes could also be a problem, especially if an absent member is ill or in some remote place.  Likewise, permitting proxy voting might give party leaders more power than they already possess by effectively delegating votes to them.  (In this respect, you might say that voting in Congress is simply non-delegable.)

The Vice-President, though, is a different kettle of fish.  He isn’t really a member of the Senate.  He is only one person, so establishing the truth of his proxy should be easy.  He will always vote the Administration line, so there is no risk that the Senate Majority Leader will get more discretion as a result of the VPs proxy.   Moreover, the VP often needs to be elsewhere (on a diplomatic mission, in a national security council meeting), such that subjecting him to the whims of the Senate schedule could be a problem.  Why not let him vote by proxy?

I should add (on a related note) that a 50-50 Senate tie could expose the fact that there is no procedure in place to deal with an ill or incapacitated vice-president.  Suppose the VP has a stroke and cannot function for months.  Then all of the ties would be actual ties.  (Proxy voting would reduce but not eliminate this problem–no proxy could occur if the VP was in a coma.)  I do not believe that the Senate was equally divided during one of the periods (prior to the 25th Amendment) where we had no vice-president at all, but I’m not sure.

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The Incorporation of the Seventh Amendment

Recently a federal district court held that the Seventh Amendment applies to that territory and to the states.  While I am uncertain if this will stand up on appeal (it’s not clear that the issue need even be reached in this case), I did want to offer two thoughts about the opinion.

First, it’s disappointing (though not that surprising) that the Court said nothing about Reconstruction in its analysis.  There is a lot of talk about the importance of the civil jury to the Framers, but none about how that right was seen by John Bingham and his colleagues when they ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.  What that evidence would show (beyond Bingham’s view that the Seventh Amendment should be incorporated) is one thing, but to ignore it is wrong.

Second, I am unclear about how incorporating the Seventh Amendment against the States would change civil practice.  (Puerto Rico has a more unusual constitution, so the impact would be greater there).  In other words, to what extent can you not get a civil jury trial in a state nowadays?  Granted, the Seventh Amendment’s outdated money threshold ($20) may wipe out higher amount-in-controversy requirements that states have, but otherwise would incorporation matter?  As an aside, why twenty dollars?  There must be a story there.

 

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Now may be the moment . . .

Heed their rising voices.

heed-rising-voicesIn light of recent events in Ferguson, Missouri, that admonition seems as relevant today as it was when it was when it appeared on March 29, 1960 in a New York Times political advertisement directed at the Montgomery, Alabama police. Of course, it was that advertisement that gave rise to the celebrated ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964).

The analogy to the events surrounding the killing of young Michael Brown and the famed First Amendment case is more apt than may first appear. How so?  Well, let us start here: It is important to remember that the First Amendment victory in Sullivan emerged against the backdrop of intense racial strife. What is remarkable about the case is how it blended the liberty principle of the First Amendment with the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment to forge a landmark opinion. Perhaps at no other time in American history have the two been so wonderfully wed as to serve the high principles of both constitutional guarantees.

Know this: Racial injustice cannot endure the light of the First Amendment; police abuse cannot continue unabated when subjected to the scrutiny of a camera; and governmental indifference cannot persist when the citizenry assembles in a united front to oppose it. Put another way, the link between free-speech liberty and racial equality is vital to the health of our constitutional democracy.

Frank Pasquale’s recent post (“The Assault on Journalism in Ferguson, Missouri) ably points out why citizens of all political stripes should be concerned about what has been going on in Ferguson. His sober post is a timely reminder of the importance of the First Amendment in the affairs of our lives, be they in Ferguson or Staten Island or elsewhere.

(CNN) – The New York City medical examiner’s office Friday confirmed what demonstrators had been saying for weeks: A police officer’s choke hold on a man being arrested for selling loose cigarettes killed him. (Aug. 2, 2014)

So, now may be the moment to reunite the liberty and equality principles. What does that mean? Among other things, it must mean this:

  1. The press — traditional and modern — must be free to continue to exercise its rights in a robust manner.
  2. Citizens should be able to freely exercise their constitutional right to peacefully assemble and protest.
  3. More transparency should be demanded of government, be it in matters concerning the investigation of the killing of Michael Brown or the need for police identification badges to be plainly visible.
  4. And demands must be made of state and local officials that clear and specific measures be taken to respect and protect the lawful exercise of any and all First Amendment rights.

To that end, press groups, civil rights and civil liberties groups, along with political and religious groups should seize this opportunity, borne out of tragedy, to reinvigorate our First Amendment freedoms employed in the service of racial justice. In that way, perhaps some of the admirably defiant spirit of New York Times v. Sullivan may find its way back into the hearts and minds of people of good will who refuse to sit silent while law-abiding citizens of Ferguson stagger through clouds of teargas.