Category: Constitutional Law

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FAN 36.1 (First Amendment News) Skover to Speak on McCutcheon Case

By way of a shameless plug for my coauthor:

INFLUENTIAL VOICES  

David Skover

David Skover

Seattle University School of Law
is proud to present
Professor David Skover

SCOTUS Books-in-Brief: When Money Speaks: A New Venture in E-Publishing

Wednesday, October 29
Room C6, Sullivan Hall, 4:30 p.m.
Reception to follow

The event is open to all, but RSVPs are requested.

Professor Skover will speak about the creation of the SCOTUS Books-in-Brief imprint and his latest coauthored book, When Money Speaks: The McCutcheon Decision, Campaign Finance Laws, and the First Amendment.

When Money Speaks analyzes the controversial U.S. Supreme Court decision in McCutcheon v. FEC, which struck aggregate limits on contributions to political candidates. It has been called “a brilliant discussion of campaign finance in America” and “the best book on the topic.”

The SCOTUS Books-in-Brief series provides readers with reliable, informative, and engaging narrative accounts of significant Supreme Court rulings shortly after they come down.

Introduction by Dean Annette E. Clark 

 

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FAN 36 (First Amendment News) Forgotten Free Press Advocates — The Women Lawyers in NYT v. Sullivan

These three women were active in ACLU First Amendment work during those early years and had an enormously powerful and lasting impact on the law we enjoy today. — Joel Gora (longtime ACLU lawyer)

The news follows, but before it does I want to say a few words about three remarkable women and their roles in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). They are:

  1. Harriet Pilpel (1911-1991)
  2. Nanette Dembitz (1913-1989)
  3. Nancy F. Wechsler (1916-2009)
Harriet Fleischl Pilpel

Harriet Fleischl Pilpel

Among others places, you will find their names on the cover of the ACLU amicus brief filed in the Supreme Court on September 9, 1963 in the Sullivan case. Beyond the single sentence they receive in the Supreme Court Reports and in Anthony Lewis’ Make No Law: The Sullivan Case and the First Amendment (1991), the women are virtually unknown players in the First Amendment world. As their respective stories reveal, there is more, much more, to be said about the people in the landmark case and how it came to be so. (BTW: Doris Wechsler — the wife of Herbert Wechsler, the attorney for the Times — helped write the merits brief in Sullivan and is listed on it. She sat in the lawyers’ section when Sullivan was argued in the Supreme Court.)

Recently, I had occasion to say a few words about some of those people in connection with a conference hosted by the University of Oregon School of Journalism and Communications and the Law School, a conference to commemorate the 50th anniversary of Sullivan. That is how I came upon the ACLU brief filed in Sullivan.

The lead attorneys for the ACLU and the New York Civil Liberties Union were Edward S. Greenbaum (of the famed Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst firm) and Harriet Pilpel. Melvin L. Wulf, Nanette Dembitz, and Nancy Wechsler were of counsel.

Here is how things began: Mel Wulf, the ACLU attorney, contacted Greenbaum and asked if his firm would file a brief on behalf of ACLU. Greenbaum agreed and, as Wulf recalls, Nancy Wechsler wrote the first draft along with help from Harriet Pilpel. Nanette Dembitz added her own comments, whereafter Wulf did the final read and edit. Greenbaum, the lead attorney, had little or no meaningful input on the brief. The ACLU brief was 37 pages long (plus appendix) and made three basic arguments:

  1. Alabama’s exercise of its long-arm jurisdiction over the Petitioners violated the First Amendment and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
  2. Alabama’s defamation law as applied to criticism of public officials on matters of public concern violated the First Amendment as applied to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment
  3. The trial judge denied the Petitioners due process of law and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment

Those arguments were teased in a variety of ways — e.g., Alabama’s use of its defamation laws was analogous to the Alien and Sedition acts; there was no reasonable basis for presuming malice or damages; and the trial was so rife with racial prejudice against the Petitioners as to deny them equal protection. More could be said about the brief, but for now let me leave it there so as to return to my sketch of the three women who contributed to the ACLU brief.

 Harriet Pilpel was an accomplished public-interest advocate with sterling credentials: A graduate of Vassar College and Columbia Law School (1936, second in her class), she went to wotk for the firm of Greenbaum, Wolf & Ernst. Later, she served as general counsel for both the ACLU (1979-1986) and Planned Parenthood. In 1982 she joined the law firm of Weil, Gotshal & Manges. During her career, she participated in 27 cases that came before the Supreme Court. She argued on behalf of Planned Parenthood in Poe v. Ulman (1961). She wrote yet other briefs for Planned Parenthood in cases such as Griswod v. Connecticut (1964, with Nancy Wechsler), Roe v. Wade (1973, with Nancy Wechsler), and Carey v. Population Services International (1977). Pilpel was also on the briefs for the Appellees in Harris v. McRae (1980).

In the free speech context, Pilpel was co-counsel with Edward Greenbaum in Farmers Union v. WDAY (1959), a statutory interpretation defamation case.

Harriet was very helpful in supporting my initial run for the ACLU National Board of Directors (a very competitive process), and she also debated Catharine MacKinnon about pornography at an ACLU Biennial Conference.Nadine Strossen

Read More

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More on Arizona State Legislature–Reply to Mike Ramsey

The always insightful Mike Ramsey has posted about my posts about the Arizona State Legislature case.  I thought I would offer a couple of further comments.

In several places the Constitution clearly says that only “the Legislature” can do something.  For the regulation of congressional districts, though, the Constitution says that “[T]he Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”  I submit that this is not clear as Mike suggests.  Why is that?  Because governors have always had the power to veto redistricting plans (as the Supreme Court held in Smiley v. Holm and as the practice was going back to the Founding), whereas they have not had the power to veto, for example, ratifications of constitutional amendments under Article V.  As a result, Article I, Section IV must mean “prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof” consistent with the lawmaking process set forth in the state constitution.

Does this principle include a state constitution that drastically reduces the Legislature’s role in an unprecedented way?  I’m not sure.  The Arizona scheme may go too far given the text and the Court’s holding in Holm, but I don’t see an originalist ground to object.  Were the Framers opposed to state referenda for regulating elections?  I doubt that you can find any evidence for that.  In that sort of vacuum, I think it is relevant to point out the policy implications of saying that the remedy for partisan gerrymandering lies only with the legislature doing the partisan gerrymandering.  That is not, as Mike says, “purely an argument from policy.”  Moreover, Congress could have exercised its Article I, Section 4 powers to bar independent commissions mandated by a state constitution for redistricting.  It has not done so.  A judicial decision doing so would (as I said in my last post) create a “Dormant Elections Clause,” which I do not think is consistent with any original understanding.

All of this leads me to the conclusion (albeit marginally) that the Arizona plan is constitutional.  What would change my mind?  Probably learning something relevant about the history of state regulation of redistricting or the reasons behind the Framers’ choice to give Congress and state legislatures joint ownership over this power.  So we’ll see what the briefs have to say.

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FAN 35.2 (First Amendment News) — Former NSA Director counsels against going after James Risen

Hey, I knew we were playing up against the line.

. . . I don’t understand the necessity to pursue Jim.

– General Michael Hayden

On Sunday October 12th, James Risen of the New York Times appeared on 60 Minutes. He was interviewed by Lesley Stahl. Below are some selected excerpts from that installment of the CBS news program.

Stahl:  Will you divulge your source?

James Risen on 60 Minutes with Lesley Stahl

James Risen on 60 Minutes with Lesley Stahl

Risen:  No, never; I’m not going to talk.

Stahl: Sometimes you get yourself in trouble.

Risen: [Chuckles] Yea, the government has been after me for a while now. . . .

Stahl: What was your first reaction when you realized that the New York Times was onto the NSA story?

General Michael Hayden: First reaction was this is not good news. . . . [The NSA surveillance practices] were warrantless but not unwarranted. It would have been irresponsible for NSA not to have done this in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9-11. . . . Hey, I knew we were playing up against the line. . . . Jim is going to go to jail, why? Because Jim wants to protect his sources. . . .

Stahl: What kept you from walking out [when your editors initially held back your story]? Read More

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FAN 35.1 (First Amendment News) — Creative Freedom & the First Amendment

On Wednesday, October 22, Freedom House and the Motion Picture Association of America, in support of Free Speech Week, will host a discussion on Creative Freedom and the First Amendment. The event will be held in Washington, D.C.

image001Panelists

Using current on-screen examples, the discussion will focus on how movies and television shows in the United States are powerful instruments that inform and enlighten us, advancing debates on crucial social and cultural issues. The creative freedom the First Amendment protects is fundamental to the ability of storytellers to tell these stories through television and film in America.

 Free Speech Week is an annual, non-partisan national event celebrating the value of freedom of speech.

→ For more information about the Creative Freedom event, contact Ivory Zorich at ivory_zorich@mpaa.org

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FAN 35 (First Amendment News) Clear & Present Danger in the states — Holmes’s Legacy

Suppose that a code were made and expressed in language sanctioned by the assent of the courts.  – Oliver Wendell Holmes (1870)

Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.

Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes

46 States & 209 statutes 

Incredibly, commentators have long overlooked one of Holmes’s greatest contributions to American law, namely his contribution to state statutory law. Today, 46 states have codified, in one form or another, Holmes’s clear-and-present-danger formula for either civil or criminal liability. This codification, found in 209 state statutes, is not limited to criminal advocacy cases. State lawmakers have tapped Holmes’s famous formula for any variety of purposes, including but not limited to the following categories of regulation:

  • Parental rights
  • Food and drug safety
  • Witness protection
  • Bullying in schools
  • Gun safety
  • Therapist and counselor privilege
  • Building safety
  • Environmental reports
  • Banking law
  • Involuntary commitment
  • State-municipal loans
  • Treatment of the elderly

Because this body of statutory does not concern free speech cases involving criminal advocacy, Schenck and its progeny leading to and beyond Brandenburg v. Ohio need not govern the interpretative meaning of the clear-and-present-danger formula. In other words, state courts are largely free, consistent with other legal constraints, to give such statutes whatever interpretative gloss they wish.

Re Freedom of Expression

Of the 209 state laws that currently employ the clear-and-present-danger language, 40 have done so in matters relating to freedom of expression and/or assembly. Examples of such laws include the following:

  • Regulation of the content of student newspapers
  • Regulation of speech advocating the overthrow of the government
  • Regulation of speech related to the incitement of riots
  • Criminal contempt with respect to publication of court proceedings
  • Regulation of criminal syndicalism
  • Regulation of reading materials of the mentally ill
  • Regulation of free assembly
  • Regulation of expression in public places where alcohol is served
  • Regulation of prison inmate correspondence

422 State Court Opinions Read More

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More on Redistricting

Another way of looking at the Arizona State Legislature case is that the Constitution should be read to limit the freedom of states to take decisions that affect the structure or composition of the national government.  This rationale is advanced in some of the cases that discuss different uses of the word “legislature,” so let’s explore some examples.

1.  The ratification and proposal of constitutional amendments.  Article Five provides that Congress gets to decide how a constitutional amendment is ratified (either through state legislatures or conventions).  Article Five also specifies that only state legislatures may petition Congress for a second constitutional convention.  In neither instance may a state choose another method (say, by giving the Governor a role, using the initiative process, etc.)  Why?  I suppose because these are national (rather than local) decisions and thus the nation gets to choose the means.

2.  The election of Senators prior to the Sixteenth Amendment.  Only state legislatures could pick senators.  A state could not write its constitution to use another method.  Senators, of course, are national officials.

3.  The creation of new states from existing states.  Article Four says that this cannot be done without the consent of the relevant state legislatures.  Creating new states, of course, has a profound effect on the national government.

Why do I bring these up?  You could say that congressional redistricting is an example of a state action that directly affects the composition of Congress.  As a result, the Constitution’s statement that this “shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof” does limit a state’s ability to use some other method like an independent body.  On the other hand, Article One, Section expressly gives Congress the power to override a state decision of this sort.  As a result, you could say that if Congress does not prohibit what a state does in this regard then the Constitution should not be read to impose an independent barrier.  in other words, there is no “Dormant Elections Clause.”

Just food for thought.

 

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34.4 (First Amendment News) Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference — Call for Papers

abrams-logoThe Abrams Institute for Freedom of Expression and the Information Society Project at Yale Law School invite applications for the third annual Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference.  The conference will be held on May 2-3, 2015, at Yale Law School.

 The conference brings scholars together to discuss their works-in-progress concerning freedom of speech, expression, press, association, petition, assembly, and related issues of knowledge and information policy.  The past two conferences were great successes, with many interesting conversations, dozens of papers presented, and upwards of 50 scholars attending. Diversity of views welcome.

The conference offers participants an opportunity to receive substantive feedback through group discussion. Unlike a traditional conference, authors do not give formal presentations of their work.   Rather, each accepted paper will be assigned a discussant, who will briefly introduce the paper, provide feedback to the author, and lead a discussion among participants.  This format permits substantive and lively discussion of ideas and writings that may be inchoate or not yet fully developed.

Because of the format of the conference, participants will be expected to read and be prepared to discuss at least one paper per session, and to attend the entire conference.  In the past, there have typically been eight sessions, running from Saturday morning through Sunday afternoon, with a welcome dinner on Friday evening for those already arrived in New Haven.

 Participation in the conference is by invitation only, but we welcome paper submissions–and applications to participate as a discussant–from a wide range of scholars.  Please feel free to share this call for submissions with any colleagues that may be interested.

Titles and abstracts of papers should be submitted electronically to jonathan.manes@yale.edu no later than February 20, 2015.

→ Those interested in participating as discussants or participants without submitting a paper should also contact jonathan.manes@yale.edu by February 20, 2015.

 Workshop versions of accepted papers will be due on April 3, 2014 so that they can be circulated to discussants and conference participants in advance.

The conference announcement is online here.  Information about prior conferences, including attendees and the titles of workshopped papers, is available here and here.  As before, we are expecting that scholars will ask their home institutions to cover travel expenses.

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Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Ind. Redistricting Comm’n

I was planning to write a post on how the Constitution uses the word “legislature,” but after reading Chief Justice Hughes’ opinion for the Court in Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932), I think that is unnecessary.  Hughes does a good job of laying out the arguments in the context of Article One, Section Four.  Let me summarize the case and then explain why Smiley‘s holding should be extended in Arizona State Legislature (the congressional redistricting case that the Supreme Court just decided to hear).

After the 1930 Census, the Minnesota Legislature passed a congressional redistricting plan that was vetoed by the Governor.  One branch of the legislature then passed a resolution ordering the Secretary of State to implement the plan in spite of the veto.  A suit was filed challenging this plan as unlawful, and the counterargument was that Article One, Section Four gave the Legislature exclusive authority over congressional districting.  The Supreme Court held that the Legislature’s position was without merit.  In part, this was because longstanding practice in the states was that governors could veto in congressional redistricting legislation.  The Court also said that there was “no suggestion in the federal constitutional provision of an attempt to endow the legislature of the state with power to enact laws in any manner other than that in which the constitution of the state has provided that laws shall be enacted.”

The Arizona case can be distinguished from Holm in two ways.  First, there is no longstanding practice for states to remove by constitutional amendment the power of the legislature to undertake congressional redistricting.  Second, one could say that the dictum just quoted assumes that the legislature will play a role in redistricting by referring to laws that are being enacted.  If the state constitution gives that power exclusively to a special commission, then law is not being enacted in the ordinary way.  On the other hand, the dictum can be read broadly to mean “whatever the State Constitution says on this question is consistent with the Federal Constitution.”  Here the Arizona Constitution is provided that no laws on congressional redistricting shall be enacted.  End of story.

Why do I think that the latter interpretation is better?  Mainly on structural grounds.  The remedy for partisan gerrymandering cannot be placed within the authority of the institution that does the gerrymandering.   In practice, there is no judicial review of partisan gerrymandering claims and Congress will not act.  Thus, the only plausible remedy is through an initiative or referendum in states that permit them.  There is the argument that a state can limit partisan gerrymandering in its constitution while still letting the legislature draw district lines.  Perhaps the Arizona referendum goes too far by cutting out the Legislature entirely.  The problem is that state constitutional provisions on partisan gerrymandering (such as in Florida) have not led to any meaningful relief, so I’m not sure this option is real.

This will be a fascinating case if the Court reaches the merits.  I must admit that my thoughts on this issue have changed as I’ve worked through the materials.  At first I was sure that the Arizona amendment was constitutional.  Now I have doubts, though I still think on balance that this amendment is constitutional.

 

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FAN 34.2 (First Amendment News) — Court agrees to hear judicial campaign solicitation case

The case is Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar. This morning the Court agreed to review the case.

Lanell Williams-Yulee

Lanell Williams-Yulee

The issue is whether a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from personally soliciting campaign funds violates the First Amendment. In a per curium opinion, a divided Florida Supreme Court denied the First Amendment challenge. (See here re video and transcript of oral arguments in Florida Supreme Court.)

petition for certiorari was filed by Andrew PincusCharles Rothfeld, and Michael Kimberly with assistance from Ernest Myers and Lee Marcus along with Eugene Fidell of the Yale Law School Clinic.

Facts – Here is how Judge Chris Helinger, a referee for the Florida State Bar described the key facts in the case: “The Florida Bar alleges that on or about September 2009, the Respondent became a candidate for County Court Judge, Group 10, Hillsborough County, Florida. On September 4, 2009, the Respondent signed a campaign fundraising letter wherein the Respondent personally solicited campaign contributions. The Respondent admits that she reviewed and approved the September 4, 2009 letter. The Respondent further testified that prior to approving the letter she reviewed Canon 7C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct regarding solicitation of funds. However, the Respondent testified that she interpreted the Canon to only apply if there was another candidate in the race. At the time the solicitation letter was sent no other candidate had been announced. Canon 7C(1) states that the prohibition of personal solicitation of campaign funds apply to any candidate for ‘judicial office that is filled by public election between competing candidates.’” In that regard, the Florida Supreme Court noted: “[T]he referee found that the Respondent misrepresented the fact that there was no incumbent in the judicial race for which she was running. Further, the referee found that the Respondent’s misrepresentation [which she claims was the result of a good faith mistake based on a misunderstanding of the Canon] was published in a newspaper article on November 3, 2009.”  (Source: here)

Offending Mass-Mail Solicitation Letter

LANELL WILLIAMS-YULEE

_____________________________________________

Bringing Diversity to the Judicial Bench

Elect Lanell Williams-Yulee For County Court Judge Group 10 and Campaign Fundraiser

Dear Friend:

I have served as a public servant for this community as Public Defender as well as a Prosecutor for the past 18 years. Having been involved in various civic activities such as “The Great American Teach In,” Inns Of Court, Pro Bono Attorney, Metropolitan Ministries outreach program, as well as a mentor for various young men and women residing within Hillsborough County, I have long worked for positive change in Tampa. With the support of my family, I now feel that the time has come for me to seek elected office. I want to bring fresh ideas and positive solutions to the Judicial bench. I am certain that I can uphold the Laws, Statutes, Ordinances as prescribed by the Constitution of the State of Florida as well as the Constitution of the United States Of America.

I am confident that I can serve as a positive attribute to the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit by running for County Court Judge, Group 10. To succeed in this effort, I need to mount an aggressive campaign. I’m inviting the people that know me best to join my campaign and help make a real difference. An early contribution of $25, $50, $100, $250, or $500, made payable to “Lanell Williams-Yulee Campaign for County Judge”, will help raise the initial funds needed to launch the campaign and get our message out to the public. I ask for your support In meeting the primary election fund raiser goals. Thank you in advance for your support.

Sincerely,
/s/
Lanell Williams-Yulee, Esq.

(Source: here)

 →See YouTube video of TV political ad here.

State Judicial Elections

As Professor Richard Briffault has observed: “The vast majority of judicial offices in the United States are subject to election. The votes of the people select or retain at least some judges in thirty-nine states, and all judges are elected in twenty-one states.” Consistent with the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct, states such as Florida have enacted laws or rules barring judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions.

Andrew Pincus, counsel for Petitioner

Andrew Pincus, counsel for Petitioner

Conflicts in Lower Courts 

↓ On the one hand, the Third and Seventh Circuits along with the high courts of Arkansas,Oregon, and now Florida have ruled that such solicitation bars do not run afoul of the First Amendment.

↑ On the other hand, the SixthEighthNinth, and Eleventh Circuits have ruled otherwise. (Note the irony: Florida is in the Eleventh Circuit.)

Differing Rules for Sitting Judges vs Judicial Candidates? In light of the above, counsel for the Petitioner notes: “It is not in fact certain that that the Seventh Circuit or the supreme courts of Arkansas and Oregon would align with the Florida Supreme Court in this case. Unlike here [those cases] involved solicitations by sitting judges. In the Ninth Circuit’s view, the constitutional balance may differ in cases involving incumbent candidates as compared with ‘non-judge candidates.’ [citations omitted] But we are skeptical of any constitutional distinction between incumbents and non-incumbents, which would subject competitors in a single election to different First Amendment rules.”

First Amendment Arguments Read More