Category: Civil Rights

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Police Killing Unarmed Minority Men on Video with Impunity is not New

The grand jury’s decision to not indict a police officer in the death of Eric Garner despite video of the incident, in the wake of the failure to indict Darren Wilson, further illustrates the apparent immunity of police officers in cases where officers have killed ethnic minority Americans. The Garner case is a reminder that the interpretation of (crime) videos is filtered through pre-existing cultural lenses, but it also speaks to a more fundamental problem. The case provides more evidence that video has not been a panacea in addressing lethal violence by police officers, a fact which is relevant in discussing the likely efficacy of cop cams. I have posted other similar disturbing videos of lethal force being used against unarmed ethnic minority men (after the jump) wherein there has been no accountability in the criminal justice system for the officers involved.

Read More

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Scottish Referendum and Evolutionarily Fit Legal Systems

Some thoughts in the aftermath of the scottish referendum.

Why do regions want to secede? To some extent, secession attempts imply a desire for different rules than the state provides. From the individual perspective, that of the individual scott, basque, or chechen, this suggests the state’s rules do not give the individual the freedom to do what the individual desires. From the collective perspective, this corresponds to the state not letting the local group determine its conduct the way that the group desires. Thus, from the individual’s perspective it is a question of freedoms and from the collective perspective it is an issue of federalism, local governance.

I’d like to think that the US does not have secessionist regions (like Scotland, the Basque country, Quebec, Catalonia, Chechnya, etc) because it has a legal system that produces enough freedom and welfare that individuals do not feel the desire to secede. This also suggests that the legal system should not be merely optimizing for welfare but for a combination of welfare and freedom (I am not forgetting equality; egalitarianism is a component of welfare). A note of optimism for the scholarly enterprise: Since we have no gauge of freedom, normative legal and economic scholarship is still scratching the surface. Read More

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Marian Anderson & Justice Black, April 9, 1939

Harold Ickes & Marian Anderson

Harold Ickes & Marian Anderson

I was just watching a WETA segment on our national parks when I came upon the Marian Anderson story and how the Daughters of the American Revolution refused to let her perform at Constitution Hall, which they owned.

Upset by the incident, Eleanor Roosevelt urged Harold Ickes (the former president of the Chicago NAACP & then Secretary of the Interior) to arrange for the opera singer to perform at the Lincoln Memorial. Ms. Anderson performed there on Easter Sunday, April 9, 1939, to a crowd of 75,000 admiring onlookers. The event was also broadcast on national radio.

Of course, all of this and more are well known. What is far less known is that invitations were sent out to the all of the Justices of the Supreme Court.  (See Gerald T. Dunne, Hugo Black & the Judicial Revolution 304 (1977)). One Justice accepted, which brings me back to my public television story.

Justice Hugo Black, 9 April 1939

Justice Hugo Black, 9 April 1939

If you go to the YouTube clip of the Anderson concert, you will see Justice Black in the audience (1 minute & 19 seconds into it).

By that time in 1939 Justice Black had been on the Court for some 20 months — this 15 years before Brown. Most likely, word of Justice Hugo Black’s solo appearance made its way to Alabama, his home state. And yet, he was there (see pic) and the newsreels captured it all, too.

For an account of the concert and its historical significance, see Raymond Arsenault, The Sound of Freedom: Marian Anderson, the Lincoln Memorial, & the Concert that Awakened America (2009).

 

 

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Soft launch of historical website — Calendar of civil liberties

There is a new website: Today in Civil Liberties History, which has five or six events for each day. Each event includes learning materials: books, reports, web sites, Youtube videos, and more. It covers the full range of civil liberties issues: First Amendment, racial justice, reproductive rights, lesbian and gay rights, national security, and more.

The official public launch will be on Constitution Day, Wednesday September 17th, but you can view in now.

For more information about Today in Civil Liberties History, click here: http://samuelwalker.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Coming-This-Fall2.p

And congrats to Professor Sam Walker for what promises to be a welcome addition to our daily calendar experiences.

Meanwhile, here is what happened on this day in August:

AUGUST 28

1955

Emmett Till, 14, Murdered in Mississippi

1963

“I Have a Dream”: King Delivers Historic Speech at March on Washington

1963

John Lewis Speech at March on Washington Censored

1968

“Police Riot” at Democratic Party Convention

1987

Reagan Administration Bars Visas to People with HIV

2011

Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial Dedicated

 

1

Dr. King on the First Amendment & the right to protest

Screen Shot 2014-08-14 at 11.21.51 PMMartin Luther King, Jr., April 3, 1968:

All we say to America is, “Be true to what you what you say on paper.” If I lived in China or even in Russia, or any totalitarian country, maybe I could understand the denial of certain basic First Amendment privileges, because they hadn’t committed themselves to that over there. But somewhere I read of the freedom of assembly. Somewhere I read of the freedom of speech. Somewhere I read of the freedom of the press. Somewhere I read that the greatness of America is the right to protest for rights. 

See YouTube clip here.

→ See also the following books and articles:

  1. Harry Kalven, The Negro and the First Amendment (1965)
  2. David Garrow, Protest at Selma:Martin Luther King, Jr. and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (1978)
  3. Andrew Mach, “Martin Luther King Jr.: 8 peaceful protests that bolstered civil rights,” Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 15, 2012
  4. Burke Marshall, “The Protest Movement and the Law,” 51 Virginia L. Rev. 785 (1965)
  5. Clark McPhail, David Schweingruber & John McCarthy, “Policing Protest in the United States: 1960-1995” in Policing Protest (1998) by  Donatella D. Porta, et al, eds.
  6. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., “A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience,” 23 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 205 (1966)
  7. Nicholas Katzenbach, “Protest, Politics and the First Amendment,” 44 Tulane L. Rev. 439 (1970)
  8. Ronald Krotoszynski, Jr. “Celebrating Selma: The importance of context in public forum analysis,” 104 Yale L. J. 1411 (1995)
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Now may be the moment . . .

Heed their rising voices.

heed-rising-voicesIn light of recent events in Ferguson, Missouri, that admonition seems as relevant today as it was when it was when it appeared on March 29, 1960 in a New York Times political advertisement directed at the Montgomery, Alabama police. Of course, it was that advertisement that gave rise to the celebrated ruling in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964).

The analogy to the events surrounding the killing of young Michael Brown and the famed First Amendment case is more apt than may first appear. How so?  Well, let us start here: It is important to remember that the First Amendment victory in Sullivan emerged against the backdrop of intense racial strife. What is remarkable about the case is how it blended the liberty principle of the First Amendment with the equality principle of the Fourteenth Amendment to forge a landmark opinion. Perhaps at no other time in American history have the two been so wonderfully wed as to serve the high principles of both constitutional guarantees.

Know this: Racial injustice cannot endure the light of the First Amendment; police abuse cannot continue unabated when subjected to the scrutiny of a camera; and governmental indifference cannot persist when the citizenry assembles in a united front to oppose it. Put another way, the link between free-speech liberty and racial equality is vital to the health of our constitutional democracy.

Frank Pasquale’s recent post (“The Assault on Journalism in Ferguson, Missouri) ably points out why citizens of all political stripes should be concerned about what has been going on in Ferguson. His sober post is a timely reminder of the importance of the First Amendment in the affairs of our lives, be they in Ferguson or Staten Island or elsewhere.

(CNN) — The New York City medical examiner’s office Friday confirmed what demonstrators had been saying for weeks: A police officer’s choke hold on a man being arrested for selling loose cigarettes killed him. (Aug. 2, 2014)

So, now may be the moment to reunite the liberty and equality principles. What does that mean? Among other things, it must mean this:

  1. The press — traditional and modern — must be free to continue to exercise its rights in a robust manner.
  2. Citizens should be able to freely exercise their constitutional right to peacefully assemble and protest.
  3. More transparency should be demanded of government, be it in matters concerning the investigation of the killing of Michael Brown or the need for police identification badges to be plainly visible.
  4. And demands must be made of state and local officials that clear and specific measures be taken to respect and protect the lawful exercise of any and all First Amendment rights.

To that end, press groups, civil rights and civil liberties groups, along with political and religious groups should seize this opportunity, borne out of tragedy, to reinvigorate our First Amendment freedoms employed in the service of racial justice. In that way, perhaps some of the admirably defiant spirit of New York Times v. Sullivan may find its way back into the hearts and minds of people of good will who refuse to sit silent while law-abiding citizens of Ferguson stagger through clouds of teargas.

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Richard Posner & NAACP v. Button — A Short History

Since I had to prepare remarks for a panel discussion for today, I was unable to do my weekly First Amendment News column. Instead, I opted to present an abbreviated essay from a work-in-progerss, actually two. In the main, I  stitched together something from one of my books (We Must not be Afraid to be Free) and a future article (“The Maverick – A Biographical Sketch of Richard Posner”), this in addition to some reliance on Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion (2010) by Seth Stern and Stephen Wermiel and other works. I also benefitted from the thoughtful assistance of Judge Posner and Robert M. O’Neil. The result is this post, also a prelude to a more scholarly work on NAACP v. Button (1963). Shortly, I will say more about Judge Posner’s involvement in Button, but before I do I thought it might useful to say a few prefatory things about the history of the case.

* * * *

The case’s original name was NAACP v. Patty, which began in 1957. After cert. was granted, the case name changed to NAACP v. Gray. Later it would be changed to Button, the last name of the Virginia Attorney General at the time. The controversy involved a challenge to five Virginia laws which, according to Fourth Circuit Court Judge Morris Aimes Soper, “were enacted [in 1956] for the express purpose of impeding the integration of the races in the public schools of the state which the plaintiff corporations are seeking to promote.” The laws in question banned the encouragement of certain kinds of litigation (“barratry” statutes) and the solicitation of clients (including in pro bono cases) and/or the financing of litigation (“champerty” statutes). The lawyer who represented the NAACP was Robert L. Carter (1917-2012), Thurgood Marshall’s chief legal assistant (and later General Counsel to the NAACP). By 1957, recalled Carter in his memoir (A Matter of Law), the group was involved in 25 cases in various states employing barratry and champerty laws aimed at halting civil rights litigation. Henry T. Wickham (1920-2008) represented the state of Virginia. In his obituary it was noted that Mr. Wickham “served as a special assistant to former Virginia Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond Jr. representing Virginia in an effort to preserve segregated public schools” in Brown v. Board.

 For an informative and thoughtful account of Button, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 75-90 (1965).

The Hand of Fate

Robert Button was the Attorney General of Virginia (1962-1970) who backed policies of Massive Resistance to prevent public school desegregation.

Robert Young Button was the Attorney General of Virginia (Dem. –1962-1970) who backed policies of Massive Resistance to prevent public school desegregation (see short video clip here)

When it came time for a conference vote in the Button case, Chief Justice Earl Warren, predictably, voted to reverse. “The purpose of the statute is obviously to circumvent Brown,” he said. Justice Hugo Black agreed. “This is part of a scheme to defeat the Court’s order, and sooner or later we will have to grapple with these problems in those terms. The NAACP is finished if this law stands.” But Justice Felix Frankfurter pushed back. “I can’t imagine a worse disservice than to continue being the guardians of the Negroes. . . . There is nothing in the record to show that this statute is aimed at Negroes as such.” Justices Tom Clark and Charles Evans Whittaker agreed. “To strike this law down, we would have to discriminate in favor of Negroes,” said Clark, to which Whittaker added: “We should be color blind on this law.”

Warren added up the votes. It was a five-to-four split in favor of the state of Virginia. Justice Frankfurter eagerly began work on his majority opinion upholding Virginia’s law—the laws that made the NAACP’s brand of non-pecuniary solicitation and financing of litigation a disciplinary offense that could result in disbarment. (For a discussion of Frankfurter’s early role in the case, see Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law 277-278 (1994).)

At the same time, Justice Black circulated drafts of a dissent in which he claimed, among other things, that perhaps the law should be renamed “[a]n Act to make it difficult and dangerous for the [NAACP] and Virginia lawyers to assert the constitutional rights of Virginia Negroes in state and federal courts.” Then Black added a passage revealing how far removed he was from his days as a hooded member of the Ku Klux Klan. “The job of lawyers under [the] Constitution is not to lead revolutions, but to lead their people in taking advantage of the American methods for correcting injustice.” And courts, Black continued, had a responsibility to serve as “sanctuaries of justice.” To ignore that role here, he concluded, was to leave the courts “a little less havens of refuge than they were before this Virginia law was sustained.”

Robert L. Carter, lawyer for the NAACP

Robert L. Carter, lawyer for the NAACP

Justice Black’s internal comments exposed just how wide the ideological chasm had grown between the members of this Court. But Robert Carter wouldn’t get a chance to read them. Nor, for that matter, would anyone else. On April 1, 1962, before the Court could announce its decision in NAACP v. Button, Justice Whittaker retired on the advice of his physician. He was sixty-one. The “great volume and continuous stresses of the court’s work,” he explained in a written statement, had brought him to the “point of physical exhaustion.” That left a four-to-four split among the remaining jurists, who scheduled a rehearing of the case the following term. Then, a few days later, seventy-nine-year-old Felix Frankfurter collapsed at his desk from a stroke. He lived, but shortly afterwards he announced his retirement. Just like that, President Kennedy could appoint two new Justices—and Robert Carter could feel new hope.

 An audio of the arguments in NAACP v. Gray can be found here.

New Faces, New Result

By the fall of 1962, President Kennedy had successfully appointed to the bench his top two choices—Byron White and Arthur Goldberg. And it promised to be a busy fall at the Supreme Court after they were both confirmed. Sometime around then, as Stern and Wermiel recount it, Justice Brennan busily circulated a 63-page memo that detailed the activities of the NAACP and its Virginia branch.

After hearing rearguments in Button, the Justices met privately to discuss the case on October 12, 1962. Chief Justice Warren had not changed his mind since first discussing the facts a year earlier. “The NAACP has a right to be in business,” he began. “If this suit goes against the NAACP, it is out of business.” Justices Black, Douglas, and Clark also maintained their original opinions. So did the typically restrained Justice John Marshall Harlan, who continued to claim that Virginia’s new law was “plainly constitutional. . . . Brown v. Board of Education will never work out if it is left in the federal domain. The states must do it. We have no reason to reverse Virginia on this law.” Justice Potter Stewart, the Eisenhower appointee from Cincinnati with the unpredictable voting record, was the first of the veteran Justices to suggest a possible change of heart. “I am not sure,” he said, “but I am inclined to reverse.” Justice White, the first of the two new members to speak at the private conference, was even less certain than Stewart. “I do not know where I stand.” Goldberg was more certain. “There is a substantial equal protection point here and I could reverse on that,” he said. Read More

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Bright Ideas: Prof. Rick Hasen on the Recent and Future Voting War Engagements

There has been a tremendous amount of activity around election law since 2000. Decisions by the Supreme Court, district courts, and legislatures are affecting the future of how our country votes. The fights are in some ways old as voting is always political, but are new as the battlegrounds have changed. I am excited to welcome Professor Richard L. Hasen on Bright Ideas to get into some history, perspective on recent cases, and thoughts on where we need more research. As Professor Hasen says “The more we can address these points with facts and logic rather than hyperbole and assumption, the better.” Read on to find out the details.

Professor Hasen is Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. I have been fortunate to know his work in person from when he spoke at Thomas Jefferson School of Law about his book The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown. Professor Hasen is a nationally recognized expert in election law and campaign finance regulation, and is co-author of a leading casebook on election law. He is the author of more than 80 articles on election law issues, published in numerous journals including the Harvard Law Review, Stanford Law Review and Supreme Court Review. He was elected to the American Law Institute in 2009, and he was named one of the 100 most influential lawyers in America by The National Law Journal in 2013. We are are fortunate to have Professor Hasen with us today. With that let’s get to the questions.

Q: Rick, voting rights have taken on new importance. States are trying to pass laws that require proof of citizenship. The Supreme Court has rejected some attempts to require proof of citizenship in federal elections. But a federal judge in Kansas has just ruled that the federal government must aid states that wish to require proof of citizenship. Before we get into the details about whether that ruling makes sense, can you help folks understand what is going on? Why is there a renewed interest in voter registration?

A: The interest in voter registration is part of a broader interest in, and fights over, rules for how we run our elections, from registration, to voter i.d., to how to handle the ballots of people who vote in the wrong voting precinct. As I explain in my 2012 book, The Voting Wars, since 2000 we have witnessed a great struggle between the parties, and between the federal and state governments, over who controls the voting rules. The disputed 2000 election ending with Bush v. Gore showed everyone that in very close elections, the rules of the game can make a difference. Parties have been jockeying for position, with Republicans generally favoring laws making it harder to register and vote and Democrats making it easier. Both parties’ positions conveniently line up with their own electoral chances: an expanded electorate (full of poor, minority, and non-regular voters who are less likely to be registered) is believed to skew toward Democrats.

Q: Before we get into the recent cases, your mention of close elections makes me wonder, has something changed in the past twenty years? If I remember correctly, there have been a few other major elections at the state level where the vote came down to a handful of votes. It just seems odd that at a large scale, we are seeing major power shifts determined by a few hundred votes. I suppose the same could be said about Kennedy’s election. But still, does the closeness reflect something about political divisions, corruption, or something else?

A: I think something has changed. The amount of legislation on the state level has increased–at least if we think of controversial legislation. Further, the amount of election litigation has more than doubled in the period after the disputed 2000 election compared to the period before. Election law has become part of a political strategy. It is not just about litigating after a close election; it is about litigating before an election to get advantage under the rules.

Q: So it seems the fight for power has two shifts then. First, there are close elections. Second, there is the renewed and modern fights to control who votes. With that, what happened in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.? What was the question and how did the Court come out on the issues before it?

A: Since Congress passed the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA, or “motor voter law,” because it mandates that motor vehicle departments offer voter registration), states have been required to accept a “federal form” for registering voters in federal elections. The Federal Election Commission used to be in charge of this form, but in 2002, when Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) creating the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the EAC has been in charge of the form.

Arizona asked the EAC to modify the form to require it to include a requirement that new residents in Arizona provide documentary proof of citizenship before registering to vote. The EAC deadlocked on the request. Arizona did not challenge the EAC determination in court. Instead, Arizona decided not to accept registrations on the federal form. Plaintiffs representing groups of voters sued to require Arizona to accept registrations submitted on the federal form. In the Arizona v. Inter Tribal case, the Supreme Court said that Congress had the power under the Elections Clause to set the “manner” of voting in federal elections, and on this basis Arizona could not refuse to accept the federal form.

In a twist, however, the Court (in an opinion by Justice Scalia) suggested that Arizona should sue the EAC for not requiring the citizenship information on the form. The Court noted that although the Elections Clause gives Congress the power to set the maner of federal elections, it gives states the power to set voter qualifications, even in federal elections. The Court further suggested that the EAC might not be able to promulgate a federal form which frustrates a state’s attempt to verify voter qualifications.

Arizona, joined by Kansas, filed just such a suit, and a federal district court just decided that suit. I offer my analysis here, and here is an important NY Times analysis of what may come next.

Q: Fantastic explanation. Thank you. I urge folks to look at Rick’s post and the Times piece. Although you are quite honest that you “do not know how this case will fare as it works its way up on appeal,” I’d like to close with a couple questions. First, the Times piece notes that Alabama is moving forward with its new voter requirements. It seems that the federal form would be quite complicated if it had to reflect 50 different voter qualifications. Furthermore if each, or even several, are challenged, whether a form is ever stable enough to use could be a problem. That may be a goal for some, but it makes me wonder at the odd outcomes. It has been some time since I took administrative law, but could the practical complications be a way to challenge the Scalia logic? It just seems strange that states can dictate to the federal government. Second, as broader question and to wrap up, do you have any suggestions about discrete topics professors or students should pursue on this topic (i.e., are there open issues on either side that merit study)?

A: On the specifics of the form, the EAC has made modifications before, and it is not clear that states wanting citizenship verification are going to demand different things–or that the different things can’t be easily pointed to on the form. I think the broader issue is whether states could stymie other federal laws, such as laws protecting military and overseas voters which require states to accept a “fail safe” federal ballot for voting. There’s lots of potential mischief in a muscular reading of states’ rights to enforce voter qualifications over Congressional election law power. Derek Muller flags some of these confusing points.

On the open questions there are so many, beginning with how to understand the borderline between state and federal power in this area. There is also a great need for more (and better) empirical work on the effect of these laws on turnout, fraud prevention, and voter confidence. The more we can address these points with facts and logic rather than hyperbole and assumption, the better.

Thanks for taking the time to listen!

Thank you, Rick for sharing your ideas and giving us a sense of things to come.

NOTE: This interview was written using Google Docs. I posed questions to which Rick replied, and we edited content for flow and clarity.

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FAC.2 (First Amendment Conversations) – Bruce Johnson on Press Access to Prisons

JohnsonBruce_low

His name is well known among First Amendment practitioners. He is Bruce E.H. Johnson, a friend and seasoned First Amendment lawyer who is a partner at the Seattle office of the Davis Wright Tremaine law firm. He represents information industry clients on issues involving media and communications law as well as technology and intellectual property matters. In addition to being the co-author of the leading treatise on commercial expression (Advertising and Commercial Speech, A First Amendment Guide (2nd ed. 2013), Bruce has written scholarly articles and has done considerable First Amendment appellate work, both in federal and state courts. He has also drafted three press-related statutes that have been enacted into law in Washington State.

Today’s topic concerns press and public access to jails and prisons for the purpose of gathering information relevant to conditions therein. (Hat tip: I selected this topic after reading William Bennett Turner’s informative and engaging book Figures of Speech: First Amendment Heroes & Villains (2011), which has a chapter on the topic. See also Helene Vosters, Media Lockout: Prisons & Journalists.)

Bruce, welcome to the Concurring Opinions blog and thank you for agreeing to share your thoughts with our readers. 

Question: Ever since the Supreme Court’s 3-1-3 split in Houchins v. KQED (1978), some doubt whether there is any meaningful First Amendment right of press and public access to jails or prisons for the purpose of gathering and distributing information about the conditions therein. On that constitutional score, how bleak are things in your opinion?

Answer:  Not good, in my view. In practice, prison administrators have virtually unbridled discretion to prevent meaningful public access, and thus also media access. One problem has been the refusal to permit videotaped interviews within prisons, even though the use of audio and video equipment does not create any additional risks for prison security. Ironically, the one area in the case law that shows some promise is the media’s right of access to executions, especially now that major issues have been raised about executioners’ use of compounded drugs as a result of European refusals to permit the export of killing drugs. Several court decisions, beginning with the press lawsuit against Idaho in 2012, have recognized that the press and the public have access rights to executions.  Another success story has been the efforts of the Human Rights Defense Center and its affiliate Prison Legal News (which we have represented in several matters), to gain access to prison information and to push for prisoner rights of access to the media. [See Society of Professional Journalists, “Prison Access Policies“]

Prisons are a vast, undercovered, but important beat. [W]e need more criminal justice coverage.  Dan Froomkin, Nieman Reports, Sept. 18, 2013

Question: Are you aware of any independent state constitutional rulings or state statutory reforms in this area?

Answer: Prison rights tend to get litigated more often in federal court than in state court.  One exception was the HRDC-PLN lawsuit in Seattle against various telecom carriers, alleging that the companies had overcharged prisoners for their telephone calls.  That class action case took more than a decade and was finally settled in 2013. The case should also remind lawyers that prisoners and their families may have valid claims against non-state entities, as well as the prison authorities themselves.

Question: As a statutory matter, could a state law extend protections to the institutional or traditional press, and it alone, without running afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment? In other words, would it be constitutionally problematic if such special protection did not extend to the general public as well?

Answer: Generally, at least since 1974, when Justice Potter Stewart gave his speech at Yale Law School [26 Hastings L. J. 631 (1975)] suggesting that the Press Clause should have some independent meaning, the courts have refused to recognize any significant media-non-media distinctions in First Amendment jurisprudence.  The essence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United (2010), which rejected precisely such a distinction on First Amendment grounds, is that press rights and public rights must be treated identically.  The First Amendment protections discussed in Citizens United clearly apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.  But as a practical matter (and speaking as someone who successfully drafted and lobbied for state legislation protecting confidential sources and reporters’ work product, deterring SLAPP claims, and encouraging corrections and clarifications of allegedly defamatory publications), I don’t see any likelihood that the media can obtain statutory protections from state legislatures by throwing fellow citizens under the bus. Politics is about building coalitions, not avoiding them.

Question: If you were to draft a model access law relating to state jails and prisons, what would be its key components?

Answer: Like the Washington anti-SLAPP law (which I drafted back in 2010), it should provide speed (deadlines should be specified), monetary incentives (such as attorney fee awards and perhaps statutory damages) to facilitate government cooperation, and immediate and prompt judicial and appellate review.

Question: Where and why would you draw the line when it comes to limiting any such access?

Answer: Obviously, if there is truly a concern about prison security, state authorities should have appropriate discretion.

Thank you Bruce, I hope you will join us again sometime soon.   

LAST FAC.1: With Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe.

NEXT FAC.3: With Northwestern Law Professor Martin Redish.

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Identity Performance as a Bottleneck to Employment Opportunity

In his timely and provocative book, Professor Joey Fishkin makes an important intervention to anti-discrimination law praxis and theory. Poignantly, he observes that in developing anti-discrimination legislation and doctrine, policy makers as well as judges have largely focused on either eliminating or diminishing severe, pervasive, and arbitrary bottlenecks in the opportunity structure as opposed to focusing singularly on the achievement of equal outcomes. He defines bottlenecks as a “narrow place in the opportunity structure through which one must pass in order to successfully pursue a wide range of valued goals.” (Page 13). Professor Fishkin identifies three types of bottlenecks—“qualification,” “developmental,” and “instrumental good”—that policy should address in educational and employment contexts to bring about “equality pluralism”: “[the] opening up a broader range of opportunities for everyone.” (Page 2). As a race and law and employment discrimination law scholar, I am particularly interested in how Fishkin’s “anti-bottleneck” principle applies to arbitrary “qualification bottlenecks” in the employment context. Indeed, my scholarship on grooming codes discrimination illuminates how an obscured yet severe and pervasive “qualification bottleneck”—(non)conformity with racialized and gendered identity performance standards imposed by employers (which are reified within anti-discrimination jurisprudence like Title VII)—constrains or widens one’s range of employment opportunities.In this post, I will draw upon my scholarship on grooming codes discrimination to briefly explicate how one’s ability to navigate and negotiate identity performance demands limits or increases employment opportunities. Read More