Site Meter

Category: Civil Rights

0

Richard Posner & NAACP v. Button — A Short History

Since I had to prepare remarks for a panel discussion for today, I was unable to do my weekly First Amendment News column. Instead, I opted to present an abbreviated essay from a work-in-progerss, actually two. In the main, I  stitched together something from one of my books (We Must not be Afraid to be Free) and a future article (“The Maverick – A Biographical Sketch of Richard Posner”), this in addition to some reliance on Justice Brennan: Liberal Champion (2010) by Seth Stern and Stephen Wermiel and other works. I also benefitted from the thoughtful assistance of Judge Posner and Robert M. O’Neil. The result is this post, also a prelude to a more scholarly work on NAACP v. Button (1963). Shortly, I will say more about Judge Posner’s involvement in Button, but before I do I thought it might useful to say a few prefatory things about the history of the case.

* * * *

The case’s original name was NAACP v. Patty, which began in 1957. After cert. was granted, the case name changed to NAACP v. Gray. Later it would be changed to Button, the last name of the Virginia Attorney General at the time. The controversy involved a challenge to five Virginia laws which, according to Fourth Circuit Court Judge Morris Aimes Soper, “were enacted [in 1956] for the express purpose of impeding the integration of the races in the public schools of the state which the plaintiff corporations are seeking to promote.” The laws in question banned the encouragement of certain kinds of litigation (“barratry” statutes) and the solicitation of clients (including in pro bono cases) and/or the financing of litigation (“champerty” statutes). The lawyer who represented the NAACP was Robert L. Carter (1917-2012), Thurgood Marshall’s chief legal assistant (and later General Counsel to the NAACP). By 1957, recalled Carter in his memoir (A Matter of Law), the group was involved in 25 cases in various states employing barratry and champerty laws aimed at halting civil rights litigation. Henry T. Wickham (1920-2008) represented the state of Virginia. In his obituary it was noted that Mr. Wickham “served as a special assistant to former Virginia Attorney General J. Lindsay Almond Jr. representing Virginia in an effort to preserve segregated public schools” in Brown v. Board.

 For an informative and thoughtful account of Button, see Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the First Amendment 75-90 (1965).

The Hand of Fate

Robert Button was the Attorney General of Virginia (1962-1970) who backed policies of Massive Resistance to prevent public school desegregation.

Robert Young Button was the Attorney General of Virginia (Dem. –1962-1970) who backed policies of Massive Resistance to prevent public school desegregation (see short video clip here)

When it came time for a conference vote in the Button case, Chief Justice Earl Warren, predictably, voted to reverse. “The purpose of the statute is obviously to circumvent Brown,” he said. Justice Hugo Black agreed. “This is part of a scheme to defeat the Court’s order, and sooner or later we will have to grapple with these problems in those terms. The NAACP is finished if this law stands.” But Justice Felix Frankfurter pushed back. “I can’t imagine a worse disservice than to continue being the guardians of the Negroes. . . . There is nothing in the record to show that this statute is aimed at Negroes as such.” Justices Tom Clark and Charles Evans Whittaker agreed. “To strike this law down, we would have to discriminate in favor of Negroes,” said Clark, to which Whittaker added: “We should be color blind on this law.”

Warren added up the votes. It was a five-to-four split in favor of the state of Virginia. Justice Frankfurter eagerly began work on his majority opinion upholding Virginia’s law—the laws that made the NAACP’s brand of non-pecuniary solicitation and financing of litigation a disciplinary offense that could result in disbarment. (For a discussion of Frankfurter’s early role in the case, see Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law 277-278 (1994).)

At the same time, Justice Black circulated drafts of a dissent in which he claimed, among other things, that perhaps the law should be renamed “[a]n Act to make it difficult and dangerous for the [NAACP] and Virginia lawyers to assert the constitutional rights of Virginia Negroes in state and federal courts.” Then Black added a passage revealing how far removed he was from his days as a hooded member of the Ku Klux Klan. “The job of lawyers under [the] Constitution is not to lead revolutions, but to lead their people in taking advantage of the American methods for correcting injustice.” And courts, Black continued, had a responsibility to serve as “sanctuaries of justice.” To ignore that role here, he concluded, was to leave the courts “a little less havens of refuge than they were before this Virginia law was sustained.”

Robert L. Carter, lawyer for the NAACP

Robert L. Carter, lawyer for the NAACP

Justice Black’s internal comments exposed just how wide the ideological chasm had grown between the members of this Court. But Robert Carter wouldn’t get a chance to read them. Nor, for that matter, would anyone else. On April 1, 1962, before the Court could announce its decision in NAACP v. Button, Justice Whittaker retired on the advice of his physician. He was sixty-one. The “great volume and continuous stresses of the court’s work,” he explained in a written statement, had brought him to the “point of physical exhaustion.” That left a four-to-four split among the remaining jurists, who scheduled a rehearing of the case the following term. Then, a few days later, seventy-nine-year-old Felix Frankfurter collapsed at his desk from a stroke. He lived, but shortly afterwards he announced his retirement. Just like that, President Kennedy could appoint two new Justices—and Robert Carter could feel new hope.

 An audio of the arguments in NAACP v. Gray can be found here.

New Faces, New Result

By the fall of 1962, President Kennedy had successfully appointed to the bench his top two choices—Byron White and Arthur Goldberg. And it promised to be a busy fall at the Supreme Court after they were both confirmed. Sometime around then, as Stern and Wermiel recount it, Justice Brennan busily circulated a 63-page memo that detailed the activities of the NAACP and its Virginia branch.

After hearing rearguments in Button, the Justices met privately to discuss the case on October 12, 1962. Chief Justice Warren had not changed his mind since first discussing the facts a year earlier. “The NAACP has a right to be in business,” he began. “If this suit goes against the NAACP, it is out of business.” Justices Black, Douglas, and Clark also maintained their original opinions. So did the typically restrained Justice John Marshall Harlan, who continued to claim that Virginia’s new law was “plainly constitutional. . . . Brown v. Board of Education will never work out if it is left in the federal domain. The states must do it. We have no reason to reverse Virginia on this law.” Justice Potter Stewart, the Eisenhower appointee from Cincinnati with the unpredictable voting record, was the first of the veteran Justices to suggest a possible change of heart. “I am not sure,” he said, “but I am inclined to reverse.” Justice White, the first of the two new members to speak at the private conference, was even less certain than Stewart. “I do not know where I stand.” Goldberg was more certain. “There is a substantial equal protection point here and I could reverse on that,” he said. Read More

0

Bright Ideas: Prof. Rick Hasen on the Recent and Future Voting War Engagements

There has been a tremendous amount of activity around election law since 2000. Decisions by the Supreme Court, district courts, and legislatures are affecting the future of how our country votes. The fights are in some ways old as voting is always political, but are new as the battlegrounds have changed. I am excited to welcome Professor Richard L. Hasen on Bright Ideas to get into some history, perspective on recent cases, and thoughts on where we need more research. As Professor Hasen says “The more we can address these points with facts and logic rather than hyperbole and assumption, the better.” Read on to find out the details.

Professor Hasen is Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science at the University of California, Irvine. I have been fortunate to know his work in person from when he spoke at Thomas Jefferson School of Law about his book The Voting Wars: From Florida 2000 to the Next Election Meltdown. Professor Hasen is a nationally recognized expert in election law and campaign finance regulation, and is co-author of a leading casebook on election law. He is the author of more than 80 articles on election law issues, published in numerous journals including the Harvard Law Review, Stanford Law Review and Supreme Court Review. He was elected to the American Law Institute in 2009, and he was named one of the 100 most influential lawyers in America by The National Law Journal in 2013. We are are fortunate to have Professor Hasen with us today. With that let’s get to the questions.

Q: Rick, voting rights have taken on new importance. States are trying to pass laws that require proof of citizenship. The Supreme Court has rejected some attempts to require proof of citizenship in federal elections. But a federal judge in Kansas has just ruled that the federal government must aid states that wish to require proof of citizenship. Before we get into the details about whether that ruling makes sense, can you help folks understand what is going on? Why is there a renewed interest in voter registration?

A: The interest in voter registration is part of a broader interest in, and fights over, rules for how we run our elections, from registration, to voter i.d., to how to handle the ballots of people who vote in the wrong voting precinct. As I explain in my 2012 book, The Voting Wars, since 2000 we have witnessed a great struggle between the parties, and between the federal and state governments, over who controls the voting rules. The disputed 2000 election ending with Bush v. Gore showed everyone that in very close elections, the rules of the game can make a difference. Parties have been jockeying for position, with Republicans generally favoring laws making it harder to register and vote and Democrats making it easier. Both parties’ positions conveniently line up with their own electoral chances: an expanded electorate (full of poor, minority, and non-regular voters who are less likely to be registered) is believed to skew toward Democrats.

Q: Before we get into the recent cases, your mention of close elections makes me wonder, has something changed in the past twenty years? If I remember correctly, there have been a few other major elections at the state level where the vote came down to a handful of votes. It just seems odd that at a large scale, we are seeing major power shifts determined by a few hundred votes. I suppose the same could be said about Kennedy’s election. But still, does the closeness reflect something about political divisions, corruption, or something else?

A: I think something has changed. The amount of legislation on the state level has increased–at least if we think of controversial legislation. Further, the amount of election litigation has more than doubled in the period after the disputed 2000 election compared to the period before. Election law has become part of a political strategy. It is not just about litigating after a close election; it is about litigating before an election to get advantage under the rules.

Q: So it seems the fight for power has two shifts then. First, there are close elections. Second, there is the renewed and modern fights to control who votes. With that, what happened in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.? What was the question and how did the Court come out on the issues before it?

A: Since Congress passed the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA, or “motor voter law,” because it mandates that motor vehicle departments offer voter registration), states have been required to accept a “federal form” for registering voters in federal elections. The Federal Election Commission used to be in charge of this form, but in 2002, when Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) creating the United States Election Assistance Commission (EAC), the EAC has been in charge of the form.

Arizona asked the EAC to modify the form to require it to include a requirement that new residents in Arizona provide documentary proof of citizenship before registering to vote. The EAC deadlocked on the request. Arizona did not challenge the EAC determination in court. Instead, Arizona decided not to accept registrations on the federal form. Plaintiffs representing groups of voters sued to require Arizona to accept registrations submitted on the federal form. In the Arizona v. Inter Tribal case, the Supreme Court said that Congress had the power under the Elections Clause to set the “manner” of voting in federal elections, and on this basis Arizona could not refuse to accept the federal form.

In a twist, however, the Court (in an opinion by Justice Scalia) suggested that Arizona should sue the EAC for not requiring the citizenship information on the form. The Court noted that although the Elections Clause gives Congress the power to set the maner of federal elections, it gives states the power to set voter qualifications, even in federal elections. The Court further suggested that the EAC might not be able to promulgate a federal form which frustrates a state’s attempt to verify voter qualifications.

Arizona, joined by Kansas, filed just such a suit, and a federal district court just decided that suit. I offer my analysis here, and here is an important NY Times analysis of what may come next.

Q: Fantastic explanation. Thank you. I urge folks to look at Rick’s post and the Times piece. Although you are quite honest that you “do not know how this case will fare as it works its way up on appeal,” I’d like to close with a couple questions. First, the Times piece notes that Alabama is moving forward with its new voter requirements. It seems that the federal form would be quite complicated if it had to reflect 50 different voter qualifications. Furthermore if each, or even several, are challenged, whether a form is ever stable enough to use could be a problem. That may be a goal for some, but it makes me wonder at the odd outcomes. It has been some time since I took administrative law, but could the practical complications be a way to challenge the Scalia logic? It just seems strange that states can dictate to the federal government. Second, as broader question and to wrap up, do you have any suggestions about discrete topics professors or students should pursue on this topic (i.e., are there open issues on either side that merit study)?

A: On the specifics of the form, the EAC has made modifications before, and it is not clear that states wanting citizenship verification are going to demand different things–or that the different things can’t be easily pointed to on the form. I think the broader issue is whether states could stymie other federal laws, such as laws protecting military and overseas voters which require states to accept a “fail safe” federal ballot for voting. There’s lots of potential mischief in a muscular reading of states’ rights to enforce voter qualifications over Congressional election law power. Derek Muller flags some of these confusing points.

On the open questions there are so many, beginning with how to understand the borderline between state and federal power in this area. There is also a great need for more (and better) empirical work on the effect of these laws on turnout, fraud prevention, and voter confidence. The more we can address these points with facts and logic rather than hyperbole and assumption, the better.

Thanks for taking the time to listen!

Thank you, Rick for sharing your ideas and giving us a sense of things to come.

NOTE: This interview was written using Google Docs. I posed questions to which Rick replied, and we edited content for flow and clarity.

0

FAC.2 (First Amendment Conversations) – Bruce Johnson on Press Access to Prisons

JohnsonBruce_low

His name is well known among First Amendment practitioners. He is Bruce E.H. Johnson, a friend and seasoned First Amendment lawyer who is a partner at the Seattle office of the Davis Wright Tremaine law firm. He represents information industry clients on issues involving media and communications law as well as technology and intellectual property matters. In addition to being the co-author of the leading treatise on commercial expression (Advertising and Commercial Speech, A First Amendment Guide (2nd ed. 2013), Bruce has written scholarly articles and has done considerable First Amendment appellate work, both in federal and state courts. He has also drafted three press-related statutes that have been enacted into law in Washington State.

Today’s topic concerns press and public access to jails and prisons for the purpose of gathering information relevant to conditions therein. (Hat tip: I selected this topic after reading William Bennett Turner’s informative and engaging book Figures of Speech: First Amendment Heroes & Villains (2011), which has a chapter on the topic. See also Helene Vosters, Media Lockout: Prisons & Journalists.)

Bruce, welcome to the Concurring Opinions blog and thank you for agreeing to share your thoughts with our readers. 

Question: Ever since the Supreme Court’s 3-1-3 split in Houchins v. KQED (1978), some doubt whether there is any meaningful First Amendment right of press and public access to jails or prisons for the purpose of gathering and distributing information about the conditions therein. On that constitutional score, how bleak are things in your opinion?

Answer:  Not good, in my view. In practice, prison administrators have virtually unbridled discretion to prevent meaningful public access, and thus also media access. One problem has been the refusal to permit videotaped interviews within prisons, even though the use of audio and video equipment does not create any additional risks for prison security. Ironically, the one area in the case law that shows some promise is the media’s right of access to executions, especially now that major issues have been raised about executioners’ use of compounded drugs as a result of European refusals to permit the export of killing drugs. Several court decisions, beginning with the press lawsuit against Idaho in 2012, have recognized that the press and the public have access rights to executions.  Another success story has been the efforts of the Human Rights Defense Center and its affiliate Prison Legal News (which we have represented in several matters), to gain access to prison information and to push for prisoner rights of access to the media. [See Society of Professional Journalists, "Prison Access Policies"]

Prisons are a vast, undercovered, but important beat. [W]e need more criminal justice coverage.  Dan Froomkin, Nieman Reports, Sept. 18, 2013

Question: Are you aware of any independent state constitutional rulings or state statutory reforms in this area?

Answer: Prison rights tend to get litigated more often in federal court than in state court.  One exception was the HRDC-PLN lawsuit in Seattle against various telecom carriers, alleging that the companies had overcharged prisoners for their telephone calls.  That class action case took more than a decade and was finally settled in 2013. The case should also remind lawyers that prisoners and their families may have valid claims against non-state entities, as well as the prison authorities themselves.

Question: As a statutory matter, could a state law extend protections to the institutional or traditional press, and it alone, without running afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment? In other words, would it be constitutionally problematic if such special protection did not extend to the general public as well?

Answer: Generally, at least since 1974, when Justice Potter Stewart gave his speech at Yale Law School [26 Hastings L. J. 631 (1975)] suggesting that the Press Clause should have some independent meaning, the courts have refused to recognize any significant media-non-media distinctions in First Amendment jurisprudence.  The essence of the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Citizens United (2010), which rejected precisely such a distinction on First Amendment grounds, is that press rights and public rights must be treated identically.  The First Amendment protections discussed in Citizens United clearly apply to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.  But as a practical matter (and speaking as someone who successfully drafted and lobbied for state legislation protecting confidential sources and reporters’ work product, deterring SLAPP claims, and encouraging corrections and clarifications of allegedly defamatory publications), I don’t see any likelihood that the media can obtain statutory protections from state legislatures by throwing fellow citizens under the bus. Politics is about building coalitions, not avoiding them.

Question: If you were to draft a model access law relating to state jails and prisons, what would be its key components?

Answer: Like the Washington anti-SLAPP law (which I drafted back in 2010), it should provide speed (deadlines should be specified), monetary incentives (such as attorney fee awards and perhaps statutory damages) to facilitate government cooperation, and immediate and prompt judicial and appellate review.

Question: Where and why would you draw the line when it comes to limiting any such access?

Answer: Obviously, if there is truly a concern about prison security, state authorities should have appropriate discretion.

Thank you Bruce, I hope you will join us again sometime soon.   

LAST FAC.1: With Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe.

NEXT FAC.3: With Northwestern Law Professor Martin Redish.

7

Identity Performance as a Bottleneck to Employment Opportunity

In his timely and provocative book, Professor Joey Fishkin makes an important intervention to anti-discrimination law praxis and theory. Poignantly, he observes that in developing anti-discrimination legislation and doctrine, policy makers as well as judges have largely focused on either eliminating or diminishing severe, pervasive, and arbitrary bottlenecks in the opportunity structure as opposed to focusing singularly on the achievement of equal outcomes. He defines bottlenecks as a “narrow place in the opportunity structure through which one must pass in order to successfully pursue a wide range of valued goals.” (Page 13). Professor Fishkin identifies three types of bottlenecks—“qualification,” “developmental,” and “instrumental good”—that policy should address in educational and employment contexts to bring about “equality pluralism”: “[the] opening up a broader range of opportunities for everyone.” (Page 2). As a race and law and employment discrimination law scholar, I am particularly interested in how Fishkin’s “anti-bottleneck” principle applies to arbitrary “qualification bottlenecks” in the employment context. Indeed, my scholarship on grooming codes discrimination illuminates how an obscured yet severe and pervasive “qualification bottleneck”—(non)conformity with racialized and gendered identity performance standards imposed by employers (which are reified within anti-discrimination jurisprudence like Title VII)—constrains or widens one’s range of employment opportunities.In this post, I will draw upon my scholarship on grooming codes discrimination to briefly explicate how one’s ability to navigate and negotiate identity performance demands limits or increases employment opportunities. Read More

0

UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 2

Volume 61, Issue 2 (January 2014)
Articles

Negotiating Nonproliferation: International Law and Delegation in the Iranian Nuclear Crisis Aslı Ü. Bâli 232
Detention Without End?: Reexamining the Indefinite Confinement of Terrorism Suspects Through the Lens of Criminal Sentencing Jonathan Hafetz 326
Transparently Opaque: Understanding the Lack of Transparency in Insurance Consumer Protection Daniel Schwarcz 394

 

Comments

California’s Unloaded Open Carry Bans: A Constitutional and Risky, but Perhaps Necessary, Gun Control Strategy Charlie Sarosy 464
Exclusion, Punishment, Racism and Our Schools: A Critical Race Theory Perspective on School Discipline David Simson 506

 

 

 

0

Google Books and the Social (Justice) Contract

In channeling Judge Baer, Judge Chin at long last dropped the other shoe in the judicial effort to bring new information technology uses for copyrighted works fully in to the copyright regime. Congress has been slow to address the challenge of tapping the full copyright social utility/justice potential of these advances and it’s been left to the courts to sort it all out in the context of individual adversarial conflicts. Poignantly, when Jonathan Band asks “What [was] the Authors Guild fighting for?”, he also illustrates the tree-myopic/forest blind nature of the Guild’s position. What the Guild failed to see is that property rights fit into a larger socio-legal system: Yes your neighbor is precluded from trespassing on to your land but your ability to engage in whatever “private” activity strikes your fancy while thereon is limited by the legal system as a whole. Your land is individual private property, not an independent sovereign state.

 

Judge Baer reminded rights holders of this aspect of the social contract and now Judge Chin has made it clear to the Guild that this is not some narrow, eccentric application of copyright social utility. Property rights, including copyrights, exist to advance society, and to state the obvious, information technology has evolved our society. Like all other rights, customs, and expectations, however, whereas some aspects of copyright as previously envisioned fit comfortably into our new configuration others don’t fit at all. And when that ill-fit impedes important social progress modifications must be made, and if necessary, expectations altered.

 

The courts’ reasoning in both Hathitrust and Google Books moves fair use jurisprudence further toward the express consideration of copyright social justice in the application of the doctrine. As Kevin Smith notes, the judges in both cases have seized this opportunity to retrofit fair use, and it seems to me that these decisions push beyond questions of aesthetic and even functional transformation and pave the way for weighing social transformation in assessing the first fair use factor. I have also applied some of the legal conclusions drawn from Bill Graham Archives and other Grateful Dead archive projects to specific copyright social justice needs, for example, that of socially beneficent access to the literature of the Harlem Renaissance. Like some other historically and culturally important works, many of these books enjoy only marginal commercial market value and similar to the information harvested through data mining, “digital fair use” may be the only means by which to return these works to the general public. The social resuscitation of significant works through mass-digitization, and other uses that serve important and otherwise unattainable copyright social objectives, should be considered a purpose that satisfies the first fair use factor.

 

Authors and other copyrights holders would do well to finally get ahead of the information technology curve. The Authors Guild’s mistake was not so much in the effort to preserve what they considered to be their property rights or even in the effort to extract every conceivable drop of revenue out those rights, but rather, in failing to accept that in order for these rights to retain any value they must function as part of a thriving societal system or eventually forfeit the basis for legal recognition. In the analog world, the public’s access to most books remains largely dependent upon the vagaries of the commercial marketplace. Digital information technology has presented the opportunity to compile the world’s books toward the creation of global libraries accessible to every human being on a socially equitable basis. To believe that analog social inequity will be permitted to endure indefinitely in the face of digital information possibilities is simply unrealistic. Keeping in mind that the stimulation, perpetuation, and re-ignition of the cultural expression/dissemination/inspiration combustive cycle is the raison d’etre of copyright will enable authors to embrace digital change and as Gil Scott Heron sang, possibly even direct the change rather than simply be put through it.

 

0

Exciting news for the Center on Democracy & Technology: Nuala O’Connor Appointed President and CEO

Brilliant news: CDT’s Board of Directors just announced that Nuala O’Connor has been named President & CEO, effective January 21, 2014. O’Connor will succeed Leslie Harris, who is stepping down after leading CDT for nearly nine years. As the privacy community knows well, Harris provided extraordinary leadership: vision, enthusiasm, and commitment. O’Connor will build on that tradition in spades. She is the perfect leader for CDT.

From CDT’s announcement:

“Nuala drove an ambitious civil liberties agenda as the first Chief Privacy Officer at the Department of Homeland Security in a post 9-11 world. She fought for and implemented policies to protect the human rights of U.S. and global citizens in a climate of overreaching surveillance efforts. The Board is thrilled to have Nuala at the helm as CDT expands on 20 years of Internet policy work advancing civil liberties and human rights across the globe,” said Deirdre Mulligan, CDT Board Chair.

O’Connor is an internationally recognized expert in technology policy, particularly in the areas of privacy and information governance. O’Connor comes to CDT from Amazon.com, where she served both as Vice President of Compliance & Customer Trust and as Associate General Counsel for Privacy & Data Protection. Previously she served as the first Chief Privacy Officer at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). At DHS, O’Connor was responsible for groundbreaking policy creation and implementation on the use of personal information in national security and law enforcement.

“I am honored to join the superb team at the Center for Democracy & Technology. CDT is at the forefront of advocating for civil liberties in the digital world,” said O’Connor. “There has never been a more important time in the fight to keep the Internet open, innovative and free. From government surveillance to data-driven algorithms to the Internet of things, challenges abound. I am committed to continuing to grow CDT’s global influence and impact as a voice for the open Internet and for the rights of its users.”

“Nuala is a brilliant choice to lead CDT. She is a passionate advocate for civil liberties, highly expert about the emerging global challenges and fully committed to CDT’s mission. She is a bold leader who will guide CDT into its next chapter. I have had the honor of working with CDT’s talented and thoughtful team for almost nine years. I am confident that they will thrive with Nuala at the helm,” said Leslie Harris.

Beyond her experience at Amazon and DHS, O’Connor has also worked in consumer privacy at General Electric, and as Chief Counsel for Technology at the U.S. Department of Commerce. She also created the privacy compliance department at DoubleClick and practiced law at Sidley Austin, Venable, and Hudson Cook.

O’Connor, who is originally from Belfast, Northern Ireland, holds an A.B. from Princeton University, an M.Ed. from Harvard University, and a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center. She currently serves on numerous nonprofit boards, and is the recipient of a number of national awards, including the IAPP Vanguard Award, the Executive Women’s Forum’s Woman of Influence award, and was named to the Federal 100, but is most proud of having been named “Geek of the Week” by the Minority Media & Telecom Council in May 2013. She lives in the Washington, D.C. area with her three school-aged children.

8

Stanford Law Review Online: Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the Forgotten Oath

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Note by David R. Friedman entitled Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the Forgotten Oath. Mr. Friedman argues that:

[M]any of the Justices, especially Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg, seemed troubled by the implications of Michigan’s amendment for traditionally disadvantaged minorities. At the same time, several Justices seemed perplexed by the potentially wide scope of a doctrine that, in its most expansive form, subjects every law that moves a decision from one level of government to another to strict scrutiny. For instance, if Michigan’s constitutional amendment is subject to strict scrutiny, is Title VII subject to strict scrutiny? Is the Fair Housing Act? Is 42 U.S.C. § 1983? All three of these laws similarly move a decision involving race—the decision of how much governmental protection to provide against racial discrimination—from one level of government (the states) to another (the federal government). These types of potential consequences led to a great deal of time being consumed by questions looking to answer that classic legal question: where do we draw the line?!

He concludes:

The Michigan electorate should be required to pay now or pay later to prove that the laws of its state do not violate the Constitution. If it chooses to pursue a state constitutional amendment through direct initiative, it will trade the scrutiny of the legislative process, mediated by those who have taken an Article VI oath to uphold the Federal Constitution, for the burden of affirmatively proving that its measure is constitutional.!footnote_21 If it chooses instead to lobby its state legislature to propose a state constitutional amendment, it will face no such burden later in the process. Only by requiring this choice can we really be sure that “equal treatment” is actually the same as “equal protection” in this case.

Read the full article, Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action and the Forgotten Oath at the Stanford Law Review Online.

0

UCLA Law Review Vol. 61, Issue 1

Volume 61, Issue 1 (December 2013)
Articles

Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler 2
Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt 66

 

Comments

“Let’s Have a Look, Shall We?” A Model for Evaluating Suspicionless Border Searches of Portable Electronic Devices Sid Nadkarni 148
An Article III Divided Against Itself Cannot Stand: A Critical Race Perspective on the U.S. Supreme Court’s Standing Jurisprudence Raj Shah 198