Category: Blogging

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And I’m Back – Deven to GA Tech, Scheller College of Business

I joined the Scheller College of Business at Georgia Tech in August. Some have asked (or speculated as law professors seem to do) about my choice. As those who know my past might see, I go where I think the best work is possible. My scholarship dives into business and technology literatures. GA Tech is excellent in both areas. I took the interview and the position with the hope that I could go deeper into these fields. And, as I hoped, it is great here. Peter Swire is my office neighbor. My group in law and ethics is smart and fun. Throw in friends like Stu Graham, and excellent professors in marketing (can you say more branding?), strategic management, information technology management, operations management, organizational behavior, accounting, and finance, and it is a field day. Folks here are pursuing data analytics, IT and supply chain, behavior and identity shaping by branding, and more. Chats have already pointed to me books and articles for my next set of papers. And that is just at Scheller. I am connecting with the engineers and public policy folks too. Not to mention that friends at Emory, GA State, and Georgia law are near, and I am overdue to visit them. So why move? The opportunity and resources make it a high quality problem place: so much to do and so many people with whom to connect that picking is difficult.

With a summer hire and move, blogging has not been active. Plus, I find that I am bursty (if that is a word). A few ideas pop up and blog posts fly. Then things seem less interesting for a bit. In any event, I think I have a few posts up my sleeve. See you in the funny papers, err blogosphere, as Hawkeye Pierce would say.

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Knee Defender, Barro’s error, and Surprise Norms

Being a believer in Coase’s irrelevance “theorem” (see corresponding CALI lesson by me), I bring you a peeve springing from a podcast’s discussion of knee defender (a product that prevents the airline seat in front of you from reclining, which led to a recent fight on a plane, the plane’s diverted landing, and the arrest of the fighting passengers), which referenced a pundit’s (Barro‘s) quip that since nobody has offered to bribe him not to recline, little demand for no reclining exists. The podcast was also critical of reclining generally (as it is of warning motorists about speed traps), which raises the issue of hidden, surprise norms.

First on Coase. Bribing someone not to do something that annoys you is completely counterintuitive and counterproductive. It sounds and feels like extortion and perhaps we have an innate intuition against extortion. Maybe a jurisdiction existed, in the history of human development, where it was acceptable and habitual for some to pay others not to engage in annoying activities. However, nobody lives there any more because it got too annoying, since this functioned as an incentive for annoying behavior. How do we get from this point (my anti-extortion exception to acceptable Coasean bargaining) to worlds where ranchers bargain with farmers or quiescent spas with percussionists? I think social interaction follows the golden rule of do unto others as you would have done unto you (I accept gradual moderate reclining especially while napping and am very thankful indeed for speed trap warnings) and polite counterrequests not to recline are easy and possible (and we luckily have judges to protect us against oversensitive cops). Farmer-rancher and spa-percussionist interactions are different in that they happen at the professional level. Ranchers and farmers do not know eachother’s cost-benefit calculus making bargaining acceptable, as I think it is between neighbors with different attitudes about noise or lawn care. That having been said, my sense is that airline seat design seems to be sensitive to the various concerns because it seems to have shifted to minimal reclining in short flights or cramped rows and more reclining in transoceanic flights, where, also, the flight attendants do ask passengers to lift their seats for meals. So, anti-reclining demand seems to be producing results, consistent with Coasean reasoning and contrary to the intuition of Barro. Notice the unusual power of Coase here, since two of his conditions, the clarity of rights and enforceability of bargains, seem to be lacking in the social context of seat reclining (but not in neighborhood lawn care? Or is that why people pay a premium to live in associations? Coase all the way! Is it Lee Fennell or Jay Weiser who discuss premiums paid for association houses? Maybe both.). Perhaps I am wrong on reclining and it is clearly a right, not only because the button is on the handrest of the recliner (rather than the seat back, as the podcast points out) but also and especially since the airlines have banned knee-defender. The airlines also offer some seats with protection against reclining, the bulkhead and the exit row seats (maybe airlines could increase the number of non-reclined-against seats or charge the knee-defender premium for them). Thus, those seeking no reclining can obtain it by taking such seats instead of bribing Barro, buying knee defender, or trying to create a norm against it.

Second on surprise norms. No no no no, thou shalt not spring your righteous surprise norms on me. Western legal and social arrangement rests on the foundation that what is not prohibited is allowed. I can press my recline button and I can blink my brights to oncoming motorists at the cost of flying next to crying babies and driving behind those doing under the speed limit. (But in Sunday’s NY Times magazine, in Branson’s interview, he mentioned that he wants or tried to have his airline move toward children’s cabins, a development for which my ears are praying albeit from behind BOSE noise-cancelling headphones). To my reasoning, a necessary corollary of the rule of law is the non-rule of non-legal norms. When a need for a rule has enough thrust that it alters the law, then we have some warning about it and perhaps the chance to object against its creation. Holding people to a standard of conduct they do not know and to which they may object seems the height of (righteous, meddlesome, antiliberal, puritanical, strike four words) unfairness. (BTW, strike is obsolete litigator legalese for delete, dating from the days where the transcriber would back up the typewriter carriage and type XXXX or dashes over the, thus, struck text. That I could perfectly easily delete the words reveals my affectation here, but ignore that.) I have a sense that when I lived in the east coast a lot more of these surprise norms seemed to exist than here in the midwest and it grated. Or I am a rude boor who belongs in that extinct society above.

So, what is the norm in this blogo-podcast-sphere? Should I reveal that I am commenting on Oral Argument of Joe Miller and Christian Turner or should I leave the podcast nameless because I criticize it somewhat? Since law professors thrive on citation counts, I will presume that they would prefer attribution to marginalization despite that I am not in full agreement with everything they say (and who could possibly expect complete agreement in our milieu of professional debaters of trivialities?). I am very thankful for their podcast adding interest to my driving time and for triggering this post.

I hope no norm against run-on sentences and parentheticals exists in the blogosphere, or I am toast! In my defense, please notice that I could not instead drop notes. BTW, drop a [foot]note is legalese for removing from the main text a diversion or interjection and placing it in a footnote, which reminds me…

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Moving Targets: A new blog from Mary Anne Franks discusses revenge porn, feminist theory, and social media

Former Concurring Opinions guest blogger Mary Anne Franks (an expert on “revenge porn,” cyber civil rights, and feminist theory) has just launched her own blog at Moving Targets. As expected, it’s fantastic.

Concurring Opinions readers are familiar with Professor Franks’ writings on topics like masculinity, consent, and social media. Professor Franks is a popular figure in the news as well — in a recent Huffington Post panel discussing gender roles, she thoroughly beat up poor anti-feminist internet writer Gavin McInnes. Her new blog provides a space for further follow up and conversation, and she’s already using it in that role. In a legal blogosphere which has been sometimes limited in its engagement with feminist legal theory, Professor Franks’ voice is a very welcome addition.

Welcome to the blogosphere, Mary Anne!

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Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Part 1): Why we used SIPP data from 1996 to 2011

(Reposted from Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports)

 

BT Claim:  We could have used more historical data without introducing continuity and other methodological problems

BT quote:  “Although SIPP was redesigned in 1996, there are surveys for 1993 and 1992, which allow continuity . . .”

Response:  Using more historical data from SIPP would likely have introduced continuity and other methodological problems

SIPP does indeed go back farther than 1996.  We chose that date because it was the beginning of an updated and revitalized SIPP that continues to this day.  SIPP was substantially redesigned in 1996 to increase sample size and improve data quality.  Combining different versions of SIPP could have introduced methodological problems.  That doesn’t mean one could not do it in the future, but it might raise as many questions as it would answer.

Had we used earlier data, it could be difficult to know to what extent changes to our earnings premiums estimates were caused by changes in the real world, and to what extent they were artifacts caused by changes to the SIPP methodology.

Because SIPP has developed and improved over time, the more recent data is more reliable than older historical data.  All else being equal, a larger sample size and more years of data are preferable.  However, data quality issues suggest focusing on more recent data.

If older data were included, it probably would have been appropriate to weight more recent and higher quality data more heavily than older and lower quality data.  We would likely also have had to make adjustments for differences that might have been caused by changes in survey methodology.  Such adjustments would inevitably have been controversial.

Because the sample size increased dramatically after 1996, including a few years of pre 1996 data would not provide as much new data or have the potential to change our estimates by nearly as much as Professor Tamanaha believes.  There are also gaps in SIPP data from the 1980s because of insufficient funding.

These issues and the 1996 changes are explained at length in the Survey of Income and Program Participation User’s Guide.

Changes to the new 1996 version of SIPP include:

Roughly doubling the sample size

This improves the precision of estimates and shrinks standard errors

Lengthening the panels from 3 years to 4 years

This reduces the severity of the regression to the median problem

Introducing computer assisted interviewing to improve data collection and reduce errors or the need to impute for missing data

Introducing oversampling of low income neighborhoods
This mitigates response bias issues we previously discussed, which are most likely to affect the bottom of the distribution
New income topcoding procedures were instituted with the 1996 Panel
This will affect both means and various points in the distribution
Topcoding is done on a monthly or quarterly basis, and can therefore undercount end of year bonuses, even for those who are not extremely high income year-round

Most government surveys topcode income data—that is, there is a maximum income that they will report.  This is done to protect the privacy of high-income individuals who could more easily be identified from ostensibly confidential survey data if their incomes were revealed.

Because law graduates tend to have higher incomes than bachelor’s, topcoding introduces downward bias to earnings premiums estimates. Midstream changes to topcoding procedures can change this bias and create problems with respect to consistency and continuity.

Without going into more detail, the topcoding procedure that began in 1996 appears to be an improvement over the earlier topcoding procedure.

These are only a subset of the problems extending the SIPP data back past 1996 would have introduced.  For us, the costs of backfilling data appear to outweigh the benefits.  If other parties wish to pursue that course, we’ll be interested in what they find, just as we hope others were interested in our findings.

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Brian Tamanaha’s Straw Men (Overview)

(Cross posted from Brian Leiter’s Law School Reports)

Brian Tamanaha previously told Inside Higher Education that our research only looked at average earnings premiums and did not consider the low end of the distribution.  Dylan Matthews at the Washington Post reported that Professor Tamanaha’s description of our research was “false”. 

In his latest post, Professor Tamanaha combines interesting critiques with some not very interesting errors and claims that are not supported by data.   Responding to his blog post is a little tricky as his ongoing edits rendered it something of a moving target.  While we’re happy with improvements, a PDF of the version to which we are responding is available here just so we all know what page we’re on.

Stephen Diamond explains why Tamanaha apparently changed his post: Ted Seto and Eric Rasmusen expressed concerns about Tamanaha’s use of ad hominem attacks.

Some of Tamanaha’s new errors are surprising, because they come after an email exchange with him in which we addressed them.  For example, Tamanaha’s description of our approach to ability sorting constitutes a gross misreading of our research.  Tamanaha also references the wrong chart for earnings premium trends and misinterprets confidence intervals.  And his description of our present value calculations is way off the mark.

Here are some quick bullet point responses, with details below in subsequent posts:

  • Forecasting and Backfilling
    • Using more historical data from SIPP would likely have introduced continuity and other methodological problems
    • Using more years of data is as likely to increase the historical earnings premium as to reduce it
    • If pre-1996 historical data finds lower earnings premiums, that may suggest a long term upward trend and could mean that our estimates of flat future earnings premiums are too conservative and the premium estimates should be higher
    • The earnings premium in the future is just as likely to be higher as it is to be lower than it was in 1996-2011
    • In the future, the earnings premium would have to be lower by **85 percent** for an investment in law school to destroy economic value at the median
  • Data sufficiency
    • 16 years of data is more than is used in similar studies to establish a baseline.  This includes studies Tamanaha cited and praised in his book.
    • Our data includes both peaks and troughs in the cycle.  Across the cycle, law graduates earn substantially more than bachelor’s.
  • Tamanaha’s errors and misreading
    • We control for ability sorting and selection using extensive controls for socio-economic, academic, and demographic characteristics
    • This substantially reduces our earnings premium estimates
    • Any lingering ability sorting and selection is likely offset by response bias in SIPP, topcoding, and other problems that cut in the opposite direction
    • Tamanaha references the wrong chart for earnings premium trends and misinterprets confidence intervals
    • Tamanaha is confused about present value, opportunity cost, and discounting
    • Our in-school earnings are based on data, but, in any event, “correcting” to zero would not meaningfully change our conclusions
  • Tamanaha’s best line
    • “Let me also confirm that [Simkovic & McIntyre’s] study is far more sophisticated than my admittedly crude efforts.”
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Happy 10,000th Post!

I was just working on my next guest post when I noticed a little statistic in the dashboard: there have been 10,007 posts to Concurring Opinions. Which means this lil’ ol’ “blawg” passed a significant milestone about a week ago that deserves some celebration — and heartfelt  thanks to Dan Solove and the cadre of other permanent bloggers who keep it going.

By my count, post number 10,000 was a pointer to a new essay about the Kirtsaeng decision in the Stanford Law Review Online. That’s appropriate, because spreading the word about interesting and timely legal scholarship — especially stuff that appears in less traditional places like the journals’ online supplemnets — has been one of ConOp’s many services to the rest of us for years now.

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Blog Cross Posting and Multiple Postings

What are the norms about whether you can manually post the same blog post more than once on the same blog or multiple times on other blogs or other media, such as newspapers?

There has been much fair criticism about cross-posing automatically, especially given the varying platforms of different social media.  But while there seems to be acceptance of manual cross-posting, it too comes in for criticism when done excessively just to get out there.

When is it too much or too little?  It seems that, as a general rule, it ought always be okay to re-post when bloggers at another site (or in another forum) invite the re-posting.  They predict another group of readers will find it valuable.

It also seems reasonable to ask, when being invited to post as a guest elsewhere, to be allowed to re-post on your own blog.  It may be fair in either case for a site to negotiate for a limited period of exclusivity, such as two weeks.

A more contextual approach would compare the probable audiences on different blogs.  If readership overlaps substantially, it imposes too great a tax on readers to cross-post.  But cross-posting across different blogs (or other media) with varied readership makes sense all around, to enhance each outlet, to distribute the ideas widely, and to offer readers more.

That leaves re-posting on the same blog.   This is usually done by “moving something to the front” and seems most acceptable when the content concerns something seeking reader reaction, such as a survey.  Otherwise, I’m not so sure about this practice.

We always feel as if some of our best blog posts are posted, contribute fleetingly, and then disappear.   But re-posting does not seem to be the answer.   The better way? Continue to write and expand on a topic, linking to the older posts, and trying to move the conversation along.

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Zelinsky on the Federal Law Clerk Hiring Crisis

My colleague Aaron Zelinsky, who is visiting with University of Maryland School of Law before heading off to the Supreme Court to clerk, has written an incisive post at the Huffington Post on the federal judiciary’s failure to stick to the hiring plan, the troubles defection causes, and his recommendation for what we ought to do about it.  The entire post is here.  For a bit of his wisdom:

So what’s to be done?

If judges are serious about creating a new plan to fix this race to the bottom, there’s an easy solution: use the old plan. The old plan worked just fine. It only had one problem; it was voluntary, so it unraveled. The solution is simple: make the plan mandatory.

Remember the story of Odysseus, who wanted to hear the song of the Sirens but was worried that doing so would cause him to sail too close to the rocks and wreck his ship? To get around the problem he had his crew tie him to the mast.

The judicial branch tried this solution with the old hiring plan, but they made a critical mistake: Odysseus didn’t tie himself to the mast. He had his crew do it. That way he couldn’t get the knots undone. Otherwise, tying yourself up is about as useful as putting that piece of chocolate cake in the back of the refrigerator. Sure, it helps for about ten minutes, but then you open the door, move the mayonnaise to the side, and there it is.

Instead of voluntary compliance, the judicial branch should ask someone else to tie them to the mast. In the context of our constitutional system, the term of art for this is one you may remember from middle school civics: the separation of powers.

Congress has the power of the purse. It allocates funds for building courthouses, keeping the lights on, and employing staff. For instance, law clerks are employed under 28 U.S.C. 752 (for district courts) and 28 U.S.C. 712 (for circuit courts). If the judiciary really wants to fix the hiring plan, then judges should request that Congress condition salaries for law clerks upon them being hired in compliance with the judicial hiring plan. In other words, if you don’t play by the rules, you don’t have law clerks.

But wait, isn’t that unconstitutional? Nope. The Constitution prevents Congress from lowering the salaries of federal judges, but says nothing about their staff (anyways, such a law could be written to apply only to those hired in the future, not those already employed). And Congress isn’t infringing on the judicial power in any way – this law does not effect how judges make use of their clerks, just the timing of how they hire them. And it would leave the actual formation of the plan up to the judiciary.

Federal judges could ask Congress to make the hiring plan mandatory via a proposal from a special judicial working group, or even in Chief Justice Roberts’s year end report to Congress. And they should. A new, mandatory plan would be fairer for less-advantaged law students and late-bloomers, more efficient for federal judges, and maybe even better for you.

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Blogging Ethics

Here’s a question that I’ve pondered every once in a while.   Suppose I want to post about a legal issue that is relevant to a company in which I own shares.  What should I do?

A.  “Recuse” myself and not post about the issue.

B.  Post but make it clear that I own shares in said stock.

C.  Post and say nothing.  Nobody cares about my posts–they won’t influence stock prices or legal arguments made about the company.

Thus far, I have done A.  I’d be curious to get input from other bloggers about what they think.

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Stanford Law Review Online: The Dead Past

Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published Chief Judge Alex Kozinski’s Keynote from our 2012 Symposium, The Dead Past. Chief Judge Kozinski discusses the privacy implications of our increasingly digitized world and our role as a society in shaping the law:

I must start out with a confession: When it comes to technology, I’m what you might call a troglodyte. I don’t own a Kindle or an iPad or an iPhone or a Blackberry. I don’t have an avatar or even voicemail. I don’t text.

I don’t reject technology altogether: I do have a typewriter—an electric one, with a ball. But I do think that technology can be a dangerous thing because it changes the way we do things and the way we think about things; and sometimes it changes our own perception of who we are and what we’re about. And by the time we realize it, we find we’re living in a different world with different assumptions about such fundamental things as property and privacy and dignity. And by then, it’s too late to turn back the clock.

He concludes:

Judges, legislators and law enforcement officials live in the real world. The opinions they write, the legislation they pass, the intrusions they dare engage in—all of these reflect an explicit or implicit judgment about the degree of privacy we can reasonably expect by living in our society. In a world where employers monitor the computer communications of their employees, law enforcement officers find it easy to demand that internet service providers give up information on the web-browsing habits of their subscribers. In a world where people post up-to-the-minute location information through Facebook Places or Foursquare, the police may feel justified in attaching a GPS to your car. In a world where people tweet about their sexual experiences and eager thousands read about them the morning after, it may well be reasonable for law enforcement, in pursuit of terrorists and criminals, to spy with high-powered binoculars through people’s bedroom windows or put concealed cameras in public restrooms. In a world where you can listen to people shouting lurid descriptions of their gall-bladder operations into their cell phones, it may well be reasonable to ask telephone companies or even doctors for access to their customer records. If we the people don’t consider our own privacy terribly valuable, we cannot count on government—with its many legitimate worries about law-breaking and security—to guard it for us.

Which is to say that the concerns that have been raised about the erosion of our right to privacy are, indeed, legitimate, but misdirected. The danger here is not Big Brother; the government, and especially Congress, have been commendably restrained, all things considered. The danger comes from a different source altogether. In the immortal words of Pogo: “We have met the enemy and he is us.”

Read the full article, The Dead Past by Alex Kozinski, at the Stanford Law Review Online.