Category: Articles and Books

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Radical Pragmatism

Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism 01I recently posted on SSRN a book chapter I co-authored with Professor Michael Sullivan (Emory, Philosophy).  The chapter is called Radical Pragmatism and it is in The Cambridge Companion to Pragmatism pp. 324-344 (Alan Malachowski, ed. 2013).  This is a much shortened version of an earlier essay we wrote critiquing Judge Richard Posner’s conception of pragmatism.  We have tightened the argument, and this piece makes our key points much more succinctly.  Here’s the abstract:

“[P]ragmatist theory of law is, like much pragmatist theory, essentially banal.” So wrote Thomas Grey at the dawn of pragmatism’s renaissance in legal theory. Several contemporary pragmatists, as well as a number of critics of pragmatism, view pragmatism as a thin theory, more of a method than a philosophy with substantive commitments. For example, Richard Posner, one of the leading contemporary pragmatists, asserts that “pragmatism is more a tradition, attitude, and outlook than a body of doctrine” and that it has “no inherent political valence.” Likewise, Richard Rorty contends that pragmatism “is neutral between alternative prophecies, and thus neutral between democrats and fascists.”

Under this view, pragmatism generally leads to cautious common-sense policies. It is far from radical and unsettling, for it is too lacking in substantive value commitments to be otherwise. In this book chapter, we contest this account of pragmatism and offer a thicker account. Pragmatism does indeed have a political valence. It has substantive values. And, far from being banal, it is radical at its core.

You can download the chapter on SSRN.

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The Babe Ruth of Good Business Today

baberuthOne hundred years ago this week, on July 11, 1914, George Herman (“Babe”) Ruth made his major league debut, for the Boston Red Sox at two-year old Fenway Park. Over the course of his baseball career, The Great Bambino set many records, including leading the league in home runs for twelve seasons; most total bases in a season (457); and highest slugging percentage for a season (.847). In all, he hit 714 home runs, a record that stood until 1974, when Hank Aaron of the Atlanta Braves claimed the title. But that is not why the Babe is immortal.

Other home run kings have achieved nothing like Ruth’s iconic status. Many decade-leading hitters—such as Harry Davis, Gavy Cravath, or Jimmie Foxx—are barely known. Even falling short of Ruth’s stature are the two players who passed him in home runs, Aaron and Barry Bonds (Pittsburgh Pirates and San Francisco Giants), who took the top spot in 2007. Nor is Ruth’s immortality due entirely to the fact that he also excelled as a pitcher: for forty-three years he held the record for consecutive scoreless innings pitched in World Series play and his overall win-loss ratio (.671) remains the seventh best of all time.

Ruth’s immorality, rather, is due to how, through such extraordinary feats, he changed the game of baseball. He brought power to the sport at a time when typical strategy was to move players around the bases one small hit at a time. While baseball was thriving as an American pastime before he played, the Babe’s bold style, vast generosity, and utter unpretentiousness won the public’s adulation. His deep sense of ethics helped to rescue baseball from the damage done by the miscreant players who threw the 1919 World Series.  His strength and optimism gave hope to millions during the Great Depression. Ruth made baseball a richer sport with a wider and enduring following, which is why we all recognize his name a century after his rookie year. And people venerate the Babe despite his many bad personal habits, such as gluttony, promiscuity, and pugnaciousness.

In American business, we have likewise enshrined transformative figures like Ruth despite faults. Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and Cornelius Vanderbilt built the nation’s infrastructure while J. P. Morgan and Henry Ford forged its business structures and methods. We condemn the cheaters to memory’s hell—from Charles Ponzi to Bernie Madoff—or at least purgatory, as with Michael Milken. We remain ambivalent about the likes of Jay Gould and others still derided as robber barons. Read More

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Buffett’s Evolution: From Stock-Picking Disciple of Ben Graham to Business-Building Devotee of Tom Murphy

While everyone knows that Warren Buffett modeled himself after Ben Graham for the stock picking that made Buffett famous in the latter 20th century, virtually no one knows a more important point for the 21st century: he has modeled himself after Tom Murphy in assembling a mighty conglomerate.   Murphy, a legendary executive with great skills in the field of acquisitions that resulted in the Capital Cities communications empire, engineered the 1985 $3.5 billion takeover by Capital Cities of ABC before selling it all to to Disney a decade later for $19 billion.  You did not hear that explicitly at Saturday’s Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, but Warren mentioned it to me at brunch on Sunday and, when you think about it, it’s a point implicit deep in the meeting’s themes and many questions.

In fact, Berkshire mBBB COvereetings are wonderful for their predictability.   Few questions surprise informed participants and most seasoned observers can give the correct outlines of answers before hearing Buffett or vice chairman Charlie Munger speak. While exact issues vary year to year and the company and its leaders evolve, the core principles are few, simple, and unwavering.  The meetings reinforce the venerability and durability of Berkshire’s bedrock principles even as they drive important underlying shifts that accumulate over many years.  Three examples and their upshot illustrate, all of which I expand on in a new book due out later this year (pictured; pre-order here).

Permanence versus Size/Break Up. People since the 1980s have argued that as Berkshire grows, it gets more difficult to outperform. Buffett has always agreed that scale is an anchor. And it’s true that these critics have always been right that it gets harder but always wrong that it is impossible to outperform.   People for at least a decade have wondered whether it might be desirable to divide Berkshire’s 50+ direct subsidiaries into multiple corporations or spin-off some businesses.  The answer has always been and remains no.  Berkshire’s most fundamental principle is permanence, always has been, always will be. Divisions and divestitures are antithetical to that proposition.

Trust and Autonomy versus Internal Control. Every time there is a problem at a given subsidiary or with a given person—spotlighted at 2011’s meeting by subsidiary CEO David Sokol’s buying stock in Lubrizol before pitching it as an acquisition target—people want to know whether Berkshire gives its personnel too much autonomy. The answer is Berkshire is totally decentralized and always will be-another distinctive bedrock principle. The rationale has always been the same: yes, tight leashes and controls might help avoid this or that costly embarrassment but the gains from a trust-based culture of autonomy, while less visible, dwarf those costs.

Capital Allocation: Berkshire has always adopted the doubled-barreled approach to capital allocation, buying minority stakes in common stocks as well as entire subsidiaries (and subs of subs).  The significant change at Berkshire in the past two decades is moving from a mix of 80% stocks with 20% subsidiaries to the opposite, now 80% subsidiaries with 20% stocks.  That underscores the unnoticed change: in addition to Munger, Buffett’s most important model is not only Graham but Murphy, who built Capital Cities/ABC in the way that Buffett has consciously emulated in the recent building of Berkshire.

For me, this year’s meeting was a particularly joy because I’ve just completed the manuscript of my next book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values (Columbia University Press, available October 2014). It articulates and consolidates these themes through a close and delightful look at its fifty-plus subsidiaries, based in part on interviews and surveys of many subsidiary CEOs and other Berkshire insiders and shareholders.   The draft jacket copy follows. Read More

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The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy

I’m pleased to announce that my article with Professor Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum. L. Rev. 583 (2014), is now out in print.  You can download the final published version at SSRN.  Here’s the abstract:

One of the great ironies about information privacy law is that the primary regulation of privacy in the United States has barely been studied in a scholarly way. Since the late 1990s, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been enforcing companies’ privacy policies through its authority to police unfair and deceptive trade practices. Despite over fifteen years of FTC enforcement, there is no meaningful body of judicial decisions to show for it. The cases have nearly all resulted in settlement agreements. Nevertheless, companies look to these agreements to guide their privacy practices. Thus, in practice, FTC privacy jurisprudence has become the broadest and most influential regulating force on information privacy in the United States — more so than nearly any privacy statute or any common law tort.

In this Article, we contend that the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is functionally equivalent to a body of common law, and we examine it as such. We explore how and why the FTC, and not contract law, came to dominate the enforcement of privacy policies. A common view of the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is that it is thin, merely focusing on enforcing privacy promises. In contrast, a deeper look at the principles that emerge from FTC privacy “common law” demonstrates that the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence is quite thick. The FTC has codified certain norms and best practices and has developed some baseline privacy protections. Standards have become so specific they resemble rules. We contend that the foundations exist to develop this “common law” into a robust privacy regulatory regime, one that focuses on consumer expectations of privacy, extends far beyond privacy policies, and involves a full suite of substantive rules that exist independently from a company’s privacy representations.

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Making Changes to Fundamental Law

Thanks to Deven, Gerard, and everyone else at Concurring Opinions for the warm welcome.  I plan to blog a bit about the new book, America’s Forgotten Constitutions, as well as some matters related to ongoing research.

A few words about the conception of the book.  It combines American history and legal theory in a way that I hope tells us some new things about events and ideas that have already received some scholarly attention.  It also analyzes some events in constitutionally significant terms when they previously have not received such treatment (e.g., the world federalist movement, the recent drafting of an Aryan constitution).  In doing so, the book seeks to shed light on certain recurring theoretical questions about our constitutional process, writ large.  The primary organizing themes are the dual meta-principles of written constitutionalism and popular sovereignty, combined by the Framers of the U.S. Constitution and unleashed on the population.  I’m interested in how average people adapt these basic principles to forge new relationships and communities, develop novel procedures for authorizing a constitution, and defend extra-legal tactics.

The book’s ambition is to go beyond current treatments of “popular constitutionalism”–so we can have an honest discussion about the energizing and dangerous aspects of our political tradition.  I pick eight examples where Americans wrote constitutions at various important moments in time, in order to explore these questions.  The colorful cast of characters consists of squatters, native Americans, slaveholders, abolitionists, socialists, world federalists, black nationalists, and white separatists.  I explore how the functions of writing and notions of sovereignty mutate after the Founding period.

Allow me to begin by suggesting that these constitution-writing episodes push us to reevaluate what we think we know about the procedure for making constitutional law.  Just to get the ball rolling, much of the literature identifies the following ways of altering fundamental law (let’s note but for now bracket the crucial lurking question of the relative legitimacy of each approach):

1.  Making foundational law during a true revolutionary moment, marked by political breakdown or some other break in historical time, when procedural questions are up for grabs along with substantive commitments.

2.  Formally amending a constitutional text (in the U.S. Constitution, according to the process outlined in Article V) without rejecting the continuing legitimacy of the legal order created.

3.  Creatively using conventional national institutions (say, by one party winning successive elections, enacting transformative laws, making key judicial appointments, winning landmark decisions through litigation).  Again, this is done without rejecting the authority of the overarching legal order.

4.  Gaining control of key bureaucracies (White House, OLC, DOD) or forging government-private relationships (such as Federalist Society-DOJ-Judiciary).  These social networks may not be lasting, but the goal is to achieve major shifts in substantive law rather than to overthrow an entire system.

5.  Creating a social movement that signals popular discontent, shapes public debate, forces national institutions to rethink governing commitments.

What are the protagonists in my stories doing?  For the most part, options # 2, # 3, and # 4 elude their grasp.  Typically, they compose a small group holding marginalized ideas, so it is not realistic to dominate any particular political party, win successive elections, or gain ideological control of key institutions.  Even where, as with the Confederates, they enjoyed a degree of access to formal power at the national level, they have given up on the possibility of making fundamental law within the conventional rules.  Option # 5 is possible for a few of my groups, but in the main they find themselves on the outliers of oppositional movements and trends.  In fact, the act of writing a constitution signals their differences with other dissenters in terms of state-building goals and tactics, not to mention the depths of their despondency that legal change through conventional means is possible.

None of my popular legal theorists believes that anything in the 1787 Constitution or our political tradition requires preapproval to write a new constitution; it merely dictates how rewrites of the existing one must be accomplished.  The right to write is inherent and fundamental.  They also agree that the people have the power to alter the basis and terms of political community.  Where they tend to differ is over tactics and procedures.

For some–let’s call them the classical revolutionaries–they believe themselves to be engaged in process # 1.  They confidently point to ample evidence of political breakdown, and argue that they are justified in authoring a new governing document and coming up with completely new protocols for deliberation and ratification.  This best captures the slaveholding statesmen who formed the Confederate States of America, though their theory of consent is vigorously disputed by Lincoln and other defenders of the 1787 Constitution.

At first blush, the classical situation also seemingly captures John Brown’s proposal for a new republican form of government and the Republic of New Afrika’s constitution created by the followers of Malcolm X after his assassination.  In both cases, people’s conventions determined that the original Constitution did not bind them, either because it was irreparably broken due to slavery and racial subjugation, or because the Framers never gained the rightful consent of the governed (i.e., slaves and former slaves).

Here’s where it gets complicated.  Most people don’t agree the country faces a true revolutionary moment.  Each dissident group gains supporters, but never enough regular folks to threaten the national legal order as a social movement, or enough elites to control any formal levers of power.  Each struggles with the question of violence as a tool for constitutional change, ultimately concluding that under extreme circumstances targeted violence is justified by the political tradition.  Force, they believe, can be constitutionally used to liberate slaves or defend against private and public acts of violence, inequality, and degradation.  Each group has national aspirations: in the case of John Brown, he hopes his constitutional vision will supplant the tottering slave-holding vision propped up by the High Court; for Imari and Gaidi Obadele, the goal is to convince the U.S. to give up the former slaveholding states so a black republic can be established.

As they await better conditions for revolutionary consolidation, created by themselves or others, they decide to start living out their constitutional principles.  In other words, their constitutions are not simply pieces of paper to be discussed one day if enough people are intrigued.  This shift toward social implementation is somewhat seamless for their respective communities because they espouse a strong dose of what I call “ethical sovereignty”–the notion that true legal authority derives from shared moral beliefs.  They begin to sustain law-based communities despite lacking control of territory and not completing the tasks of authorizing and implementing their constitutions.  In fact, while they see themselves as pursuing strategy # 1, I think both groups at some point transition into a different strategy of constitutional change: modeling an alternative community.  The Republic of New Afrika lasts longer than John Brown’s group, mostly because Brown decided to force the action at Harpers Ferry, and his execution decimates that nascent law-based community.  But New Afrikans are also better at it in that they reach more deeply into the recruitable population.

Once we see that dissenters can use imperfectly authorized constitutions to model alternative communities (let’s now call it strategy # 6), we start to notice other things.  Modeling derives from the same basic principles of popular sovereignty and written constitutionalism.  Modeling can stand alone or supplement any of the other strategies for constitutional change.  Innovative use of state and local laws (not simply national laws and institutions) can facilitate the formation of alternative constitution-based communities (more on this in a future post).  Suddenly, we start to notice a lot more groups of people writing constitutions, for all sorts of reasons and to varying degrees of success.

 

Now you can insist on control of your material. You can insist on veto power over everything; down to casting and choice of directors and script approval, you can insist on all those things. J.K. Rowling insisted on all those things. And J.K. Rowling got all those things because there were enough people interested in that. Now if you’re not J.K. Rowling, and you insist on all those things, the studios are not going to be very interested or less studios will be interested in it so you’ll get less money or none at all. Or alternatively, you can not insist on everything and you can just sell them the book and what they do with it is what they do with it and you have to live with it. You no longer have approval over anything, you no longer have…you know what I mean? And those are the two extremes. In between of course there’s a vast area of shades of gray.

— George R. R Martin

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George R. R. Martin on Copyright, Inheritance, and Creative Control

He cares much more about French dynastic history than you do.

He cares much more about French dynastic history than you do.

This is Part 3 of the interview I did with George R. R. Martin in  2007.  For background and part 1, click here.  For Part 2, click here. For the audio file, click here.

HOFFMAN: Yeah, but you just generally right. The trope something that really speaks to folks. I guess maybe that raises a question about your fans generally. You’ve obviously got a huge fan base and I’ve been reading a little bit about them. One question that comes up a bunch of different times is fan fiction and what do you think about fan fiction?

MARTIN: I’m opposed to fan fiction.

HOFFMAN: Why?

MARTIN: Well number one, its copyright infringement and it can potentially endanger my copyrights and my trademarks if I were to allow it. Also, yes maybe it’s a gesture of love that they love your characters and they love your world and all that but it’s not the kind of gesture of love that I really want. And for aspiring writers and some of these people, sure it’s a wide range of fan fiction writers, some who are terrible. Some of them are actually talented writers. I think for the talented writers it’s particularly tragic because they should be doing their own material.

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Economic Dynamics and Economic Justice: Making Law Catastrophic, Middling, or Better?

Contrary to Livermore,’s post,  in my view Driesen’s book is particularly powerful as a window into the  profound absurdity and destructiveness of the neoclassical economic framework, rather than as a middle-ground tweaking some of its techniques.  Driesen’s economic dynamics lens makes a more important contribution than many contemporary legal variations on neoclassical economic themes by shifting some major assumptions, though this book does not explore that altered terrain as far as it might.

At first glance, Driesen’s foregrounding of the “dynamic” question of change over time may, as Livermore suggests, seem to be consistent with the basic premise of neoclassical law and economics:   that incentives matter, and that law should focus ex ante, looking forward at those effects.   A closer look through Driesen’s economic dynamics lens reveals how law and economics tends to instead take a covert ex post view that enshrines some snapshots of the status quo as a neutral baseline.  The focus on “efficiency” – on maximizing an abstract pie of “welfare”  given existing constraints —  constructs the consequences of law as essentially fixed by other people’s private choices, beyond the power and politics of the policy analyst and government, without consideration of how past and present and future rights or wrongs constrain or enable those choices.  In this neoclassical view, the job of law is narrowed to the technical task of measuring some imagined sum of these individual preferences shaped through rational microeconomic bargains that represent a middling stasis of existing values and resources, reached through tough tradeoffs that nonetheless promise to constantly bring us toward that glimmering goal of maximizing overall societal gain (“welfare”) from scarce resources.

Driesen reverses that frame by focusing on complex change over time as the main thing we can know with certainty.  In the economic dynamic vision, “law creates a temporally extended commitment to a better future.” (Driesen p. 52). Read More

All fiction to some degree takes place in an invented world, with invented people doing unreal things. In a way the upside down definition may be the most useful - fantasy is books published by fantasy imprints and shelved in the fantasy sections. As far as what content makes a book a fantasy book rather than general fiction, it varies with the reader. I guess you know it when you see it. Although magic swords are often a giveaway.

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Law and Hard Fantasy Interview Series: Joe Abercrombie

joe_abercrombieThis post is a part of our ongoing interview series with fantasy authors who generally write in the burgeoning genre of gritty / hard / dark epic fantasy.   The series began with this book review post, and continued with interviews of George R. R. Martin and Patrick Rothfuss, and Mark Lawrence.

Today, I’m interviewing Joe Abercrombie.  Joe is the author, most famously, of the “First Law” trilogy, and some more recent spin-offs set in that world.  Joe’s writing is characterized by dark (very, very dark) humor, grit (as in dirt), and an unhealthy amount of revenge.  He’s on twitter, he has a blog, and he was nice enough to agree to answer some questions from me about his writing and its relationship to law.

DH: There’s been a lot of talk in recent years about the collapse of the “fantasy” and “fiction” categories. Is there anything useful about the distinction? If so, what are the minimal characteristics of books that would stay on your fantasy shelf?

JA: Any question about definitions and categorisations is always a complicated one, with lots of confusions and blurry areas. All fiction to some degree takes place in an invented world, with invented people doing unreal things. In a way the upside down definition may be the most useful – fantasy is books published by fantasy imprints and shelved in the fantasy sections. As far as what content makes a book a fantasy book rather than general fiction, it varies with the reader. I guess you know it when you see it. Although magic swords are often a giveaway.

DH: One marker of the trend toward harder / darker fantasy is more fulsome world-building and world-planning. But you are well-known as a guy who hates maps (recent books excepted!) Here’s a practical question: do you sit down and think about the rules of the world before you start to write, or do you start writing and work them out as you go along?

JA: I don’t know that I’d necessarily agree with your first assertion, there. I think a marker of the trend towards harder/darker fantasy is a greater focus on character and internal life over setting and world building, certainly I see that as key in what I’m doing. But you want the backdrop to be consistent and coherent. So you have some ideas about the rules of the world. Certainly you have some strong ideas about the effect certain cultures will have on the way the characters think. That’s the kind of world building I’m most interested in, I suppose you could say, the kind that has a direct effect on the behaviour of the characters, rather than the kind that specifies exactly how many thousand years the tower of Zarb had guarded Dragonfire Pass.

DH: What do you have against maps anyway?

JA: I love maps. I have loads of them. But I don’t necessarily want to share them with the reader. I want the reader to see the action in close up, not wide shot. I want them to be with the characters, not thinking so much about the setting.

DH: Is there any civil law in your world? By that, I mean a system by which contractual breaches and torts are enforced outside of blood feuds, deeds are recorded, property disputes disposed of? What does that system look like?

JA: It depends a little on the culture. In the North there has been a relatively primitive tradition of ownership by clans, judgement by elders and chieftains, but it’s broken down during a period of sustained warfare and a new king has tried to impose a new and much more centralised system, with varying success. The Union, by contrast, has a well-established aristocracy and a complex and extensive centralising bureaucracy, although with a weak king on the throne and a lot of pressure from external threats it’s become rather a corrupt system, prone to being carved into personal fiefdoms by powerful and charismatic individuals in the government. Hardly surprising, in a way, since the whole thing has been explicitly designed to allow one man (Bayaz) to maintain control. The whole thing’s further distorted by the conflict between old power and new money, as the Union has spread to include more diverse cultures and the merchant class has gained in influence.

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FAN.1 (First Amendment News)

From time to time, I will post some First Amendment news items that might otherwise escape the attention of free expression enthusiasts.  It may be about a controversy or brief or new book or article or conference or what have you.  If you wish to send along your own newsworthy item for consideration, drop my an e-mail.  With that, here is my first dollop of news:

  • On February 15th the Harvard Law Review will host a conference on “Freedom of the Press” in celebration of the 50th anniversary of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.  Participants include: Mark Tushnet (Harvard), Stuart Benjamin (Duke), Sonja R. West (U. Ga.), RonNell Andersen Jones (BYU), David Anderson (U. TX), Marvin Ammori (New America Foundation), Marjorie Heins (Free Expression Policy Project), Jonathan Zittrain (Harvard), Rebecca Tushnet (Georgetown), Caroline Corbin (U. Miami), Jack Balkin (Yale), Yochai Benkler (Harvard), and Dawn Nunziato (GWU).
  • Speaking of NYT v. Sullivan, Lee Levine (a noted First Amendment media lawyer) and Steve Wermiel (a professor at American University Law School) have just published The Progeny: Justice William Brennan’s Fight to Save New York Times v. Sullivan (American Bar Association, 2014). Check out my SCOTUSblog interview with the authors.
  • Recently, the Minnesota Law Review published a thought-proving article titled “Speech Engines” by James Grimmelmann (U. MD Law).  It is one of the best pieces of scholarship I have seen concerning the regulatory debates over just how the law – of copyright, trademark, defamation, privacy and of the First Amendment – should treat Google’s search engines.
  • Gabriel Schoenfeld, writing in the Weekly Standard, just reviewed Floyd Abrams’ latest book, Friend of the Court: On the Front Lines with the First Amendment (Yale University Press, 2013).  (For Mr. Abrams’ views on McCullen v. Coakley (the Mass. abortion-protest case now before the Court), see  Jonathan H. Adler’s post over at the Volokh Conspiracy.)
  • This June Yale Law School Dean Robert Post will release his latest book, Citizens Divided: Campaign Finance Reform and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 234 pp., $25.00).  The book is an outgrowth of Post’s 2013 Tanner Lectures at Harvard.  Here is a little excerpt from the publisher’s blurb: “Defenders of the First Amendment greeted the ruling with enthusiasm, while advocates of electoral reform recoiled in disbelief. Robert Post offers a new constitutional theory that seeks to reconcile these sharply divided camps.” Post’s text is followed by commentaries by Pamela S. Karlan, Lawrence Lessig, Frank I. Michelman, and Nadia Urbinati.
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Google Books and the Social (Justice) Contract

In channeling Judge Baer, Judge Chin at long last dropped the other shoe in the judicial effort to bring new information technology uses for copyrighted works fully in to the copyright regime. Congress has been slow to address the challenge of tapping the full copyright social utility/justice potential of these advances and it’s been left to the courts to sort it all out in the context of individual adversarial conflicts. Poignantly, when Jonathan Band asks “What [was] the Authors Guild fighting for?”, he also illustrates the tree-myopic/forest blind nature of the Guild’s position. What the Guild failed to see is that property rights fit into a larger socio-legal system: Yes your neighbor is precluded from trespassing on to your land but your ability to engage in whatever “private” activity strikes your fancy while thereon is limited by the legal system as a whole. Your land is individual private property, not an independent sovereign state.

 

Judge Baer reminded rights holders of this aspect of the social contract and now Judge Chin has made it clear to the Guild that this is not some narrow, eccentric application of copyright social utility. Property rights, including copyrights, exist to advance society, and to state the obvious, information technology has evolved our society. Like all other rights, customs, and expectations, however, whereas some aspects of copyright as previously envisioned fit comfortably into our new configuration others don’t fit at all. And when that ill-fit impedes important social progress modifications must be made, and if necessary, expectations altered.

 

The courts’ reasoning in both Hathitrust and Google Books moves fair use jurisprudence further toward the express consideration of copyright social justice in the application of the doctrine. As Kevin Smith notes, the judges in both cases have seized this opportunity to retrofit fair use, and it seems to me that these decisions push beyond questions of aesthetic and even functional transformation and pave the way for weighing social transformation in assessing the first fair use factor. I have also applied some of the legal conclusions drawn from Bill Graham Archives and other Grateful Dead archive projects to specific copyright social justice needs, for example, that of socially beneficent access to the literature of the Harlem Renaissance. Like some other historically and culturally important works, many of these books enjoy only marginal commercial market value and similar to the information harvested through data mining, “digital fair use” may be the only means by which to return these works to the general public. The social resuscitation of significant works through mass-digitization, and other uses that serve important and otherwise unattainable copyright social objectives, should be considered a purpose that satisfies the first fair use factor.

 

Authors and other copyrights holders would do well to finally get ahead of the information technology curve. The Authors Guild’s mistake was not so much in the effort to preserve what they considered to be their property rights or even in the effort to extract every conceivable drop of revenue out those rights, but rather, in failing to accept that in order for these rights to retain any value they must function as part of a thriving societal system or eventually forfeit the basis for legal recognition. In the analog world, the public’s access to most books remains largely dependent upon the vagaries of the commercial marketplace. Digital information technology has presented the opportunity to compile the world’s books toward the creation of global libraries accessible to every human being on a socially equitable basis. To believe that analog social inequity will be permitted to endure indefinitely in the face of digital information possibilities is simply unrealistic. Keeping in mind that the stimulation, perpetuation, and re-ignition of the cultural expression/dissemination/inspiration combustive cycle is the raison d’etre of copyright will enable authors to embrace digital change and as Gil Scott Heron sang, possibly even direct the change rather than simply be put through it.