Category: Administrative Law

15

Swindling/Selling, Bribing/Contributing, Extorting/Taxing

At the recent Security and Human Behavior conference, I got into a conversation that highlighted perhaps my favorite legal book ever, Arthur Leff’s “Swindling and Selling.”  Although it is out of print, one measure of its wonderfulness is that used copies sell now for $125.  Then, in my class this week on The Ethics of Washington Lawyering (yes, it’s a fun title), I realized that a key insight from Leff’s book applies to two other areas – what is allowed in campaign finance and what counts as extortion in political office.

Swindling/selling.  The insight I always remember from Leff is to look at the definition of swindling: “Alice sells something to Bob that Bob thinks has value.”  Here is the definition of selling: “Alice sells something to Bob that Bob thinks has value.”  See?  The exchange is identical – Bob hands Alice money.  The difference is sociological (what society values) and economic (can Bob resell the item).  But the structure of the transaction is the same.

Bribing/contributing.  So here is a bribe: “Alice gives Senator Bob $10,000 and Bob later does things that benefit Alice, such as a tax break.”  Here is a campaign contribution: “Alice gives Senator Bob $10,000 and Bob later does things that benefit Alice, such as a tax break.”  Again, the structure of the transaction is identical.  There are two likely differences: (1) to prove the bribe, the prosecutor has to show that Bob did the later action because of the $10,000; and (2) Alice is probably careful enough to give the money to Bob’s campaign, and not to him personally.

 Extorting/taxing.  Here is the classic political extortion: “Alice hires Bob, and Bob has to hand back ten percent of his salary to Alice each year.”  Here is how it works when a federal or state government hires someone: “Alice hires Bob, and Bob has to hand back ten percent of his salary to Alice each year.”  The structure of the transaction is the same – Bob keeps 90% of the salary and gives 10% to Alice.  The difference here?  Like the previous example, the existence of bureaucracy turns the bad thing (bribing or extorting) into the acceptable thing (contributing/taxing).  In the modern government, Alice hires Bob, and Bob sends the payment to the IRS.  The 10% does not go to Alice’s personal use, but the payment on Bob’s side may feel much the same.

For each of these, drawing the legal distinction will be really hard because the structure of the transaction is identical for the lawful thing (selling, contributing, taxing) and for the criminal thing (swindling, bribing, extorting).  Skeptics can see every transaction as the latter, and there is no objective way to prove that the transaction is actually legitimate.

I am wondering, did people know this already?  Are there citations to previous works that explain all of this?  Or, perhaps, is this a simple framework for describing things that sheds some light and merits further discussion?

9

Nepotism and the Cabinet

Title 5, §3110 of the United States Code states:

A public official may not appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian position in the agency in which he is serving or over which he exercises jurisdiction or control any individual who is a relative of the public official.

This anti-corruption statute is reasonable enough, but the plain language also applies to the President.  In other words, John F. Kennedy could not have appointed Robert Kennedy as Attorney General if this provision had existed in 1961.  (The statute was enacted in 1967, probably in response to RFK’s nomination.)

I have serious doubts that Section 3110 is constitutional as applied to a President.  First, as far as I can tell, this is the only statutory limit on the President’s authority to choose his political appointees.  Separation-of-powers would suggest that Congress cannot intrude so bluntly into his discretion to choose close advisors.  Second, if the position is subject to Senate confirmation, that represents an adequate check on executive excess.  Third, presidents would take a significant political hit if they abused their appointment authority to help out friends and relatives.  (BTW, what does relative mean?  Any relation?  Only a spouse, child, or sibling?)

0

The Right to Data Portability (RDP) as a Per Se Anti-tying Rule

Yesterday I gave a presentation on “The Right to Data Portability: Privacy and Antitrust Analysis” at a conference at the George Mason Law School. In an earlier post here, I asked whether the proposed EU right to data portability violates antitrust law.

I think the presentation helped sharpen the antitrust concern.  The presentation first develops the intuition that consumers should want a right to data portability (RDP), which is proposed in Article 18 of the EU Data Protection Regulation.  RDP seems attractive, at least initially, because it might prevent consumers getting locked in to a software platform, and because it advances the existing EU right of access to one’s own data.

Turning to antitrust law, I asked how antitrust law would consider a rule that, say, prohibits an operating system from being integrated with software for a browser.  We saw those facts, of course, in the Microsoft case decided by the DC Circuit over a decade ago.  Plaintiffs asserted an illegal “tying” arrangement between Windows and IE.  The court rejected a per se rule against tying of software, because integration of software can have many benefits and innovation in software relies on developers finding new ways to put things together.  The court instead held that the rule of reason applies.

RDP, however, amounts to a per se rule against tying of software.  Suppose a social network offers a networking service and integrates that with software that has various features for exporting or not exporting data in various formats.  We have the tying product (social network) and the tied product (module for export or not of data).  US antitrust law has rejected a per se rule here.  The EU proposed regulation essentially adopts a per se rule against that sort of tying arrangement.

Modern US and EU antitrust law seek to enhance “consumer welfare.”  If the Microsoft case is correct, then a per se rule of the sort in the Regulation quite plausibly reduces consumer welfare.  There may be other reasons to adopt RDP, as discussed in the slides (and I hope in my future writing).  RDP might advance human rights to access.  It might enhance openness more generally on the Internet.  But it quite possibly reduces consumer welfare, and that deserves careful attention.

0

UCLA Law Review Vol. 59, Issue 4 (April 2012)

Volume 59, Issue 4 (April 2012)


Articles

Liability Holding Companies Anat R. Admati, Peter Conti-Brown & Paul Pfleiderer 852
Congress in Court Amanda Frost 914


Comments

The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism Amy Kapczynski 970
More Than Just a Formality: Instant Authorship and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age Brad A. Greenberg 1028
Reconciling Caperton and Citizens United: When Campaign Spending Should Compel Recusal of Elected Officials Samuel P. Siegel 1076
2

Brett Frischmann’s Contribution to Policy Debates Regarding Governance of Infrastructures

Because the framing of issues is so critical to how policy debates are conducted and policy outcomes are ultimately chosen, Brett’s analysis contributes to more balanced discussion within policy debates related to governance of infrastructures. Brett’s book emphasizes the functional role both of infrastructure resources to society and of commons as a resource management strategy, providing important insights for considering appropriate governance of infrastructure resources. Its analytical strength stems from development of a typology of different infrastructures “based on the types of systems dependent on the infrastructural resource and the distribution of productive activities it facilitates” (p. 61), which is then used to understand the importance of (what Brett describes as) demand-side characteristics of various types of infrastructures. This demand-side functional approach is contrasted with the supply-side approach that has tended to dominate the focus of policy debates related to governance of infrastructures.

To understand Brett’s analysis, it is critical to understand the definitions of component terms and certain economic and legal concepts upon which his analysis is based. For this reason, one has to patiently work their way through substantial portions of the book that lay the foundation for understanding how his typology contributes to understanding commons management (a form of nondiscriminatory access rule) to infrastructures both generally and in specific contexts. This is a compliment – not a criticism – of how Brett took on the challenge of carefully constructing analytical arguments, particularly from concepts of law and economics of which readers are likely familiar but perhaps with differing shades of meaning.

However, it is also challenging to accurately incorporate the research of others who are also attempting to contribute towards a more balanced policy debate of governance related to access to infrastructures. In this regard, for me, a weakness in the analysis throughout Brett’s book is some inaccuracies (or insufficient clarity) as to the functional role of various bodies of law that have developed to address access problems in varying contexts. For example, discussion of common carriage (see p. 218) conflates origins of the common law of common carriage and public utilities. The origins of common carriage obligations are based on duties under tort law; and it is public utility law, not common carriage, that developed in part from laws of franchise and monopoly. But because some infrastructures – such as railroads, telegraphy and telephony – are both common carriers and public utilities, the distinctive functional roles of the two bodies of law have come to be conflated and misunderstood. This conflation, in turn, has tended to mislead discourse related to many deregulatory telecommunications policies, including network neutrality.

Therefore, in my view, the contribution of Brett’s work towards a more balanced policy discussion of governance of infrastructures would be further strengthened by juxtaposition of his functional approach to infrastructure resources with a more carefully delineated (and accurate), functional approach to the various bodies of law that have developed thus far to address varying forms of infrastructure access problems.

 

0

Introduction: Symposium on Infrastructure: the Social Value of Shared Resources

I am incredibly grateful to Danielle, Deven, and Frank for putting this symposium together, to Concurring Opinions for hosting, and to all of the participants for their time and engagement. It is an incredible honor to have my book discussed by such an esteemed group of experts. 

The book is described here (OUP site) and here (Amazon). The Introduction and Table of Contents are available here.

Abstract:

Shared infrastructures shape our lives, our relationships with each other, the opportunities we enjoy, and the environment we share. Think for a moment about the basic supporting infrastructures that you rely on daily. Some obvious examples are roads, the Internet, water systems, and the electric power grid, to name just a few. In fact, there are many less obvious examples, such as our shared languages, legal institutions, ideas, and even the atmosphere. We depend heavily on shared infrastructures, yet it is difficult to appreciate how much these resources contribute to our lives because infrastructures are complex and the benefits provided are typically indirect.

The book devotes much-needed attention to understanding how society benefits from infrastructure resources and how management decisions affect a wide variety of private and public interests. It links infrastructure, a particular set of resources defined in terms of the manner in which they create value, with commons, a resource management principle by which a resource is shared within a community.

Infrastructure commons are ubiquitous and essential to our social and economic systems. Yet we take them for granted, and frankly, we are paying the price for our lack of vision and understanding. Our shared infrastructures—the lifeblood of our economy and modern society—are crumbling. We need a more systematic, long-term vision that better accounts for how infrastructure commons contribute to social welfare.

In this book, I try to provide such a vision. The first half of the book is general and not focused on any particular infrastructure resource. It cuts across different resource systems and develops a framework for understanding societal demand for infrastructure resources and the advantages and disadvantages of commons management (by which I mean, managing the infrastructure resource in manner that does not discriminate based on the identity of the user or use). The second half of the book applies the theoretical framework to different types of infrastructure—e.g., transportation, communications, environmental, and intellectual resources—and examines different institutional regimes that implement commons management. It then wades deeply into the contentious “network neutrality” debate and ends with a brief discussion of some other modern debates.

Throughout, I raise a host of ideas and arguments that probably deserve/require more sustained attention, but at 436 pages, I had to exercise some restraint, right? Many of the book’s ideas and arguments are bound to be controversial, and I hope some will inspire others. I look forward to your comments, criticisms, and questions.

1

Cybersecurity Legislation and the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board

Along with a lot of other privacy folks, I have a lot of concerns about the cybersecurity legislation moving through Congress.  I had an op-ed in The Hill yesterday going through some of the concerns, notably the problems with the over broad  “information sharing” provisions.

Writing the op-ed, though, prompted me to highlight one positive step that should happen in the course of the cybersecurity debate.  The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board was designed in large part to address information sharing.  This past Wednesday, the Senate Judiciary Committee had the hearing to consider the bipartisan slate of five nominees.

Here’s the point.  The debate on CISPA and other cybersecurity legislation has highlighted all the information sharing that is going on already and that may be going on in the near future.  The PCLOB is the institution designed to oversee problems with information sharing.  So let’s confirm the nominees and get the PCLOB up and running as soon as possible.

The quality of the nominees is very high.  David Medine, nominated to be Chair, helped develop the FTC’s privacy approach in the 1990’s and has worked on privacy compliance since, so he knows what should be done and what is doable.  Jim Dempsey has been at the Center of Democracy and Technology for over 15 years, and is a world-class expert on government, privacy, and civil liberties.  Pat Wald is the former Chief Judge of the DC Circuit.  Her remarkably distinguished career includes major experience on international human rights issues.  I don’t have experience with the other two nominees, but the hearing exposed no red flags for any of them.

The debates about cybersecurity legislation show the centrality of information sharing to how government will respond to cyber-threats.  So we should have the institution in place to make sure that the information sharing is done in a lawful and sensible way, to be effective and also to protect privacy and civil liberties.

13

Banning Forced Disclosure of Social Network Passwords and the Polygraph Precedent

The Maryland General Assembly has just become the first state legislature to vote to ban employers’ from requiring employees to reveal their Facebook or other social network passwords.  Other states are considering similar bills, and Senators Schumer and Blumenthal are pushing the idea in Congress.

As often happens in privacy debates, there are concerns from industry that well-intentioned laws will have dire consequences — Really Dangerous People might get into positions of trust, so we need to permit employers to force their employees to open up their Facebook accounts to their bosses.

Also, as often happens in privacy debates, people breathlessly debate the issue as though it is completely new and unprecedented.

We do have a precedent, however.  In 1988, Congress enacted the Employee Polygraph Protection Act  (EPPA).  The EPPA says that employers don’t get to know everything an employee is thinking.  Polygraphs are flat-out banned in almost all employment settings.  The law was signed by President Reagan, after Secretary of State George Shultz threatened to resign rather than take one.

The idea behind the EPPA and the new Maryland bill are similar — employees have a private realm where they can think and be a person, outside of the surveillance of the employer.  Imagine a polygraph if your boss asked what you really thought about him/her.  Imagine your social networking activities if your boss got to read your private messages and impromptu thoughts.

For private sector employers, the EPPA has quite narrow exceptions, such as for counter-intelligence, armored car personnel, and employees who are suspected of causing economic loss.  That list of exceptions can be a useful baseline to consider for social network passwords.

In summary — longstanding and bipartisan support to block this sort of intrusion into employees’ private lives.  The social networks themselves support this ban on having employers require the passwords.  I think we should, too.

14

Viewpoint, Voting, and Structuring the Electorate

I am delighted to join the blogging community of Concurring Opinions for the month of April.  Thanks to Solangel Maldonado and Daniel Solove for their gracious invitation.

Denying voting rights to citizens with felony convictions has gotten a bad rap. The reason it’s not worse is because that rap is based on only half the story.  Anyone familiar with the complexion of our prison population knows that felon disfranchisement laws extend striking racial disparities to the electoral arena.  Less known, however, is that citizens with felony convictions are excluded from the electorate, in part, because of perceptions about how this demographic might vote or otherwise affect the marketplace of ideas.  In other words, citizens with felony convictions are denied the right to vote because of their suspected viewpoint.

Picking up on this point earlier this year, Michael Dorf highlighted a dispute between Republican presidential candidates Mitt Romney and Rick Santorum about which of them held the most conservative position concerning the voting rights of citizens convicted of a felony.  Inventing a criminal persona named Snake, Dorf queried what issues might provoke such a person to vote: Lower protections for private property or public safety? Redistribution of public resources from law enforcement to education, health, or recreation?  Elimination of certain criminal laws?  I can fathom many other lawful motivations for voting.  However, as Dorf points out (and decidedly rejects), the underlying objection to allowing citizens with felony convictions to vote is based on an assumption that, if they could vote, they would express self-serving and illegitimate interests. In other words, the viewpoint that felons would express through voting has no place in the electoral process.

I have always assumed that my viewpoint was precisely what I and other voters are supposed to express at the ballot box.  Whether that viewpoint is shared, accepted, condoned or vehemently disdained and abhorred by others is irrelevant to the right to vote.  Not so for citizens with felony convictions.  This group of citizens is presumed to possess deviant views that justify their exclusion from the electorate and the denial of a fundamental right. Read More

1

Recommended Reading: Harlan Yu and David Robinson on The New Ambiguity of “Open Government”

Last week, we had an engrossing discussion of Julie Cohen’s Configuring The Networked Self, which embraces three key principles for protecting the structural conditions of human flourishing, including transparency of networked architecture which routes, shapes, and determines the collection, use, and flow of information.  Harlan Yu of Princeton’s Center for Information Technology Policy and David Robinson of the Yale Information Society Project have done important work puzzling through the question of transparency, and the related concerns of privacy and civil engagement, in “open government” efforts.  Their conclusion:

Separating technological from political “openness”—separating the ideal of adaptable data from that of transparent politics—will yield benefits for all sides. New technologies, cut free from the heavy political burdens they have recently been made to carry, will be free to assume their widely varied natural roles, spreading throughout government in nimble and unpredictable ways, and helping governments at every level pursue all kinds of objectives. The Internet will still help, where it can, to make regimes more transparent.

At the same time, a clearer focus on transparency will give political reformers, who will no longer be shoehorned together with technologists, more freedom to focus on the political questions that motivate them in the first place. From their perspective, technology will do what it always does when working well: fade into the background and make room for human concerns.

When I spoke at Princeton about my work on Technological Due Process, Robinson and Yu helped me puzzle through my privacy concerns about Government 2.0, which I then developed in “Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust Privacy Protections,” 78 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 822 (2010).  They are exciting thinkers, and their newest piece helps us appreciate and conceptualize calls for transparency and open government and the appropriate role technologists and technology can and should play.