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Category: Administrative Law


“Would Winston Smith and Josef K. please return to the gate? Your flight is ready to depart.”

Yesterday the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit released its opinion in Latif v. Holder.  Ayman Latif is a U.S. Citizen and disabled Marine Corps veteran who lives in Egypt.  Airport officials in Cairo prevented him from boarding a plane to return to the United States, where he needed to attend a scheduled disability evaluation.  Latif sought help from the U.S. Embassy, but he alleges that months later, after lengthy FBI interviews and polygraph tests, American officials told him that he could fly to the United States only as a “one-time thing,” without any guarantee that he would be allowed to return to his wife and daughters in Egypt.  He refused the offer and his benefits as a disabled veteran were cut.

Latif filed suit, along with other citizens and lawful permanent residents in the U.S. and abroad who alleged similar treatment.  They all claimed that they were prevented from traveling because the United States Government  placed them on its No Fly List.  This unanimous court of appeals decision opens a door to judicial review that, until yesterday, the Government had succeeded in keeping tightly shut.  After the break, I’ll provide a brief review of the current system and then analyze how the Ninth Circuit’s opinion presents a substantial opportunity for change.

(Full Disclosure:  Readers might recall me as a past guest at Concurring Opinions.  My bio is here and my interest in this case comes from my work on a book to be published in December by the University of Michigan Press called Mrs. Shipley’s Ghost: The Right to Travel and Terrorist Watchlists.) Read More


Are Liberals Under-Estimating the Chances that the Catholic Hospitals Will Win Against the Health Care Act?

(Disclaimer — I decided soon after law school not to focus most of my efforts on the Supreme Court or con law.  There are brilliant people who work on it all the time, and I don’t.  But I am a law prof who can’t help noticing some things …)

Last week, liberals went through the near-death experience for the Affordable Care Act — far, far, far closer than the confident predictions of most liberals when the law was passed.

This week, I had the chance to speak in depth with an experienced liberal lawyer about the Next Big Constitutional Thing — the Catholic hospital challenges to the ACA’s requirements that contraception and other coverage must be included for the employees of hospitals, universities, and other Catholic institutions that are not themselves part of the Church.

The lawyer confidently predicted that the Catholic hospitals would lose.  After all, everyone knows the peyote case — Employment Division v. Smith, where a neutral state anti-drug law trumped a Free Exercise of religion argument that would have allowed an adherent to use peyote.  The lawyer said there was no precedent for the Catholic hospitals to win, such a holding would disrupt innumerable neutral state laws, and even Justice Scalia would be bound by his prior writings to find against the Catholic hospitals.

My reaction — “here we go again.”  It felt just like the over-confident predictions that the individual mandate inevitably would be upheld.  And my friend sounded like other liberals who have scoffed at the claims of the Catholic hospitals.

My instinct — as a realist prediction of the outcome, and not as a statement of my policy choice — is that the Catholic hospitals very possibly will win if the case goes to final judgment in the courts.

First, I don’t think Justice Scalia will find that a law prohibiting peyote (a “good” and long-standing law) is remotely similar to a law requiring the Catholic Church, for the first time in history, to buy an insurance package that pays for contraceptives.  He’ll think that the latter is a “bad” law.

Second, the Catholic Church has tens of millions of members in the U.S., and is not the splinter group at issue in the earlier case.  In a realist analysis, the views of a tiny church are not the same as those of the largest organized Church in western history.

Third, the views of the Church on contraception are sincere, widely publicized, and long-standing.  Although many individual Catholics don’t follow the doctrine on this issue, the institution of the Church is firmly on record on the issue.  This is not a pretext to take mind-altering drugs; it is a major doctrinal tenet.

Fourth, many Catholic hospitals are deeply religious institutions.  They often have a cross and a Bible in each room.  Many nuns and priests work in the hospitals.  Providing health care is deeply rooted in the mission of the Church, and has been for many years.  In other words, this is not the equivalent of “unrelated business income.”  Instead, religion and healing of the sick are thoroughly intertwined.

Fifth, and my apologies for mentioning it, six of the nine Supreme Court justices are Catholic.  I am not saying that a Catholic judge will hold for the Church any more than a white judge holds for whites and a black judge holds for blacks.  However, the justices will have deep personal knowledge of the healing tradition of Catholic hospitals.  They will read the briefs in the context of their personal knowledge.  I don’t think they will lightly assume that they are bound by cases with facts that seem to them quite different.

After we went through this list, my liberal friend said that he had adjusted his prediction.  He now thought that some of the district court cases, at least, would go for the Church.  He then added an extra idea — the case may arise under the Administrative Procedure Act, on whether the HHS rule was properly promulgated and consistent with the statute.  His point was that a court may have a “procedural” way to block the rule from mandating that the Catholic hospitals pay for insurance that covered contraceptives.  That might be an easier path for a judge to take than overturning Free Exercise case law, if the judge were inclined to stop the rule from taking effect.

Currently, there are over 20 challenges by Catholic hospitals to this provision.  Smart lawyers in each case will be trying to define distinctions that will retain the peyote precedent while letting the hospitals win this case.  Randy Barnett and others had a huge success with the “action/inaction” distinction about the individual mandate. My realist instincts are that we will see the emergence of clever, new distinctions for the hospital cases.

I think that many liberal con law experts were complacent when the individual mandate was challenged.  If they are complacent again about the Catholic hospital cases, then I, for one, will not be surprised to see the current HHS approach struck down.


Volume 59, Issue 5 (June 2012)

Volume 59, Issue 5 (June 2012)


Implicit Bias in the Courtroom Jerry Kang et al. 1124
The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure: Lessons From Administrative Law Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski 1188


Techniques for Mitigating Cognitive Biases in Fingerprint Identification Elizabeth J. Reese 1252
Credit CARD Act II: Expanding Credit Card Reform by Targeting Behavioral Biases Jonathan Slowik 1292
Shocking the Conscience: What Police Tasers and Weapon Technology Reveal About Excessive Force Law Aaron Sussman 1342

Stanford Law Review, 64.5 (2012)

Stanford Law Review

Volume 64 • Issue 5 • May 2012

The City and the Private Right of Action
Paul A. Diller
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1109

Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers
Merritt B. Fox
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1173

How Much Should Judges Be Paid?
An Empirical Study on the Effect of Judicial Pay on the State Bench

James M. Anderson & Eric Helland
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1277

How Congress Could Reduce Job Discrimination by Promoting Anonymous Hiring
David Hausman
64 Stan. L. Rev. 1343


Swindling/Selling, Bribing/Contributing, Extorting/Taxing

At the recent Security and Human Behavior conference, I got into a conversation that highlighted perhaps my favorite legal book ever, Arthur Leff’s “Swindling and Selling.”  Although it is out of print, one measure of its wonderfulness is that used copies sell now for $125.  Then, in my class this week on The Ethics of Washington Lawyering (yes, it’s a fun title), I realized that a key insight from Leff’s book applies to two other areas – what is allowed in campaign finance and what counts as extortion in political office.

Swindling/selling.  The insight I always remember from Leff is to look at the definition of swindling: “Alice sells something to Bob that Bob thinks has value.”  Here is the definition of selling: “Alice sells something to Bob that Bob thinks has value.”  See?  The exchange is identical – Bob hands Alice money.  The difference is sociological (what society values) and economic (can Bob resell the item).  But the structure of the transaction is the same.

Bribing/contributing.  So here is a bribe: “Alice gives Senator Bob $10,000 and Bob later does things that benefit Alice, such as a tax break.”  Here is a campaign contribution: “Alice gives Senator Bob $10,000 and Bob later does things that benefit Alice, such as a tax break.”  Again, the structure of the transaction is identical.  There are two likely differences: (1) to prove the bribe, the prosecutor has to show that Bob did the later action because of the $10,000; and (2) Alice is probably careful enough to give the money to Bob’s campaign, and not to him personally.

 Extorting/taxing.  Here is the classic political extortion: “Alice hires Bob, and Bob has to hand back ten percent of his salary to Alice each year.”  Here is how it works when a federal or state government hires someone: “Alice hires Bob, and Bob has to hand back ten percent of his salary to Alice each year.”  The structure of the transaction is the same – Bob keeps 90% of the salary and gives 10% to Alice.  The difference here?  Like the previous example, the existence of bureaucracy turns the bad thing (bribing or extorting) into the acceptable thing (contributing/taxing).  In the modern government, Alice hires Bob, and Bob sends the payment to the IRS.  The 10% does not go to Alice’s personal use, but the payment on Bob’s side may feel much the same.

For each of these, drawing the legal distinction will be really hard because the structure of the transaction is identical for the lawful thing (selling, contributing, taxing) and for the criminal thing (swindling, bribing, extorting).  Skeptics can see every transaction as the latter, and there is no objective way to prove that the transaction is actually legitimate.

I am wondering, did people know this already?  Are there citations to previous works that explain all of this?  Or, perhaps, is this a simple framework for describing things that sheds some light and merits further discussion?


Nepotism and the Cabinet

Title 5, §3110 of the United States Code states:

A public official may not appoint, employ, promote, advance, or advocate for appointment, employment, promotion, or advancement, in or to a civilian position in the agency in which he is serving or over which he exercises jurisdiction or control any individual who is a relative of the public official.

This anti-corruption statute is reasonable enough, but the plain language also applies to the President.  In other words, John F. Kennedy could not have appointed Robert Kennedy as Attorney General if this provision had existed in 1961.  (The statute was enacted in 1967, probably in response to RFK’s nomination.)

I have serious doubts that Section 3110 is constitutional as applied to a President.  First, as far as I can tell, this is the only statutory limit on the President’s authority to choose his political appointees.  Separation-of-powers would suggest that Congress cannot intrude so bluntly into his discretion to choose close advisors.  Second, if the position is subject to Senate confirmation, that represents an adequate check on executive excess.  Third, presidents would take a significant political hit if they abused their appointment authority to help out friends and relatives.  (BTW, what does relative mean?  Any relation?  Only a spouse, child, or sibling?)


The Right to Data Portability (RDP) as a Per Se Anti-tying Rule

Yesterday I gave a presentation on “The Right to Data Portability: Privacy and Antitrust Analysis” at a conference at the George Mason Law School. In an earlier post here, I asked whether the proposed EU right to data portability violates antitrust law.

I think the presentation helped sharpen the antitrust concern.  The presentation first develops the intuition that consumers should want a right to data portability (RDP), which is proposed in Article 18 of the EU Data Protection Regulation.  RDP seems attractive, at least initially, because it might prevent consumers getting locked in to a software platform, and because it advances the existing EU right of access to one’s own data.

Turning to antitrust law, I asked how antitrust law would consider a rule that, say, prohibits an operating system from being integrated with software for a browser.  We saw those facts, of course, in the Microsoft case decided by the DC Circuit over a decade ago.  Plaintiffs asserted an illegal “tying” arrangement between Windows and IE.  The court rejected a per se rule against tying of software, because integration of software can have many benefits and innovation in software relies on developers finding new ways to put things together.  The court instead held that the rule of reason applies.

RDP, however, amounts to a per se rule against tying of software.  Suppose a social network offers a networking service and integrates that with software that has various features for exporting or not exporting data in various formats.  We have the tying product (social network) and the tied product (module for export or not of data).  US antitrust law has rejected a per se rule here.  The EU proposed regulation essentially adopts a per se rule against that sort of tying arrangement.

Modern US and EU antitrust law seek to enhance “consumer welfare.”  If the Microsoft case is correct, then a per se rule of the sort in the Regulation quite plausibly reduces consumer welfare.  There may be other reasons to adopt RDP, as discussed in the slides (and I hope in my future writing).  RDP might advance human rights to access.  It might enhance openness more generally on the Internet.  But it quite possibly reduces consumer welfare, and that deserves careful attention.


UCLA Law Review Vol. 59, Issue 4 (April 2012)

Volume 59, Issue 4 (April 2012)


Liability Holding Companies Anat R. Admati, Peter Conti-Brown & Paul Pfleiderer 852
Congress in Court Amanda Frost 914


The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual Property Internalism Amy Kapczynski 970
More Than Just a Formality: Instant Authorship and Copyright’s Opt-Out Future in the Digital Age Brad A. Greenberg 1028
Reconciling Caperton and Citizens United: When Campaign Spending Should Compel Recusal of Elected Officials Samuel P. Siegel 1076

Brett Frischmann’s Contribution to Policy Debates Regarding Governance of Infrastructures

Because the framing of issues is so critical to how policy debates are conducted and policy outcomes are ultimately chosen, Brett’s analysis contributes to more balanced discussion within policy debates related to governance of infrastructures. Brett’s book emphasizes the functional role both of infrastructure resources to society and of commons as a resource management strategy, providing important insights for considering appropriate governance of infrastructure resources. Its analytical strength stems from development of a typology of different infrastructures “based on the types of systems dependent on the infrastructural resource and the distribution of productive activities it facilitates” (p. 61), which is then used to understand the importance of (what Brett describes as) demand-side characteristics of various types of infrastructures. This demand-side functional approach is contrasted with the supply-side approach that has tended to dominate the focus of policy debates related to governance of infrastructures.

To understand Brett’s analysis, it is critical to understand the definitions of component terms and certain economic and legal concepts upon which his analysis is based. For this reason, one has to patiently work their way through substantial portions of the book that lay the foundation for understanding how his typology contributes to understanding commons management (a form of nondiscriminatory access rule) to infrastructures both generally and in specific contexts. This is a compliment – not a criticism – of how Brett took on the challenge of carefully constructing analytical arguments, particularly from concepts of law and economics of which readers are likely familiar but perhaps with differing shades of meaning.

However, it is also challenging to accurately incorporate the research of others who are also attempting to contribute towards a more balanced policy debate of governance related to access to infrastructures. In this regard, for me, a weakness in the analysis throughout Brett’s book is some inaccuracies (or insufficient clarity) as to the functional role of various bodies of law that have developed to address access problems in varying contexts. For example, discussion of common carriage (see p. 218) conflates origins of the common law of common carriage and public utilities. The origins of common carriage obligations are based on duties under tort law; and it is public utility law, not common carriage, that developed in part from laws of franchise and monopoly. But because some infrastructures – such as railroads, telegraphy and telephony – are both common carriers and public utilities, the distinctive functional roles of the two bodies of law have come to be conflated and misunderstood. This conflation, in turn, has tended to mislead discourse related to many deregulatory telecommunications policies, including network neutrality.

Therefore, in my view, the contribution of Brett’s work towards a more balanced policy discussion of governance of infrastructures would be further strengthened by juxtaposition of his functional approach to infrastructure resources with a more carefully delineated (and accurate), functional approach to the various bodies of law that have developed thus far to address varying forms of infrastructure access problems.



Introduction: Symposium on Infrastructure: the Social Value of Shared Resources

I am incredibly grateful to Danielle, Deven, and Frank for putting this symposium together, to Concurring Opinions for hosting, and to all of the participants for their time and engagement. It is an incredible honor to have my book discussed by such an esteemed group of experts. 

The book is described here (OUP site) and here (Amazon). The Introduction and Table of Contents are available here.


Shared infrastructures shape our lives, our relationships with each other, the opportunities we enjoy, and the environment we share. Think for a moment about the basic supporting infrastructures that you rely on daily. Some obvious examples are roads, the Internet, water systems, and the electric power grid, to name just a few. In fact, there are many less obvious examples, such as our shared languages, legal institutions, ideas, and even the atmosphere. We depend heavily on shared infrastructures, yet it is difficult to appreciate how much these resources contribute to our lives because infrastructures are complex and the benefits provided are typically indirect.

The book devotes much-needed attention to understanding how society benefits from infrastructure resources and how management decisions affect a wide variety of private and public interests. It links infrastructure, a particular set of resources defined in terms of the manner in which they create value, with commons, a resource management principle by which a resource is shared within a community.

Infrastructure commons are ubiquitous and essential to our social and economic systems. Yet we take them for granted, and frankly, we are paying the price for our lack of vision and understanding. Our shared infrastructures—the lifeblood of our economy and modern society—are crumbling. We need a more systematic, long-term vision that better accounts for how infrastructure commons contribute to social welfare.

In this book, I try to provide such a vision. The first half of the book is general and not focused on any particular infrastructure resource. It cuts across different resource systems and develops a framework for understanding societal demand for infrastructure resources and the advantages and disadvantages of commons management (by which I mean, managing the infrastructure resource in manner that does not discriminate based on the identity of the user or use). The second half of the book applies the theoretical framework to different types of infrastructure—e.g., transportation, communications, environmental, and intellectual resources—and examines different institutional regimes that implement commons management. It then wades deeply into the contentious “network neutrality” debate and ends with a brief discussion of some other modern debates.

Throughout, I raise a host of ideas and arguments that probably deserve/require more sustained attention, but at 436 pages, I had to exercise some restraint, right? Many of the book’s ideas and arguments are bound to be controversial, and I hope some will inspire others. I look forward to your comments, criticisms, and questions.