Category: Administrative Law

Don’t Apply for Asylum in Atlanta

That’s the advice savvy immigration lawyers will probably be giving applicants after the publication of a new analysis of 140,000 immigration decisions. The Atlanta office granted asylum to only 12% of applicants, compared to a national average of 40%. Intracourt disparities were also astonishing:

In one of the starker examples cited, Colombians had an 88 percent chance of winning asylum from one judge in the Miami immigration court and a 5 percent chance from another judge in the same court.

The study reminds me of a fascinating documentary entitled “A Well-Founded Fear,” which looks inside one immigration office and records cases presented to staff there. My main impression of the process (or lack thereof) was that the judges were often tasked with a near-impossible job of figuring out whether a given applicant was “credible” on the basis of a very informal “hearing”–basically, just listening to their story and asking questions designed to provoke inconsistent statements. Only a thick paper file documenting trauma or home country conditions had the potential to deter a snap judgment of “not credible.” The disparity among judges is also quickly in evidence–one appears to be a classic “bleeding heart,” but she is easily outnumbered by others who appear ready to dismiss just about any narrative of persecution as unbelievable.

Will Article III courts intervene to supervise this “agency under stress“? Early indications are grim. Consider this language from a First Circuit opinion in Albathani v. U.S.:

the Board member who denied Albathani’s appeal is recorded as having decided over 50 cases on October 31, 2002, a rate of one every ten minutes over the course of a nine-hour day. . . . We are not willing, however . . . to infer from these numbers alone that the required review is not taking place. . . . [W]orkload management devices . . . . do not, either alone or in combination with caseload statistics, establish that the required review is not taking place.

Which leads me to wonder–would one minute of review be enough? Fifteen seconds? When would such nanoreview cease being a “matter committed to agency discretion,” and threaten our sense of the rule of law?

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Why Watters Matters: An Early Lesson from the First Circuit

Even in a quieter Term, the Supreme Court’s 5-3 decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. would hardly go down as one of the more significant, noteworthy, or even interesting rulings handed down, and that will certainly prove to be the case as the present Term races toward its (increasingly controversial) end. That’s not to say, though, that Watters won’t turn out to have a substantial impact on federal and state commercial regulation in a large class of cases, and we have a First Circuit decision from yesterday as proof of that. [Hat tip to How Appealing.]

First, Watters. I’ve blogged extensively about the issue and the decision before (see, e.g., here, here, and here), but the short of it is that the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency is entitled to preempt state consumer regulation of “national banking activities” even when those activities are conducted by entities other than “national” banks. In Watters itself, the issue was whether the OCC could preempt state regulation of national banks’ operating subsidiaries, and the Court affirmed decisions of the Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits, all answering that question in the affirmative (although, as I noted at the time, the Court adopted the Ninth Circuit’s Chevron-free analysis, rather than the Chevron-laden views of the other three circuits).

The problem is that by focusing on the activity rather than the actor, the Court endorsed a broad understanding of the OCC’s preemptive authority, and one that could possibly extend to oust state regulation of all kinds of commercial actors, none of whom are actually “national banks,” and none of whom are therefore expressly protected by federal statute. Justice Stevens, in his eloquent dissent, raised the specter of such a possibility, and the First Circuit, yesterday, proved Justice Stevens prophetic. More about the decision below the fold…

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Argument & Authority

One part of the intro to Kennedy & Fisher’s Canon of American Legal Thought really hit me today:

Law students struggle to understand the relationship between “the rules” and the vague arguments that lawyers call “policy.” Should “policy” begin only in the exception—when legal deduction runs out—or should it be a routine part of legal analysis? If the latter, how should lawyers reason about policy? What should go into reasoning about “policy”—how much ethics, how much empiricism, how much economics? Which of the arguments laypeople use count as professionally acceptable arguments of “policy” and which do not? Which mark one as naïve, an outsider to the professional consensus? What is it about policy argument that makes it seem more professional, more analytical, more persuasive, than talking about “mere politics”?

I think I might begin my administrative law class next term with those questions at the forefront. Administrative Law is occasionally derided as a Seinfeld class–a class about nothing–because the precedents seem so malleable and ad hoc. All seems to turn on an increasingly complicated jurisprudence of deference. But the agencies are often getting deference because they are presumed to have a better grasp on “empiricism and economics” than nonspecialist judges.

The problems raised by K&F go beyond law into flelds like economics itself. Consider EconJournalWatch’s recent issue examining the role of math in top-level publications. Sutter & Pejsky ask “Where Would Adam Smith Publish Today?,” and note a “near absence of math-free research in top journals.” A bit from their conclusion:

The emphasis on mathematical modeling and regression analysis imposes a toll on the profession. Adam Smith spent his early years studying literature, history, ethics, political and moral philosophy, and then teaching literature and rhetoric to college students. Today to succeed in the profession he would need to study model building and regression analysis well enough to publish in “good” journals, and he (and the rest of us) would have lost the value added from the studies displaced. The same would apply for many Nobel prize winners who published their work in an economics profession less tied down to model building and regression analysis.

Sutter & Pejsky, along with many other interesting authors in EJW, are arguing for a more pluralistic approach to economic authority. I hope to show my students in Admin the multiple sources of authority for agency decisions…and how that complexity, while occasionally frustrating and obfuscatory, can make the resulting decisions stronger, like a Peirce’s cable.

Don’t Cry for G, Buy Toyota

Today brings word that Toyota has finally displaced GM as the world leader in auto sales. To celebrate this doesn’t come naturally for me; my father was a displaced steel worker who insisted on buying American cars as long as he lived. But a brief review of the corporate record of the two entities leads me to hope the eclipse of GM will warn other companies that they need to reckon with the “Green Imperative.”

It’s often said that when emissions standards were introduced, Toyota hired a 1000 engineers to meet them, and GM hired a 1000 lawyers to fight them. I’m not saying engineers are necessarily more useful than lawyers–think of the yeomen’s labor of those who had to fight GM in court! Their sad plight is chronicled in Keith Bradsher’s High and Mighty: The Dangerous Rise of the SUV. Consider this interaction between GM and the EPA (296):

[To fight recognition of Kyoto Protocol-inspired standards], GM hired a law firm that prepared a 4-inch thick document for the EPA on why the rules were too stringent, laying the groundwork for a legal challenge. But Ford cut the ground out from under GM’s arguments by saying that it had no objection to the new rules….

GM decided not to sue the federal government to block the new rules….[But while] Ford had voluntarily and deeply reduced air pollution from its entire lineup of light trucks[,] GM had not even bothered to match Ford’s example.

…and they certainly haven’t matched the Prius. Rather, GM (and, sad to say, the UAW and some other domestic manufacturers) have furiously lobbied to weaken already lax fuel economy standards.

As Dan Filler might say, sometimes regulation can help the regulated. If GM had the “ecomagination” of a GE, perhaps it would still have the market position it lost today.

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A Big Day for Enviros

Hi everyone! I’m psyched to be able to blog here, and to start on what to me is a really great legal day.

So how about that Supreme Court? And its decision in the two Clean Air Act cases today? The blogosphere’s been all over this already, but I have to say, as someone whose first Supreme Court amicus briefs (team-written with some very wonderful colleagues, I should say) were in these two cases, today was incredibly satisfying.[*] (Or, in more cas-speak: OMGWOW.)

One thing I’ve been trying to emphasize in my classes, though (perhaps to the frustration of my students) is that litigation is not the end all and be all. And these cases illustrate that. The Supreme Court’s decision in the global warming case, for example, is merely a remand back to the EPA to consider the petitioners’ request for a rulemaking–albeit one taking into account the Supreme Court’s guidance in Mass v. EPA. The EPA, therefore, could conceivably still reach the same decision on remand, albeit with more legally defensible reasoning. The PSD (Prevention of Significant Deterioration) case involving Duke Energy also involves a remand, and allows the lower court, on remand, to consider whether EPA’s allegedly inconsistent positions on this issue is “retroactively targeting twenty years of accepted practice.”

My anticipatory frustration is that although what happens next is as much a part of the whole story as the Supreme Court proceedings, there will be somewhat less press coverage of those later administrative (and political) proceedings. This is not to blame the press, really. I mean, it’s reflective of legal teaching, even, where the focus is more on the individual court “cases,” and less on the overall outcome (regardless of where the outcome “arises”). Hell, I see this in administrative law, where students are a lot more excited about reading current individual cases, than reading draft rulemakings and the comments made about them.

So I guess this is just a rambly way of getting to a question: how does one effectively “teach” the interaction between individual case decisions, administrative decisions, and broader societal politics? I don’t want to make my classes into any sort of poli sci/public administration class, and certainly couldn’t do effectively even if I wanted to. Yet I also believe that if we’re training students to advocate as effectively as possible for their clients, then we as educators should give them practice in thinking beyond strategizing about individual cases.

[*] A short recap: In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court held that the EPA did have the authority to regulate greenhouse gases, and required it to re-review the plaintiffs’ request for a rulemaking. According to the Supreme Court, “Under the Act’s clear terms, EPA can avoid promulgating regulations only if it determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate change or if it provides some reasonable explanation as to why it cannot or will not exercise its discretion to determine whether they do.” And in Environmental Defense Fund v. Duke Energy, the Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s regulations requiring permits for changes in power plants that lead to an annual increase in emissions, rejecting Duke Energy’s argument that permits can only be required when the changes lead to an increase in the hourly rate of emissions.

Trans-Scientific Facts on Endless Trial

late doctor.jpgIs there a doctor shortage? Judging from the fact that physician salaries in the US are much higher than in comparable OECD countries, and given that leading trade associations and experts finally are calling for the training of more doctors, you might think so. Consider the Association of American Medical Colleges’ position, reported in the Chronicle of Higher Education:

Instead of a glut, experts now fear the nation will face a serious shortage of physicians just when the aging population will need them most. That stunning about-face began in 2002 with an admission by the Association of American Medical Colleges and other groups that the surplus projections by health-care analysts and policy makers may have been a mistake. “It is now evident that those predictions were in error,” the association stated last year in a report that called on medical schools to increase their enrollments by 30 percent by 2015, both by expanding existing schools and creating new ones.

When I made that point at a health law workshop in 2005, some skeptics quickly piped up: “That’s contestable. Some people think there are way too many doctors.” Neighsayers pop up in the Chron. article, too:

David C. Goodman, a professor . . . at Dartmouth Medical School, [says that] “[r]ather than spending more resources on training more physicians, we should be focusing on building more-efficient delivery systems.” . . .Simply graduating more physicians will not ensure that care is getting to the people who need it most, the Dartmouth researchers argued. Most will probably crowd into regions of the country that already have large numbers of doctors, rather than moving to rural areas or inner cities where more medical care is needed. A larger number of graduating physicians also does not guarantee that the physician work force will be appropriately distributed among specialties.

As if the government couldn’t use its subtantial role in funding medical education to condition support on schools’ addressing such issues.

Such advocacy appears increasingly irresponsible as the US imports more and more medical personnel away from less developed countries (for example, “604 out of 871 medical officers trained in [Ghana] between 1993 and 2002 now practice overseas.”). Yet reporters, ever-eager to give the appearance of objectivity, continue “balancing” overwhelmingly dominant positions with half-baked contrarian challenges.

The endless debate over the physician shortage reminds me of a classic administrative law issue–the “trans-scientific fact,” or factual judgment infused with values and assumptions about future policy. Certainly the statement “there is a doctor shortage” can never be as objective as, say, “the earth orbits the sun.” But when someone challenges it in the face of massive consensus to the contrary, don’t they have the obligation to at least respond to the most basic arguments undermining their position? And don’t journalists have an obligation to ask these types of questions? Without that kind of substance, objectivity becomes mechanical, a mere tool for the “social construction of ignorance.”

Photo Credit: Flickr/sarcasmo, “Doctor Come Lately.”