Author Archive for caroline-mala-corbin
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
In my last post, I argued that the requirement that religiously affiliated organizations include contraception in their health insurance plans does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. That’s not such a hard argument to make given the Employment Division v. Smith rule that neutral laws of general applicability are constitutional, no matter what kind of burden they may create for religious practices.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), on the other hand, is easier to violate. RFRA was passed in reaction to Employment Division v. Smith. Congress wanted to restore the more demanding (at least on paper) pre-Smith test for religious liberty claims. The Supreme Court struck down RFRA as applied to the states but not as applied to the federal government. Under RFRA, a federal law cannot impose a substantial burden on a person’s exercise of religion unless it passes strict scrutiny.
Saving the question of whether the contraception mandate imposes a substantial burden for another post, would it pass strict scrutiny? Does the contraception mandate advance a compelling state interest in a narrowly tailored way? It is not hard to come up with compelling reasons why women who do not want to become pregnant should have access to contraception. Women’s ability to control their reproduction is essential to their wellbeing, their bodily integrity, and their ability to participate as equals in the social, economic, and political life of the nation. In fact, the failure to cover contraception may well amount to sex discrimination if a health insurance plan covers all basic preventive care except for pregnancy-related preventive care like contraception. (While pregnancy discrimination is not considered sex discrimination for equal protection purposes thanks to Geduldig v. Aiello, it is sex discrimination for Title VII purposes thanks to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.) Promoting women’s health, liberty, equality, and equal access to health care are all compelling state interests.
Nevertheless, at least one court has concluded that the contraception mandate was not motivated by a compelling interest because it contains too many exceptions, such as the ones for grandfathered plans and small employers. So, while the court acknowledged that “the promotion of public health” is generally a compelling state interest, it held that “any such argument is undermined by the existence of numerous exceptions to the preventive care coverage mandate. . . . A law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest of the highest order when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.” I disagree. The number of exceptions might matter if there were some question about whether the state’s interest really was compelling or not. If we are not sure about the importance of uniform appearance among police officers, numerous exceptions to grooming requirements might lead to the conclusion that it is not as important as the state claims. However, such exceptions should not matter when the state’s goals have long been recognized as compelling — and surely we are past the point of debating whether promoting women’s liberty and equality and preventing sex discrimination are compelling state interests.
Perhaps, then, it could be argued that the law is not narrowly tailored. How strict the tailoring must be under RFRA in not clear. If RFRA is meant to reinstate the pre-Smith test as practiced, then it is not very demanding, since the Supreme Court rarely found that laws failed strict scrutiny in Free Exercise Clause challenges. In any case, one argument that should be rejected is that the law is not sufficiently tailored because the government could provide contraception instead. But that can’t be right. Imagine a bookstore that refused admittance to Hispanics. Or imagine an employer whose insurance covered cancer screenings for white employees but not Asian ones. Now imagine the bookstore or employer arguing that a law banning race discrimination in places of public accommodation or in the provision of employment benefits fails strict scrutiny because the state could sell the books or provide the benefits instead. Such a claim is a distortion of strict scrutiny and should fail.
November 2, 2012 at 11:05 am Tags: contraception, contraception mandate, health care, religious liberty, RFRA, women Posted in: Constitutional Law, Feminism and Gender, First Amendment, Health Law, Religion Print This Post 5 Comments
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
The Affordable Care Act is changing the health care landscape. Among the changes is that employers that provide health insurance must cover preventive services, including contraception. Although the requirement does not apply to religious organizations, it does apply to religiously affiliated ones. This “contraception mandate” has generated a huge outcry from some religious leaders, most notably the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. They insist that forcing Catholic hospitals, schools, or charities to include contraception in their employee insurance plans violates religious liberty.
It doesn’t. It certainly doesn’t violate the Free Exercise Clause. After Employment Division v. Smith, neutral laws of general applicability are constitutional, regardless of the burden they may impose on religious practices. Indeed, the law upheld in Smith banned a religious sacrament. But it was neutral, in that it did not intentionally target religion, and it was generally applicable, in that it was neither riddled with exceptions nor grossly underinclusive. The regulation requiring employers who provide health insurance to include contraception in that coverage is likewise a neutral law of general applicability.
While a recent Supreme Court decision (Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC) carved out an exception to this “neutral-generally-applicable-laws-do-not-violate-the-Free-Exercise-Clause” rule, it does not apply here. This exception — which holds that religious institutions are immune from neutral, generally applicable anti-discrimination laws when they are sued by their ministers — was designed to protect churches’ ability to pick their leaders without interference from the state. However, the provision by religiously-affiliated organizations of health insurance to their employees, many of whom do not belong to the same faith as their religious employer, clearly does not involve ministers or internal church governance. In short, there is no valid Free Exercise Claim.
What about the Religious Freedom Restoration Act? Stay tuned.
October 29, 2012 at 1:52 pm Tags: ACA, contraception, contraception mandate, equality, free exercise, health care, religious liberty, women Posted in: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Employment Law, Feminism and Gender, First Amendment, Health Law, Religion Print This Post 19 Comments
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) has been leading the charge against the contraception mandate, but its opposition to the mandate does not represent the USCCB’s first entanglement with contraception lawsuits. ACLU of Massachusetts v. Sebelius involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a grant given to the USCCB pursuant to the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. The grant was to provide services to victims of sex trafficking, who are often forced into prostitution and forced to endure rape or other sexual abuse. In accepting the grant, the USCCB made very clear that its religious beliefs prevented them from providing contraception or abortion to their clients, or referring them to others who would. (More specifically, the USCCB stated it would bar its subcontractors from providing or referring these services.) Even though access to contraception and abortion are crucial for women and girls who have been sexually trafficked, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) nonetheless awarded the USCCB over $15 million dollars. The ACLU sued, alleging Establishment Clause violations. USCCB responded by claiming that HHS was merely accommodating its sincere religious beliefs. The ACLU won.
Sometimes the line between constitutional accommodation of religious belief and unconstitutional advancement of religion can be hard to draw. Sometimes, however, it is not. HHS should never have awarded the grant. It is true that religious groups may now compete on an equal basis with secular groups for government grants and contracts. But they should also be rejected on an equal basis if they cannot fulfill basic grant requirements. The point of the grant, after all, is to help the intended beneficiaries. Any group, secular or religious, that cannot provide the requisite services, which in this case includes contraception and abortion, is simply not qualified. To accommodate the USCCB at the expense of trafficked sex victims goes too far. At this point, “accommodation devolve[s] into an unlawful fostering of religion.”
October 20, 2012 at 2:25 pm Tags: contraception, establishment, funding, religious liberty, sex trafficking Posted in: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Feminism and Gender, First Amendment, Religion Print This Post 8 Comments
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the IRS revoked the tax exempt status of two religiously affiliated schools because they discriminated on the basis of race. One school (Goldsboro Christian Schools) refused admittance to black students, the other (Bob Jones University) barred interracial dating and marriage. Both schools claimed that the discrimination was religiously mandated, and that the loss of their tax exempt status violated the Free Exercise Clause. The schools lost. The Supreme Court characterized tax exemptions as a taxpayer subsidy for charitable organizations that, at the very least, do not contravene fundamental public policy like our commitment to racial equality, and held that racist schools did not satisfy that requirement: “[I]t cannot be said that educational institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial discrimination, are institutions exercising beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life or should be encouraged by having all taxpayers share in their support by way of special tax status.” In addition, the Court held that eliminating race discrimination in education was a narrowly tailored and compelling state interest. The bottom line is that a university may discriminate based on race, but it should not expect to be considered a beneficial organization entitled to tax subsidies.
Assuming Bob Jones was correctly decided, should its holding be limited to discrimination in education, or discrimination on the basis of race? I think not. In fact, the IRS denies tax exempt status to any nonprofit organization, religious or not, that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race. If you are a church that excludes blacks, or won’t let blacks become ministers, you may have the constitutional right to exist, but you won’t get any government money to help you prosper. Should the same policy apply to organizations, religious or not, that invidiously discriminate on the basis of sex?
October 15, 2012 at 4:00 pm Tags: Bob Jones, discrimination, free exercise, Race, sex, taxes Posted in: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, Education, Feminism and Gender, First Amendment, Law and Inequality, Race, Religion Print This Post 10 Comments
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
Imagine the Boys Scouts of America discriminated on the basis of race. In this hypothetical, no black parents are allowed to lead troops, and no black children are even allowed to join them. If your child were eligible, would you let him become a Boy Scout? My guess is that the answer would be no. There are plenty of alternative extracurricular activities available, including other scouting clubs, so why belong to a racist one whose policies stigmatize innocent children and perpetuate hostility towards a group based on a completely irrelevant characteristic? In fact, you might not want to support them in any way. The federal government certainly does not: groups that discriminate on the basis of race are ineligible for government funding and cannot qualify as a tax exempt organization. In short, no government money would flow to them, not even in the form of tax breaks. As an expressive association, the Boy Scouts might have a constitutional right to discriminate, but that doesn’t mean that our tax dollars should help them.
In recognition of National Coming Out Day on October 11, let’s tweak the hypothetical and substitute sexual orientation for race. Shouldn’t the results be the same?
October 9, 2012 at 12:51 pm Tags: Boy Scouts, discrimination, National Coming Out Day, Race, sexual orientation Posted in: Civil Rights, Constitutional Law, First Amendment, Tax Print This Post 13 Comments
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
The Supreme Court is set next week to hear the affirmative action case of Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin. Many people are troubled by affirmative action because they are convinced that it means less qualified (non-white) students are admitted over more qualified (white) ones. To them, that just seems unfair. (One may wonder how it compares to the unfairness of a public education system that generally offers much better schooling to suburban (white) students.)
In any case, how reliable is their measurement of merit? As an initial matter, if diversity in itself is valuable, then the ability to add to it makes you more qualified then someone who cannot. Of course, what people usually have in mind are test scores, grades, and recommendations. Yet do the best grades and recommendations, for example, necessarily go to the best students? Studies on unconscious biases suggest the answer may be no. Take the most recent entry in a long series of studies revealing that identical qualifications are evaluated differently based on the race or sex of a candidate. In this randomized double-blind Yale study, science professors were asked to evaluate men’s and women’s resumes. The resumes were exactly the same except that some bore a man’s name (John) and some bore a woman’s (Jennifer). Both men and women rated the male candidates higher, and were willing to pay them more. Again, these were the exact same resumes. It is not a huge leap to think the same kind unconscious bias regularly occurs in classrooms across the country — and this is only one way that unconscious bias might lead to unfair assessments.
Granted, affirmative action may be a crude way to compensate for structural inequality and unconscious biases. But realistically, what are the alternatives?
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
In my previous blogs, I explained the basics of this judicially-created doctrine, and argued that the ministerial exception can’t really be justified by either the Free Exercise or the Establishment Clause. The main Establishment Clause justification for the ministerial exception is the fear that in adjudicating discrimination claims, courts will become entangled with theological questions or endorse one religious vision over another. In this last post, I want to argue that application of the ministerial exception can entangle a court in religious doctrine more than application of anti-discrimination law.
For the ministerial exception to apply, the plaintiff in a discrimination suit must be a “ministerial” employee. Who counts as a ministerial employee? That is the question before the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC: is a teacher at a religious school who mostly teaches secular subjects but also leads students in prayer and teaches a religion class a ministerial employee? Courts do not simply defer to a religious organization’s characterization of a position, as it could insist that all its employees were ministers. Instead, courts have taken a functional approach, looking at the main duties of the employee, and essentially asking whether plaintiff’s job “is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church.”
In order to decide whether a position is “important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of the church,” however, a court might have to delve into the religious beliefs of a particular religion. In ruling that a church’s music director was a minister, for example, the Fourth Circuit analyzed the religious significance of music. The plaintiff argued that she was not a ministerial employee because she merely taught people to sing and perform music. The court disagreed, noting that “music serves a unique function in worship” and concluding that the music director’s job was “an integral part of Catholic worship and belief.” In reaching this determination, the court did exactly what the Establishment Clause forbids: choose between competing religious visions. In the plaintiff’s vision of the Roman Catholic faith, music’s significance did not rise to the level of ministry, such that teaching it made her a minister. In the defendant’s vision, it did. The court essentially resolved a religious dispute about the role of music. Hosanna-Tabor potentially presents a similar risk. In determining whether Perich is a minister or not, the Supreme Court may end up resolving a religious dispute about the role of school teachers in Evangelical Lutheran Church schools.
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
In my previous blog on the ministerial exception, I explained the basics of this judicially-created exception. In this blog, I take a more partisan view, and argue that the religion clauses do not justify the ministerial exception. To the extent that church-clergy relations are protected, they should be protected under the freedom of association guaranteed by the Free Speech Clause.
Does the Free Exercise Clause require the ministerial exception?
The simple answer is: not after Employment Division v. Smith. Employment Division v. Smith held that as long as a law is neutral and generally applicable, it does not violate the Free Exercise Clause even if it imposes a substantial burden on religion. Smith itself upheld a law that made illegal a religious sacrament. Since few would dispute that anti-discrimination laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act are both neutral and generally applicable, Smith should defeat any free exercise justification.
Nonetheless, lower courts have uniformly argued that Smith only applies to individual free exercise claims and not institutional free exercise claims. The arguments for this distinction are not persuasive, and they can be understood as the lower courts’ attempt to limit the impact of the unpopular Smith decision. For example, courts cite to a line of Supreme Court cases addressing church property disputes as precedent for church autonomy. Yet they overlook the Supreme Court’s most recent church property case, Jones v. Wolf, which actually applies a “neutral principles of law” approach more in line with Smith than the older cases that deferred to church hierarchies.
Doesn’t the potential entanglement with religion mean the Establishment Clause requires the ministerial exception?
The Establishment Clause may be violated if a court were to independently evaluate a minister’s spiritual or theological qualifications. For example, the court would act beyond its competence if it were to hold that a church was wrong to fire a choir director for her choice of music because the music chosen was in fact perfectly suitable for Sunday services. However, it is a mistake to assume that resolving anti-discrimination cases will lead courts to substitute their judgment for that of the religious institution on spiritual and theological matters. To start, many discrimination suits do not present any religious questions. In addition, this fear overlooks a substantial body of anti-discrimination law that ensures that courts assess only matters well within their competence. In other words, when evaluating a claim that a professor was wrongfully denied tenure, courts will consider objective data, but they will not second-guess the employer about subjective professional qualifications.
Take the retaliation claim at issue in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC. In terminating Cheryl Perich, Hosanna-Tabor cited issues related to her health and its disability leave policy. No mention was made of any spiritual shortcomings. Therefore, as the Sixth Circuit concluded: “a trial would focus on issues such as whether Perich was disabled within the meaning of the ADA, whether Perich opposed a practice that was unlawful under the ADA, and whether Hosanna-Tabor violated the ADA in its treatment of Perich.”
Are churches never immune from anti-discrimination suits?
Even though the religion clauses may not justify the ministerial exception, the freedom of association might shield religious organizations from some anti-discrimination claims brought by ministers. Proponents of the ministerial exception argue that religious organizations must be able to freely select their ministers and religious leaders. The freedom of association protects that choice: especially after Boy Scouts of American v. Dale, the freedom of association protects the right of all associations, religious and nonreligious, to choose leaders who will properly represent and convey the association’s message, even if it means violating anti-discrimination law. In Dale, the Supreme Court allowed the Boy Scouts to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation on the grounds that gay Scoutmasters would undermine the Boy Scouts’ anti-homosexuality message.
At the same time, Dale makes clear that an association seeking immunity from a discrimination claim must have a message that would in some way be impaired by compliance with that anti-discrimination law. Thus, a church may assert immunity from a minister’s discrimination suit only if it first argues that its religious tenets require that discrimination. Religious organizations whose beliefs are consistent with anti-discrimination law cannot complain that compliance interferes with their expression. Unless Tabor-Hosanna argues that a disabled minister will undermine its religious message, Perich should be able to sue the religious school for violating the American with Disabilities Act.
Equality, Liberty, and Nonbelievers: Why Government Religious Speech Violates the Establishment Clause
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
This will be my last blog, and it summarizes my current work in progress. Many, many thanks to Danielle Citron and the Concurring Opinions crew for inviting me!
In the past few years, those without religious belief, whether they consider themselves atheist, agnostic, humanist, secular, or freethinker, have become much more prominent in the United States. Books by atheists whose goal is to debunk religion have become bestsellers, and an atheist iPhone application has likewise found great success. Organizations for nonbelievers are growing by leaps and bounds. President Obama even acknowledged nonbelievers in his inaugural address.
But while their visibility has increased, nonbelievers are still a small minority, and they remain disliked, distrusted, and not truly American in the eyes of many. Social scientists have noted a consistent negative attitude towards atheists, and an assumption that atheists are immoral and unpatriotic. One study described atheists as “at the very top of the list of problematic groups,” noting that Americans are less accepting of atheists than any other group—and by a wide margin. As a result, many nonbelievers are hesitant about disclosing their views, and those who do can face hostility and discrimination.
Government religious speech such as “In God We Trust” or a Latin cross war memorial violates the Establishment Clause in part because it exacerbates the precarious position of nonbelievers in this country. One of the main goals of the Establishment Clause is to protect religious minorities like nonbelievers. Contrary to claims that government religious speech is essentially harmless, and that any offense it causes should not be considered of constitutional dimension, government religious speech harms both the equality and liberty of nonbelievers.
One way the Establishment Clause protects nonbelievers is essentially to serve as an Equal Protection Clause for religious minorities. As many scholars have noted, the Equal Protection Clause has an expressive component; so too does the Establishment Clause. Indeed, the Establishment Clause’s endorsement test attempts to capture the insight from Brown v. Board of Education that government action can send unacceptable messages of inequality. Government religious speech undermines the equality of nonbelievers by sending the message that they are not worthy of equal regard. While these messages are wrong in themselves, they cause tangible harm as well by reinforcing stereotypes—in particular that atheists are immoral and unpatriotic—which lead to discrimination against them.
The perpetuation of these stereotypes also undermines the liberty of nonbelievers by making them less willing, or even afraid, to follow the dictates of their conscience. By putting its power and prestige behind religion, the government not only pressures nonbelievers into conforming to mainstream religious beliefs, but also reinforces existing prejudice against nonbelievers, which can hinder nonbelievers from acting in accordance with their beliefs. In short, the claim that government religious speech does not violate the Establishment Clause because it only offends nonbelievers misunderstands exactly what is at stake.
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
My last blog discussed how the gap between men’s and women’s participation continues to be a problem in law school classrooms. This is clearly a systemic problem, affected by issues ranging from women’s prior classroom experiences to law school diversity to the persistence of discrimination. But today I want to focus on what a lone professor might do in his or her classroom to try and close this gap. Here are a few tactics that I am trying.
First, require participation. Given that studies show the gap is at its worst when class discussion relies on volunteers, one solution might be to require everyone to contribute as often as possible. My policy is that everyone is on call for every class, unless they check themselves as unprepared before class starts. I have found that forcing a student to speak at the beginning of class increases the odds that she will volunteer in that same class later. I understand that this is anecdotal, but I’ve seen the effect repeatedly.
Second, wait a bit. Since men seem to hesitate less, instead of calling on the first person with a hand in the air, wait a few seconds if you do seek volunteers. Also, give students a chance to collect their thoughts when you ask them a question rather than immediately moving on to someone else.
Third, provide opportunities for small in-class group discussions. Getting into the habit of talking about the law in the classroom, even with just a few other students, and rehearsing an argument first, hopefully makes it easier to offer it to the entire class. I like to break students up into groups of three or four, have them debate a hypothetical before their designated “judge,” and then have the judges of each group come up to the front of the class to issue their one minute “ruling from the bench.”
Fourth, create alternate ways to participate besides speaking in class. For example, I have students complete a series of short written exercises over the course of the semester.
A bonus of these tactics is that they should benefit all students who might be reluctant speakers. To close, I want to ask everyone, professors and students: what are other strategies that you have found to be effective?
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
It is probably not news that women do not participate to the same extent as men in the law school classroom. Studies show that women speak less often and for shorter amounts of time than their male peers. For example, a 1994 study of students at the University of Pennsylvania Law School found that 1L women were significantly more likely to report that they never asked questions (67% women vs. 44% men) or volunteered in class (55% women vs. 33% men). A 2001 survey of students at Northern Illinois University College of Law found that while 50% of men reported that they ask a question in class at least once a week, only 16% of women did. While there are studies focusing on race, it was hard to find statistics on women of color.
This imbalance has consequences. It obviously affects women’s educational experiences. It can also affect their GPA if the professor opts to “bump” grades based on participation. In addition, in can hinder women’s ability to form mentoring relationships with their professors: A study at Yale found that twice as many men as women listed class participation as the way they found a mentor.
Next blog will offer (and solicit) suggestions on ways to improve women’s participation in classroom discussions.
For those who are interested in reading more, you might try:
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
A few days ago, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the Texas pledge of allegiance. In 2007, the Texas legislative added the words “under God” to the state’s pledge. In evaluating the Establishment Clause claim, the court relied in part on the endorsement test, which asks whether a reasonable person, aware of the history and context of the challenged practice, would conclude that the government was endorsing religion. The Fifth Circuit held that a reasonable person would “conclude that the pledge remains a patriotic exercise” and that the new version “acknowledges but does not endorse religious belief.” Most courts to decide the issue have agreed with the Fifth Circuit.
I do not. Am I an unreasonable person? Before you answer, consider some feminist critiques of another reasonable person standard – specifically the reasonable person standard in Title VII sexual harassment cases. Early sexual harassment plaintiffs would have their claims dismissed when courts held that a reasonable person would not find that the work environment was hostile or abusive. For example, a court dismissed a claim even though it conceded that the humor in the workplace was “rough-hewn and vulgar” and that sexual jokes and “girlie magazines” were plentiful.
Feminist commentators identified three problems with these early sexual harassment decisions. First, feminists noted that due to societal inequalities that affected men’s and women’s life experiences, men and women have different perceptions of what constitutes harassment. For example, because women are at much more risk of sexual violence than men, sexual conduct that may seem like harmless fun to reasonable men can seem like a threat of violence to reasonable women. Second, feminists pointed out that the courts tended to equate the reasonable man’s reaction with a reasonable person’s reaction, and that this male norm was invisible to the usually male judges applying it. In other words, judges were unaware that they were presenting a subjective male perspective as an objective universal perspective. Third, the failure to recognize use of the unstated male norm perpetuated male privilege and power asymmetries instead of rectifying them – the actual goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
Each of these critiques applies equally to the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of “under God” in the pledge. First, just as your sex may inform your evaluation of sexual harassment, your religion may matter when evaluating government endorsement of religion. The phrase “under God” may seem perfectly harmless and totally nonsectarian to Jews, Catholics, Protestants, and Greek Orthodox. Such a reading is less likely if you are a Hindu, or a Buddhist, or an atheist, however, and do not worship or believe in God.
Second, the reasonable person in current Establishment Clause analysis is really a person belonging to the Judeo-Christian tradition. Like the unstated male norm in early sexual harassment evaluations, this unstated norm is presented as the universal, objective norm and is often invisible to those applying it. Thus, the Fifth Circuit can concede that a state reference to God “may not reach every belief system” but nonetheless still characterize it as “tolerable attempt at acknowledging religion without favoring a particular sect or belief.”
The third feminist insight — that the failure to recognize the unstated norm perpetuates power asymmetries and privilege — is also true here. Just as tolerance of sexual harassment made it easier to exclude women from the workplace and reinforced their second-class status, the proliferation of state invocations of God makes it easier to exclude religious outsiders from the political and social community and reinforces their second-class status. Yet one of the major goals of the Establishment Clause is supposed to be to protect religious minorities from precisely this result.
For more, please check out my new article: Ceremonial Deism and the Reasonable Religious Outsider, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1545 (2010).
October 18, 2010 at 12:38 pm Tags: Establishment Clause, pledge, reasonable person, sexual harassment Posted in: Constitutional Law, Feminism and Gender, First Amendment, Religion Print This Post 8 Comments
posted by Caroline Mala Corbin
I have just returned from an excellent conference at Cardozo on Employment Division v. Smith, decided 20 years ago. In that case, the Supreme Court held that, with a couple of exceptions, religious observers are not entitled to free exercise exemptions from laws that are both neutral and generally applicable. More particularly, even the sacramental use of peyote did not justify a free exercise exemption from the neutral, generally applicable drug laws banning its use. Previously, religious observers were entitled to a free exercise exemption from a law that imposed a substantial burden on their religious practice unless that law passed strict scrutiny.
The conference request was for short provocative arguments. Here’s mine: it would be perfectly constitutional for the government to condition tax breaks for nonprofit organizations on compliance with anti-discrimination law. In particular, it would not violate the free exercise clause to deny tax exempt status to churches or other religious institutions that argue that their religion requires them to discriminate on the basis of race and sex.
A law denying tax exempt status to nonprofits that invidiously discriminate would easily satisfy the Employment Division v. Smith standard. As long as the law did not target religion, as a law denying tax benefits to religious nonprofits might, and as long as it applies to all nonprofits without exception, so that it can be considered generally applicable, it should raise no free exercise problems.
In fact, the federal government already denies tax exempt status to religious organizations that invidiously discriminate on the basis of race. Indeed, even before Employment Division v. Smith was decided the Supreme Court rejected a free exercise challenge to the IRS’s revocation of tax exempt status of two religious schools, one of which banned interracial dating for religious reasons, and one of which refused to admit black students, also for religious reasons. In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the IRS regulation passed strict scrutiny. The policy has since been expanded to cover churches as well.
There is no good reason not to expand this policy to religious organizations that invidiously discriminate on the basis of sex. Just as the government does not subsidize religious institutions including churches that discriminate against blacks, nor should it subsidize those that discriminate against women.
This approach – which allows religious institutions to discriminate but denies them tax benefits – strikes a fair balance between religious freedom and equality. It respects religious liberty because it does not ban churches from fulfilling their religious requirements. But it also promotes equality by refusing to subsidize invidious discrimination, and by ensuring the state does not put its imprimatur on the message that is it acceptable to treat anyone as second class because of their race or sex.
October 12, 2010 at 12:46 pm Tags: Bob Jones University v. United States, discrimination, Employment Division v. Smith, free exercise, tax exemption Posted in: Constitutional Law, Feminism and Gender, First Amendment, Religion Print This Post 8 Comments