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Stanford Law Review Online: The 2011 Basketball Lockout

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Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by William B. Gould IV entitled The 2011 Basketball Lockout: The Union Lives to Fight Another Day—Just Barely. Gould, a former chairman of the National Labor Relations Board, provides a succinct postmortem on the 2011 lockout:

The backdrop for the 2011 negotiations was the economic weapon once regarded as a dirty word in the lexicon of American labor-management relations—the lockout. This economic weaponry, endorsed by the Supreme Court since 1965, became the flavor of the two prior decades; baseball flirted with it in 1990, basketball in 1995 and 1999. One of hockey’s lockouts even resulted in the cancellation of the entire 2004-05 season. The lockout again was utilized in 2011 by recently peaceable football as well as by basketball. The owners gravitated towards the lockout tactic because in the event of strike (protesting changes in conditions in employment, which proved ineffective), players who crossed the union picket line could play and still sue in antitrust simultaneously. The lockout put more pressure on the players to settle. . . . The union now was represented by David Boies, who had only a few months before represented the NFL and successfully deprived that union of its only effective antitrust remedy—i.e., an injunction against the lockout, which would have required the owners to open the camps in early summer. Thus the basketball union now would not pursue the injunction remedy, notwithstanding the persuasiveness of Judge Bye’s dissenting opinion in the football case. Of course, Boies would have met himself coming around the corner if he argued for it in basketball.

He concludes:

Nonetheless, even though the union was stripped of its most effective antitrust remedy, litigation seems to have moved the parties together. It most certainly called the NBA’s bluff, in that the league’s regressive or inferior option was quickly forgotten. True, the NBA obtained givebacks that are estimated to be worth more than $300 million. Not only did it win on revenue sharing with the players—the players will possess between 49% and 51% as opposed to 57%—but more stringent luxury tax penalties for violators also have been instituted. As National Basketball Players Association Executive Director Billy Hunter said, the latter element constitutes the “harshest element of the new system.” At the same time, guaranteed contracts were preserved, restricted free agents will benefit from the reduction of the so-called “match period” when teams may match competing offers from seven to three days, which may encourage bidding on these players. The cap remains soft in that the so-called incumbent “Bird” players (named for Celtics superstar Larry Bird) may exceed the cap and have more expansive increases and lengths of contracts than other players. A so-called “amnesty” for bad contracts was permitted, in that even though the contracts must be paid, a player on each club may be waived and his salary not counted towards his team’s cap. What appeared to be a rout of the players in November emerged as a reasonable face-saving compromise.

Read the full article, The 2011 Basketball Lockout: The Union Lives to Fight Another Day—Just Barely by William B. Gould IV, at the Stanford Law Review Online.

Note: Updated quotation.

January 25, 2012 at 1:34 pm Tags: Antitrust, labor law, lockout, NBA, professional sports, strike, unions Posted in: Antitrust, Current Events, Law Rev (Stanford), Supreme Court Print This Post No Comments

Stanford Law Review Online: The Iraq War, the Next War, and the Future of the Fat Man

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published an Essay by Yale’s Stephen L. Carter entitled The Iraq War, the Next War, and the Future of the Fat Man. He provides a retrospective on the War in Iraq and discusses the ethical and legal implications of the War on Terror and “anticipatory self-defense” in the form of targeted killings going forward. He writes:

Iraq was war under the beta version of the Bush Doctrine. The newer model is represented by the slaying of Anwar al-Awlaki, an American citizen deemed a terror threat. The Obama Administration has ratcheted the use of remote drone attacks to unprecedented levels—the Bush Doctrine honed to rapier sharpness. The interesting question about the new model is one of ethics more than legality. Let us assume the principal ethical argument pressed in favor of drone warfare—to wit, that the reduction in civilian casualties and destruction of property means that the drone attack comports better than most other methods with the principle of discrimination. If this is so, then we might conclude that a just cause alone is sufficient to justify the attacks. . . . But is what we are doing truly self-defense?

Read the full article, The Iraq War, the Next War, and the Future of the Fat Man by Stephen L. Carter, at the Stanford Law Review Online.

January 16, 2012 at 1:13 pm Tags: anticipatory self-defense, Current Events, drones, iraq war, president bush, president obama, targeted killings, UAVs Posted in: International & Comparative Law, Law Rev (Stanford), Legal Ethics, Military Law, Technology Print This Post 5 Comments

Stanford Law Review Online: How to Reach the Constitutional Question in the Health Care Cases

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Stanford Law Review

In a Note just published by the Stanford Law Review Online, Daniel J. Hemel discusses a jurisdictional issue that might delay a ruling by the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and a novel way in which the Solicitor General could bypass that hurdle. In How to Reach the Constitutional Question in the Health Care Cases, he writes:

Although the Supreme Court has agreed to hear three suits challenging the 2010 health care reform legislation, it is not at all clear that the Court will resolve the constitutional questions at stake in those cases. Rather, the Justices may decide that a Reconstruction-era statute, the Tax Anti-Injunction Act (TA-IA), requires them to defer a ruling on the merits of the constitutional challenges until 2015 at the earliest. . . . Fortunately (at least for those who favor a quick resolution to the constitutional questions at stake in the health care litigation), there is a way for the Solicitor General to bypass the TA-IA bar—even if one agrees with the interpretation of the TA-IA adopted by the Fourth Circuit and Judge Kavanaugh. Specifically, the Solicitor General can initiate an action against one or more of the fourteen states that have announced their intention to resist enforcement of the health care law, and he can bring this action directly in the Supreme Court under the Court’s original jurisdiction. Such an action would be a suit for the purpose of facilitating—not restraining—the enforcement of the health care law. Thus, it would open up an avenue to an immediate adjudication of the constitutional challenges.

Read the full Note, How to Reach the Constitutional Question in the Health Care Cases by Daniel J. Hemel, at the Stanford Law Review Online.

January 9, 2012 at 12:52 pm Tags: academia, Constitutional Law, Current Events, health care law, jurisdiction, PPACA, Supreme Court, Tax Anti-Injunction Act Posted in: Constitutional Law, Courts, Current Events, Health Law, Law Rev (Stanford), Tax Print This Post One Comment

Stanford Law Review Online: Don’t Break the Internet

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Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a piece by Mark Lemley, David S. Levine, and David G. Post on the PROTECT IP Act and the Stop Online Piracy Act. In Don’t Break the Internet, they argue that the two bills — intended to counter online copyright and trademark infringement — “share an underlying approach and an enforcement philosophy that pose grave constitutional problems and that could have potentially disastrous consequences for the stability and security of the Internet’s addressing system, for the principle of interconnectivity that has helped drive the Internet’s extraordinary growth, and for free expression.”

They write:

These bills, and the enforcement philosophy that underlies them, represent a dramatic retreat from this country’s tradition of leadership in supporting the free exchange of information and ideas on the Internet. At a time when many foreign governments have dramatically stepped up their efforts to censor Internet communications, these bills would incorporate into U.S. law a principle more closely associated with those repressive regimes: a right to insist on the removal of content from the global Internet, regardless of where it may have originated or be located, in service of the exigencies of domestic law.

Read the full article, Don’t Break the Internet by Mark Lemley, David S. Levine, and David G. Post, at the Stanford Law Review Online.

Note: Corrected typo in first paragraph.

December 19, 2011 at 3:14 am Tags: banks, credit card companies, DNS, DNS filtering, domain name seizures, domain name servers, domain names, financial institutions, Intellectual Property, Internet, internet security, internet stability, IP, IP addresses, IP rights, online advertisers, PROTECT IP Act, search engine censorship, search engines, SOPA, Stop Online Piracy Act, World Wide Web Posted in: Current Events, Cyberlaw, First Amendment, Google & Search Engines, Google and Search Engines, Innovation, Intellectual Property, International & Comparative Law, Law Rev (Stanford), Law School (Law Reviews), Movies & Television, Property Law, Social Network Websites Print This Post One Comment

Stanford Law Review Online: The Drone as Privacy Catalyst

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Stanford Law Review

The Stanford Law Review Online has just published a piece by M. Ryan Calo discussing the privacy implications of drone use within the United States. In The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, Calo argues that domestic use of drones for surveillance will go forward largely unimpeded by current privacy law, but that the “visceral jolt” caused by witnessing these drones hovering above our cities might serve as a catalyst and finally “drag privacy law into the twenty-first century.”

Calo writes:

In short, drones like those in widespread military use today will tomorrow be used by police, scientists, newspapers, hobbyists, and others here at home. And privacy law will not have much to say about it. Privacy advocates will. As with previous emerging technologies, advocates will argue that drones threaten our dwindling individual and collective privacy. But unlike the debates of recent decades, I think these arguments will gain serious traction among courts, regulators, and the general public.

Read the full article, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst by M. Ryan Calo, at the Stanford Law Review Online.

December 12, 2011 at 4:52 pm Tags: academia, Brandeis, Constitutional Law, drones, Kyllo, Privacy, surveillance, UAVs, Warren Posted in: Constitutional Law, Law Rev (Stanford), Law School (Law Reviews), Privacy (Consumer Privacy), Privacy (Electronic Surveillance), Privacy (National Security), Technology Print This Post No Comments

Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:5 (May 2010)

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Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:5 (May 2010)

ARTICLES

The Subjects of the Constitution	Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz	1209
The Pleading Problem	Adam Steinman	1293

ESSAY

Dispatch from the Supreme Court Archives: Vagrancy, Abortion, and What Links Between Them Reveal About the History of Fundamental Rights

Risa L. Goluboff

1361

NOTES

Modern Threats and the United Nations Security Council: No Time for Complacency (A Response to Professor Allen Weiner)	Alexander Benard & Paul J. Leaf	1395
Risk, Everyday Institutions, and the Institutional Value of Tort Law	Govind C. Persad	1445
“No Taxation Without Representation” in the American Woman Suffrage Movement	Juliana Tutt	1473

May 18, 2010 at 8:00 am Posted in: Law Rev (Stanford), Law Rev Contents Print This Post No Comments

Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:4 (April 2010)

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Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:4 (April 2010)

ARTICLES

Mapped Out of Local Democracy	Michelle Wilde Anderson	931
Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General Approach	Orin S. Kerr	1005
The Substance of False Confessions	Brandon L. Garrett	1051
Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States	Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy	1119

April 22, 2010 at 12:00 pm Posted in: Law Rev (Stanford), Law Rev Contents Print This Post No Comments

Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:3 (March 2010)

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Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:3 (March 2010)

ARTICLES

Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine? An Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006	Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross	591
All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation	Katherine A. Trisolini	669
Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy Courts	Troy A. McKenzie	747
Measuring the Success of Bivens Litigation and Its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model	Alexander A. Reinert	809

NOTE

The Hand-Off Procedure or the New Silver Platter: How Today’s Police Are Serving Up Potentially Tainted Evidence Without Even Revealing the Search that Produced It to Defendants or to Courts

Micah G. Block

863

COMMENT

The New Rule 12(b)(6): Twombly, Iqbal, and the Paradox of Pleading

Rakesh N. Kilaru

905

April 13, 2010 at 3:19 pm Posted in: Law Rev (Stanford), Law Rev Contents Print This Post No Comments

Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:2 (January 2010)

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Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:2 (January 2010)

ARTICLES

Deep Secrecy	David E. Pozen	257
Commercializing Patents	Ted Sichelman	341
Irrelevant Confusion	Mark A. Lemley & Mark McKenna	413
The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary	Richard A. Epstein	455

NOTE

An Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan

Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg

523

COMMENT

Fourth Amendment Remedial Equilibration: A Comment on Herring v. United States and Pearson v. Callahan

David B. Owens

523

January 25, 2010 at 12:28 am Posted in: Law Rev (Stanford), Law Rev Contents Print This Post No Comments

Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:1 (December 2009)

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Stanford Law Review, Issue 62:1 (December 2009)

ARTICLES

Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform	Rachel A. Harmon	1
The Democracy Canon	Richard L. Hasen	69
Delaware’s Shrinking Half-Life	Mark J. Roe	125
Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in Crime	Elizabeth E. Joh	155
Nonlethal Self-Defense, (Almost Entirely) Nonlethal Weapons, and the Rights to Keep and Bear Arms and Defend Life	Eugene Volokh	199