On the first point, there is one study (by this [...]]]> The cornerstone of the argument against treating unprotected sex as a crime is that the frame is simply inapposite. Yes, it’s logical; one can easily fit sexual behavior with an HIV risk into the same syllogisms as brawling with a knife, but as I’m sure old OWH would say at just this point, the sex life of law has not been logic but experience. At the same time, the argument that criminal law just doesn’t fit is hard to frame, or prove, empirically. In this post, I thought I would briefly summarize the empirical evidence on two narrower points: that criminalization of risky sexual behavior does not protect public health, and may hurt it.

On the first point, there is one study (by this blogger and colleagues) that attempts to directly test the impact of criminal law on the attitudes and sexual behavior of people at risk of HIV in the US. From the abstract:

In this empirical study, 490 people at elevated risk of HIV were interviewed, 248 in Chicago and 242 in New York City. … Indicators of the law were 1) residence in the state, and 2) belief that it is a crime for a person with HIV to have sex with another person without disclosing his or her serostatus. Using stepwise logistic regression, we examined independent predictors of unprotected sex, adjusting for factors including age, race/ethnicity, disclosure, biological sex at birth, sexual orientation and number of partners.

People who lived in a state with a criminal law explicitly regulating sexual behavior of the HIV-infected were little different in their self-reported sexual behavior from people in a state without such a law. People who believed the law required the infected to practice safer sex or disclose their status reported being just as risky in their sexual behavior as those who did not. Our data do not support the proposition that passing a law prohibiting unsafe sex or requiring disclosure of infection influences people’s normative beliefs about risky sex. Most people in our study believed that it was wrong to expose others to the virus and right to disclose infection to their sexual partners. These convictions were not influenced by the respondents’ beliefs about the law or whether they lived in a state with such a law or not. Because law was not significantly influencing sexual behavior, our results also undermine the claim that such laws drive people with and or at risk of HIV away from health services and interventions.

We failed to refute the null hypothesis that criminal law has no influence on sexual risk behavior. Criminal law is not a clearly useful intervention for promoting disclosure by HIV+ people to their sex partners…

Studies have compiled prosecution data for the US and Europe. These studies are useful in assessing the possibility that criminalization could reduce HIV infection by incapacitation. The answer is no. While there have been hundreds or even thousands of prosecutions reported around the world, the number is far too small in relation to the number of HIV cases to plausibly effect population rates of transmission.

The logical arguments for the second point – that criminalization is bad for public health — are hard to fault: criminal laws create a good reason not to know one’s status if one wishes to continue having unsafe sex; they may lull uninfected people into assuming that a positive partner will disclose or insist upon condom use; they create a hostile environment that makes people afraid to be identified as HIV-positive; they promote stigma by portraying people with HIV as an evil Other. The evidence that criminalization does harm has been slow to develop, but recently some useful studies have been conducted in the UK. Both come from a team in the UK that seems to be the only research group in the world interested in this significant and enduring policy question. One, which finds that criminal prosecutions may create a false sense of security that HIV positive partners will disclose, was mentioned in an earlier post. This is from an earlier study, Dodds C, Keogh P. Criminal prosecutions for HIV transmission: people living with HIV respond. Int J STD AIDS. 2006;17:315-318.

This paper presents an analysis of responses to the first criminal convictions for HIV transmission in England and Wales within a sample of people living with HIV. … The responses were collected during 20 focused group discussions with a community and web-recruited sample of heterosexual African men and women, and gay and bisexual men (n = 125) living with diagnosed HIV in London, Manchester and Brighton. The vast majority (90%) of comments made were critical of the implementation and impact of criminalization. In particular, respondents expressed concern about the way in which criminal convictions conflict with messages about shared responsibility for ’safer sex’, and the extent to which such cases will exacerbate existing stigma and discrimination related to HIV. Most felt that the successes achieved by human rights approaches to HIV prevention, treatment, and care were placed under threat by the growing culture of blame encouraged by criminal prosecutions.

Stay tuned here for up-to-the-minute (well, semi-daily) coverage of criminalization at the Mexico City AIDS conference.

We are finding that some men with a positive diagnosis are less likely to disclose their HIV status (socially or sexually) for fear that they will be made vulnerable to a real or false accusation of transmission (this is from ongoing research with homosexually active men who have unprotected intercourse).

Men who are negative or untested for HIV are likely to prop up their expectations of HIV status disclosure from sexual partners with criminalisation discourses (this is from the Gay Men’s Sex Survey data from 2006 – being written up now as a report, and also published recently — [...]]]> Catherine Dodds, who has been doing research on the psychosocial impact of HIV prosecutions in the UK on people with and at risk of infection, sent these comments:

We are finding that some men with a positive diagnosis are less likely to disclose their HIV status (socially or sexually) for fear that they will be made vulnerable to a real or false accusation of transmission (this is from ongoing research with homosexually active men who have unprotected intercourse).

Men who are negative or untested for HIV are likely to prop up their expectations of HIV status disclosure from sexual partners with criminalisation discourses (this is from the Gay Men’s Sex Survey data from 2006 – being written up now as a report, and also published recently — Dodds et al. Homosexually active men’s views on criminal prosecutions for HIV transmission are related to HIV prevention need. AIDS Care: Psychological and Socio-medical Aspects of AIDS/HIV, Volume 20, Issue 5, 2008, Pages 509- 514 .

These two outcomes are at odds with each other and with public health goals.

Matthew Weait, who has written brilliantly on the subject, made the most important point to me off line: opposition to criminalization must fundamentally reject criminal law as the appropriate lens for judging sexual behavior. He criticizes a couple of aspects of my discussion of the Swiss case:

•Continental Europe of course draws heavily (directly and indirectly) from Roman law principles, and so sees nothing strange about imposing general / positive legal obligations on people – in contrast to common law jurisdictions, where the duty relationship [...]]]> The video posted by Kaimi is pretty funny, but it makes the point negatively as well as positively. The negotiation is extensive, involving everything from sexual positions to meeting the parents, but there is still no mention of STDs or protection.

Matthew Weait, who has written brilliantly on the subject, made the most important point to me off line: opposition to criminalization must fundamentally reject criminal law as the appropriate lens for judging sexual behavior. He criticizes a couple of aspects of my discussion of the Swiss case:

•Continental Europe of course draws heavily (directly and indirectly) from Roman law principles, and so sees nothing strange about imposing general / positive legal obligations on people – in contrast to common law jurisdictions, where the duty relationship is (relatively) narrowly circumscribed.

•You say that “smart” sex is not a fair standard to apply to A or X … I agree, but a difficult one to argue in the courts perhaps. When it comes to the criminal use of negligence in English law (as in gross negligence manslaughter) the newly qualified driver is held to the standard of the competent and experienced one, the rooky surgeon to the surgeon who’s been doing it for twenty years. And I don’t see in principle, even though we are talking in a criminal context here, why the person upon whom the duty is seen to fall (i.e. the person with conscious knowledge that there is a higher risk of being positive, albeit no certain knowledge because no testing has happened) wouldn’t be seen as being in just the same position. It all comes down to developing strong policy argument against legal liability, I think, since the law has a habit of laying these little logical traps – once you start framing the argument within a legal framework the law has a habit of winning …

I agree, and that’s why the quest for the “right” rule suggested by Shane Hartman is legally logical but socially hopeless. When law wins, it means lawyers in the bedroom. Where’s Gunther Teubner when you need him?

Point taken. In the Swiss case, there seems to be no question that the complainant was perfectly free to [...]]]> In a recent post, I described a Swiss case of “negligent HIV transmission” in which the victim’s failure to insist upon protected sex was deemed irrelevant to the defendant’s guilt. Justice Edwin Cameron of South Africa wrote me: “I know this is a very ‘African’ point that … I have been harping on, but I would have added a short observation to the first part of your discussion of the Swiss case that, it is signal that unlike in Africa, no one has suggested that the woman in the sexual encounter was less empowered than the man to take a full part in equal sexual decision-making.”

Point taken. In the Swiss case, there seems to be no question that the complainant was perfectly free to insist upon condom use, and was not (as we sometimes see in these cases) convinced to forego protection by a false assurance from the partner that he was negative. There is, indeed, evidence that she normally insisted upon protection and no evidence that it was even considered by either partner in this relationship. Both clearly knew the risks of HIV and both, being conservative, could not rule out that one of them was infected. But the court just decides that doesn’t matter: the defendant was legally responsible since he knew more about his past exposures than she did. Quite a fine legal balance there, which would seem to require the law (and sex partners) to draw some complicated, fact-senstive legal lines in addressing their potential “sexual liability.” Advice: always bring a lawyer to bed.

Caveat emptor: I was quite fluent in German in 1979, before law school.

Federal Court

{T 0/2}

6B_235/2007 /hum

Judgment of 13 June 2008

Criminal Section

Bench:

Federal Judge Schneider, President

Federal Judges Wiprächtiger, Ferrari, Favre, Zünd

Clerk of the Court: Willisegger.

Parties

X._____,

Defendant-Appellant, represented by Attorney Karin Meyer,

Against

A._____,

Complainant-Respondent, represented by lawyer Stephan Kübler,

Public Prosecutor of the Canton of Zurich, PO Box, 8090 Zurich.

The facts:

The public prosecutor of the canton of Zurich [...]]]> This is my translation of the most relevant sections of a recent Swiss case of criminal negligence in the transmission of HIV, which I discuss in another post. The case breaks new ground in holding that an individual without actual knowledge of his HIV status can be convicted of negligently transmitting the virus. See Edwin Bernard’s blog for more coverage of the case.

Caveat emptor: I was quite fluent in German in 1979, before law school.

Federal Court

{T 0/2}

6B_235/2007 /hum

Judgment of 13 June 2008

Criminal Section

Bench:

Federal Judge Schneider, President

Federal Judges Wiprächtiger, Ferrari, Favre, Zünd

Clerk of the Court: Willisegger.

Parties

X._____,

Defendant-Appellant, represented by Attorney Karin Meyer,

Against

A._____,

Complainant-Respondent, represented by lawyer Stephan Kübler,

Public Prosecutor of the Canton of Zurich, PO Box, 8090 Zurich.

The facts:

The public prosecutor of the canton of Zurich conducted a criminal investigation of A._____ concerning allegations of intentional infliction of serious injury and intentional dissemination of human diseases. These proceedings were concluded with the dismissal of the charges on 26 November 2004. …

The public prosecutor brought these charges of negligence, however, in relation to the same crime. In the indictment of 28 July 2005, A._____ was accused of having infected the victim, X._____ , during unprotected sexual intercourse in the Spring or Summer of 2002. He allegedly did so in spite of the fact that he had earlier engaged in unprotected sexual intercourse with B._____, and had been informed by her in July, 2000 that she was HIV positive. Being aware of the possibility that he had been infected with HIV by B.________ or another person, A.________ failed to take a test for HIV, and never informed the victim in this case of the risk of infection. . By having unprotected sex in the belief that he was not HIV positive and not infectious, he breached his legal duty of care.

…

[The court spends several pages reviewing the evidence of who infected whom, noting that both parties had had several casual partners before and during their relationship, discussing a theory involving additional third parties, and noting that the complainant’s testimony that she had always practiced safe sex with all her partners other than the defendant was not entirely credible.]

4.4 In sum, the lower court found that the defendant carried a rare strain of HIV from which the strain carried by the complainant certainly derived, that her infection most probably occured in June 2002 and that the defendant was already infected at that time, and that there was no dispute that the couple had had numerous unprotected sexual contacts in the same time period (beginning/middle of June 2002). On these facts the possibility of HIV transmission via one or more third parties remains purely theoretical, insufficient to ground a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the source of the infection. The contrary conclusion of the lower court is not sustainable.

…

8.1 The measure of care to be observed in connection with the transmission risk of HIV is established by the recommendations of the Federal Office of Public Health (so-called safer sex rules). They indicate that protected sex with condoms is sufficient protection against HIV infection. Outside loyal partnerships, safer sex is always recommended, and is recommended within loyal partnerships if one of the partners is possibly infected and cannot rule out HIV infection with reasonable certainty. Reasonable certainty is a negative HIV test after three months (serological window) since the last risky encounter, including any sexual act that is not considered safer sex (Beglinger, op cit Art 231 N 32, with references).

The issue of a permissible risk arises in relation to HIV transmission insofar as many people are undetected carriers. In the legal literature, the question of whether such people are entitled to have unprotected sexual contact in spite of the risk is disputed. (for: Illegal Risk: Karl-Ludwig Kunz, AIDS and criminal law, the criminalization of HIV infection by Swiss Law, ZstrR 107/1990 p. 49 ff; negative: Beglinger, op cit Art 231 N 33, Christian Huber, Selected questions about the criminalization of HIV transmission, ZstrR 115/1997 p. 116 f.; also ibid., HIV infection and AIDS disease in the light of Article 231 of the Penal Code and Assault and Homicide crimes, SJZ 85/1989 p. 152 et seq.) The correct view is that the risk of transmission of the HI-virus is not a uniformly permissible risk that the partner must be assumed to accept (for example, the spouse with no suspicion of unilateral infidelity). The opposite view – that no duty of care exists to determine one’s own health status before engaging in risky contact in the absence of a legal obligation or actual knowledge of HIV infection (Kunz, a.a.O, S. 52) – cannot be accepted. The lack of an — explicit — legal duty to have an HIV test does not answer the question under what circumstances the permitted limit of risk is exceeded. Indeed, the official recommendations are actually directed to those who do not know whether they are HIV-infected (Beglinger, op cit Art 231 N 33).

The determining factor remains whether the risk creator had reason to believe he might be HIV infected at the time of the act, which is to be determined by the circumstances of the individual case. The most basic indicator would be the person’s own knowledge of past risky behavior, such as unprotected sexual contact with a person whose sexual record he does not know. In the presence of such knowledge, the risk-creator is obliged to renounce unprotected sex as long as he cannot reasonable exclude the possibility of his own HIV infection. One who, despite recognizing the possibility of HIV infection, nonetheless disregards safer sex rules and has unprotected sex has breached a duty and created an objectively heightened danger to the rights of his sex partner that exceeds the limits of a permissible risk.

8.2 According to the factual findings of the lower court, it is clear that the defendant had unprotected sex with different partners over several years. He could not exclude the possibility that he might have been infected with HIV during one of these contacts, and therefore was bound to take risk-minimizing precautions. At the latest after the disclosure of B._____ that she was HIV positive, the possibility of his own HIV infection would have been unmistakably clear. In consequence, he protected himself during sexual intercourse with B._____, but continued to have unprotected sex with the rest of his partners. He thereby disobeyed the safer sex rules and breached his duty by exposing his partners to an impermissible risk of HIV infection risk.

8.3 Contrary to the lower court, the accusation of breach of duty is not that the defendant had not undergone HIV testing. The accusation is rather only that he did not take safer sex precautions during sexual intercourse with the complainant, even though he had at the time concrete reasons to believe that he might be infected with HIV. The raised (but unresolved) question of whether he could rely on his good faith belief concerning the lack of fever symptoms must be rejected. Because of the government campaigns for AIDS prevention, it must be considered to be generally known that unprotected sexual intercourse with unknown or changing sexual partners brings with it a significantly increased risk of infection and the obligation to take appropriate protective measures (use of condoms). In risky behavior these protection measures are required of all, not least of an educated, cosmopolitan and experienced person such as the defendant. Finally, the lower court’s consideration of the general risk of infection is irrelevant. The obligation to protect exists irrespective of the statistical probability of transmission of the HIV virus. Because it is impossible to know exactly which unprotected sexual contact infected the partner (BGE 131 IV 1 E. 2.2 p. 6). The appropriate standard of knowledge is independent of whether the actor is behaving intentionally or negligently. In any event, the elements of unintentional negligence are clear: carelessness is not just a breach of duty when actor consciously ignores a risk to the other, but also when he doesn’t even consider the risk to the rights of the victim. (Article 12 paragraph . 3, sentence 1 of the Criminal Code).

8.4 Unprotected sexual intercourse is sufficient, without more, to transmit the HI-virus to a partner; indeed, unprotected sexual contact constitutes the main reason for the transmission of HIV. The danger of successful infection was predictable. Had the defendant taken precautions in accordance with the safe sex rules, the complainant almost certainly would not have been infected. This also establishes the avoidability of infection. It remains only to examine whether the behavior of the complainant influences the allocation of responsibility.

9.

9.1 The attribution of responsibility [to the defendant] can fail on grounds of the personal responsibility of the victim. In this context, a distinction must be made between, inter alia, assisting another to endanger himself and endangering another with consent. The distinction depends on whether the rights-bearer so controls the event that at any time until the end he can take control, or whether the risky process is controlled by another. (BGE 125 IV 189 E. 3a; 131 IV 1 E. 3.2 ; Judgment of the Federal Court 6S_91/2007, January 17, 2008, E. 4.5, each with references).

Endangering oneself is not punishable. Nor is it punishable to cooperate in endangering another as long as the person encountering the risk to self and the person who is assisting are disregarding the risk to the same degree. The impunity for assisting another in self-endangerment arises from the legality of suicide and – subject to article 115 Criminal Code – assisting a suicide. If assisting in a suicide and also in deliberate self-harm is not punishable, it follows that assistance in self-endangerment cannot be punishable either. This reflects the normative value decision that there is no reason to constrain liberty as long as no one is endangered against his will (BGE 131 IV 1 E. 3.2; judgment 6S.91/2007, January 17, 2008, E. 4.5).

The impunity of assisting in another’s self-endangerment finds its limit where the assisting person has superior knowledge in relation to the threat in question (BGE 125 IV 189 E. 3a p. 194) or detects that the victim does not comprehend the scope of the risk. In such a case, the assistant creates a risk that the will of the victim no longer contemplates, and therefore its implementation is attributable to the cooperating person (BGE 131 E. IV 1 with references 3.3).

9.2 According to the case law, unprotected sexual contact with an HIV-infected person by an autonomous, informed partner constitutes assistance in self-endangerment, and not consensual endangerment of another. The crucial point is that, in sexual relations, the degree of risk is in principle under the control of both parties. They always have the option to break off in time, to use a condom or to insist that the partner does so (BGE 131 IV 1 E. 3.4 p. 10). In the cited decision, the Federal Court found that it was unpunishable assistance in self-endangerment where the victim knew his partner was HIV infected but nonetheless voluntarily continued to have unprotected sex. On the other hand, there was no excuse from liability in relation to the offence of spreading human diseases (Article 231 StGB). In the case of offences endangering the community, which pertain exclusively to public interests, the knowledge or attitude of the next person who happens to be affected is irrelevant (BGE 131 IV 1 E. 4, with references).

9.3 The same rule applies if neither of the two sexual partners knows (with certainty) that one of them HIV-infected. Whoever undertakes unprotected sexual contact without being able to rule out prior risky contacts and therefore HIV infection on the part of his partner, himself poses a danger to his own legal interests. The responsibility for harm falls as a rule on the autonomous, self-endangering behavior of the victim, should the harm of HIV transmission be realized. This applies only as long as both sexual partners disregard the risk of an earlier HIV infection and danger of transmission to the same degree. If there is on the side of the victim an ignorance of a material fact known to the actor, the self-endangerment is not longer consensual and therefore not his responsibility. In such a case, the realization of the risk is attributable to the partner (see Kunz, op cit ZstrR 1990/107 p. 55 et seq.).

9.4. According to her own testimony, the complainant only had protected intercourse with other partners, while she agreed to have unprotected sex with the defendant. There were apparently no reasons she could not have protected herself and insisted upon condoms. On the other hand, only the defendant knew that he had had unprotected sex with the HIV-infected B._____. He never informed the complainant. Likewise, she did not know that he had failed to take an HIV test and despite the information from B._____ continued to have unprotected sex apparently unconcerned about the consequences his behavior could have. Therein lies a material difference in knowledge. Thus it cannot be accepted, and we will not hold, that the complainant had the knowledge – particularly the knowledge of the defendant’s earlier risky contact with B_______ — that would have been necessary to make an informed choice to engage in unprotected sex.

[A______ was convicted of negligent infliction of bodily harm and negligent transmission of a disease]

God knows it is flattering for any law professor to be thought of as a threat to social order, but the truth is, our meeting would have been good, not bad, for China. Virtually every country that has mounted a successful drive [...]]]> I was supposed to be in China this week. A New York-based NGO called Asia Catalyst had organized a meeting on HIV and human rights. It was meant to bring together an emerging network of grassroots Chinese HIV advocates with experienced AIDS lawyers from around the world. Late last week, as Reuters reports, the Chinese government stepped in. The meeting was cancelled, the organizers told that “the combination of AIDS, law and foreigners was too sensitive.”

God knows it is flattering for any law professor to be thought of as a threat to social order, but the truth is, our meeting would have been good, not bad, for China. Virtually every country that has mounted a successful drive against HIV has depended in significant part on NGOs to provide services to gay people, drug users and sex workers -– people who are often inclined to duck and cover when government health officials come around with offers of help. Defending the rights of people with HIV is a crucial step towards creating the sort of social environment in which prevention and care reach those who need it. Independent legal advocacy organizations can productively push debate around politically sensitive policies (like de facto discrimination against homosexuals, or the criminalization of sex work), and challenge stigmatizing attitudes. They can monitor the public and private agencies funded to deliver health care and other services to people with HIV. NGOs also provide independent avenues of cooperation and communication with foreigners. And, just for the record, China is far from a disaster on the AIDS control front. More than most countries, its government has paid attention to the evidence and invested substantially in proven interventions like needle exchange. China’s response is not perfect, but it compares well with that of other countries similar stages of their epidemic development. (China’s HIV program is described in a Lancet article; there’s also a comment arguing that China is devoting too many resources to HIV in comparison with other, more prevalent health threats like smoking.)

Unfortunately, the Chinese government is not well-disposed to independent social action, particularly when it might be amplified through contact with foreigners. Some say it’s the Olympics – only nice news from China in the next 12 months, please. Others point to the report that there were something like 87,000 public protests in China in 2005 – enough to make any leadership cadre appreciate a little civil obedience. There’s the pessimistic view that the current leadership is Putinizing the nation, building up China’s military and getting tough on dissent on the home front. Whatever the causes, Chinese leaders are, as a group, ambivalent about civil society. Both NGOs and an independent legal system have the potential to help the Beijing regime deal with its terrible problems of corruption and social injustice – within the law. Many Chinese leaders recognize this, and there is support within the state for these developments. But in the case of our meeting, someone in the Public Security Bureau looked at the prospect of independent human rights lawyers networking with obstreperous global advocates – and blinked.

Like it or not, anyone promoting civil society and the rule of law in China has got to deal with this ambivalence. All kinds of actors in China – government officials, new capitalists, NGOs, members of the rising middle class, peasants – are jostling on road to the future, not entirely sure where they want to end up or the best way to get there. From a pragmatic point of view, one of the best things outsiders can do is invest in the intellectual infrastructure of human rights, rule of law and good governance. One excellent way to do that is to support the work of Chinese academics.

Law professors – the engine of social change. Alright, that’s a bit incredible, so let me put it another way: in China now, it is useful to see “civil society” in functional, rather than categorical terms. The true non-government sector is growing exponentially, but it is hemmed in by legal restrictions and undermined by a lack of money – both of which reflect to some degree the government’s impulse to retain control. At the same time, organizations formally within government — universities, media, “GONGOs”, even religious organizations — perform many of the functions of independent civil society in the West. And when it comes to developing new ideas in the human rights and anti-stigma line – specifically when it comes to making the case for progressive, evidence-based policies for HIV control — academics are typically in the vanguard. The Chinese government is reasonably open to research, social inquiry and policy proposals. It is far more comfortable hearing uncomfortable truths and suggestions for reform when they come from institutions that are under state control, even if that control is in practice exercised lightly and sporadically. Thus, well-established journals and academic publishers regulatory put out papers outlining the same sort of policy recommendations that one would see in our own academic literature. My Chinese colleagues and I had no difficulty, for example, conducting a study of how police and other public officials treated drug users at syringe exchanges, methadone clinics and AIDS research sites, or publishing an article about the tensions between criminalizing sex work and preventing HIV. In fact, China’s leaders seem to pay more attention to the evidence and ideas mustered by academics than our own leaders do. To take just one painful example, China’s central government is paying for needle exchange while ours continues to refuse, and China now has four times more exchanges in operation than we do in the US.

In China today, professors are documenting the social factors that promote HIV, writing about the impact of stigma, law enforcement, rules on migration. It was a Chinese law professor, Zhou Wei, who brought the landmark case of Zhang Xianzhu vs. the Personnel Bureau in Wuhu City, the first successful administrative lawsuit on Hepatitis B discrimination in employment in China. Professor Zhang Beichuan from Qingdao University is a leader in the effort to de-stigmatize homosexuality. Professors influence not just government officials, but also the intelligentsia, civil society and, perhaps most importantly, generations of students. In the end, human rights and the rule of law are ideas, and spreading ideas is still something universities do pretty well. I’m hopeful that China is growing into a freer and more open society. I’m convinced that it will only do so with Chinese ideas leading the way.