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Author: Lawrence Cunningham

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U Delaware Chaplin Tyler Lecture

I’m honored to be giving this lecture at my alma mater, and thanks go to Charles Elson for the opportunity and Kim Ragan for organizing the event.  It’s the first in the book tour that will take me to many other great universities with thanks to many more wonderful colleagues nationwide.  More details as they are finalized.

Poster U Delaware-page1

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GW’s C-LEAF Annual Call for Papers from Newer Business Law Scholars

The Center for Law, Economics & Finance (C-LEAF) at The George Washington University Law School has announced its fifth annual Junior Faculty Business and Financial Law Workshop and Junior Faculty Scholarship Prizes. Here are the details:

The Workshop will be held on February 27-28, 2015 at GW Law School in Washington, DC.  The Workshop supports and recognizes the work of young legal scholars in accounting, banking, bankruptcy, corporations, economics, finance and securities, while promoting interaction among them and selected senior faculty and practitioners. By providing a forum for the exchange of creative ideas in these areas, C-LEAF also aims to encourage new and innovative scholarship.

Approximately ten papers will be chosen from those submitted for presentation at the Workshop pursuant to this Call for Papers. At the Workshop, one or more senior scholars and practitioners will comment on each paper, followed by a general discussion of each paper among all participants. The Workshop audience will include invited young scholars, faculty from GW’s Law School and Business School, faculty from other institutions, practitioners, and invited guests.

At the conclusion of the Workshop, three papers will be selected to receive Junior Faculty Scholarship Prizes of $3,000, $2,000, and $1,000, respectively. All prize winners will be invited to become Fellows of C-LEAF. C-LEAF makes no publication commitment.

Junior scholars who have not yet received tenure, but have held a full-time academic appointment for less than seven years as of the submission date, are cordially invited to submit summaries or drafts of their papers. Although published work is not eligible for submission, submissions may include work that has been accepted for publication. C-LEAF will cover hotel and meal expenses of all selected presenters.

Those interested in presenting a paper at the Workshop should submit an abstract, summary or draft, preferably by e-mail, on or before October 17, 2014. To facilitate blind review, your name and other identifying information should be redacted from your paper submission. Direct your submission, along with any inquiries related to the Workshop, to:  Professor Lisa M. Fairfax, Leroy Sorenson Merrifield Research Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, 2000 H Street, NW, Washington, DC 20052, lfairfax@law.gwu.edu.

Papers and Junior Faculty Scholarship Prizes will be selected after a blind review by members of the C-LEAF Executive Board. Authors of accepted papers will be notified by November 24, 2014. Please feel free to pass this Call for Papers along to any colleagues who may be interested.  For more information on C-LEAF Fellows, please visit  here or contact us at cleaf@law.gwu.edu. The Workshop and prizes are supported by grants from the Schulte Roth & Zabel law firm.

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Coming Soon: Law School Tuition $11,000

coquillette While today’s Harvard Law students are about to pay the hoary institution as much as $54,580 in annual tuition, a new law school designed on the original Harvard Law model plans to charge $11,000.  I have just received an offer to join its faculty and find the model intriguing.

Designed by the renowned legal historian, Dan Coquillette, once Dean of Boston College and former colleague of mine, the new school will have no administrators but rather an automated system, no books but a digital library, and two faculty members who will teach three courses per semester to a class of thirty-five students.  There will be no ABA accreditation and the school will have to compete on the apprenticeship model.

Dan’s idea arises from his research for his magisterial history of Harvard Law School, where Dan has long been the Charles Warren Visiting Professor of American Legal History.  Called “On the Battlefield of Merit,” Harvard University Press will publish this multi-volume history, volume one telling of how apprenticeship competition nearly  destroyed the infant law school.

In Harvard Law’s golden age, there were just two faculty members, Joseph Story and Simon Greenleaf, who taught all the courses. With a faculty-student ratio of 17.5:1, Story also published a treatise a year.

As Dan explained in his appointment offer to me:

The students of the Story-Greenleaf School read like a Who’s Who of the New Republic, and they uniformly praised their Law School experience, particularly the close mentoring and inspiration they got from their two teachers.  Of course, Story and Greenleaf knew every student in the School. The physical plant was terrible; the Library, open to Harvard Square, often lost more books a year then it gained; and the only nonacdemic employee was a janitor who spoke Latin.  The students did not care, as long as there was Story at one end of a log, and a student at the other.

If we replicated that School exactly, setting faculty salaries at today’s levels and including all overhead, student tuition would be 20% of what they pay now. I am ready when you are.

I believe that this offer is non-transferable but, hey, you never know.

BC Book Club

Annual Book Author Party, BCLS Faculty (2004): Zyg Plater, Frank Garcia, Dan Coquillette, Jim Repetti, Paul McDaniel, Larry Cunningham, Bob Bloom, David Wirth, John Garvey.

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Ace Greenberg, RIP

Ace GAlan C. (“Ace”) Greenberg has died at 86 (e.g., Crain’s NY Business, Money, Bloomberg, WSJ, USA Today).  A force behind the rise to prominence of Bear Stearns (which he headed from 1978 to 1993), Ace was a friend to me. He gave generously to Cardozo Law School, from which his wife Kathy graduated (in 1982), and contributed intellectually to programming I conducted there while directing the Samuel and Ronnie Heyman Center on Corporate Governance

Ace’s delightful little book, Memos from the Chairman, contains profound and pithy insight into business management, drawn from his famous memos to staff, that I’ll relish forever.  His book about the downfall of his beloved firm is also a nice contribution to our understanding of the financial crisis of 2008.

Ace kindly wrote a blurb for one of my early books on investing, How to Think Like Benjamin Graham and Invest Like Warren Buffett.  He said that the book “puts the ABCs of common sense valuation back into the business of investing” and was “the place to look for insight and guidance in the age of volatile markets and colliding ideas.”

Ace epitomized common sense and was a practical, generous, funny, and clever man.  He was also scrappy, tough, shrewd, and frugal.  Best of all, he was a champion of the underdog, just like me.   We’ll miss Ace.

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On National Ice Cream Day, Thanks Dairy Queen

DQIn honor of National Ice Cream Day (July 20), here is a brief celebration of Dairy Queen, an institution of American culture—entrepreneurial, legal, literary, and familial—that helped put this cold concoction on the national calendar. I developed these reflections when researching my upcoming book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values (Columbia U. Press 2014), which provides deep looks at the corporate culture of Berkshire Hathaway’s fifty-plus subsidiaries, including Dairy Queen.

While full treatment must await publication of the book (which can be pre-ordered now), here are a few passages along with many outtakes—i.e., sections that did not make it into the final book because they are too technical, but may appeal to readers of this blog interested in the history of franchising businesses and intellectual property rights.

Dairy Queen’s roots date to 1927’s founding of Homemade Ice Cream Company by John F. (“Grandpa”) McCullough (1871‒1963) and his son Alex near the Iowa-Illinois border. Innovative ice cream makers, they experimented with temperatures and textures and eventually pioneered soft ice creams. One discovery: ice cream was frozen for the convenience of manufacturers and merchants, not for the delight of consumers.

At first, the McCulloughs were unable to interest any manufacturer in building the necessary freezers and dispensers to serve soft ice cream. Luckily, however, Grandpa happened to see a newspaper ad in the Chicago Tribune describing a newly-patented continuous freezer that could dispense soft ice cream. Grandpa answered the inventor/manufacturer, Harry M. Oltz, and the two made a deal in the summer of 1939.

The McCullough-Oltz agreement entitled Oltz to patent royalties equal to two cents per gallon of soft ice cream run through the freezer; the agreement also granted the McCulloughs patent licensing rights in the Western U.S., while Oltz retained them for the Eastern part of the country. The agreements that McCullough and Oltz made with licensees seemed to cover only the patent, rather than the DQ trademark, and contained few quality controls.

After World War II, DQ stores hit their stride, drawing lengthy lines of increasingly loyal customers enjoying the cooling effects of soft ice cream all sultry-summer long. The customer throngs at one store in Moline, Illinois caught the attention of Harry Axene. An entrepreneurial farm equipment salesman for Allis-Chalmers, Axene wanted to invest in the business. He contacted the McCulloughs and acquired both the rights to sell the ice cream in Illinois and Iowa as well as an interest in the McCullough’s ice cream manufacturing facility. Read More

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Truth, Candor, and Crisis at Yeshiva University

Among universities in trouble, the darkest cloud hangs over Yeshiva University, a venerable Jewish institution founded in New York in 1886. The University acknowledges huge economic losses and failed investment policies and is taking extraordinary steps to balance its books, including ceding control over its one-time crown jewel, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, which has close friends of its law school, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, very concerned.  Critics, moreover, see a death spiral and question the leadership’s candor.

Amid calls for the resignation or dismissal of Yeshiva’s president, Mr. Richard M. Joel, he says the University will no longer engage with the media on fiscal questions. The Wall Street Journal reports that the University has hired the crisis-management communications firm, Kekst & Co., but any benefits from that hiring are not yet obvious.sunlight

In a familiar pattern facing other organizations in crisis, what both sides miss in this dangerous heightening of tensions is the importance of trust to any institution’s health. To resolve this crisis, as always, the institution’s leadership must regain trust by explaining how its current fiscal stewardship advances the institution’s mission. Critics must not rush to judgment and hear the leadership out on what it has learned from recent problems and plans for the future.

Like other investors, part of Yeshiva’s problems are due to the financial collapse of 2008, but its roots are a bit deeper and offer broader lessons. Since at least 1993, the board of trustees oversaw Yeshiva’s endowment and made investment decisions. University policy permitted trustees to invest endowment in funds the trustees managed, despite conflicts of interest, so long as they made full disclosure.

During the early 2000s, the trustees increasingly allocated endowment to their own hedge funds, which were heavily weighted in risky securities. By 2008, the endowment, valued at more than $1 billion, held riskier investments than those of peer institutions. The financial upheaval of 2008 thus hit Yeshiva even harder than most peers, shrinking its endowment by more than $300 million, including $100 million due to the Ponzi scheme of Bernie Madoff, whose top victims also included a Yeshiva trustee.

While it appears that the trustees and the administration acted in good faith, even if no laws were broken, poor judgment abounded. The loose conflict-of-interest policy certainly was a mistake, as a trustee’s personal involvement skews his judgment. Reputable and durable institutions scrupulously avoid the remotest appearance of impropriety. For stalwarts like Yeshiva, this principle of integrity, coupled with an ethic of prudence, should govern investment decisions.

The University learned its lesson from this calamity and has adopted new policies that may serve as a model for other endowments. It created a professional investment office to set strategy, updated oversight protocols, and established a rigorous conflicts policy. While thus implicitly recognizing earlier weaknesses, the University has not offered a mea culpa nor has it identified particular past faults—whether sins of omission or commission, of process or substance, or whether the product of mere haplessness or of actual chicanery. That reticence allows unimpressed critics to overlook the significance of these reforms.

It is hard to measure objectively the exact economic costs of Yeshiva’s policies or market onslaughts from which it has suffered. One result of this difficulty is wildly different numbers being reported by the University and critics—ranging from $300 million to a staggering $1.3 billion. However, it is less important to achieve consensus on financial figures than to find common ground on productive next steps.

At stake is advancing the institution’s core mission, which is not to maximize endowment or earn a profit but to promote knowledge and teach students. The fiscal drama becomes a superficial distraction from fundamental academic judgments about the relation among current and future pedagogical, scholarly, scientific, cultural and religious needs and resources.

Constituents would rightly like to know more about Yeshiva’s finances as well as the academic thinking behind decisions concerning building or closing facilities and forming or ending joint ventures and programs. For example, when Yeshiva recently ceded managerial control over Einstein College of Medicine to another institution to cut costs, it did not publicly detail the educational rationale. Critics jumped on the move, assuming and asserting that it was a sign of distress rather than a shrewd maneuver that promotes the University’s goals.

When institutions are imperiled in this way, the best course of action is to make certain that the operative facts are publicly known, to identify lessons learned, and to act on them. In that spirit, the University might do well to form an independent task force with unlimited access to University information charged to report a public assessment of where things stand and where they are going. Lifting the cloud over this 128-year old bastion of Judaism, such a look would enable Yeshiva University to move forward with its important business of education.

Lawrence A. Cunningham, a graduate and former faculty member of Yeshiva University’s law school (Cardozo), is a professor at George Washington University and the author of the forthcoming book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values.

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The Babe Ruth of Good Business Today

baberuthOne hundred years ago this week, on July 11, 1914, George Herman (“Babe”) Ruth made his major league debut, for the Boston Red Sox at two-year old Fenway Park. Over the course of his baseball career, The Great Bambino set many records, including leading the league in home runs for twelve seasons; most total bases in a season (457); and highest slugging percentage for a season (.847). In all, he hit 714 home runs, a record that stood until 1974, when Hank Aaron of the Atlanta Braves claimed the title. But that is not why the Babe is immortal.

Other home run kings have achieved nothing like Ruth’s iconic status. Many decade-leading hitters—such as Harry Davis, Gavy Cravath, or Jimmie Foxx—are barely known. Even falling short of Ruth’s stature are the two players who passed him in home runs, Aaron and Barry Bonds (Pittsburgh Pirates and San Francisco Giants), who took the top spot in 2007. Nor is Ruth’s immortality due entirely to the fact that he also excelled as a pitcher: for forty-three years he held the record for consecutive scoreless innings pitched in World Series play and his overall win-loss ratio (.671) remains the seventh best of all time.

Ruth’s immorality, rather, is due to how, through such extraordinary feats, he changed the game of baseball. He brought power to the sport at a time when typical strategy was to move players around the bases one small hit at a time. While baseball was thriving as an American pastime before he played, the Babe’s bold style, vast generosity, and utter unpretentiousness won the public’s adulation. His deep sense of ethics helped to rescue baseball from the damage done by the miscreant players who threw the 1919 World Series.  His strength and optimism gave hope to millions during the Great Depression. Ruth made baseball a richer sport with a wider and enduring following, which is why we all recognize his name a century after his rookie year. And people venerate the Babe despite his many bad personal habits, such as gluttony, promiscuity, and pugnaciousness.

In American business, we have likewise enshrined transformative figures like Ruth despite faults. Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, and Cornelius Vanderbilt built the nation’s infrastructure while J. P. Morgan and Henry Ford forged its business structures and methods. We condemn the cheaters to memory’s hell—from Charles Ponzi to Bernie Madoff—or at least purgatory, as with Michael Milken. We remain ambivalent about the likes of Jay Gould and others still derided as robber barons. Read More

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Happy 4th to The Persons of the Divided States of America

shredded flag“Person means a natural person, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, business trust, joint stock company, trust, unincorporated business association, joint venture, governmental entity, or other organization.”

That is from the definitions section of a commercial agreement I happened to be reading today for a consulting assignment.  That type of definition appears in millions of commercial contracts–purchase agreements, merger agreements, loan agreements, leases, licenses, you name it.

In the commercial world, among business lawyers and clients, it is commonly assumed that whenever we reference persons we mean to include every form of organization people have created.   That familiar usage might make the holdings in cases such as Holly Hobby or Citizens United seem natural, with corporations having many of the same rights and duties as people have.

On the other hand, we use the term this way in the business context where the issues being addressed concern commercial obligations and powers, liabilities and indemnities and purchases and sales–not free speech or free exercise of religion.  Moreover, the presence of such definitions in these agreements, despite ubiquity, underscores that it is more natural for persons to be seen only as natural persons, not organizations.

Hard liners on both sides of debates about corporate rights and duties show stupidity, arrogance, or mendacity when declaring either, on the right, “of course corporations are persons” or, on the left, “of course corporations are not persons.” In fact, organizations are not natural persons.  But for some purposes, they should be treated as natural persons are and for others they should not.  (See here for some additional thoughts on Hobby Lobby drawing on the example of Berkshire Hathaway.)

Context is key and hard liners tend to forget context.  In the talk these days about these two SCOTUS cases, it looks as if the Divided States of America is increasingly peopled by hard liners. Alas, that’s not something to celebrate this Fourth of July.

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What Berkshire Hathaway Teaches About Hobby Lobby

Eleven years ago tomorrow, the abortion issue led Berkshire Hathaway, the huge conglomerate Warren Buffett built and now owned by one million different shareholders, to end its shareholder-directed charitable contribution program. Under the program, Berkshire’s board earmarked an amount for charitable giving and then let the company’s class A shareholders designate the charities to which their share went. In twenty-two years, the program distributed $197 million to thousands of different charities.

Berkshire terminated the program on July 3, 2003 because activists boycotted products of one of its subsidiaries to protest giving to organizations they opposed on religious grounds: some designated Planned Parenthood, which facilitates a woman’s choice to abort an unwanted pregnancy, while others gave to Catholic Social Services, which opposes abortions.

Berkshire stood for neither position, of course, because it is a business organization whose mission is to increase its intrinsic economic value, which has nothing to do with religion. Berkshire’s board chose to terminate the program because the boycotts hurt Berkshire’s business and its personnel while offering shareholders only a slight convenience and tax advantage.

The scenario speaks to the debate that erupted this week between foes in the abortion debate thanks to the Supreme Court’s decision in the Hobby Lobby case. The issue in that case, narrower and more technical than accompanying rhetoric suggests, was whether the word persons in a federal statute about religious freedom includes corporations owned by a small number of people with a specific set of religious beliefs. If so, then regulations implementing Obamacare cannot require them to fund birth control devices in conflcit with their religious beliefs.

A majority of the Court concluded that closely-held corporations are persons for the purpose of the statute because they are readily seen as merely a convenient legal form through which individuals do business. The dissent complained that only individuals can have religious beliefs and therefore corporations, whether closely held or otherwise, aren’t persons for purposes of the federal law.

The Berkshire example is instructive on both opinions. Buffett has always boasted that Berkshire, though using the corporate form, adopts a partnership attitude. The shareholder charitable contribution program epitomized this attitude. It gave the decision to the owners, as is done in partnerships and closely held corporations, not the board, the practice in public corporations. Those owners, moreover, were the class A shareholders, a subset of Berkshire’s shareholder body made up of people with larger and older stakes—including hundreds who really were Buffett’s original partners.

Berkshire shareholders, class A and class B, readily agree on a wide variety of business and ownership topics. For example, in a vote earlier this year on the company’s dividend policy, 98 percent ratified the existing—and unusual—no-dividend practice. But put a question about hot-button religious or political  issues of the day such as abortion and expect deep divisions.

Berkshire’s shareholders may be able to act like partners or closely-held shareholders on business issues while the charitable giving program proved they were unable to do so on others. For the Court in Holly Lobby, this perspective supports the majority’s holding about the nature of close corporations while validating the dissent’s appetite for a sharp boundary between them and the typical business organization.

Lawrence A. Cunningham is the author of the upcoming Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values and editor of The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for Corporate America. He teaches business-related courses at George Washington University Law School.

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Trashing, Defending, and Deferring to Yeshiva University

University bashing is in fashion, from the broad-gauged film Ivory Tower to particular attacks on given schools. Some critiques usefully expose problems that need correcting with constructive solutions on offer.  But others seem to trash the academy for other reasons, as with a recent diatribe against Yeshiva University, which seems more calculated to exacerbate the school’s problems than help it find solutions.

In an  expose-style that seems to blow the school’s financial challenges out of proportion, Steven Weiss, who acknowledges having been expelled from Yeshiva in 2002, portrays Yeshiva’s leadership since that year variously as gullible, myopic, conflicted, or greedy.  This piece stung because I am a graduate and former faculty member of Yeshiva’s law school (Cardozo) and I know and have worked with some of the people vilified in the story.  While I am not familiar with all of the factual background of the University’s recent experience, Weiss’s story seems awfully one-sided and therefore the story, as much as the facts about Yeshiva, causes concern.

I share Weiss’s praise for Yeshiva’s former president, Rabbi Norman Lamm, whom I knew, worked with, and admired.  Lamm, and later his VP for business affairs, Sheldon Socol, led Yeshiva from the brink of bankruptcy in 1975 to fiscal soundness and renewed its status for academic excellence and cultural distinction.  (Rabbi Lamm told me how, when he was about to declare bankruptcy, his hand shook so intensely that he could not sign the papers.)

But Weiss then makes a foil out of Lamm,  painting a golden era that ended after 2002 when he passed the baton to Richard Joel, the current president, who has faced a different set of challenges that entices Weiss’s wrath.  In Weiss’s telling, after Lamm’s retirement and Joel’s succession, it’s been all downhill for Yeshiva and its students.  Joel, whom I knew as an able administrator and gentleman when he served as Dean of Business Affairs at Cardozo, certainly has a different style than the rabbi-scholars such as Lamm who preceded him.  But Weiss exaggerates in inexplicably inflammatory tones how this style difference has played out, in a story misleadingly headlined “How to Lose $1 Billion: Yeshiva University Blows Its Future on Loser Hedge Funds.” Read More