Cultural Dissent
posted by Frank Pasquale
I’m often reminded of Madhavi Sunder’s brilliant article Cultural Dissent. Sunder argues that recognition of dissent within doctrine “would prevent law from becoming complicit in . . . project[s] of suppressing internal cultural reform.” Consider the Russian feminist band which could be imprisoned for staging a minute-long rock video in a church. The band sang and performed an intercessory prayer for the removal of President Putin from power. Here is one member’s closing statement:
That Christ the Savior Cathedral had become a significant symbol in the political strategy of the authorities was clear to many thinking people when Vladimir Putin’s former [KGB] colleague Kirill Gundyayev took over as leader of the Russian Orthodox Church. After this happened, Christ the Savior Cathedral began to be openly used as a flashy backdrop for the politics of the security forces, which are the main source of political power in Russia.
Why did Putin feel the need to exploit the Orthodox religion and its aesthetic? After all, he could have employed his own, far more secular tools of power—for example, the state-controlled corporations, or his menacing police system, or his obedient judicial system. It may be that the harsh, failed policies of Putin’s government, the incident with the submarine Kursk, the bombings of civilians in broad daylight, and other unpleasant moments in his political career forced him to ponder the fact that it was high time to resign; that otherwise, the citizens of Russia would help him do this. Apparently, it was then that he felt the need for more persuasive, transcendent guarantees of his long tenure at the pinnacle of power. It was then that it became necessary to make use of the aesthetic of the Orthodox religion, which is historically associated with the heyday of Imperial Russia, where power came not from earthly manifestations such as democratic elections and civil society, but from God Himself.
The whole statement is well worth reading. As Russia struggles with capital flight and crumbling infrastructure, it might wish to reconsider the fusion of political and religious authority.
August 13, 2012 at 6:15 pm
Posted in: First Amendment, Religion
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Responses (4)
A.J. Sutter - August 13, 2012 at 11:59 pm
I think you may be getting cultural and political dissent mixed up. Notwithstanding Yekaterina Samutsevich’s reference to “Orthodox culture” in her closing statement, and the band’s use of certain cultural symbols in their performance, their protest was against Putin, and they’re under threat of being punished by the state. If it were cultural dissent, it should be the Russian Orthodox Church that would be taking action against them, assuming that they’re even members (though the fact that the church is run by ex-KGB would strain the “cultural” characterization of any such action, too). Moreover, this matter doesn’t seem to invoke the “liberty versus equality” conflict that Sunder focuses on, either — it can be seen simply as a political liberty issue. I’m not sure I buy Sunder’s arguments anyway, but I don’t think they’re so germane to the understanding of this case.
Frank Pasquale - August 14, 2012 at 10:54 am
But aren’t they just as much criticizing the Orthodox Church for capitulating? Aren’t they calling on it to do, say, what the Roman Catholic Church has done in some cases with authoritarian regimes–refuse to capitulate to the regime picking religious leaders? See, e.g.,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303292204577518553244967064.html
A.J. Sutter - August 14, 2012 at 2:29 pm
I think the Chinese example to which you’ve linked is slightly more relevant to the “cultural dissent” situation in Sunder’s article, because it relates to someone faced with the choice of leaving the Catholic Church or enduring an intolerable situation from which they dissent. Even that case has some differences from Sunder’s “cultural” case, because of the element of government control; leaving because the Church won’t accept some more internal form of dissent (female or gay priests, e.g.) seems better to fit her paradigm.
A Russian analogue to the Chinese example might have been where the political authorities left Pussy Riot alone, but the Church threatened to excommunicate them because of their criticism of Putin. In the actual case, though, they didn’t get in trouble with the Church (so far as I know; in any case, it’s not their biggest problem). They got in trouble with the government, and that was for their sensationally visible criticism of Putin.
The government’s use of religion in the trial seems mainly a cynical and convenient pretext for avenging the lèse-majesté. Nonetheless, even if it were sincere, the defendants’ religious affiliation here seems incidental. The prosecution ostensibly is seeking to prove that the hooliganism was a hate crime. When a prosecutor in the US attempts to prove that a defendant was motivated by hatred for Jews, Muslims, Sikhs, etc., the prosecutor isn’t acting on behalf of any religion or religious body. I expect that if the band members had been Anabaptists, Jews, or something else, the Russian prosecution would have proceeded along the same lines. And while this particular prosecution may be an abuse of the “hate crime” category, I don’t think we’d want to claim categorically that all “hate crime” prosecutions are illegitimate attempts to suppress “cultural dissent.”
Matt - August 15, 2012 at 1:01 am
The Russian Orthodox Church has really never been distinct from the Russian (or largely even Soviet) government. (For example, the Orthodox Church in Russia now is the descendent of the group that stayed and agreed to work under the Soviets. There was a groups that left, but it has no influence inside Russia.) Under Yeltsin, the Orthodox Church got special tax breaks to import and sell cigarettes tax-free, for example. (There are other examples, but this is one of the grossest.) The idea that the Orthodox church would stand up to the state here is just about impossible. They are too entwined with it. It’s also essential to understand the deeply cynical way that the laws against provoking “religious hatred” and the like are used in Russia. (Look up the case of Orthodox thugs attacking the Sakharov museum, and see who was charged with promoting “religious hatred” to get a taste.) This isn’t really law at all, and nothing is gained by pretending that it is.
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