Talking Law

You may also like...

2 Responses

  1. Julie Cohen says:

    Valerie, thanks for these comments. Sometimes U.S. privacy advocates point to the European approach as the solution, and it’s important to be reminded that it contains its own internal tensions. Even moving beyond the U.S. civil rights paradigm to a human right paradigm doesn’t necessarily lend that paradigm deep content; it’s exactly my hope that directly confronting the privacy-subjectivity problem could deepen the foundations. And it’s become quite clear over the last decade or so that looking to Canada would help!

  2. Valerie Steeves says:

    Canada’s a bit of a hybrid, using data protection language (which is quite limited) and constitutional language that mirrors the American 4th amendment (which is also limited). Unfortunately, the right to privacy didn’t make the final cut of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when we repatriated our constitution in 1982. European countries with constitutional protections for privacy and notions of personhood have richer legal language because they draw on European human rights conventions that stand apart from data protection. It’s the discursive richness of the human rights commitment to dignity that provides an opportunity for legal scholars to make the link between dignity, personhood and privacy. But it’s just an opportunity – and one that can be quickly shut down by instrumental arguments based on data protection. On that note, it’ll be fun to watch the new EU battle with Google and see who wins this one…