Furthermore, any precedent set by this case only applies to that level of that court in New York. It might be considered as persuasive precedent for higher courts, or for courts in other jurisdictions, but it is certainly not binding precedent.

First, there was no great imbalance of wealth or power between plaintiff and defendant, as often occurs in SLAPP cases. Second, the plaintiff had ample reason to drop the underlying litigation – not just the defendant’s lack of means but also the knowledge that the defendant apparently was not prepared to escalate matters from insults to violence. Third, there was no issue of public interest involved, as typicaly seems to be the case in SLAPP litigation. Finally, the threshold ruling that calling Cohen a “ho” was an accusation of prostitution was so absurd that I doubt we will see anything like it anytime soon.

And I understand the appeal and important implications of a First Amendment argument, but if, as has often been cited, the lawsuit (despite its merit) is initiated to harass or intimidate, and this can be proven, doesn’t Rule 11 (or its state analogs) cover that sort of conduct? It’s just a slippery slope to start penalizing litigants for bringing meritorious lawsuits, unless an improper purpose for the suit can be affirmatively proven.

I don’t think this could work for cases when corporations want to unmask whistleblowers, or for other situations in which the plaintiff could seriously harm the defendant in other extralegal ways. And the line-drawing might make this standard impracticable. But still, mightn’t the threat of lost anonymity be exactly the right deterrent in many cases of online harassment?

And then I saw that “m” was suspiciously close to the “,”. Nuts to you, Kerr, for making me just that much less productive tonight.

As you might guess, Google’s TOS say no such thing — indeed, it’s hard to imagine otherwise. To the contrarym Google’s privacy policy says that they will disclose if they “have a good faith belief that access, use, preservation or disclosure of such information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law, regulation, legal process or enforceable governmental request.” All they need is good faith, which they surely have here.

http://www.google.com/privacypolicy.html

There are instances, however, of plaintiffs bringing a lawsuit merely as a ruse to unmask anonymous bloggers. In The Future of Reputation: Gossip, Rumor, and Privacy on the Internet, I wrote about one case where an employer used the technique to find out the identity of an employee who was making some very nasty comments. When the company found out the employee’s identity, it dropped the suit and fired him. (pp. 148-149)

There must be some limit on the practice of bringing suits merely to unmask bloggers. That said, whether Cohen falls into this category depends upon the facts, and the facts you point out definitely help support the argument she might not fall into this category.

Secondly, since when did calling someone names like “ho” or “skank” become defamation? Is there still some form of delineation between broad hyperbole like that and specific, factual accusations (“she performs sex acts for money” perhaps, or “she has herpes”)?