Your point about liability certainly explains some of the examples I’ve seen of almost surely unconstitutional, yet certainly expedient, policing of public expression.

I had always read Edwards, Cox, and Gregory as casting serious doubt on Feiner — although I suppose those cases might have been civil rights era-specific and, in any event, did not expressly overrule Feiner.

Police increasingly are willing to remove “annoying” speakers from the streets just to get rid of them and the noise, despite knowing that the speech likely is protected, the move-along order is wrong, and that any “charges” will not stick. But because of the structure of § 1983 liability, police can do this as a way to keep people quiet without incurring any meaningful penalty.

I have heard officers describe doing gun searches they knew would not hold up, just to “get the gun off the streets,” even if no charges are going to stick to the person. Some officers are now transferring this practice to “get the speech off the streets.”

The problem with Terminiello is the uncertain extent to which it is overridden by, or at least in tension with, Feiner v. New York, where the Court seemed to sanction arresting the annoying speaker to quiet the angered crowd–and, it would seem to follow, the angered or “harassed” police officer. Feiner at least gives officer a reason to think that move-along orders may be proper in some circumstances, even if charges will not stick.