As a layperson, I very much enjoyed the argument, indeed, found it persuasive (conceding the aformentioned cognitive liability).

Nothing urgent or profound to say, but after an admittedly quick reading…

When you refer to the ‘affective aspects of practical reasoning’ it sounds rather expressivist or emotivist (non-cognitive) with regard to morality. I trust this is not your intent, however (even if there is an important emotional component to moral reasoning and judgments), when speaking of our abilitiy to be moved by moral reasons. Why not simply–after Aristotle if memory serves me correctly, simply speak of the moral dimension of practical reasoning (in reference to norms, ends, goals, values, etc.)?

In reference to mental states, I wonder what is gained by describing them as ‘subjective.’ Does this imply the absence of an objective dimension?

And ‘same shared grammar’ (p. 118) might be, simply, ‘shared grammar.’

As a layperson, I very much enjoyed the argument, indeed, found it persuasive (conceding the aformentioned cognitive liability).

Nothing urgent or profound to say, but after an admittedly quick reading…

When you refer to the ‘affective aspects of practical reasoning’ it sounds rather expressivist or emotivist (non-cognitive) with regard to morality. I trust this is not your intent, however (even if there is an important emotional component to moral reasoning and judgments), when speaking of our abilitiy to be moved by moral reasons. Why not simply–after Aristotle if memory serves me correctly, simply speak of the moral dimension of practical reasoning (in reference to norms, ends, goals, values, etc.)?

In reference to mental states, I wonder what is gained by describing them as ‘subjective.’ Does this imply the absence of an objective dimension?

And ‘same shared grammar’ (p. 118) might be, simply, ‘shared grammar.’