That way we use electronic machines, but if there’s any question, then we’ve got a paper backup available.

Also slashdot has been on fire on the topic. A new post has the highlights http://backslash.slashdot.org/backslash/06/08/01/191235.shtml

An interesting point was made about the way Nevada regulates gaming machines. It seems that Nevada has a better system for securing and preventing tampering than our voting machines.

But another reader notes that sooner or later even with tamper proof machines you have to trust someone (software maker and so on). I think that point is true yet somehow I am less concerned about the programer and few narrow points of trust (who could affect the outcomes but I would think be easier to track) than any election official being able to play with the machine.

Think of it this way: say your computer has two hard drives in it. One has OS X and one has Windows XP. There’s a switch on the motherboard of your computer that says which drive to load from when you first turn on the computer. To change involves shutting down, opening up the box, flipping the switch, closing the box, and rebooting.

So in practice the exploit goes as follows: one valid set of voting instructions goes on one drive and one suitable for the malicious interloper is on the other. The valid one is booted, which the verifier checks. Now the interloper has to turn off the machine, flip the switch, and turn the machine back on, all without anyone not sympathetic to his methods seeing. Possible? Of course, but not nearly as surreptitious as the press release seems to indicate.