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	<title>Comments on: The ChoicePoint Settlement</title>
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	<link>http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/01/the_choicepoint_1.html</link>
	<description>The Law, the Universe, and Everything</description>
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		<title>By: Bruce</title>
		<link>http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/01/the_choicepoint_1.html/comment-page-1#comment-60582</link>
		<dc:creator>Bruce</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2006 23:17:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solove.org/archives/2006/01/the-choicepoint-settlement.html#comment-60582</guid>
		<description>I don&#039;t agree with the conclusion that an exception for breaches that do not produce &quot;a significant risk of identity theft&quot; means that no breaches will be reported.  That language is pretty mushy, and assuming more than minimal enforcement (which seems a safe assumption at the moment with the FTC), a subjective internal assessment of insignificant risk does not seem like a comfortable safe harbor for businesses attempting to avoid the PR and regulatory hit of having a complaint filed against them.  On the plus side, it means that consumers won&#039;t get flooded with notices every time a backup tape in a proprietary format gets logged in wrong at the warehouse.

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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I don&#8217;t agree with the conclusion that an exception for breaches that do not produce &#8220;a significant risk of identity theft&#8221; means that no breaches will be reported.  That language is pretty mushy, and assuming more than minimal enforcement (which seems a safe assumption at the moment with the FTC), a subjective internal assessment of insignificant risk does not seem like a comfortable safe harbor for businesses attempting to avoid the PR and regulatory hit of having a complaint filed against them.  On the plus side, it means that consumers won&#8217;t get flooded with notices every time a backup tape in a proprietary format gets logged in wrong at the warehouse.</p>
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		<title>By: Gary Moore</title>
		<link>http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/01/the_choicepoint_1.html/comment-page-1#comment-60581</link>
		<dc:creator>Gary Moore</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 30 Jan 2006 15:26:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.solove.org/archives/2006/01/the-choicepoint-settlement.html#comment-60581</guid>
		<description>Daniel,

Great article.  And you are exactly correct in stating the following about the proposed bill

&quot;With most of the security breaches that were announced in 2005, the companies insisted that the risk of identity theft was minimal to non-existent. So it would seem that with this provision, hardly any companies would make the disclosure. If a company decides that it must disclose, then it is also conceding that there is a &quot;significant risk&quot; of identity theft from its breach. Few companies will want to make such a concession, as it will create a public relations nightmare&quot;

I have evidence to back that up.  Back in 2002, Information Week had a survey of over 3400 companies.  In that survey, almost 50% of the companies surveyed do not report an security incident with anyone.  This includes partners, customers, legal counsel, the CERT advisory group and government authorities.  In fact barely 20% of these companies contact legal counsel and less than 20% have contacted the government.

If that proposed bill passes, it will preempt stronger state lawas and companies will be less inclined to report security breaches.

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		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Daniel,</p>
<p>Great article.  And you are exactly correct in stating the following about the proposed bill</p>
<p>&#8220;With most of the security breaches that were announced in 2005, the companies insisted that the risk of identity theft was minimal to non-existent. So it would seem that with this provision, hardly any companies would make the disclosure. If a company decides that it must disclose, then it is also conceding that there is a &#8220;significant risk&#8221; of identity theft from its breach. Few companies will want to make such a concession, as it will create a public relations nightmare&#8221;</p>
<p>I have evidence to back that up.  Back in 2002, Information Week had a survey of over 3400 companies.  In that survey, almost 50% of the companies surveyed do not report an security incident with anyone.  This includes partners, customers, legal counsel, the CERT advisory group and government authorities.  In fact barely 20% of these companies contact legal counsel and less than 20% have contacted the government.</p>
<p>If that proposed bill passes, it will preempt stronger state lawas and companies will be less inclined to report security breaches.</p>
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